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CHRISTIAN EXAMINER

AND

GENERAL REVIEW.

VOL. XXI.

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THE

CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

No. LXXVI.

THIRD SERIES—No. VII.

SEPTEMBER, 1836.

Art. 1.—*The Character and Institutions of Moses, considered with particular Reference to their Bearing on the Science of Government and Civil Liberty.*

When we see it stated, that some of the early colonists of New England determined to govern themselves for a time by the Hebrew laws, many are strongly tempted to smile at their simplicity. But the colonists knew what they were doing. They were right, in supposing that the Hebrew institutions were intended for a state of affairs very similar to their own. Some parts of the ancient code, some of its local provisions, would not answer for modern times; but with some abatement, principally, however, of laws which could not possibly be brought into use and action, the Hebrew constitution was as well suited, as any that could be devised, for the infant colonies of our country. Those who ridicule the measure, are probably not aware, that the Hebrews lived under a government of laws and not of men. It was the *spirit of freedom* which ran through those institutions, that recommended them to the strong hearts of our fathers. *They* saw, what many others who read the Bible never saw, that it was the constitution of a free people.

A government of laws and not of men! How much the institutions of the United States have been admired because these words describe them! The friends of freedom, in all the civilized world, are looking upon us with deep and anxious interest, because they believe that our government is the only one on the face of the earth, to which those words will apply. It is thought, that such a government has been wrought out by the experience and wisdom of ages. The world, after ten thousand trials, has come to certain conclusions; and these results, practically applied to our social system, have given it the excellence which it is allowed to possess. And so hard is it to reconcile liberty with order, to allow the utmost freedom to the individual and at the same time to secure the greatest peace and welfare of the whole, that no thoughtful man wonders, that so many ages passed, before the world discovered how a people could be self-governed and yet governed,—how men could be kept in order, and still be free.

If such is the slow process by which the world arrives at such results as this, what shall we say of the Hebrew constitution, which gave, to those who lived under it, as much freedom as ours? Was it not a brilliant discovery, in an age of barbarism, which thus anticipated the best wisdom of modern times? Is it not a most surprising thing, that the Hebrew lawgivers should thus have solved the problem, of reconciling liberty with order, which the gifted minds of succeeding ages have till lately attempted in vain? Those who doubt the divine legation of Moses, will find an argument here, to which it is not easy to reply.

Perhaps, however, many are not aware of the true character of the Hebrew constitution. The hard name of Theocracy has disguised it. This name is given to it, because it recognised God as their national king. And yet this, if understood, is the exact description of a *republic.* A republic is a government, which has God, and God alone, for its king. By the Hebrew constitution, every individual was held directly responsible to God, and to God alone, for the use of his political privileges and powers; so it is in *our* republic. The Hebrews, as a people, acknowledged no human power above them; the same is true of us. The Hebrew constitution allowed no one to injure or oppress another; as respected their civil rights, all were equal, and all free. The Hebrew constitution allowed no privileged orders. The case of the priesthood may seem an exception to this remark; but it was not so in reality, for they were *not* a privileged order; they were rather a disfranchised body. They had no means of gaining wealth, influence, or power. As to wealth, they were restricted to a fixed income, and constant and laborious duties. As to influence, they had no means of gaining it, since they had no personal intercourse with the people. Their services were not required or permitted at marriages or funerals; they dwelt apart in their own cities, associating only with each other, and were thus deprived of all temptation to gain power which could never be used. Since it was necessary to have a national religion, a priesthood could not be dispensed with; but it was guarded with provisions, which, so long as they were observed, made it perfectly impossible for it ever to endanger the liberties of the country.

As an evidence of the general inattention to the true character and provisions of the Hebrew law, one or two particulars may be mentioned; and, if there is a prevailing mistake as to details, it can hardly be expected that general views of the character and spirit of the law should be sound and just. We remember to have been informed by a clergyman, that he was dismissed from his charge for refusing to marry a man to the sister of his deceased wife. On our asking why he refused, he said that such connexions were forbidden by the Hebrew law. Probably he had not read the law, but had acted upon his impressions. Had he read it, he would have seen that Moses prohibited marrying a wife's sister only when the wife was living, and gave as a reason the rivalship which it would occasion between the two. Many, to this day, believe that the marriage of first-cousins was also forbidden; forbidden by the Canon law it was, but the law of Moses contains no such prohibition. It would be easy to produce many other examples to show, how little some of those who profess to pay most respect to the Hebrew law, are acquainted with its provisions; and, this being the case, we could hardly expect to find them taking just views of the spirit and tendency of its institutions.

Before remarking upon those institutions, we will give some account of their illustrious founder, and the remarkable manner in which divine Providence prepared him for his difficult and important duty.

From his childhood he was designated to the high trust which he afterwards fulfilled; and with his infancy commenced his education for the part he was to sustain. The Hebrews, when God determined to separate them as a peculiar people to keep alive the knowledge of himself in the midst of an idolatrous world, were thrown by a succession of events, all bearing upon this purpose, into the very heart of Egypt, the very place to which they would have gone to learn the arts, sciences, and general improvement, in the highest perfection in which they then existed. Egypt was the fountain of intellectual light to the ancient world. The intellectual men of Greece, her philosophers and historians, always travelled to Egypt in search of instruction ; in truth, it was their boast that they sprang from Egypt, Danaus, the founder of Greece, being, tradition says, the brother of Egyptus, the Egyptian king. Possibly it was by birthright that Greece inherited that beautiful and perfect taste, which made her the glory of ancient times. That Egypt was able to give improvement in the arts, is attested by her architectural monuments, which still bid defiance to the waste of time and the elements, and even to man, the most barbarous of all destroyers. After the land has been ravaged by Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans, and in modern times by Saladin and Napoleon, her temples are upright and firm as in the day when Cambyses halted his brazen chariot to gaze on their majestic walls. It was to this land that Providence conducted the descendants of the patriarchs, that they might learn the arts and employments which they would require, when they were changed from wandering shepherds into a fixed and industrious people. The circumstance that they were in bondage there, was favorable to this kind of improvement; and how independent of other nations this discipline made them, appears from the description of the tabernacle or pavilion which they constructed in the wilderness ; — a work of splendor and skill that could not be exceeded in that day.

But while the Hebrew people, any or all, could learn the arts and employments of Egypt, her learning and intellectual improvement were less accessible. They were all in the hands of the priests, who confined them jealously to their own order, and never suffered any one who was not of their *caste* to receive the least portion of instruction. And their attainments were such as to give them a commanding title to respect. They were the surgeons and physicians of the day; they were also the astronomers, and traced, with surprising accuracy, the movements of the heavens ; they were also geometricians by profession, and surveyed the land every year, after the inundation of the Nile had swept all the landmarks and boundaries away ; in short, they knew all that was then to be known, and not the least of their accomplishments was the art of alphabetical writing, which was then new to the world. These were all attainments which it was important for the founder of a state to possess; and it is interesting to observe the order of Providence by which he is made master of them all. The Egyptian Pharaoh,—the common name of her kings,—had issued an order, like that of Herod, to destroy the Hebrew children, in order to reduce the numbers of a people who were growing powerful and impatient of bondage. When Moses was born, his parents, in order to save him from destruction, hid him in the rushes on the banks of the Nile. There he was found by the daughter of the king, who, struck with the child's beauty, saved his life, and had him brought up in the palace as her own adopted son. Now, by the law of Egypt, all of royal race, whether by blood or adoption, belonged to the caste of the priests. The young princes were instructed in every thing which the most accomplished priests could teach them; and thus Moses, who otherwise would have had as little intellectual cultivation as the rest of his people, had the opportunity of acquiring all the learning of the Egyptians, which was then all the learning of the world. While he was so fortunately situated for this purpose, he was not cut off from intercourse with his own race. By a harmless stratagem, his mother is employed as his nurse; and thus, perhaps, the earliest words he heard, were the story of the wrongs and sorrows of his people.

Unbelievers have objected to the Old Testament history, on the ground that Moses could not have *written* the law in so early an age. But the researches of Champollion have supplied an answer to this objection. That ingenious and fortunate discoverer, so early lost to the world, found manuscripts in Egyptian catacombs of an earlier date than that of Moses, and thus set the question at rest; since it is certain, that, if the art of writing was then known, Moses would have learned it among the other accomplishments of the priesthood. Champollion also ascertained that the temples and columns, which now astonish the traveller by the beauty of their finish and the grandeur of their proportions, were constructed while the Israelites were slaves in Egypt. They, probably, as Josephus tells us, aided in their construction. Moses was so situated as to know how great was the oppression which they endured, and the result shows what feelings it inspired in his generous heart.

This naturally leads to some examination of his character, which was even more important than his attainments for the duty he was to perform. And the very circumstance just mentioned, that he dwelt in a palace, in the sunshine of royal favor, surrounded by the comforts and luxuries of life, and that *there* his heart was all engaged with the sufferings of his people, is a sufficient proof of moral greatness. For to be governed by a generous sentiment,—to have a generous sentiment act upon the heart with such power as to make a man indifferent to personal comfort and indulgence,—to have that sentiment of patriotism and philanthropy, which in most men's hearts is cold as a winter moon-beam, kindling up into a flame that animates all within,—this, if any thing, is moral greatness. No one whose heart is right, can help admiring this inmate of a palace, whose whole soul is bent on the restoration of his people, and who, so far from being tempted to become a renegade, deliberately rejected all prospects of wealth and rank, choosing, as was said of him by an Apostle whose heart beat with similar emotions, to renounce the pleasures of sin and to suffer affliction with the people of God.

There are many, whose generosity is equal to a single great act of self-devotion,—who could make gigantic sacrifices while under the immediate impulse of strong feeling, but the feeling will not last; when it meets with ingratitude, it dies away, and leaves the heart colder than ever. It was not so with him. Though he met with no grateful return, though he heard not one word of thankfulness to a million of complaint and upbraiding, his spirit of self-sacrifice endured to the last; and those, who know any thing of the heart, will confess, that the crown of the living is more honorable than that of the dying martyr; it is easier to die, than to live as he did, for men. His post was not one that common ambition would have desired. It brought no superiority of comfort or luxury; it was a laborious, thankless, and self-denying station; it brought no other reward than the approbation of his conscience and his God.

The only stain upon his character was his haste of temper, which sometimes caused him to offend; but human infirmity will always be associated with human greatness. All who have ever accomplished great things in this world, have had a vast deal of slumbering fire within; witness our Washington, whose natural temper was harder to govern than his army. It would seem as if, without this warmth, they could not sustain themselves through all their labors and trials. When the Israelites at Meribah called on him to supply them with water, forgetting the divine promise, he reproved them for asking an impossibility,—that he should supply them with water among those burning rocks and sands. It was of the utmost importance that he should manifest a perfect confidence in the Almighty, and, standing as he did in the highest station, his example of unbelief might have proved fatal; the crime under the circumstances was such, that it deprived him of the glory of entering the promised land. But, instead of repining or imploring to be spared, he prayed that God would raise up another in his stead, who would be equally devoted to his people.

Indeed, it was this very devotion to the welfare of his people, which sometimes caused his offending. When he had dashed in pieces the tables of stone, in his wrath at witnessing their relapse into Egyptian idolatry, the moment God threatens the people, his whole feeling changes, and he says, passionately and without reverence, "If thou wilt, forgive their sin; and if not, blot me out of the book which thou hast written." There is nothing in the Scripture more calmly majestic than the divine reply, "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book." It should be remembered that there was never the least taint of selfishness in his passion; from the time when he slew the Egyptian, in his anger at seeing a countryman basely oppressed, there were several such instances of impatience; but it was always for others, not for himself, that he encountered the divine displeasure.

In the great work which Moses was to do, moral energy was at least as important as intellectual power; but in this gift also he abounded. His historical writings have always been admired for their simplicity; much is said in few words; and a perfect idea is given of all the ground which philosophical history ought to cover, including not only the course of events, but of society, manners, government, and religion, which prevailed in the early ages. His poetical talent, which in its perfection is one of the noblest gifts of God, is one of the best proofs of his mental superiority. Read the noble lyric ode in which he celebrates the passage of the Red Sea; or the one, more powerful yet, in which he blest the people and bade them a last farewell. Among the Psalms, the plaintive elegy, beginning "Lord! thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations," is ascribed to him; and no one of the whole number exceeds it in mournful and affecting beauty.

And yet, after all, the work which he accomplished was the greatest in which intellect can possibly be exerted. He had determined to redeem his people from the most powerful of all nations. The Hebrews were slaves, feeble, unwarlike, and spirit-broken by their bondage; he was to brace them up to bold and decisive action, to force their way through the desert and seize the land of promise, and, what was still more, to subdue their ungovernable spirits to the peace and order required by the law. He had the mental gifts which eloquence requires, because he was a poet, and dealt in the living images and passionate sentiment, which fire the hearts of thousands at once; but an imperfection in his speech deprived him of this means of influence; in addressing the people, he was obliged to employ the peaceful oratory of his brother. He pretended to no military skill, the talent most dazzling in the eyes of an uncultivated people; but he had a clear and powerful understanding to plan, and a mighty heart to bear him through, the enterprise, which was perhaps the most difficult ever undertaken by man. And it was planned and executed by him, not when the fire of youth was burning within him, but when eighty years had passed over and whitened his head.

But, without saying more at present of the difficulty of that enterprise, we will take a survey of the principles of that Constitution by which he hoped to secure the happiness of his people.

It was the opinion of Mr. Jefferson,—we believe it is a general opinion,—that the pursuit of agriculture is the best foundation for the safety and happiness of a free people. Such was the judgment of the Hebrew statesman. Such was the employment by which he designed to support the great body of the people. He knew that commerce would only tend to make the nation a temptation and a prey to invaders, while it would destroy the spirit which would enable the Hebrews to resist them. Therefore it was, that he took so much pains to impress upon his people, that their country was most favorable to these pursuits, and that these pursuits were most favorable to the prosperity and happiness of the country. It was a land of rivers and fountains,—a land of valleys and hills,—a land which drank liberally of the rain of heaven, and the blessing of God was upon it from the beginning to the end of the year. As for commerce, they could have all its benefits without engaging in it themselves. The great Phenician cities, Tyre and Sidon, were on their borders, and ready to supply them with all they wanted in return for their agricultural productions; the rich caravans of the desert continually swept along their borders, so that, if they chose, they could enjoy the benefit of the enterprise of other nations without expense to themselves. He endeavoured then to make them content under their vines and fig-trees, and to convince them, that, in these unambitious cares, they might not find wealth nor fame indeed, but they would find the best happiness which this world could bestow.

We would ask now if he was not right in his judgment both as to private happiness and public security? Is it not the impression of the most enlightened statesmen of the present day, not that commerce should be discouraged indeed, but that agriculture is the best pursuit for the great body of a free people? The circumstances of the world are altered now; our country is more favorably situated than his, because our rampart is the sea, while his was exposed on every side; and yet it is admitted that this maxim of political wisdom will apply to every free nation at the present day. It is true that his hopes were disappointed; this unaspiring pursuit was too quiet for the taste of his countrymen, when war was the business of all the rest of the world. But the event proved the truth of his principles and predictions. We find that some of the tribes were constantly engaged in commercial pursuits. Solomon laid Ophir and Tarshish,—the East and West Indies of the day,—indeed he laid all the known world, under contribution; he had his harbours in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; he built Tadmor in the desert,—now a marble waste,—as a station for his caravans. Wealth flowed in through a thousand channels, and, as the prophetic eye of Moses foresaw, it proved the ruin of the country; it became a golden weight which ground its free institutions to the dust.

The second great principle of the Hebrew constitution was the discouragement, and the exclusion as far as possible of a military taste among the people; we mean a taste for conquest, and all the passions which it implies and inspires.

Here, too, there is something wonderful in his discernment of the true elements of prosperity in a commonwealth. He lived in an age when war was the business and delight of man; when hardly any thing was respected in nations, or in men, in comparison with military fame; when public virtue and civil wisdom dwindled into nothing before the splendid sins of war. In such an age he saw the hollowness of such glory; he saw, and the verdict of our republic has confirmed his wisdom, that the greatness of a nation consisted not in its memorable victories, or its extended bounds, but in the amount of individual prosperity and happiness spread through the dwellings and hearts of the land.

His object was to make all citizens soldiers sufficiently trained for all purposes of defensive war, and he anticipated no other. This militia system was more efficient in his age than it is in ours, for then every man had more or less of the hardy qualifications of the soldier. These were to be drawn out by an impartial system of conscription, and thus a force could be gathered at once upon any point exposed to invasion. His principle in these respects was the same with ours. But all his calculations were defeated, as the best designs are often defeated, by those whom they were meant to serve. He conducted the Israelites in a direct path to the promised land, intending to take peaceable possession, if possible, of the land of their fathers. But the spirit of the nation had sunk so low during their long period of bondage, that they dared not enter the land; and, had they entered it, would not have had vigor and virtue enough to be free. He was compelled to withdraw them in disappointment and sorrow; and to wait till a generation had been formed by the hardships of the wilderness, energetic enough to enter and take possession of the land. But the very process by which they were prepared for this service, unfitted them in about the same proportion for the arts of peace, which were essential to their prosperity in the land when they had once possessed it.

Much fault has been found with the treatment of the Canaanites under his directions, and with the severity of his war laws. They were not his; they were the customs of the age, to which every statesman must of necessity conform. Suppose that a Christian statesman feels obliged, under all the circumstances, to consent to a declaration of war. What shall he do? Shall he order the troops to strike soft in battle, and be careful not to hurt any body with their arms? The idea of conducting such operations in a mild and pleasant manner,— such as shall be agreeable to all parties, — is absurd. The least reflection on the subject shows, that, whatever a statesman's private feelings may be, his military operations must be carried on after the fashion of the day. He did not consider the vagrant tribes, who happened to be upon the soil, as established tenants of the country. It does not appear that he ever meant to dislodge them; for it is certain that many Canaanites remained and were protected long after the Hebrews took possession. Whenever he had occasion, in his wanderings, to pass through a settled country, he asked permission; if it was not granted, he took some other way, except in cases of great insult and outrage, and then for the sake of example he avenged his wrongs. These things were forced upon him; any one can see, that they were against his policy, against his maxims of civil wisdom. He saw, that when a taste for conquest gained possession of a republic, that moment it was undone; it had no longer any claim to existence. If the merchant vessel becomes a pirate, she cannot founder or become a wreck too soon. He foresaw all that actually happened in succeeding times. David, a gallant and successful warrior, extended his dominions from the Euphrates to the Red Sea, and bound all the subject nations into as firm and vigorous an empire as the world ever saw. But it could only be ruled by a hand as vigorous as his own; and its fate was like that of the Roman Empire. The oppressed barbarians rose at last, and not only reclaimed their own, but bore down and overwhelmed their masters. Moreover, while it existed, the property of individuals was sacrificed to the glory of the whole; the empire was great, but no member of it was happy. It was an unnatural state; and, by a common retribution, no one suffered more than he whose ambition overthrew the institutions of that wise statesman, who thought that an hour of freedom was worth an eternity of fame.

Another maxim of his policy was that of giving every citizen a right and interest in the soil. Nobles and landlords there were none; every other country had its privileged orders; but in order to give to his commonwealth as proper a character as was possible, he made every man a landholder. When the soil of Canaan was first appropriated, it was parcelled out among the families of every tribe; genealogies and registers were kept with the most sacred regard. When a man died, his property was divided among his sons; not all given to the eldest, though respect for the patriarchal feelings of the day compelled him to give the eldest son, the presumptive head of the family, two parts, where each of the others had one. This arrangement secured to every man an interest in the soil, by assigning him either a field, a vineyard, an olive-yard, or a garden. Thus local attachment, the feeling on which patriotism so much depends, was formed among the Jews. It was a great undertaking thus to change the whole social system,—to make those who had been wandering shepherds, going wherever they pleased, content with institutions that restricted them, each to a narrow enclosure; but he knew it could be done, and it was done. These wanderers became afterwards renowned for the deep devotion of their attachment to their own land; witness their lament under the weeping willows of Babylon. Their feeling is expressed in all its strength and beauty by one of their prophets, speaking of their exile: "Weep not for the dead. Oh no, weep not for him; but weep sore for him that goeth away; for he shall never return; he shall never again behold his native country."

In order still further to secure this equality in the condition of the people, Moses provided, that, every fiftieth year, all the lands which had been sold should revert to the original owner or his heirs. This was in fact rendering lands inalienable; since the lands reverted on the year of Jubilee, it was evident that all which the owner could really part with was the produce of the soil for a term of years, longer or shorter according to the time when the next Jubilee was to come. The effect of this arrangement was to render it impossible for any man to be miserably poor; he or his heirs always retained their claim to the land of their fathers. They could raise money upon it if they were in want; but they could neither part with nor lose their right, since the registry, kept by the scribes, would always show to whom the land belonged. It rendered it impossible, also, for any man to become a great proprietor, and thus to gain the influence which a feudal lord possesses over his tenants at will. In that day, when the great were so apt to be usurpers, and the small to be slavish in their feeling, the power of great proprietors of land would have endangered the public liberties, in a thousand times greater proportion than would be possible now.

The objection which would suggest itself to this arrangement is, that the land would soon be so much subdivided as to render the hereditary estate too small to support its proprietor. But this statesman, when he determined that every rood of ground should support its man, was not embarrassed by any popular system of political economy. Moses evidently believed, that, with a favorable social system, the soil would support all who came upon it: — not by its own products perhaps; — nor was this necessary, since commerce with foreigners was not prohibited within the bounds of Palestine. He evidently calculated also, that the means of subsistence would grow with the population, since enterprise, art, and industry would be developed so as to increase the resources of the country full as fast as they were wanted. So it always will be in every well-governed state, — every state that gives man a fair field, secures him the profits of his labor, and then leaves the race to the swift and the battle to the strong. The little province of Palestine supported its millions, and it seldom became necessary to apply the remedy of famine to keep down their numbers.

Such were some of the maxims upon which his institutions were founded. We will now look at the frame-work of his government; and it will be enough to show its free character, to point out its general resemblance to our own.

In the first place, it was a union of separate tribes, differing in many respects of position, habits, manners, and feelings; each with its own government to conduct its internal concerns, the municipal arrangements of every tribe being left entirely in its own hands. He did not attempt to bind together these separate states by a confederacy; such a government, even if it would have held them together, would not have been vigorous and decided enough in its action. He therefore drew up a Constitution, which applied not to each tribe as a body, but to the individuals in the tribe. He made it bear on every individual in every tribe; thus giving each one a personal interest in the national concerns, making him as much a member of the nation as he was of his own tribe. There was a strong feeling of ambition, and sometimes of rivalship, in each separate tribe. Judah, the ancient dominion, found the superiority which it assumed, more than once warmly contested;

but, while each Hebrew was strongly concerned to maintain the honor of his tribe, the Constitution of the general government gave him an almost equal interest in the honor of his country.

Situated as the Hebrews were, with marauding tribes upon their borders, it was not possible in all cases to wait for all to unite in a declaration of war. Wherever invasion came, it must be resisted; and thus it happened that sometimes one or two tribes would carry on a war, in which the nation had no concern. But this concession to the separate tribes did not extend so far as to allow them to conduct their own foreign relations. All were bound to unite against the common enemy; and so strong was the national feeling, that, instead of complaining that they were summoned to fight the battles of the nation, the tribes rather felt aggrieved and insulted when they were not called upon to aid the common cause. Indeed this was a neglect by which their harmony was more than once endangered, since, in the hurry of military preparations, the forms of public intercourse were sometimes disregarded.

This political organization was not without its disturbing forces. The tribes occasionally magnified their reserved rights, and betrayed a strong disposition to nullify the laws of the land. But it was understood, that in such cases the tribe did it at its peril, and the history of an act of nullification on the part of Benjamin showed, that there needed no force-bill there to sustain the authority of the national law. That tribe was prophetically described as a ravening wolf,—a figure very descriptive of its warlike and savage fierceness. A Levite, in travelling peaceably through, had one member of his family abused in such a manner as to cause her death. He made his appeal for retribution to all the other tribes. They assembled at once in convention at Mizpeh, heard the appeal to their justice, and sent a summons to the tribe of Benjamin to deliver up the delinquents according to the law. That tribe refused, and determined rather to dissolve the union, than to submit to the dictation of the majority. The rest of the tribes declared them in a state of rebellion, and proceeded against them accordingly. So stubborn and unbending was the spirit of the nullifying tribe, that the national army was twice defeated; but, in the third battle, Benjamin was routed with the loss of twenty-five thousand men. And there was no danger of the offence being repeated; for the offending city was levelled with the ground, the country was made a wilderness, and six hundred men, posted on the inaccessible rock of Rimmon, were all that remained of the contumacious tribe.

With respect to the various departments of the national government, they were arranged in such a manner as to secure the liberty and prosperity of the people, their republican character depending upon their spirit, rather than on any given forms. There was no need of legislative action; since a code had been prepared, suited to all public and private relations then existing, and all which would be likely ever to arise. The social and domestic part of this law is, as has been suggested, extremely well suited to infant agricultural colonies, like those of our fathers, so far as they could apply. There were cases in which directions were given respecting divorce, vengeance for blood, and some other things, which would not answer for modern times; but it will be observed, that these practices are not enjoined by his law. They were practices then existing and common, which he introduced into his law only to limit and discourage them, with a view to their final abolition. So there were local regulations with respect to clothing and provisions, so clearly limited to their climate and people, that no other would think of adopting that portion of the law. Neither would the sanguinary penalties of his law answer for modern and more gentle times; death was his common punishment, because in all Israel there was but one prison, and that was—the grave.

But while there was no need of a Congress for the purpose of making laws, conventions were often required and often assembled for other public purposes; and these were attended by the *notables*, or renowned men of the congregation,—more properly those who were used to attend. It does not appear that delegates were elected by the people; but there were those who by prescription represented the people, and to whom, without any formal act, they looked in all matters of public concern. They were more like an assembly of 'notables,' than like the members of our public bodies; but the people evidently considered them as representing their interests, and their acts in turn were binding upon the people.

The judicial department was organized in such a manner as to insure the administration of justice without delay. The Hebrew statesman considered this trust so important, that he intended to retain it in his own hands. But he soon found, that no human strength was equal to the labor; he therefore appointed others, and, at last, there were judges in almost every city. Not, however, those who bear that name in the Old Testament. Most of the Judges, as they are unappropriately called, were persons of no civil authority; some were mere partisan officers; there was but one, Samuel, who in any respect resembled a President of our Union.

With respect to the Executive department, it was the object of the founder of Israel to do, if possible, without one. Knowing how difficult it was to control power once intrusted to the hands of an individual, he wished to have executive purposes answered without setting apart a single person for that tempting distinction, trusting that, on emergencies, men would appear, who could discharge the duty required by the occasion, without any other commission than their own qualifications, acknowledged by the public voice. Such were the persons recorded in the book of Judges,—persons wholly without authority, starting up whenever and wherever they were needed, doing whatever was necessary, and then sinking back into the great body of the people, whence they sprang.

But he foresaw that this arrangement would not always be satisfactory to the Hebrews; indeed, that it might not always be adequate to public purposes; and that his people, too unenlightened to relish republican simplicity, would be misled by the example of surrounding nations, and would at last demand a king. He therefore made provision for this exigency in case it should arise, and, after solemn warnings of the danger of despotism, proceeded to enact, that, if they insisted upon having a king, he should be a king only in name, and nothing more than a popular magistrate in power. No king was ever to ascend the throne against the will of the people. When Saul, by acclamation, was called to this high station, Samuel prepared a writing, and deposited it in the sanctuary, where reference might afterwards be made to it, in case of royal usurpation. And when Saul was set aside, in consequence of mental derangement, David did not ascend the throne till he was called to it by the popular voice. For some time, he was acknowledged only as king of Judah, nor did he think of extending his authority over the other tribes, till their consent had been formally given; and even after the revolt of Absalom was suppressed, a new election on the part of the nation was thought necessary, before David could re-ascend the throne. The king was restricted as to the public treasures. He was forbidden to keep a force of cavalry, since they were not wanted for defence, and would only be employed in foreign invasions. The words and spirit of the law enjoined upon the king to consider himself as one of the people, — never to suffer his heart to be lifted up above his brethren; thus the office was made as consistent as possible with republicanism and popular rights; and by a wise foresight, which conceded to the people what he knew they would require, he guarded at once against the dangers of despotism, and saved his institutions from being overthrown.

If this concession seem inconsistent with republicanism on the part of the Hebrew statesman, it must be remembered that it was equally inconsistent with his own views of what was best for the people. It was forced upon him, as some other things were, by a tendency of popular feeling, which there was no resisting. The spirit of his law was wholly against it; all who afterwards maintained the spirit of his law, were equally strong against it. This was the case with Samuel, — that perfect example of a popular magistrate, — who remonstrated solemnly and eloquently with the people against their rash determination to have a king. He might have secured the throne for himself and his children; but this he disdained to do. He told the people that they were fastening upon themselves an Oriental despotism; that their kings would rule them with a rod of iron, and they would repent when it was too late. The scene, where he resigns his own authority to the convention of the people, and calls on each man who had been injured by his public acts, to step forward and accuse him, is one of the finest scenes in history. They all reply, with one voice, "Thou hast injured, oppressed, and defrauded none."

The truth was, that all who followed the maxims of the founder of the state, set their faces against usurpation, and maintained the rights of the people at all hazards, and in the most disastrous times. When Saul, his head turned by success, undertook to unite the sacerdotal with the royal power, a step unconstitutional in itself, and dangerous to freedom, the republican spirit of the nation took the alarm at once. From that moment, Samuel and other friends of liberty felt, that he was not the man to govern a free people. We have seen how cautiously David, who was a better politician, proceeded, never attempting to claim the royal authority till it was freely conceded by the people, who were also induced by his forbearance to give him the right of naming his own successor. The reign of Solomon was full of public discontent, occasioned by taxation, and his life was made wretched by the curses both loud and deep which followed him to the grave. When his son came forward in his stead, only Judah and Benjamin acknowledged him. The rest of the tribes offered to do it on conditions which were not accepted. They then, not rebelliously, but in the exercise of an undoubted right, rejected him, chose their own sovereign, and established a separate kingdom. All this was the action of the republican spirit, and that spirit was inspired, cherished, and sanctioned by the constitution. Who, then, can doubt whether it was a constitution intended for the free?

If any doubt remained upon the subject, it would be removed by an express provision in the constitution itself, that it was not to be considered in force till it had been submitted to the people, and formally accepted by them all. The place and manner, in which it should be accepted, were also pointed out. When they were come into the land of promise, they were to be assembled in an amphitheatre formed by two mountains,—Ebal, a bleak, frowning rock towering on one side, and Gerizim, springing up covered with verdure and beauty on the other. The one height was a prophetic monument of the prosperity and loveliness, which would follow the observance of those institutions: the other was expressive of the barrenness and desolation, which a disregard of their constitution would inevitably bring upon their country; which indeed it has brought, so that, even to this day, the traveller finds the land of promise, through all its borders, as dreary and sterile as the peak of that dismal rock. There the tribes were ranged in order to hear its provisions, and there they signified their acceptance, by an act of free choice, which was binding on themselves and their children. Every seven years it was publicly read over, and a new oath of allegiance was taken by the people.

Thus we see that the Hebrew law, in its substance and in its forms, was not only republican, but that it bore in its leading features a striking resemblance to our own. And again we ask, if it is not wonderful, that, in the midst of barbarism and darkness, surrounded by examples of slavery and oppression, hearing no sounds but those of violence, and seeing no soil that was not stained with blood, a legislator should have founded a government on principles of peace, humanity, and social order, carried out as far as in the freest government now existing in this world.

But it may be said, these institutions did not secure the prosperity of the Hebrew nation; on the contrary, their whole history is a record of degeneracy, and the suffering which followed it. But were his institutions to blame for this? He told them, that it would be so. He told them, that, the moment his constitution was violated, they would begin their downward march to ruin. So long as it was maintained, they prospered; when they disregarded his directions, they began to fall. Now, to make him responsible for this, is as unfair as the way in which some reproach the Christian religion. They say, "Look at the disputes, the passions, the corruption of Christians." What of it? Is it Christianity which makes them quarrel and sin? So far from it, Christianity positively forbids all those offences; and if they only regarded it, these things would be done away. There is not one principle, — one text or one letter of Christianity, which leads to these things; all, on the contrary, if regarded, tend to prevent these things; and yet there are those, who accuse Christianity as the cause and author of all that it forbids. And they are the persons who charge the Hebrew institutions as the cause of the degeneracy and ruin of the Jews.

But they did fall; and why? — Because the people were not good enough for their institutions. There was not among them that degree of intelligence and virtue, which was necessary in order to keep such institutions in successful operation. For these institutions do not exist independent of the people. The people, in every free country, are the state. If they are corrupt, the state is corrupt; and, when this is once found to be the case, the fate of the nation is sealed. It is gone, past all mercy and redemption, nor can any temporary expedients prevent its ultimate fall. In the dome of St. Peter's at Rome, which Michael Angelo boasted that he had suspended in the clouds, certain fissures have been discovered; to save this glory of architecture, they have bound it with a vast iron chain. Such is the way with republics. When they begin to fall, they are upheld for a season, as Rome was by Cæsar, by some strong hand, which binds them with a mighty chain; but, when the first small chasm begins to creep along the wall, it is a sign,—an unfailing sign, that their days are numbered.

Such has been the fate of other republics; who shall assure us that it will not be so with ours? It is not despotism,—it is not the iron chain, that we have reason to dread. No, it is rather the unsoundness in the fabric, which renders it necessary to use that chain,—without which no one would ever think of using it. Despotism is only the strong hand, which comes to hold together for a season decaying institutions, which are already tumbling to their fall. There are some who think they can trace such crevices in the walls of our republic;—there are some who think at times, that they hear hollow sounds in its foundations, as if the stones were beginning to burst asunder. There is hope,—there is reason to hope for better things; but, if it should be so, our fall will be owing to the same cause with that of the Hebrew republic,—that we are not worthy to be free. The glorious gift of freedom must be reserved in the treasuries of Heaven for some other race, more enlightened and virtuous, and therefore more blessed, than ours.

And now let me ask, What other legislator of ancient times is still exerting any influence upon the world? What philosopher, what statesman of ancient times, can boast a single disciple now? What other voice comes down to us, over the stormy waves of time? But this man is at this day,—at this hour,—exerting a mighty influence over millions; the whole Hebrew nation do homage to his illustrious name. Though the daily sacrifice has ceased, and the distinction of the tribes is lost,—though the temple has not left one stone upon another, and the altar-fires have been extinguished long ago,—still wherever a Jew is found,—and they are found wherever the foot of an adventurer travels,—he is a living monument of the power which the great Hebrew statesman still has over the minds and hearts of his countrymen.

And now let us take one glance at the death of this prophet,—the close of a life so laborious and honored. Up to his one hundred and twentieth year, his eye was not dim, nor had his strength abated. But now,—when he stands almost on the edge of the promised land, his last hour of mortal life is come. To conduct his people to that land had been his daily effort, and his nightly dream; and yet he is not permitted to enter it, though it would never have been the home of Israel, but for him. He ascends a mountain to die, and there the land of promise spreads out its romantic landscape at his feet. There is Gilead, with its deep valleys and forest-covered hills; there are the rich plains and pastures of Dan; there is Judah with its rocky heights, and Jericho with its palm-trees and rose-gardens; there is the Jordan, seen from Lebanon, downward winding over its yellow sands; the long blue line of the Mediterranean can be seen over the mountain battlements of the west. On this magnificent death-bed, the Statesman of Israel breathed his last. Lest the gratitude which so often follows the dead, though denied to the living, should pay him divine honors, they buried him in darkness and silence, and no man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day.

W. B. O. P.

Art. II.—*Report on the State of Education in Bengal.* Published by the Order of Government. Calcutta: 1835. 8vo. pp. 137.

The English government has been turning its attention for some time towards the establishment of a system of national education, to be applied, with the necessary modifications, at home and in the Colonies; and, as a preliminary step, it is taking the proper measures for ascertaining what is already done to supply this want, by the people themselves, or by benevolent societies or foundations. The Report before us, which is intended to give the information required respecting the existing state of education in Bengal, was drawn up by Mr. Adam, whose name is familiar to most of our readers as having been a Unitarian Missionary for some time at Calcutta. If, in his efforts in connexion with the Board of Education, he succeeds in determining the government to the adoption of some wise plan of general instruction and civilization in British India, he will do more, though indirectly, for the ultimate diffusion of pure Christianity in that country, than all the missionaries put together. We think, moreover, that he is right in the general principle, that the plan adopted by the government for the improvement of the morals and intellect of the native population, should be, as far as practicable, based upon and accommodated to the indigenous institutions for this purpose, closely interwoven as these are with the habits of the people, and the customs of the country, and all other peculiarities of climate and physical and mental constitution, and, we may add, by no means so few or contemptible in themselves, as we had supposed.

Mr. Adam divides the existing educational institutions of India into four classes. 1. *Indigenous Elementary Schools*, or schools in which the elements of knowledge are taught, and which owe their existence to, and are supported by the natives themselves, in contradistinction to those that are supported by religious or philanthropic societies. 2. *Elementary Schools, not Indigenous*, or schools for elementary instruction, attended by the native children, but supported by, and entirely under the control of foreign residents or benevolent associations. 3. *Indigenous Schools of Learning*, or colleges in which the higher branches of an Oriental education are provided for at the expense and under the sole direction of natives. 4. *English Colleges and Schools*, including all those institutions, both of a higher and lower grade, one of whose principal objects is to teach the English language, and through that medium European science and literature.

We have been most interested in the accounts given in the Report of the Indigenous Elementary Schools, from which it appears, as Mr. Adam says, that the system of village schools has long been extensively prevalent in Bengal, and that the design to give education to their male children must be deeply seated in the minds of parents, even of the humblest classes.

> "A distinguished member of the General Committee of Public Instruction in a minute on the subject expressed the opinion, that if one rupee *per mensem* were expended on each existing village school in the Lower Provinces, the amount would probably fall little short of 12 lakhs of rupees per annum. This supposes that there are 100,000 such schools in Bengal and Behar; and, assuming the population of those two provinces to be 40,000,000, there would be a village school for every 400 persons. There are no *data* in this country known to me by which to determine, out of this number, the proportion of school-going children, or of children capable of going to school, or of children of the age at which, according to the custom of the country, it is usual to go to school. In Prussia it has been ascertained by actual census, that, in a population of 12,256,725, there were 4,487,461 children under fourteen years of age, which gives 366 children for every 1,000 inhabitants,

or about eleven-thirtieths of the nation. Of this entire population of children it is calculated that three-sevenths are of an age to go to school, admitting education in the schools to begin at the age of seven years complete, and there is thus in the entire Prussian monarchy the number of 1,823,200 children capable of receiving the benefits of education. These proportions will not strictly apply to the juvenile population of this country, because the usual age for going to school is from five to six, and the usual age for leaving school is from ten to twelve instead of fourteen. There are thus two sources of discrepancy. The school-going age is shorter in India than in Prussia, which must have the effect of diminishing the total number of school-going children; while, on the other hand, that diminished number is not exposed to the causes of mortality to which the total school-going population of Prussia is liable from the age of twelve to fourteen. In want of more precise *data*, let us suppose that these two contrary discrepancies balance each other, and we shall then be at liberty to apply the Prussian proportions to this country. Taking therefore eleven-thirtieths of the abovementioned 400 persons, and three-sevenths of the result, it will follow that in Bengal and Behar there is on an average a village school for every sixty-three children of the school-going age. These children, however, include girls as well as boys; and, as there are no indigenous girls' schools, if we take the male and female children to be in equal or nearly equal proportions, there will appear to be an indigenous elementary school for every thirty-one or thirty-two boys." — pp. 8, 9.

But lest our readers should form too high an opinion of the state of elementary education in these countries, it will be proper to make them acquainted with the quantity and quality of instruction given in these seminaries.

"The education of the Bengalee children, as has been just stated, generally commences when they are five or six years old and terminates in five years, before the mind can be fully awakened to a sense of the advantages of knowledge or the reason sufficiently matured to acquire it. The teachers depend entirely upon their scholars for subsistence, and, being little respected and poorly rewarded, there is no encouragement for persons of character, talent, or learning to engage in the occupation. These schools are generally held in the houses of some of the most respectable native inhabitants or very near them. All the children of the family are educated in the vernacular language of the country; and in order to increase the emoluments of the teachers, they are allowed to introduce, as pupils, as many respectable children as they can procure in the neighbourhood. The scholars begin with tracing the vowels and consonants with the finger on a sand-board and afterwards on the floor with a pencil of steatite or white crayon; and this exercise is continued for eight or ten days. They are next instructed to write on the palm-leaf with a reed-pen held in the fist, not with the fingers, and with ink made of charcoal which rubs out, joining vowels to the consonants, forming compound letters, syllables, and words, and learning tables of numeration, money, weight, and measure, and the correct mode of writing the distinctive names of persons, castes, and places. This is continued about a year. The iron style is now used only by the teacher in sketching on the palm-leaf the letters which the scholars are required to trace with ink. They are next advanced to the study of arithmetic and the use of the plantain-leaf in writing with ink made of lamp-black, which is continued about six months, during which they are taught addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, and the simplest cases of the mensuration of land and commercial and agricultural accounts, together with the modes of address proper in writing letters to different persons. The last stage of this limited course of instruction is that in which the scholars are taught to write with lamp-black ink on paper, and are further instructed in agricultural and commercial accounts and in the composition of letters. In country places, the rules of arithmetic are principally applied to agricultural, and in towns to commercial accounts; but in both town and country schools the instruction is superficial and defective. It may be safely affirmed, that, in no instance whatever, is the orthography of the language of the country acquired in those schools; for, although in some of them two or three of the more advanced boys write out small portions of the most popular poetical compositions of the country, yet the manuscript copy itself is so inaccurate, that they only become confirmed in a most vitiated manner of spelling, which the imperfect qualifications of the teacher do not enable him to correct. The scholars are entirely without instruction, both literary and oral, regarding the personal virtues and domestic and social duties. The teacher, in virtue of his character or in the way of advice or reproof, exercises no moral influence on the character of his pupils. For the sake of pay, he performs a menial service in the spirit of a menial. On the other hand, there is no text or school-book used containing any moral truths or liberal knowledge; so that education, being limited entirely to accounts, tends rather to narrow the mind and confine its attention to sordid gain, than to improve the heart and enlarge the understanding. This description applies, as far as I at present know, to all indigenous elementary schools throughout Bengal." — pp. 10, 11.

In treating particularly of the District of Hooghly, the Report says:

"The indigenous elementary schools amongst Hindoos in this district are numerous, and they are divisible into two classes; first, those which derive their principal support from the patronage of a single wealthy family; and secondly, those which are destitute of such special patronage, and are dependent upon the general support of the native community in the town or village in which they are established. The former are the most numerous, there being scarcely a village without one or more of them. The primary object is the education of the children of the opulent Hindoos by whom they are chiefly supported; but as the teacher seldom receives more than three rupees a month from that source, he is allowed to collect from the neighbourhood as many additional pupils as he can obtain or conveniently manage. These pay him at the rate of two to eight annas per month, in addition to which each pupil gives him such a quantity of rice, pulse, oil, salt, and vegetables at the end of each month as will suffice for one day's maintenance. Sometimes the teacher, in addition to the salary he receives, is fed and clothed by his patron. Such schools have seldom any house built or exclusively appropriated for the use of the teacher and his pupils. The second class of schools is not so numerous as the former, but they afford a better maintenance to the teacher. In general the pupils pay him from four to eight annas per month while they write upon leaves, and from eight annas to one rupee, according to their means, when they write upon paper; in addition to which he also receives one day's maintenance per month from each pupil. Another perquisite of the teacher is a piece of cloth from each scholar on promotion to a higher class; but this is not one of the conditions of admission, and depends upon the liberality of the parents. The number of scholars in each school of either description averages thirty, some schools in populous towns having more, and others in small villages having less. The teachers are either Brahmans or Sudras. If the former are respectable and learned, they gain a comfortable subsistence; but the majority of them do not take sufficient pains to write a neat hand, and they have in general only a superficial acquaintance with arithmetic and accounts. Books are not in use in this class of elementary schools. The instruction comprises writing on the palm-leaf and on Bengalee paper, and arithmetic. As soon as the scholar is able to write a tolerable hand and has acquired some knowledge of accounts, he in general leaves school. In this district they enter school usually at the age of six and remain four or five years." — pp. 61, 62.

Some important reforms, we are happy to find, have lately been introduced into schools of this description, particularly in Calcutta, through the exertions of the Calcutta School Society.

> "Printed, instead of manuscript, school-books are now in common use. The branches formerly taught are now taught more thoroughly; and instruction is extended to subjects formerly neglected, viz., the orthography of the Bengalee language, geography, and moral truths and obligations. The mode of instruction has been improved. Formerly the pupils were arranged in different divisions according as they were learning to write on the ground with chalk, on the palm-leaf, on the plantain-leaf, and on paper, respectively; and each boy was taught separately by the schoolmaster in a distinct lesson. The system of teaching with the assistance of monitors and of arranging the boys in classes, formed with reference to similarity of ability or proficiency, has been adopted; and as in some instances it has enabled the teachers to increase the number of their pupils very considerably, and thereby their own emoluments, it is hoped that it will ultimately have the effect of encouraging men of superior acquirements to undertake the duties of instructors of youth." — p. 12.

From the statistics given in the Report respecting the indigenous schools for the higher branches of learning, it is plain that the class of men in Bengal who either have received, or are engaged in giving or receiving a Hindoo collegiate education, is large and influential. "The principle," we are told, "which secures the perpetuation of these institutions, as long as the Hindoo religion subsists, and is professed by the mass of the people, and by a majority of the wealthy and powerful, is, that it is deemed an act of religious merit to acquire a knowledge of the Hindoo *shastras*, or to extend the knowledge of them either by direct instruction, or by pecuniary support or assistance, given either to scholars or teachers." But the following description of the Hindoo colleges, is not such as to authorize us to expect that they will do much to help onward civilization. After stating that the buildings are generally constructed of clay, the Report goes on:

> "Sometimes three or five rooms are erected, and in others nine or eleven, with a reading-room which is also of clay. These huts are frequently erected at the expense of the teacher, who not only solicits alms to raise the building but also to feed his pupils. In some cases rent is paid for the ground; but the ground is commonly, and in particular instances both the ground and the expenses of the building are a gift. After a school-room and lodging-rooms have been thus built, to secure the success of the school the teacher invites a few Brahmans and respectable inhabitants to an entertainment, at the close of which the Brahmans are dismissed with

some trifling presents. If the teacher finds a difficulty in obtaining scholars, he begins the college with a few junior relatives, and by instructing them and distinguishing himself in the disputations that take place on public occasions, he establishes his reputation. The school opens early every morning by the teacher and pupils assembling in the open reading-room, when the different classes read in turn. Study is continued till towards mid-day, after which three hours are devoted to bathing, worship, eating, and sleep; and at three they resume their studies which are continued till twilight. Nearly two hours are then devoted to evening worship, eating, smoking, and relaxation, and the studies are again resumed and continued till ten or eleven at night. The evening studies consist of a revision of the lessons already learned, in order that what the pupils have read may be impressed more distinctly on the memory. These studies are frequently pursued, especially by the students of logic, till two or three o'clock in the morning.

"There are three kinds of colleges in Bengal, one in which chiefly grammar, general literature, and rhetoric, and occasionally the great mythological poems and law are taught; a second in which chiefly law and sometimes the mythological poems are studied; and a third in which logic is made the principal object of attention. In all these colleges select works are read and their meaning explained; but instruction is not conveyed in the form of lectures. In the first class of colleges, the pupils repeat assigned lessons from the grammar used in each college, and the teacher communicates the meaning of the lessons after they have been committed to memory. In the others, the pupils are divided into classes according to their progress. The pupils of each class having one or more books before them, seat themselves in the presence of the teacher, when the best reader of the class reads aloud, and the teacher gives the meaning as often as asked, and thus they proceed from day to day till the work is completed. The study of grammar is pursued during two, three, or six years, and where the work of Panini is studied not less than ten, and sometimes twelve years are devoted to it. As soon as a student has obtained such a knowledge of grammar as to be able to read and understand a poem, a law book, or a work on philosophy, he may commence his course of reading also, and carry on at the same time the remainder of his grammar studies. Those who study law or logic continue reading either at one college or another for six, eight, or even ten years. When a person has obtained all the knowledge possessed by one teacher, he makes some respectful excuse to his guide and avails himself of the instructions of another."—pp. 20, 21.

It would also seem that in the matter of college vacations, and the bestowment of literary honors, no extraordinary degree of sagacity, or enlargement of mind, is evinced. We copy again from the Report.

"The colleges are invariably closed and all study suspended on the eighth day of the waxing or waning of the moon; on the day in which it may happen to thunder; whenever a person or animal passes between the teacher and pupil while reading; when an honorable person arrives, or a guest; at the festival of Saraswati during three days; in some parts during the whole of the rainy season or at least during two months, which include the Durga, the Kali, and other festivals, and at many other times. When a student is about to commence the study of law or of logic, his fellow-students with the concurrence and approbation of the teacher, bestow on him an honorary title descriptive of the nature of his pursuit, and always differing from any title enjoyed by any of his learned ancestors. In some parts of the country, the title is bestowed by an assembly of pundits convened for the purpose; and in others the assembly is held in the presence of a Raja or Zamindar who may be desirous of encouraging learning, and who at the same time bestows a dress of honor on the student and places a mark on his forehead. When the student finally leaves college and enters on the business of life, he is commonly addressed by that title."—p. 22.

The Hindoo colleges in the District of Nuddea are among those in the highest repute. In 1829, they were twenty-five in number.

"These are called *tols*, and consist of a thatched chamber for the pundit and the class, and two or three ranges of mud-hovels in which the students reside. The pundit does not live on the spot, but comes to the *tol* every day on which study is lawful at an early hour, and remains till sunset. The huts are built and kept in repair at his expense, and he not only gives instruction gratuitously, but assists to feed and clothe his class, his means of so doing being derived from former grants by the raja of Nuddea, and presents made to him by the zemindars in the neighbourhood at religious festivals, the value of which much depends on his celebrity as a teacher. The students are all full-grown men, some of them old men. The usual number in a *tol* is about twenty or twenty-five, but in some places, where the pundit is of high repute, there are from fifty to sixty. The whole number is said to be between 500 and 600. The greater proportion consists of natives of Bengal, but there are many from remote parts of India, especially from the south. There are some from Nepaul and Assam, and many from the eastern districts, especially Tirhoot. Few if any have means of subsistence of their own. Their dwelling they obtain from their teacher, and their clothes and food in presents from him and the shopkeepers and landholders in the town or neighbourhood. At the principal festivals they disperse for a few days in quest of alms, when they collect enough to sustain them till the next interval of leisure. The chief study at Nuddea is nyayu or logic, there are also some establishments for tuition in law, chiefly in the works of Raghunanda, a celebrated Nuddea pundit, and in one or two places grammar is taught. Some of the students, particularly several from the Dekhin, speak Sanscrit with great fluency and correctness."—pp. 85, 86.

Of the means employed by the Mohammadan population of Bengal, to preserve the appropriate learning of their faith and race, it is impossible, according to the Report, to speak with much distinctness or confidence, partly because these means are less systematic and organized than those adopted by the Hindoos, and partly because less inquiry has been made, and less information is possessed respecting them, by the officers of government.

"It is believed, however," says Mr. Adam, "that in the Lower, as well as the Western Provinces there are many private Mohammadan schools, begun and conducted by individuals of studious habits who have made the cultivation of letters the chief occupation of their lives, and by whom the profession of learning is followed, not merely as a means of livelihood, but as a meritorious work productive of moral and religious benefit to themselves and their fellow creatures. Few accordingly give instruction for any stipulated pecuniary remuneration, and what they may receive is both tendered and accepted as an interchange of kindness and civility between the master and his disciple. The number of those who thus resort to the private instructions of masters is not great. Their attendance and application are guided by the mutual convenience and inclination of both parties, neither of whom is placed under any system or particular rule of conduct. The success and progress of the scholar depend entirely on his own assiduity. The least dispute or disagreement puts an end to study, no check being imposed on either party, and no tie subsisting between them beyond that of casual reciprocal advantages which a thousand accidents may weaken or dissolve. The number of pupils seldom exceeds six. They are sometimes permanent residents under the roof of their masters, and in other instances live in their own families; and in the former case, if Musalmans, they are supported at the teacher's expense. In return, they are required to carry messages, buy articles in the bazar, and perform menial services in the house. The scholars in consequence often change their teachers, learning the alphabet and the other introductory parts of the

Persian language of one, the Pandnameh of a second, the Gulistan of a third, and so on from one place to another, till they are able to write a tolerable letter and think they have learned enough to assume the title of Munshi, when they look out for some permanent means of subsistence as hangers-on at the Company's Courts. The chief aim is the attainment of such a proficiency in the Persian language as may enable the student to earn a livelihood; but not unfrequently the Arabic is also studied, its grammar, literature, theology, and law. A proper estimate of such a desultory and capricious mode of education is impossible." — pp. 23, 24.

The elementary schools, not indigenous, have had to contend with many obstacles growing out of the prejudices of the natives, their want of confidence in the foreign residents by whom these schools have been established and are controlled, and the narrow and short-sighted policy in which the schools themselves have, in some cases, been conceived and governed. A large proportion of them have been opened in the neighbourhood of the missionary stations, and are under the superintendence of the missionaries. It is to be hoped that these gentlemen have had experience enough to convince them, that, if they would make these schools extensively useful, it must be by conducting them on the most liberal plan, by confining them almost entirely to the children of the poor, and by adapting them, rather to improve by serving as models, then to supersede the indigenous institutions. We also hope, that their efforts will not be unavailing to do away the misconceptions, which lead native parents utterly to neglect the education of their daughters.

The growing desire, amounting even to a passion, on the part of the natives in some places, to give their sons, and their countrymen generally, the advantages of English instruction, and the efforts and sacrifices they have made and are making among themselves for this object, far exceed the common belief, and will be hailed by all as a most favorable omen. The more so, when it is understood from the author of the Report, that within his own knowledge, fifteen years ago, a European of reputed talents and acquirements, resident in Calcutta, in vain sought to obtain a humble livelihood by opening an English school for the Bengalese. The following extract relates exclusively to English schools established and supported by natives in a single District, that to which Calcutta belongs.

"The first English school of this kind is situated at Bhowanipore, and is called the Union School, in consequence of its having been formed by the union of two such schools respectively established at Bhowanipore and Kidderpore. They were established without any communication with Europeans by native gentlemen for the instruction of Hindoo children in English, and were at first supported by voluntary subscription. In May, 1829, they were placed upon an improved footing; and in the management of them, Europeans and natives were then first associated. They were opened to pay-scholars, and the Calcutta School Society made them a monthly grant towards their support; but, that resource not proving adequate to their wants, they applied to the General Committee of Public Instruction for assistance. Their immediate wants extended only to about 500 rupees for the necessary school-furniture; but the General Committee placed 1,000 rupees at the disposal of the School Society for the use of each school, considering it to be 'a great object to establish schools of this description which might in time serve as preparatory steps to the Hindoo college, and relieve that institution of part of the duty of elementary tuition.' The united school is supported partly by public subscriptions and partly by the fees of the scholars, of whom there are at present about 150. This is a day-school, instruction being given every day of the week from ten to three except on Sundays.

"Another English school of this description is situated at Simliya, and has about 70 scholars. It is exclusively a pay-school, having no other resources except the fees paid by the scholars. There are three teachers, one Englishman and two Hindoos.

"A third school of this kind is situated in Upper Circular Road, and has 30 or 40 scholars. It is a pay-school, and the proprietor is a Christian, who supports himself by teaching.

"A fourth pay-school is situated in Burra Bazar, and has 30 or 40 scholars taught by a native.

"The most popular school of this description is situated at Sobha Bazar, and has about 300 scholars. The proprietors are a Christian and a native, who employ several assistant teachers under them. This is also a pay-school, and the charge is four rupees per month for each scholar; in some the charge is three rupees per month, and in others it is not more than two rupees.

"Besides these pay-schools, there are native free-schools for the gratuitous instruction of native youth in English, supported either by public subscription or private benevolence.

"The principal one of these is called the Hindoo Free School, and is situated at Arpooly. It has five Hindoo teachers who instruct 150 scholars. The limited resources of the school do not enable the managers to command the services of the teachers except in the morning between six and nine o'clock, to which hours their instructions are confined.

"Another school of this kind is called the Hindoo Benevolent Institution, and is entirely supported by two benevolent native gentlemen. Three or four native teachers instruct about 100 scholars in English. It is a morning school.

"Another school of this description is situated at Chor Bagan, and is also supported by two native gentlemen. Four native teachers instruct about 60 scholars in English in the morning hours." — pp. 39-41.

Besides these, there are English schools in almost every District, designed chiefly for the instruction of children of Christian parents, but from which natives are not excluded. There are also two English colleges: Bishop's College at Calcutta, and Serampore College, in a Danish settlement of that name. The funds of the former have been derived, for the most part, from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, and other societies and individuals in the Church of England, and the whole constitution and government are under Episcopal influence and discipline. Those of the latter are dependent, for the most part, on subscriptions and contributions collected among the liberal and munificent friends of the missionary cause, in England, Scotland and the United States, the college itself, we believe, not being pledged to any denomination of Christians, though it has been built up mainly by the Baptists, and the instruction is chiefly in the hands of their missionaries at that station. Both have been in operation about fifteen years. The following is given as the most recent authentic report of the condition of the institution at Serampore.

"On the 31st December, 1834, there were in the college 10 European and East-Indian students; 48 native Christian students; and 34 native students not Christian. The European and East-Indian students are taught Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Bengalee, and mathematics, and attend lectures on mental philosophy, chemistry, and ancient and ecclesiastical history. The native Christian students and the native students not Christian are taught Sanscrit, Bengalee, and English, and they pursue their studies together in no classification except what is required from the difference of their attainments. The non-Christian students are the sons of Brahmans and other natives residing in Serampore and its vicinity, who neither board in the college nor do any thing that may compromise their caste, but attend daily for instruction on their tutors, and at the lectures delivered in the college. In Latin — Cicero, Horace, and Juvenal are read; and in Greek — Homer, Xenophon, and Demosthenes. The Bengalee language is sedulously cultivated, and the chemical studies are grounded on a treatise drawn up by Professor Mack as a text-book. The logical course includes a summary of the inductive or Baconian system, as well as an analysis of the ancient or Aristotelian method, and an explanation of the nature, the varieties, and the laws of evidence; while the divinity course comprehends a series of lectures on some book of Scripture read in the original language, and on the principles of biblical interpretation." — pp. 70, 71.

The Report contains a full, interesting, and on the whole, encouraging account of the origin, history, and policy of these institutions; though it is impossible to conceal the fact, that they have not, as yet, accomplished any thing like so much as might reasonably have been expected from so large an expenditure of money, labor, and good intention. But those who have the management of them are growing wiser every day. Without losing sight of the primary purpose of the East-Indian colleges, as connected with the dissemination of Christianity, they are continually adopting a more liberal course in regard to notions not Christian, and making more and more account of the bearings and influence which these institutions ought to have on the general interests of education. In this point of view, we regard them as destined to prove a great and universal blessing to Bengal, by making literature conspire with religion in becoming the vehicle of European civilization.

Ed.

Art. III. — 1. *Introduction to the History of Philosophy.* By Victor Cousin, Professor of Philosophy of the Faculty of Literature at Paris. Translated from the French. By H. G. Linberg. Boston. 1832.

2. *Elements of Psychology, included in a critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.* By the Same. Translated from the French, with an Introduction, Notes, and Additions; by C. S. Henry: Hartford, (Ct.) 1834.

3. *Fragmens Philosophiques.* By the Same. 2d edition. Paris. 1833.

Whoever would see the American people as remarkable for their philosophy as they are for their industry, enterprise, and political freedom, must be gratified that these works have already attracted considerable attention among us, and are beginning to exert no little influence on our philosophical speculations. It is a proof that our philosophical speculations are taking a wholesome direction, and especially that the great problems of mental and moral science are assuming in our eyes a new importance, and calling to their solution a greater and an increasing amount of mind. We are, in fact, turning our attention to matters of deeper interest, than those which relate merely to the physical well-being of humanity. We are beginning to perceive that Providence, in the peculiar circumstances in which it has placed us, in the free institutions it has given us, has made it our duty to bring out the ideal man, and to prove, by a practical demonstration, what the human race may be, when and where it has free scope for the full and harmonious developement of all its faculties. In proportion as we perceive and comprehend this duty, we cannot fail to inquire for a sound philosophy, one which will enumerate and characterize all the faculties of the human soul, and determine the proper order and most efficient means of their developement.

These works will, we think, afford us important aid in rescuing the Church, and religious matters in general, from their present lamentable condition. Religion subsists among us, and always will, for it has its seat in the human heart; but to a great extent it has lost its hold upon the understanding. Men are no longer satisfied with the arguments by which it has heretofore been defended; the old forms, in which it has been clothed, fail to meet the new wants which time and events have developed, and there is everywhere, in a greater or less degree, a tendency to doubt, unbelief, indifference, infidelity. We have outgrown tradition, and authority no longer seems to us a valid argument. We demand conviction. We do not, as in the middle ages, go to religion to prove our philosophy, but to our philosophy to prove our religion. This may or may not be an evil, but it is unavoidable. We must accept and conform to it. Henceforth religion must, if sustained at all, except as a vague, intangible sentiment, be sustained by philosophy. To doubt this, is to prove ourselves ignorant of the age in which we live.

But the philosophy, which has hitherto prevailed, and whose results now control our reasonings, cannot sustain religion.

Everybody knows, that our religion and our philosophy are at war. We are religious only at the expense of our logic. This accounts for the fact, that, on the one hand, we disclaim logic, unchurch philosophy, and pronounce it a dangerous thing to reason; while, on the other, we reject religion, declaim against the clergy, and represent it exceedingly foolish to believe. This opposition cannot be concealed. It is found not only in the same community, but to a great extent in the same individual. The result cannot be doubtful. Philosophy will gain the victory. The friends of religion may seek to prevent it, labor to divert men's minds from inquiry by engaging them in vast associations for practical benevolence, or to frighten them from philosophizing by powerful appeals to hopes and fears; but the desire to philosophize, to account to ourselves for what we believe, cannot be suppressed. Instead, then, of quarrelling with this state of things, instead of denouncing the religious as do professed free inquirers, or the philosophizers, as is the case with too many of the friends of religion, we should reëxamine our philosophy, and inquire if there be not a philosophy true to human nature, and able to explain and verify, instead of destroying, the religious belief of mankind? We evidently need such a philosophy; such a philosophy we believe there is, and we know of no works so well fitted to assist us in finding it, as those of M. Cousin.

We welcome the appearance of M. Cousin's works, also, as indications, perhaps we should say, results, of a revolution which, within a few years, has been effected in French philosophy. As Americans, we cannot be indifferent to France. She is associated with what is most soul-stirring in our national history, and with much that is most hallowed in our memories. She has exerted by her opinions, her literature, and especially by her philosophy, and must long continue to exert, a great influence on our destiny. Aside, then, from the general concern which we take in what affects our race for good or for evil, and the deep sympathy we feel with man wherever and whatever we find him, we cannot but take a very great interest in every thing which relates to France; and we consider it of vast importance to ourselves, the future welfare of our own country, that she has renouncéd that chilling materialism, which was preached with such fervent and fanatical zeal by her philosophers of the last century.

What has been known, and what is now considered by many, in an especial sense, as French philosophy, is sensualism, so called from its professing to trace back all the facts of consciousness to sensation. France was ready for this philosophy when Voltaire introduced it to her acquaintance, from England, where he had borrowed it from Locke and his disciples. Condillac simplified it, gave it systematic unity, constructed its logic, and fitted it for empire, which it obtained and held for nearly a century, without contradiction and without example in the whole history of philosophy. It penetrated everywhere, into the court and saloons, into literature, the sacred desk, and, as the most decisive proof of its popularity, even into all the branches of instruction.* The Revolution, in 1789, came to swallow it up for a time, as it did every thing else but unchained passion, exalted enthusiasm, and terrible energy in action; but, as soon as the storm abated and there was a momentary calm, under the Directory, it reappeared and resumed its dominion. No one thought of questioning its legitimacy. That brilliant *coterie* who philosophized with so much eclat at the close of the last century and during the first days of the present, among whom were Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, Volney, Degerando, and Laromiguière, however they might differ among themselves on some minor points, all received sensualism, systematized and perfected by Condillac, as the last word of philosophy. In their opinion, so far as its essential principles are concerned, Condillac had finished philosophy, and left nothing for future workmen but to illustrate and adorn it. Even down to the last moments of the Empire, sensualism was philosophy *par excellence*, and scarcely a scientific voice above a whisper was heard against it.

But its reign is now ended, and its glory departed. The works before us, together with their popularity in France, and that of their author, are sufficient proof of it. Providence, doubtless, assigned it an important mission; but that mission ended with the destruction of the old Catholic Church and the feudal monarchy, and, though it continued to reign some time after, it was as a tradition rather than as a living system.

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* See Damiron's *Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en France du XIXe Siècle*, in 2 vols., 8vo. A work we can recommend without reserve, to all who would become acquainted with French philosophy during the present century. We think we have seen a third edition of it. Ours is the second: Paris, 1828.

It indeed maintained nearly the same extent of territory, exhibited the usual emblems, and preserved the customary forms of authority ; but its internal power was much weakened and its vital energy nearly exhausted. Napoleon disliked it, — not because it was sensualism, but because its most zealous adherents were the friends of liberty, and the firm but orderly opponents of the despotism he established, — and the weight of his displeasure, together with the fact that he exerted the whole energy of his government to make soldiers instead of philosophers, could not fail to hasten its downfall. Some of its friends, especially Laromiguière, in order to improve it and facilitate its defence, departed from some of its essential principles, and aided in destroying, while intending to preserve it. Several individuals, without having any clear perceptions of a different system, opposed it by their strong instinctive tendency to spiritualism. Among these were Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, Chateaubriand, and Madame de Staël, who by their love and praise of nature, their sense of the beautiful, their enthusiasm, their appeals to the heart, the moral and religious sentiments and regrets which they awakened, prepared the way for a sounder philosophy, one loftier in its conceptions and truer to human nature. In 1811, M. Royer-Collard, a disciple of the Scotch school, was raised to the chair of philosophy, from which, up to 1814, he attacked sensualism without scruple and without mercy. It was not able to survive his blows. Dr. Broussais, in 1828, published a work on *Irritation et Folie*, in its defence ; but he did little more than show himself *irritated* at the general disrespect with which it was treated, and the extreme *folly* of undertaking to restore it to power. In 1815, M. Victor Cousin, whose attention had been drawn to philosophy by the instruction of M. Laromiguière, and who had been taught to analyze the will by M. de Biran, and converted by M. Royer-Collard from sensualism, was made professor of philosophy in the Normal School and the Faculty of Literature. Young, ardent, penetrating, and eloquent, he soon produced a powerful movement, completed the revolution commenced by M. Royer-Collard, and prepared for France a new philosophical future. If he have not, as some may believe, given to France the philosophy which must reign during that future, he has at least given the method for its creation, and rendered the return to sensualism impossible.

M. Cousin calls the system of philosophy which he and his friends profess and advocate,[1] ECLECTICISM; because it recognises the leading principles of all the great schools into which the philosophical world has been divided, and attempts to mould them into one grand whole, which shall include them all, and yet be itself unlike any of them. It went into power with the King of the Barricades, and will undoubtedly preside over the new system of schools and instruction which the government is preparing for France. We already see it in the most popular French journals, and in many of the most fashionable literary productions; and we can hardly persuade ourselves but that (in these and other ways) its influence on the destinies of France is at present, and must be for the future, very great. But without going into any speculations on the influence and prospects of this philosophy, we proceed to give our readers as clear and as satisfactory a statement of what it is, as we can within the limits to which we are necessarily restricted. In doing this we shall draw liberally from the Preface to the second edition of the *Philosophical Fragments*, the third work on our list, in which the author has given us a summary of his system, together with answers to some objections which are raised against it, and some account of its formation and growth in his own mind. We shall arrange what we have to offer under the heads of, 1. Method; 2. Application of Method to Psychology; 3. Passage from Psychology to Ontology; 4. Passage from God to Nature, and 5. General Views on the History of Philosophy.

I. The adoption of a method decides the destinies of a philosophy; for any given system of philosophy is only the developement and application of a given method. The method of all sound philosophy is that of observation and induction. Our first step is to study human nature, by observation to ascertain what is in the consciousness; our next and last step is to draw from observation by induction, by reasoning, all the consequences contained in the facts it has collected. Philosophy is the science of facts, and also the science of reasoning. It begins with observation, but it ends only with the limits of the reason itself. It observes and it reasons. In physical science we begin with observation of facts, but we do not end with it; we rise from observation, by reasoning, to general laws and to the system of the world. We should pursue the same method in mental and moral science. If we receive as true whatever legitimately follows from the facts of the external world, which we have observed, we should do the same with whatever legitimately follows from the facts of the internal world, which we have scrupulously observed and profoundly analyzed.

In philosophizing, we must guard against rushing too precipitately, from hasty and incomplete observation, to hazardous inductions; and also against confining ourselves, in spite of all the craving of our nature, to mere observation, against never venturing upon an induction, a synthesis of the facts observed. To neglect observation is to fall into hypothesis; to restrict ourselves to mere observation is, whether we know it or not, to place philosophy on the road to skepticism. Skepticism and hypothesis are the two rocks, which philosophy must study to avoid. True method avoids them both. It does not end at the beginning; it does not begin at the end. It acknowledges no limits to induction but those of the reason itself, but it supports induction on a sufficient observation. Reserving to itself the right to the ulterior employment of the faculties of the understanding, philosophy cannot observe too scrupulously. It can no more than physical science, proclaim too loudly, insist too earnestly, that observation is its necessary point of departure. There is, in fact, no difference between philosophy and physical science, except in the nature of the phenomena to be observed. The proper phenomena of physical science are those of external nature, of that vast world of which man makes so small a part; the proper phenomena of philosophy are those of internal nature, of that world which each man carries within himself, and which is observed by that inward light called consciousness, in like manner as the other is observed by the senses.

Philosophy begins by observing the phenomena of the world within us. A mere glimpse of those phenomena is not observation. They are as truly open to our inspection as those of the world without us; but they appear and disappear so rapidly, that the consciousness perceives and loses sight of them almost at the same instant. To merely glance at them as they are passing over the varying theatre of consciousness, is not enough; we must retain them as long a time as possible, recall them from the darkness into which they vanish, demand them anew of the memory, reproduce them, that we may examine them at our leisure, vary the lights in which we observe them, survey each one under all its aspects, that we may embrace each one in its entireness. We must reflect; not only listen to nature, but question her; not only observe, but make experiments. Whatever be the objects to which it is applied, experience has the same conditions and rules; and it is only by following them, in the science of man as in that of nature, that we can arrive at exact classifications.

These classifications, when their subject is human nature, the human soul, are called psychology. Psychology, an exact classification of the mental phenomena, is the first part, the foundation, but not the whole of philosophy. This is a point of great importance. The principal peculiarity of M. Cousin's system results from the fact, that he makes psychology the foundation, but not the superstructure, the beginning, but not the end of philosophy. By making psychology the basis of philosophy, he connects his philosophical enterprise with modern philosophy itself, which from Descartes, Bacon, and Locke, tolerates only the experimental method. In this he does not dissent from the philosophy which reigned in France during the last century. That philosophy was indeed sensualism, but it was also experimental; as experimental M. Cousin accepts, and though he modifies, continues it. This deserves the especial notice of those, who have supposed that he rejects experience and ought to be confounded with the hypothesis-constructing Germans. In method, he is as free from hypothesis as he is from skepticism. By beginning with psychology, making it the only door of entrance into the temple of philosophy, he not only connects himself with the old French, but separates himself from the new German school. The new German school, represented by Schelling and Hegel, begins where he ends, and ends where he begins. It begins by an hypothesis, rises at once without means, or by means of which it takes no account, to the Absolute, to the Being of beings, and attempts to reach nature and humanity through ontology. When we have once placed ourselves in ontology, in absolute being, the passage to the phenomenal, to nature and humanity, is without difficulty; psychology may most assuredly be found in ontology; but how can we attain to ontology? How shall we place ourselves in the Absolute as our point of observation? We must attain the summit by a slow and toilsome ascent from the valley, where is our starting-point, not by dropping from the heavens. Our only true method is to begin by ascertaining what is; from what is, the actual, we may pass to its origin, from that to its legitimacy, and thus attain the Absolute. Should we adopt the method of the new German school, and by some lucky devination obtain the truth, which M. Cousin considers to be the case with the school in question, the truth thus obtained, not having been scientifically obtained, would be without any scientific validity.

II. But if M. Cousin separates himself, so far as it concerns method, from the new German school and approaches the old French school, he separates also from this last, as soon as he proceeds to the application of his method to psychology. Their method is the same, but the French school is not true to it. It applies it with the prejudices of a system. It observes, but it observes only what suits its convenience. It mutilates the consciousness, and observes only the facts of the sensibility. Its analysis is, therefore, necessarily too narrow for its generalizations.

There is, undoubtedly, a class or order of phenomena in the consciousness, which may be traced back to sensation. That this class exists, and is of large extent, is incontestable. The manner in which the phenomena it includes, are generated, although somewhat complicated, is easily comprehended; and they have the advantage of reposing on a primitive fact, which, by connecting them with the physical sciences, seems to vouch for their reality. This fact is, that of the impression produced on the organs of sensation and reproduced by the brain in the consciousness. The illusion of believing that this order includes all the phenomena of which we can be conscious, was therefore very natural. If there be only a single order of phenomena in the consciousness, there can be only a single faculty to which we can refer those phenomena, and which in its transformations must produce all the others. This faculty is that of sensation, or, if we may adopt the etymological instead of the common meaning of the word, the sensibility; but if sensibility be the root of all our intellectual faculties, it must be the root of all our moral faculties. This reduces man to a mere creature of sensation. He can then know nothing which is not cognizable by some one or all of his five senses. Our senses can take cognizance of only material objects; if other objects exist we cannot know them; they are for us as though they were not. When we recognise only material existences, thought itself becomes materialized; painting, sculpture, poetry, all the fine arts, take a tinge of materiality, cease to reveal the infinite, and merely represent some small portions of the finite. All our notions of God, of the soul, of the Beautiful, the Right, inasmuch as they are not copies of outward material objects, which are observed alike by the senses, are illusions, mere fantasies, no more to be trusted than the dreams which disturb our nightly slumbers; religion withers into a mere form, hardens into a petrifaction, or entirely disappears; or, at least, can be retained only as an inconsequence or as an instrument; morality freezes into selfishness; pleasure and pain become the synonymes of right and wrong; and that alone which gives pleasure,—not to the soul but to the senses,—can be dignified with the name of *good*; the soul, having no longer any employment, takes its departure, and the man sinks in the animal, recognising and laboring only for animal wants. This is the unavoidable result of recognising in the consciousness the phenomena of the sensibility alone, and of reducing the whole nature of man to the faculty of receiving a sensation. The history of France in the last century proves this. She began with Condillac, who reduced the soul to sensation, and ended with Helvetius, who reduced morality to the simple maxim, "Seek pleasure, fly pain," with D'Holbach, who raved for materialism and atheism as a fanatic, and Lamettrie, who discoursed eloquently of the Man-Machine and the Man-Plant. But is this a true account of man? Who does not find in himself the ideas of the just and the unjust, the beautiful and its opposite, the holy and the unholy, the true, the true in itself? An impartial observation refutes both the principle and the system which is deduced from it, by making it appear that there are in the consciousness phenomena which no effort can legitimately trace back to sensation,—numerous ideas, ideas which are perfectly real, both in human life and in language, which sensation cannot explain. After having been struck with the relations of the human faculties, we are struck also with their differences, and a rigorous method enlarges the field of psychology.

M. Cousin recognises in the consciousness three classes of phenomena, which result from the great elementary faculties which comprehend and explain all the rest. These faculties are Sensibility, Activity, and Reason. They are never found isolated one from another. Yet they are essentially distinct, and a scrupulous analysis distinguishes them in the complex phenomena of intellectual life without dividing them. To sensibility belong all the internal phenomena, which are derived from sensation, through our senses, from the external world; to the activity belong those, which we are conscious that we ourselves produce; and under the head of reason must be arranged all our ideas of the Absolute, the Supersensible, and all the internal facts which are purely intellectual, which we know we do not produce, and which cannot be derived through sensation from external nature. The activity is developed only by sensation. Activity and sensibility can generate no idea without the reason; and without sensibility and activity the reason would have no office. This psychology destroys sensualism, and leads to a philosophy of a totally different character. The philosophy to which it leads has already made some progress. It is represented on the theatre of the nineteenth century by the Scotch school, but more especially by the Kantian school, which, professing the same method as the Scotch, applies it with a very different rigor and extent. This school has enriched psychology by so many ingenious and profound observations, and is above all so distinguished by the beauty and grandeur of its morality, that it must always be held in deserved honor.

The Sensualist school admits and studies with great success the facts of the sensibility; but overlooking those of the activity and the reason, or not making a sufficient account of them, it mutilates the soul, and becomes false in its inductions. The Scotch school avoids this error; it distinguishes between the reason and sensibility, but without much scientific precision. The Kantian school has done it with more care and accuracy; it has also described with great clearness and precision the laws of the reason, but it has not discerned with sufficient exactness the distinction between the reason and the activity. This deficiency has ruined the school. The activity is personal. *We* are in the activity; that alone is our *self.* To confound the reason with the activity, as Kant and his followers do, is to make the reason personal, and to deprive it of all but a subjective authority; that is, to make it of no authority except in relation to the individual in whom it is developed. To deprive the reason of all but a subjective authority, to allow it no validity out of the sphere of our own personality, is to deprive it of all legitimate authority, and to place philosophy on the route to a new and original skepticism. If the reason have no authority out of the sphere of the personality, out of the individual consciousness in which its phenomena appear, it can reveal to us no existences which lie beyond ourselves. Such may be the laws of our nature, that we cannot help believing that we are, that there is an external world, and God; but our belief can repose on no scientific basis. There is nothing to assure us, that it is not a mere illusion; nothing can demonstrate to us, that any thing really exists to respond to it. All certainty resolves itself into a mere personal affection. To this conclusion all are driven who assert the subjectivity of the reason. This may be seen by going from Kant, the circumspect master, to Fichte, the audacious disciple, who shrinks from no logical results, and even ventures to represent the external world, and God himself, as productions of that mysterious something we mean, when we say, *I, Me!*

To avoid this extravagance, we must distinguish between the reason and the activity, and show that, though intimately connected, they are nevertheless fundamentally distinct. The reason, though appearing in us, is not our *self*. It is independent of us, and in no sense subject to our personality. If it depended on our personality, or if it constituted our personality, we could control its conceptions, prescribe its laws, and compel it to speak according to our pleasure. Its conceptions would be ours, as much and in the same sense, as our intentions; its revelations would be our revelations, that is, revelations of ourselves, and its truths would be our truths. Who is prepared to admit such a conclusion? We may say, "my actions, my crimes, my virtues," for we consider ourselves very justly as their cause; we may even say, "my error," for our errors are in some degree attributable to ourselves; but who dare say "*my* truth"? Who does not feel, who does not know, that the truth is not his, — is nobody's, but independent of everybody? If, then, we are conscious that the conceptions of the reason are not ours, that the truths it reveals are not our truths, are not truths which are in any sense dependent on us, we must admit that the reason is independent of us, and, though appearing in us, is not ours, is not our *self*.

Nobody doubts the independence of the reason in the consciousness itself. Who doubts the reality of the mental phenomena of which we are directly conscious, — who doubts the apperceptions of consciousness, apperceptions on which is founded the knowledge of our own existence? No skeptic doubts these, for no skeptic doubts that he doubts. But not to doubt that we doubt, is to know that we doubt, is to know something, is, in fine, *to know*. Now, what is it that *knows*? What is that inward light we call consciousness, which has these apperceptions in which we confide, which knows in any degree, — which knows at all? Is it not the reason? If the reason may be trusted in one case, why not in another? If the knowledge, which the reason gives us of what is passing within us, be undeniable, why shall not all other knowledge, which the same reason gives, be considered equally certain? The reason is the same in all its degrees, and we have no right arbitrarily to restrict or extend its limits.

III. The reason, once established in its true nature and independence, becomes a legitimate authority for whatever it reveals. A true analysis of it shows, that, instead of being imprisoned in the consciousness and compelled to turn for ever within the sphere of the subjective, it extends far beyond, and attains to beings as well as to phenomena. It reveals to us God and the world on precisely the same authority as our own existence, or the slightest modification of it. Ontology thus becomes as legitimate as psychology; since it is psychology, which, by disclosing to us the true nature of the reason, conducts of itself to ontology.

We suppose that few, comparatively speaking, feel much interest in, or have any very clear conceptions of the precise problems, which it is the object of the higher metaphysics to solve. There are but few who wish to pass from the subjective to the objective, from psychology to ontology. Once convinced that man is determined by a law of his nature to believe in an external world and in God, most men are satisfied without seeking any thing farther. But there are those who would have the legitimacy, as well as the existence, of that law established. This was the case with Hume. He saw very clearly that man was determined by his nature to believe in an external world and in God; but, as this determination was no result of experience, he counted it of no scientific value, and asserted that the existence neither of the world nor of God, could be proved, and, though every man in his senses must believe in the existence of both, that philosophy must for ever remain in relation to them a skeptic. The Scotch school, honorable for its good intentions, undertook to refute him; but, incapable of comprehending him, it alleged against him the very fact which he admitted, and which he acknowledged that no man in his senses could deny. It alleged as a proof of God and the external world, that we were compelled to believe in them by a law, a first, a constituent principle of our nature. So said Hume. But what is the authority of that principle? What is its legitimacy? What vouches for its veracity? The Scotch school answered only by a paralogism. The Kantian school advances not a step beyond Hume. It describes the conditions on which the belief is formed; but it denies that we can know the Absolute, that we can, in relation to God and the world, have any thing more than an irresistible belief, founded on the subjective laws of our own nature. Schelling and his school assume, by a bold hypothesis, the Absolute, the objective, and give us a magnificent poem, which we believe to be mainly true, but which is nevertheless no philosophy, and can in no degree solve the difficulty stated by Hume. The psychological truth of God and the world, we think, has been demonstrated over and over again, in a manner that must be satisfactory to the most skeptical, who are not ignorant of the demonstrations which have been given; but no philosopher, with whom we are acquainted, unless it be M. Cousin, has demonstrated their ontological truth. M. Cousin professes to have demonstrated, that we not only have the belief, and cannot help having it, but that it is well founded, that there is something out of us to respond to it. This he supposes he has done by establishing the independence of the reason; by proving that the reason is objective in relation to our personality, he thinks he has obtained a legitimate witness of the objective; and since this witness unquestionably deposes to the existence of God and of the world, he thinks he has proved their validity.

He asserts that the reason, — the only faculty in us which knows, the only principle of all certainty, the only rule of the true and the false, of the right and the wrong, which alone perceives its own aberrations, disabuses itself when deceived, recovers its path when led astray, accuses, acquits, or condemns itself, — the reason gives us ontology, the science of being, the knowledge of our own personal existence, and of the existence of external nature and of God, by precisely the same title as the least knowledge which we possess, and gives it too without waiting for any long developements, immediately, wholly and in each of its parts, in every fact of consciousness, in the first as well as in the last. It is on psychology that he supports himself in this assertion, but on a psychology to which only a profound reflection can attain.

Can there be any fact of consciousness without some attention? Our thoughts, if we do not attend to them, become confused, fall into indistinct reveries, very soon vanish away, and become for us as though they were not. Even the perceptions of our senses, without attention, degenerate into mere organic impressions. An organ is struck, and even with force, but the mind, if engaged elsewhere, does not perceive it; there is then no sensation, and, if no sensation, of course no consciousness. In every fact of the consciousness, therefore, the attention does and must intervene.

Now is not every act of the attention more or less voluntary? Is not every voluntary act marked with this character, that we consider ourselves its cause? And is it not this cause, whose effects may vary while it remains itself unvaried, this power, which its acts alone reveal to us, and which its acts do not exhaust, — is it not this cause, power, force, that we call *I*, *me*, our individuality, our personality, that personality of which we never doubt, which we never confound with any other, because we never refer to any other the voluntary acts which give us an intimate sentiment and an unalterable conviction of it? The *I*, the personality, is then given us in every fact of consciousness. There can be no fact of consciousness without a conception of our own existence.

We find *ourselves* then, in the fact of consciousness, and we find ourselves a cause, a creative force. This is the radical idea which we have of ourselves. We know ourselves under no other character than that of a cause, and we exist for ourselves no farther than we are a cause. The bounds of our causality are the bounds of our existence. Can this cause, which we are, do whatever it will? Meets it no resistance, no obstacles? It does, at every step, and of every kind. To the sentiment of our strength is ever added that of our weakness. Thousands of impressions from without continually assail us. If we do not attend to them, they come not to the consciousness; but, as soon as we attend to them, sensation begins. Now, here is the intervention of a new element. We refer to ourselves the act of attending to the impressions made upon our organs of sense, but we do not, and we cannot, refer to ourselves, as their cause, the impressions to which we attend. We receive sensations, we do not cause them. But, if we cannot refer them to ourselves as their cause, we cannot help referring them to some cause, and necessarily to a cause which is out of us, exterior. The existence of this exterior cause is as certain to us as our own existence; for the phenomenon,—sensation,—which suggests it, is as certain to us, as the phenomenon,— act of attention,—which suggests to us our existence. Both too, are given together, in the same phenomenon. There is then, in every fact of consciousness, not only a conception of our own existence, of our personality, but also a conception of something which is not ourselves, something independent of our personality and exterior to it,— external nature.

If any one should doubt this, he is required to conceive of himself without also conceiving of that which is not himself, or of that which is not himself without conceiving of himself. I cannot have a clear conception of myself without distinguishing myself from all other existences. To assert that I exist, is to assert that I am, and that I am myself and not another. In the complex phenomena of consciousness, we have seen there necessarily intervene activity and sensibility. There are the impressions from a cause which we are not, and attention, which is our act, applied to those impressions, giving us a consciousness of them. These two causes, one of which we are, the other of which we are not, external nature, are then unquestionable in every fact of consciousness, and both equally certain. But with what characters do we find these two causes? Certainly they appear as relative, imperfect, bounded, finite. The cause, which we are, meets resistance, obstacles, bounds, in that variety of causes to which we refer the phenomena of which we are conscious, which we do not produce and which are purely affective and involuntary; and these causes themselves are limited and bounded by that voluntary cause which we are. We resist them as they resist us, and, to a certain extent, limit their action as they limit ours. It is only in the meeting, the clashing of the two causes, it is only in their conflict, that either is revealed to us. There is no question that we always conceive of them, and cannot help conceiving of them, as relative and as finite causes. Now, what is it to conceive of these two causes, as relative and finite? It is to distinguish them in our minds as such; it is to assert that they are not absolute, infinite causes, but relative and finite causes. If, then, whenever these two causes are in the consciousness, they are there as relative, as finite, they must be there as contrasted with the infinite, the absolute. But they cannot be contrasted with, or distinguished from, the infinite and the absolute, without a conception of the infinite and the absolute; and, without being so contrasted or distinguished, they cannot be conceived as relative and finite. In every fact of consciousness, then, there is a conception of ourselves, or of personality, and of something which is not ourselves, external nature, both as relative, finite causes; and of the infinite, the absolute, to which they are by the reason necessarily referred, and with which they must be contrasted in order to be conceived.

The reason, which is developed in the consciousness, and which perceives there at the same time attention and sensation, as soon as it has the apperception of them, makes us conceive immediately of the two sorts of distinct, but correlative and reciprocally finite causes to which they are referred. But the reason does not stop here. The notion of finite and limited causes once given, we cannot help conceiving of a superior, absolute, and infinite cause, which is itself the first and last cause of all causes. The internal and personal cause which we are, and the exterior causes which we call nature, are undeniably causes in relation to their own effects; but the same reason which gives them as causes, giving them as relative and limited causes, prevents us from stopping with them as causes which are sufficient for themselves, and forces us to refer them to a supreme Cause, which produces and sustains them, which is relatively to them what they are relatively to their own phenomena, and which, being the Cause of all cause, and Being of all being, is sufficient for itself, and for the reason which seeks nothing and finds nothing beyond.

If this analysis of a fact of consciousness be accurate, we are authorized to say that no fact of consciousness is possible without the conception of our own existence, the existence of the world, and that of God. The ideas, of ourselves as a free personality, of nature, and of God as the substance, the cause, of both us and nature, constitute a single fact of the consciousness, are its inseparable elements, and without them consciousness is impossible. Ourselves, nature, and God are, then, necessarily asserted in every word, in every affirmation, in every thought. The skeptic who professes to doubt their existence, in that he can assert that he doubts, asserts that they exist. Atheism is, then, impossible; some men may want the term, the word, but all men believe in God.

The world and ourselves are found in the fact of consciousness as causes, and God is also found in the same fact, as a cause, the infinite, the absolute cause, which is the cause and substance of the relative and finite causes which we and nature are. God, then, exists to us under the character of a cause. A little reflection soon discovers the identity of cause and substance. We call ourselves and the world substances for the simple reason that they are causes, and in our conception the limits of their causality are the limits of their substantiality. God, being absolute cause, is absolute substance. If absolute, he must be one, for two absolutes are an absurdity. The relative, free, intentional causality, personality, which we are, implies absolute intentional causality, absolute personality; and, as the absolute can be found only in the absolute, it follows that God is not a blind, fatal causality, but a free, intentional cause, that is, a person. Descending again into the reason, we find there the absolute principles of the Just and the Beautiful. These principles, being absolute, belong to the absolute. Hence, from the absolute principles of Causality, Substance, Unity, Intentionality, the Just, and the Beautiful, we obtain the absolute God, Cause of causes, Being of beings, substance of substances, unity of unities, intentionality of intentionalities, morally just, beautiful, righteous, — our Father.

It should be remarked, that we do not *infer* the Absolute from the relative, the Infinite from the finite, God from nature and humanity. The Absolute is no logical creation, no production of reasoning. It could not be deduced from the relative. No dialectic skill has ever yet been able to draw the infinite from the finite, the unconditioned from the conditioned. Both terms are given together, both are primitive *data*, without which no reasoning could possibly take place. Remove from man the idea of the infinite, or of the finite, and he would be incapable of a single intellectual act. A man, to reason, must assert something, and must assert that something to be either infinite or finite. But no man can say that a thing is finite without having at the same time the conception of the infinite; or that a thing is infinite without at the same time conceiving the finite. Neither, then, can be deduced from the other; both coexist in the intelligence as its fundamental elements, and not only coexist, but coexist as cause and effect. Hence the ideas of the infinite, the finite and their relation, not of mere coexistence but as cause and effect, are inseparable and essential elements of all intellection. This being true, all three, embracing all existence, ourselves, God, and the world, must have existed in the understanding, before ever an intelligent act was possible. They are, then, so far from being inferred, some from the others, that all then must exist before an inference is possible. They are the primitive *data* of the intellect, the starting-points of all reasoning. That is, when they are considered in relation to their logical origin, though in point of fact they are not developed in the understanding, till the understanding begins to act. All three, however, are developed simultaneously in the first fact of the intellectual life.

But if the absolute logically precedes the relative, and if the conceptions of the infinite, the finite, and their relation be indispensable conditions of all reasoning, it follows of course that our belief in God, in nature, in our own existence, is the result of no reasoning. When we first turned our minds inward in the act of reflection, we found that belief. We had it, and every man has it, from the first dawn of the intellect. It does not proceed then from reflection ; and, as reflection is the only intellectual act in which we have any agency, it follows that it does not exist in consequence of any thing we have willed or done. It is prior to *our* action, and independent of it. Whence then its origin ? It must be a primitive, spontaneous belief, the result of the spontaneity of the reason. The reason sees by its own light, is itself active; and, being in relation with the objective and the absolute, it can and does of itself reveal to the consciousness God and the world, giving by its own vigor the belief in question. The reason, being in its nature independent, and in its spontaneity acting independently of us, and though developing itself in us, is a good and legitimate witness for what lies beyond us, and exists independent of us.

Is this a legitimate passage from the subjective to the objective, from psychology to ontology, from the phenomenon to being, from the relative to the absolute, from the conditioned to the unconditioned ? Is there here a verification of that law of our nature, which determines us to believe in God and an external world ? Is there here a proof, that our belief in the existence of the world and of God has any objective reality to respond to it ? The reason is independent, it is objective ; therefore, it is a legitimate authority for the objective. The reason is objective, it is absolute, and therefore a sufficient witness for the absolute. The reason reveals the absolute, therefore the absolute exists. This conclusion, which we believe to be correct, rests upon an assumption of the credibility of the reason. The reason may declare itself to be independent, absolute, but how can we prove that it is not a law of thought, a mere mode of intellectual activity? It is true we may so define personality as to make the reason objective in relation to what we are pleased to term *ourself*, but a definition is not a demonstration. We have only the reason with which to prove the reason's independence; consequently, we have only its own word that it is not subjective. We attain the objective on the faith of the reason, but we have no voucher for that faith.

We dissent from M. Cousin with no little distrust of ourselves; but we confess that we are unable to conceive the possibility of absolutely demonstrating, logically proving, the objective, till we can obtain an independent witness to vouch for the independence and veracity of the reason. This witness we have not, and cannot have. If such a witness could be supposed, he could give his testimony to us only through the reason, and we should still have only the reason's authority for it. We must take the reason's word that the reason has correctly reported what the witness has testified. But at the same time that we deny the possibility of demonstrating the objectivity of the reason in relation to *man*, though we may do it in relation to the *will*, we contend that there is no need of doing it. The reason sees, and knows, and truly reveals the absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned, the spiritual world,— God. It sees and reveals the spiritual world, the world of reality, by its own light and energy; and this is the highest degree of certainty we ever have, the highest we ever ask, for none of us have ever asked that the reason be proved reasonable. M. Cousin, we think, has demonstrated all that he was required to demonstrate. He has shown beyond a question, that the reason, which is our only light, gives us the Absolute, God, and external nature, as positively and on the same authority as our own existence or the apperceptions of consciousness. We have no authority for either but the reason, and that is given as decidedly for one as the other. We may be as certain, then, that there is a God as that we exist. But we cannot prove it. We cannot prove that we exist, because, in every attempt to prove our existence, we are obliged to assume it, and because we have nothing more evident than our existence with which to prove it. But are we less certain that we exist on this account? That which we best know, is least susceptible of being proved. The proof must be more certain than that which is to be proved. When, therefore, the proposition in question is one of those which have the highest degree of certainty, it of course cannot be proved. But it is certain without being proved. The Deity knows all things; but could he, if he would, prove to himself this fact? With what should he prove it? What is more evident to him than the fact that he knows all things? We are now engaged in writing, we know what we are doing, but we should be at a loss to prove to ourselves that we are writing. But, to our very great relief, we discover no necessity of having it proved. So, in relation to ontology, we know it, but cannot prove it. With what shall we prove it? The reason is the only eye with which we see it, and we have no witness but the reason to bring to prove that the reason's eye really sees it. But as the deposition of the reason is always all the proof we ask, we need no other witness.

The whole matter, then, turns on the credit due the reason. Grant reason tells the truth, we know the Absolute, the Unconditioned, — God. Deny the reason, or declare the reason unworthy to be believed, and we neither know God, the world, ourselves, nor any thing else. We are reduced to a worse strait than to "doubt that doubt itself be doubting," a strait in which we cannot possibly remain even in thought so long as it takes to name it. Thus much, we think, M. Cousin has done, and, we believe, it is all that he considers himself as having done, though he calls it a demonstration, which we contend it is not. The demonstration would require him to prove the credibility of the reason, a thing which he cannot do, because he has only the reason with which to establish the truth of the reason. But this is no cause of regret. We want no higher authority than the reason. The reason in all its essential elements is in every man. It is the light, "the true light that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world." As it reveals spontaneously, in every man's consciousness, the vast world of reality, the absolute God, the cause and substance of all that APPEARS, it follows that every man has the witness of the spiritual world, of the Absolute, the Infinite, God, in himself.

IV. The reason can reveal nothing which it has not in itself. If it reveal the absolute, it must itself be absolute. If absolute, it must be the Being of beings, God himself. The elements of the reason are then the elements of God. An analysis of the reason gives, as its elements, the ideas of the infinite, the finite, and their relation as cause and effect. Then these ideas are the elements of all thought, of thought in itself, of God. God then, is thought, reason, intelligence in itself. An intelligence which does not manifest itself, is a dead intelligence, a dead thought; but a dead thought, a dead intelligence, is inconceivable. To live, to exist, intelligence must manifest itself. God, being thought, intelligence in itself, must necessarily manifest himself. To manifest himself is to create, and his manifestation is creation.

In going from humanity and nature to God, we found him a cause. If he be a cause, he must create, that is, cause something. A cause which does not create is no cause at all. Creation then is necessary. God ceases to exist to us in exact proportion as he ceases to be a creator. But out of what can God create? Not out of nothing as is easily shown. The hypothesis of the independent existence of matter is also inadmissible. If matter can exist independent of God, then it is sufficient for itself; if sufficient for itself, it is almighty, absolute. There would then be two absolutes. Two independent existences,—matter on the one side, and God on the other,—would be a gross absurdity. God, then, can create only out of himself; that is, by developing, manifesting, himself.

But God can manifest only what is in himself. He is thought, intelligence itself. Consequently there is in creation nothing but thought, intelligence. In nature, as in humanity, the supreme Reason is manifested, and there, where we had fancied all was dead and without thought, we are now enabled to see all living and essentially intellectual. There is no dead matter, there are no fatal causes; nature is thought, and God is its personality. This enables us to see God in nature, in a new and striking sense, and gives a sublime meaning to the words of Paul: "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world, even his eternal power and Godhead, are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made." Well may we study nature, for, as a whole and in the minutest of its parts, it is a manifestation of the Infinite, the Absolute, the Everlasting, the Perfect, the universal Reason, — God. It should be loved, should be reverenced, not merely as a piece of mechanism, but as a glorious shining out of the Infinite and the Perfect. How much more, however, should we study, love, reverence and stand in awe of humanity, the still brighter manifestation, more perfect type, image of the supreme Intelligence, the true God, — our Father!

This idea of creation is suggested and explained by what is continually passing in ourselves. We will to raise an arm. It may be paralytic, and consequently does not move. Nevertheless we have created something, we have created an intention. Here is the type of creation. God wills; the universe is; he speaks, and it stands fast. It is but God's volition, his intention. This gives us an affecting view of our dependence on God. We are his volition, as dependent on him as our volitions are dependent on us. We will to raise our arm, the volition to raise it exists; we cease to will, and our volition is gone, is — nothing. God wills, we are, — ceases to will, and we are not. How truly was it said, "In him we live, and move, and have our being!"

If this view of creation be admissible, that notion which presents the Deity waking from the sleep of an eternity, putting forth for a moment his omnipotent energy, creating, arranging, and adorning the world, assigning it certain laws by which to govern itself, setting its machinery in motion, and then returning to his sleep, or departing to form new world-machines, world-automata, or seating himself on a solitary throne far back from and above his creation, and contemplating his works in eternal silence, — this notion of God, we say, must be for ever abandoned. "God is at once true and real, substance and cause, always substance, always cause, being substance in that he is a cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, individuality and totality, beginning, middle, and end, alike infinite and finite at the summit and at the lowest round of existence." God is above, over and in all, cause and substance, life and reality of all.

This is not Pantheism. Pantheism considers the universe as God; but this presents God as the cause, and the universe as the effect. God is as inseparable from the universe as the cause is inseparable from the effect; but no one who can discern any distinction between an appearance and that which appears, between the phenomenon and being, the manifestation and that which is manifested, can ever confound him with the universe. The cause is always in the effect. I am in my intention, but I am not my intention. All there is in the intention is of me, but it does not exhaust me. I create an intention, and I remain with all my creative energy. So of God. The universe is his intention. It is what he wills, and he is in it, the substance of his volition; it is what he speaks, and he is in it, as a man is in his words; but he is distinct from it, by all the distinction there is between the energy that wills, and that which is willed, between him who speaks, and the words he utters.

The reason, taken absolutely, we have said is identical with God. The consequences of this are numerous and grand. The reason is God; it appears in us, therefore God appears in us. The light of reason, the light by which we see and know all that we do see and know, is truly the light of God. The voice of the spontaneous reason is the voice of God; those who speak by its authority, speak by the authority of God, and what they utter is a real revelation. This explains inspiration, accounts for the origin of prophecies, pontificates, and religious rites, and justifies the human race for having believed that some men had been the confidants and interpreters of God. He in whom the spontaneous reason was more active than in his fellow beings, had a closer communion with God, could better interpret him than they, and was rightly termed the inspired, for he was inspired; — not indeed in a sense different from the rest of mankind, but in a different, a special, degree.

This idea that God really appears in us, that it is by his light that we see, though it may be an approach to the "vision in God" of Malebranche, is one that we value for its religious as well as its philosophical bearing. It has some affinity with Fichte's doctrine of a twofold personality, one phenomenal, individual, the other absolute, real. We are, as individuals, only APPEARANCES. Our real being is in God. Back of us and through us, there is always shining out something which is not phenomenal, relative, but absolute, substantial, which may be called person in itself. Person in itself is God. God then, is our higher, our absolute personality. This explains the mystery of the incarnation, of the two natures in Jesus, and shows how Jesus was, and how we may be, one with the Father. Jesus was one with the Father, —

"God manifest in the flesh," if one chooses, — because his phenomenal personality was absorbed in the absolute, his individual will was lost in the Divine, the absolute will. The Divine, the God in man, was conspicuous in Jesus above the human. In proportion as our will, our lower, phenomenal personality, becomes lost in our higher, our absolute personality, we approach God, become one with him, pass from the phenomenal to real being, from death to life, from the mortal to the immortal, from the corruptible to the incorruptible, — from earth to Heaven. We cannot proceed; but, if we do not deceive ourselves, we have indicated here a train of thought which may lead to grand results, and throw a new, a clear, and a strong light on some of the darkest passages in our religion.

V. Man's intellectual life begins with the spontaneous reason. We believe, we confide before we reflect. In the infancy of the individual and of the race, God himself, as a tender father, is the guide and teacher. The child a little advanced, wishes to go alone, to be guided by his own light, to follow his own will, and rely on his own strength. A dangerous wish! but one which must be gratified, if the child is ever to become a man. After a while man finds he has believed, and he desires to know why he has believed, to account to himself for the phenomena he discovers. There is now a new element developed within him, the reflective reason; and henceforth, instead of confiding, he must reflect, and instead of faith he must have philosophy. No more repose, no more careless glee of the child; active life begins: its cares, its burdens, its duties must be met and borne and performed. The father gives the child his blessing, his counsel, and sends him, at his request, forth into the world to seek his fortune as best he may.

Philosophy begins, the day that man begins to reflect; it is the creation of reflection, and, since reflection is our act, it is our creation. It is to humanity, what nature and humanity are to God. As there can be nothing in nature and humanity which is not in God, so there can be nothing in philosophy which is not in humanity. He who comprehends humanity, comprehends not only true philosophy, but all systems of philosophy which have heretofore obtained, or which can obtain hereafter. He who comprehends all the systems of philosophy which have been, comprehends humanity as far as it is now developed. The study of human nature then, throws light on the history of philosophy, and the study of the history of philosophy in return, throws light on human nature. Since all the systems of philosophy which have been, embrace the entire developement of humanity in the past, it follows that he who should comprehend those systems, would comprehend thus far the whole history of our race. History in general, as throwing light on humanity, the history of philosophy in particular, as enlightening all other branches of history, and as the practical, the experimental test of a philosophy, should be ranked among the very highest objects of human study.

There can be nothing in philosophy which is not in humanity. There is nothing in humanity but intelligence. Philosophy then is a developement of intelligence. But it is a developement only of the human intelligence, which is itself only a fragment of the absolute Intelligence. It cannot, therefore, embrace intelligence in itself. The human intelligence being itself defective, incomplete, the most perfect developement of it, can be only an imperfect development of truth. To be incomplete, imperfect, consequently more or less erroneous in its creations, is the inevitable lot of humanity. No system of philosophy, then, can be obtained, however clear and far-reaching its vision, that will take in the whole horizon of truth. The most perfect system attainable must always be incomplete, leaving out vast, undefined regions of the true. But as all philosophy is a developement, more or less complete, of intelligence; and, as intelligence in all its degrees is true, an absolutely false philosophy is impossible.

Although there can be nothing in philosophy which is not in humanity, there may be much in humanity which is not in philosophy. A philosophy which does not embrace the whole of human nature is false, not only in relation to the Absolute, but in relation to man, and false because it is defective, and in its defectiveness. All that is in our past history is but a developement of human nature, and, in that it is a developement of human nature, it is true. All systems, all creeds, all events, in that they have been, are true, true as far as they go, though by no means the whole truth. It is necessary then to accept them all. Now, if our philosophy exclude any portion of them, if it cannot find in each an element of truth, if it do not explain them all, and find itself in all, it is itself defective, and, in that it is defective, false. In this way history becomes a test of a philosophy. A philosophy which accepts the entire history of humanity, and which finds in itself precisely the same number of elements as in that history, excluding nothing, owning and enlightening all, may be pronounced the true philosophy, that which exactly represents the developement of humanity. No philosophy does this, except that which finds in each system, creed, event, an element of the True, which it extracts and brings together into one vast, harmonious whole. This philosophy is ECLECTICISM. Every sound philosopher, then, must be an Eclectic.

Three ideas constitute the human as the Divine intelligence; the idea of the infinite, the idea of the finite, and the idea of their relation. These three ideas must be found in every philosophy, but they may be found in different degrees of developement; sometimes one and sometimes another may be predominant. The predominance of one or another makes the different epochs of humanity, and of philosophy. The number of these ideas determine the number of philosophical systems which are possible. These ideas are represented in the consciousness by three great faculties, the reason, activity, sensibility. The reason represents the infinite, the sensibility the finite, the activity the relation of the two. Attention, reflection, may be directed exclusively to the facts of the sensibility; it will then overlook, or see but in the back-ground, the facts of the reason and the activity, and refer all the mental phenomena to sensation. Hence SENSUALISM, which is true in relation to the facts of the sensibility, the only ones it analyzes; but it is not true of a larger number which are as really in the consciousness as those derived from sensation.

We may direct our attention exclusively to reflection, the reflective reason, which represents the activity in the world of philosophy, and which is purely personal. Plunged into ourselves, we there overlook the facts of the spontaneous reason and of the sensibility, and refer to ourselves, to the energy of our own thoughts, all the phenomena which we observe. Hence IDEALISM, which, being unable to come out of the consciousness, denies an external world, in like manner as sensualism denies the existence of whatever is not observable by the senses.

A sober-minded man may be disgusted by the contentions of these two schools, and led to question, not only the truth of both, but the truth of the reason itself; — that is, the possibility of knowing at all. Hence SKEPTICISM, which is sometimes needed to check the rage of dogmatism, to bring back system-makers to common sense, and to compel them to examine anew their means of construction, their premises, and the logic by which they have attained their conclusions.

In fine, disgusted with the perpetual wranglings of sensualism and idealism, wearied with the endless doubt and perplexity of skepticism, unable to resist the cravings of the soul to believe, we take refuge in a primitive fact, hitherto overlooked, and, rejecting reflection, repose on the spontaneous reason. Hence MYSTICISM, a philosophy which is founded on a real element of our nature, and consequently true, but, taken exclusively, like all the others becomes the occasion of more or less error.

Each of these schools has a truth, and embraces and explains a certain number of the phenomena of our nature; but neither embraces and explains them all. Transport now either of these schools into history, and it will do what it does in psychology; it will mutilate history, as it has mutilated consciousness. It will either give no account of the facts which do not suit its purpose, or it will pervert them, give a false account of them. It will at once declare war against three fourths of history. Now in this fact, each proves itself inadequate to the explanation of the history of philosophy. Each then, is false as a whole, though it may be true as a part. These four schools embrace all the phenomena of consciousness, the whole of humanity; consequently embrace the whole history of humanity. A philosophy then, which embraces and explains the principles of these four schools is proved by history to be the true philosophy. Thus history and psychology reciprocally prove each other. By psychology we determine the number of elements which there can be in history, and by history the number there can be in psychology. When the number is the same in both cases, we may be sure that we are right. Erudition and criticism on the one hand, and profound psychological analysis on the other, are the instruments of a sound philosophy.

The four schools designated are found in all the philosophical epochs of the human race. They have all appeared on the stage of modern philosophy; each has played its part, accomplished its mission, and exhausted itself. Neither school has any longer any thing to do. All it can do as an exclusive school has been done, and is now known. What then remains for philosophy? Either to take shelter under the ægis of authority, cease to be, or become an eclectic. The first is impossible. With Des Cartes it broke away from the ecclesiastical authority which ruled in the middle ages, declared itself independent, and its subjection is henceforth impossible. To say that it will cease to be, that the human race will no longer seek to render an account to itself of what it is, believes, and does, is to declare one's self ignorant of the wants of the human soul, that intelligence will cease to develope itself, that thought is dead, the human race extinct. Nothing, then, but the last remains as possible. Eclecticism is then the philosophy of our age.

We must be eclectics, excluding no element of humanity, but accepting and melting all into one vast system, which will be a true representative of humanity so far as it as yet developed. We must take broad and liberal views, expect truth and find it in all schools, in all creeds, in all ages, and in all countries. The great mission of our age is to unite the infinite and the finite. Union, harmony, whence proceed peace and love, are the points to be aimed at. We of the nineteenth century appear in the world as mediators. In philosophy, theology, government, art, industry, we are to conciliate hostile feelings, and harmonize conflicting principles and interests. We must bind together the past and the future, reconcile progress and immobility, by preserving what is good and studying to advance, that is, by meliorating instead of destroying; enable philosophy and theology to walk together in peace and love, by yielding to theology the authority of the spontaneous reason, — inspiration, — and vindicating for philosophy the absolute freedom of reflection.

Such is a very imperfect outline of M. Cousin's philosophy. As he has nowhere, to our knowledge, published a systematic developement of his entire system, it is very possible that we have not correctly seized it in all its parts, and consequently may have in some instances misconceived it in relation to the points on which we have touched. We can only say, that our respect for M. Cousin himself, and our general approbation of his philosophy, if not our love of truth, must have preserved us from all voluntary misconceptions. It was our intention to notice some objections to his system; but we have exceeded all reasonable limits already, and must therefore refer the reader to the *Preface* to the second edition of the

Fragmens Philosophiques; and we must refer him also to the same source, together with Mr. Henry's introduction to his translation of the "Criticism on Locke," for some personal details which we intended to offer, and which will be found sufficiently interesting.

M. Cousin has been charged with a want of originality. It were, perhaps, presumptuous for us to attempt to discuss a charge of this nature. He himself replies to it in some degree in the Preface referred to. He acknowledges that he has had masters, and hopes that he shall have many more. He avows himself indebted to Laromiguière, De Biran, Royer-Collard, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. He says he has borrowed much from Schelling and Hegel, which he thinks it need not demand much humility on his part to acknowledge. He does not claim originality. He has, he informs us, always sought, and he still seeks truth, first to nourish and penetrate himself, and afterwards to communicate to his fellow-beings. The several parts of his system, it is very possible, may be found elsewhere; but we confess we know not where else to find it as a whole. We should claim for him originality in his reduction of the elements of the reason to the ideas of the infinite, the finite, and their relation, in his development of the distinction between the spontaneous and reflective reason, and, consequently, in the manner in which he reaches the Objective and the Absolute; though we must confess we can find elsewhere some things from which we can, now that we know his views on these points, derive something like them, although it may be very doubtful whether we could have done it without the aid he has furnished us. Once in the Absolute, he does not differ essentially from the new German school. He follows Schelling and Hegel very nearly, in going from God to nature and humanity, and in his march through history. But his method, as has already been observed, is wholly different from theirs. He begins with the study of human nature; they, with a flight more admirable for its loftiness than its science, soar at once to the Absolute. But after all, the great question, and the only one which it becomes us to ask is, not, Is this philosophy original? but, Is it true?

We have no room to discuss this question. Our opinion may have been already gathered. We approve his Method; it is the only true method. It is simply, What is in the consciousness? How did it come there? What is its legitimacy? In psychology, he applies his method with singular sagacity and success. He describes the actual consciousness with great acuteness and precision, and treats the primitive, the origin of our ideas, in a manner to merit our confidence; as is evinced by his "Criticism on Locke," translated by Mr. Henry, the production of a consummate metaphysician, and beyond question, one of the finest pieces of philosophical criticism in the world. That he has really thrown a bridge over the gulf which separates ontology from psychology, we have above disputed; but, after what he has shown us on the nature and developement of the reason, we believe we can leap it, and consequently dispense with the bridge. In erudition, in eloquence, as a writer and a lecturer, his merit cannot be easily exaggerated. His publications make an epoch in philosophical literature. The French language in his hands, poor and deficient as Englishmen suppose it, becomes equal to the profoundest thought, the warmest emotion, and the nicest metaphysical distinctions. We wish some one would appear to do a similar service to our own language, which, though possessed of ample resources, is now, in consequence of the loose manner in which it is used, and the repugnance to abstraction which characterizes those who use it, so vague, so equivocal in its philosophical department, that the metaphysician is sure to be baffled even in his most strenuous efforts to make himself intelligible, or at least to express himself without ambiguity. Mr. Linberg and Mr. Henry have had to contend with this difficulty in translating M. Cousin; but their success has been such as to do them great credit.

In the application of his system to War and European politics, perhaps it is no want of charity to M. Cousin, to believe that the Frenchman got the better of the philosopher. However that may be, though we are decidedly opposed to war, we believe what some call his defence of it, and for which they condemn him, is substantially correct; and, till men become wise enough and good enough to tolerate individual and national differences of opinion, the shock of ideas will issue in bloodshed. But, should it be found that in the application of his system he is not always correct, it would not lessen him in our opinion. We want no man to apply his system for us. Let him give us his method and his premises; we will do the rest for ourselves. We wish there were less judging a man by the applications which he makes of his system himself, and more attention directed to its principles.

We cannot conclude without thanking M. Cousin for the sympathy he uniformly expresses with humanity. He does not tell the truth with a sneer like Gibbon, with a cold regard to obtaining mere power over man with Machiavelli, nor with a malignant scowl at man's weakness with Hobbes. He feels himself a man, is penetrated with what the French happily call the sentiment of humanity. He contemplates the progress of the race with delight, and stands in awe before the dignity of human nature, which unveils itself before the light of his philosophy. So long have we been accustomed to see man's weaknesses paraded with a sort of savage exultation, to have our hopes damped, our noblest energies repressed, by eternal declamations against human depravity, that we hold him our personal friend and benefactor for having vindicated humanity, and showed that he feels it no disgrace to be a MAN.

In conclusion we would commend the study of his works to every one who would know himself; and especially to every young man whose soul burns to take an active part in the scenes around him, and to leave his trace on the age in which he lives. He who would hereafter become a great and good man, must be a great philosopher. We know there are those, who will contradict this assertion; we know there are those, who think very meanly of philosophy, and continually exclaim, "Give us practical men, not theorizers; actions, not systems"; but, without meaning to be discourteous, we bid all such persons go and study history. The mere actor passes off, is forgotten, and there remains no trace of his actions; but the philosopher, the mere theorizer, as he is contemptuously called, by the force of a few ideas which he throws out into the mass of thought, putteth down or setteth up kings, and prepares a new future for the human race. He who best comprehends and best developes ideas, is Earth's mightiest sovereign. A Sesostris, a Cyrus, an Alexander, may be gathered to their fathers, and their empires be forgotten; a Moses, a Socrates, a Plato, live and reign for ever.

O. A. B.

Art. IV.—*History of the Town of Plymouth, from its first Settlement in* 1620 *to the Present Time; with a Concise History of the Aborigines, &c.* By James Thacher. Second Edition. Boston: Marsh, Capen, & Lyon. 1835.

The rapid circulation of the former edition of the work, if not a sure test of its merit, was an indication, we think, both of the interest taken in the subject-matter by the public, and of the opinion they entertained of the author's ability to do it justice. And there were good reasons, we need not say, for the opinion, as well as for the interest. The contributions which Dr. Thacher had made to our historical *matériel*, not less than to other departments of our literature, authorized the expectation that the annals of his own Town,—and such a town, too, as it has been,—would, in his hands, be wrought into a volume of substantial and permanent value. We are rejoiced to see this expectation realized, especially in the issuing of the edition before us, with the very considerable improvements on the first, which several years of revision might be supposed to suggest. Its appearance must be a source of more than ordinary satisfaction to historical readers,—to most students, particularly, of our own peculiar history,—to all, who are anxious, as at least all Americans should be, to appreciate, and see appreciated, as it deserves, both the character of the Pilgrims, and that of the great enterprise by which their names are chiefly known.

Nor do we feel the necessity of apologizing for venturing to congratulate the venerable Chronicler himself on the completion of this latest (we hope not *last*) public labor of the more than four-score years, of which so large a portion has been devoted to his country's service. No idle employment is it for even years like these, to bestow them on the "noble task" of rendering this tribute to the generations which have gone before us. He who performs such a work well, deserves the privilege he secures, of connecting his own memory with *theirs*. Next, in these cases, to the doing a good thing, is the recording it fitly; and if, indeed, the good men do is worthy to survive them,— if its value involves its influence as an example, on Shakspeare's principle, that ..

> "One good deed dying tongueless,
> Slaughters a thousand hanging upon that,"

then is the "bene-dicere" not so much the preservation, as it is the sequel, of the "bene-facere" of the act. The historian consummates, more than he celebrates, the career of his heroes. He coins the bullion which they leave in rude obscurity, and gives it currency with the race. This is the "*clarum fieri, vel pace, vel bello.*" No wonder if "*et qui fecêre, et qui facta aliorum scripsêre, multi laudantur.*"

This is no time for going again over the old ground of the character of the extraordinary men who are commemorated in this volume; nor need we attempt a new disquisition on the mighty consequences, which have followed, and may follow, from the equally extraordinary events they were principally active in producing. All, however, will concur in the desirableness of preserving whatever *data* may be still collected. Philosophy, and theory, and poetry, we had before. These we can have at any time,—almost as well without *data* as with them,—sometimes a great deal better; but now we wanted facts. Let us have these, while they may yet be had; and the more of them, the better. The inferences may pretty safely be left to themselves.

A large proportion of this *matériel*, in some shape or other, has of course seen the light before. The art of inventing facts is an accomplishment as little to be desired, with the historian, as the art of suppressing them, or as the somewhat popular system of bringing them up, and putting them down, and turning them round about, after the fashion of a puppet-show, and according to the particular effect which the showman wishes to produce. We do not want showmen in history, but workmen. We do not want effects, but facts. We want no machinery, nor theory, but the truth; and the more of this, as we said before, the better.

On these principles, we do not at all object to our author's informing us how much the Town agreed "to pay the French Doctor for curing Hunter's wife." We are deeply interested in the affecting story of the loves of Captain Miles Standish and Miss Priscilla Mullins, of Cape Cod; not omitting how Alden managed to get the "damages" for himself, instead of his gallant friend, whose messenger he should have been; nor how, when he went to marry her, that famous journey was performed. Governor Winslow, too, we admire more than ever in his new capacity as *Skipper* of a corn-craft,—with some others of the old "standards" for a crew,—on a peddling expedition down to the Kennebec. We would not spare a single one of all the particulars of his two days' walk through the wilderness, forty miles, to the royal hut of Massasoit, when with his mixture of sassafras-roots and strawberry-leaves he cured that Monarch of his ails, and so on; especially when we find that his Excellency's right-hand man in this humble errand was possibly a personage still more illustrious finally than himself, and none other than Hampden, the renowned Patriot, destined so early afterwards to commence in his own country the overthrow of the monarchy, in "the first daring attempt (as Mr. Baylies calls it, in his Memoir of Plymouth,) for a free constitution in England." Well is it added, little did he think, when wandering in this manner along the banks of Taunton River, of the fate which awaited him. For ourselves, however, we confess our doubts about this statement.

Again, no gorgeous picture of the most splendid modern coronation could have an interest for us, compared with the simple sketch, which our annalist has borrowed from Mr. Winthrop's Journal, of a visit paid by that gentleman, with the Rev. Mr. Wilson of Boston, and a few other friends, to some of the dignitaries of Plymouth.

We like to know precisely how much of the journey was achieved by water, and how much on foot; and what was the time consumed each way; and how the company were entertained on their arrival; what were the ceremonies of the Sabbath, and of the sacrament, especially, which they partook of; how Mr. Roger Williams "prophesied," and then propounded a question for discussion; and how, after the Boston gentry had spoken to this in turn, Deacon Fuller put the congregation in mind of the *contribution*, "upon which the Governor and all the rest went down to the Deacon's seat, and put into the bag, and then"—"returned." It seems, when they went home, the Wednesday after, "*the* Lieutenant," Holmes, was one of their escort. There was no mistaking this functionary, evidently, for any other man. The title was a distinction, and a great honor,—as the office it indicated, and the circumstances of the times, demanded that it should be. These titles were never given for nothing. The "Captain's Mount," in Duxbury, and the "Cornet's Rocks" in Scituate, are monuments to this day of the feeling with which they were regarded; (the former named, we take it, after Standish, who lived in Duxbury some years, and died there, and the latter after Cornet Robert Stetson, of the first troop of light-horse raised in the Colony, and lineal ancestor of the six or seven generations, of his own name, who have ever since tenanted the neighbouring estate.)

All this, indeed, may be the gossip of history. Yet who would be willing to part with it? Who does not see that it pours a flood of light on the character of the men, and on the condition of the times? Who does not perceive, that it is the multitude of trifles, like these, which make up the life of the volume? Would there were more of them! How should we rejoice over the discovery of the private journal of Standish, for example, —had that worthy been so obliging as to keep one; or of Elder Brewster, or the handsome John Alden himself. How should we riot in even the log-book of honest Tom Clark, the master's-mate of the May-Flower?

What fresh interest, too, might gather about the glorious old Compact itself, signed in that vessel's cabin, could all the countless little circumstances of its execution,—of the controversy, the ceremony, the long, solemn, solitary discussions which occurred in connexion with it,—be restored to their old proximity with the words of the Instrument and the names attached to it. That would be a history, indeed, of the origin of our government. The system of American Republicanism would be laid bare to its roots. The character which has been the vitality of all the Pilgrim institutions, great and small, from that day to this, might then be subjected to a scrutiny almost as rigid as a chemical analysis. We should see men and things,—worth seeing,—as they were, and are. And this, we repeat, is what we need. This is history, as it should be. The nearer we can get to it, the better.

These remarks apply with peculiar emphasis to the case of Plymouth. There was the commencement of the colonization of New England, and here is the account of it. There was the first actual American government,—the first pure democracy in the world,—established; the model of most which have followed it. Here were the legitimate appurtenances, and consequences belonging to it,—all the systems of minor institutions,—developed; and its true principles, in all their application to practice, set forth in theory, and in operation. Here were the lives of the founders of the Republic passed. Here, in the midst of them, at the fountain-head of the great stream, must be gathered, if gathered at all, the true philosophy of those vast phenomena of after-days, and of ours, which, as the sequel of the sublime labor of the Pilgrims, have placed them in the first rank of the champions of the race.

As a town, merely, the annals of Plymouth are of rare value. From first to last, it has seen perhaps as much, as any other, of the various fortunes, which, as they have given interest to the experience, ought in proportion to impart spirit to the annals of the country. Its share in the trials of the settlement,—its connexion with the natives, and especially its part in Philip's War,—its various experiments in civil, social, and religious polity, from time to time,—are indices, as characteristic as can be anywhere found, of the several great subject-matters and the successive stages of history, to which they correspond. They are distinctive specimens of those states and stages,—disinterments of the *strata* of the past. No local annals could give a better notion of the history of the country at large.

The part taken by the town (one hundred years after the deadly struggle of King Philip) in the Revolution of 1775, was such, that it seems to have been but a slight accident, in our historian's opinion, which prevented the first battle being fought at "Plymouth instead of Lexington," [Concord]. The men of the Old Colony were in the whole service of the war, on land and sea. It was the gallant Sampson who received from our Provincial Congress, the appointment of one of the first naval captains in the defence of the country.* It was James Warren, (a lineal descendant of the Richard Warren who came over in the May-Flower,) who had the credit of originating, with Samuel Adams, the famous plan of general correspondence and Committees of Safety, which did so much for the public welfare; and who, as a member of the Provincial Congress, on the death of Joseph Warren, was appointed to succeed him as the President of that body. James Otis was here also for a time. General Peleg Wadsworth, whose adventures in Maine alone have afforded President Dwight *matériel* for a chapter of romance in real life, and the brave Scammel, who fell at Yorktown, were teachers of the town's youth about the same period. The names of Chauncy,

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* There is an anecdote, in the text, of Admiral Nelson, who at one time cruised off the harbour, and was visited from town. He was then a Captain.

Cotton, Robbins, and Judson,* are sufficient to remind us that their clergy were of kindred spirit.

Thus far have we spoken of the subject-matter of this volume, and especially of the character which is chiefly discussed and developed in it, in terms of praise alone. It will not be inferred that we are blind, or that our historian has shown himself to be so, to the faults of the Pilgrims. These are too obvious, indeed, and too familiar, to justify the affectation of setting up a court of inquiry here, at this late day, to try them anew. Those who wish to refresh their recollection of such points as are the least acceptable, we have presumed, to most readers, will find that he has given them sufficient opportunity to do so. They can go over the Indian intercourse, and the persecution of the Quakers, and the illiberal laws, to their hearts' content. None of these facts, which certainly make against them, whether as faults of their own or of the age, are here suppressed; — though we must acknowledge our apprehension, by the way, that, while the author's enthusiasm in the prosecution of his work, as an historian, has impelled him to an impartial exhibition of details, his enthusiasm, as a son of the Pilgrims, in behalf of their memory, has, perhaps, as strongly swayed him occasionally to conclusions, which even his own statements do not entirely sustain.

Take, for example, the case of Standish's summary treatment of the Indian whose head he fixed on the Plymouth fort, and the whole transaction connected therewith, which drove so many of the frightened savages to perish in the swamps; the generous Iyanough, and other chieftains, against whom nothing was known, among the number. No wonder that good Mr. Robinson appealed to the Plymouth Church, "to consider the disposition of their Captain, who was of *warm temper!*" The chief evidence on which the latter acted, seems to us to have been the declarations of Hobamock and Squanto, the latter of whom, pretty soon after his joining the English, had been ascertained to be a person "not to be relied on." † It was but too probable, that Hobamok, after *his* death, if not before, might have been influenced by similar views. At the best, it was but a single testimony, and did not justify going to work in the style we refer to, without so much as an inquiry into the matter of complaint, or an opportunity given for explanation or satisfaction by those complained of, provided there should be occasion for demanding either. As to the apparent "coolness" in the manners of Massasoit,* whose fidelity had been most thoroughly tested, there would seem to have been reason enough for that, in the facts (stated on the same page) regarding the Governor's refusal to punish Squanto at his master's demand, although the Governor himself "*admitted that he deserved death;*" — for the sole reason, it must be inferred, that the services of this vagabond were needed as interpreter, to keep up the "*necessary intercourse*" between the two people. After all, what was the crime suspected? It was "a hostile combination" of several tribes of Indians against the settlement at Wessagusset,† (or Weymouth.) This was the subject on which the Governor made his communication, such as it was, on the annual court-day. On the strength of this "it was resolved," that Standish should take men enough to meet all the Indians in the Bay, consult with the settlers at Weymouth, and bring home the head of the supposed ringleader, Wattawamat. In other words, war was not only declared, but commenced, and carried on till the end of it was thought to be attained. And who were the people in whose defence this movement was undertaken? They were fifty or sixty men sent out from England a few months before (by Mr. Weston), who had tarried awhile at Plymouth on the way; and there, after receiving every hospitality the place afforded, they had acknowledged it by committing numerous thefts, and wasting the provisions of the planters who furnished them with supplies.‡ The Doctor himself does but follow his authorities, when he calls them a set of "*profligate miscreants*"; and it appears, on the very next page, that they early began stealing from the Indians, and were "*continually exasperating them against both settlements.*" Again, complaints were made, and some were punished, and one white man hanged; but all "*without amendment.*" It was for combining against these miscreants, profligates, and thieves, who were daily insulting them, and devouring their substance by robbery, that the natives were thus summarily attacked. It was for the suspicion, rather, of their intention so to combine. All which, without dwelling longer on so disagreeable a subject, we can, by no means, with our present information, consider as a "*defensible*" proceeding. The various circumstances suggested as palliations, may be gladly so received, and made the most of; especially the fearful example of the then recent Virginian massacre, and the general excitement of the times; but of course they only palliate,—they do not excuse.

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* Father of the distinguished Baptist Missionary of the same name.

† Page 46.

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* Page 47. † p. 55. ‡ p. 48.

We shall leave this strain of comment with more pleasure than we commenced it, after adding our dissent to a proposition in the Appendix to this volume, where, speaking of Alexander, the son and successor of Massasoit, the historian, we think, has inadvertently fallen into a common opinion, that this unfortunate young man was "devoid of his father's good qualities." Yet it is admitted, that all which is known of him is derived from one transaction. That affair is detailed here in two forms,—Mr. Mather's and Mr. Cotton's. The latter is founded on a statement of Major Bradford, who was one of the actors in the scene; and it wholly exculpates Alexander from any misconduct, to say the least. Under these circumstances, it seems to us a hard case enough, that the life of this unfortunate personage should have been so disastrously cut short as it was, without adding the ignominy of such a character as historians, both here and elsewhere, have ventured to ascribe to him. We confess, our own inferences have been decidedly in favor of the Indian, even from the evidently hasty and prejudiced account furnished by Mather. Every one, however, can judge for himself; and we must do our author the justice to say, that, whether he is right or wrong in his reasoning, he has followed in this instance his invariable practice of furnishing the *data* which led him to adopt it. One or two such inaccuracies, if such they are, in a volume like this, are no great marvel. The typographical blunders, which, we suppose the author is not chargeable for, might afford us better scope for critical scrutiny; the unceremonious change, by two months, in the date of the Pilgrim's landing, among others; but these errata, on account of their palpable *gaucherie*, are mostly of a character to require little notice, and we have left ourselves no time to bestow it.

In fine, as we began with waving a discussion of the character of the Pilgrim enterprise, and its consequences, or even of the character of the men who devised and sustained it, we may as safely end with repeating the intimation, that the best compliment, the most generous justice, the worthiest monument, which can now be given them, is the strictest, plainest, and fullest statement, as far as possible, of what they did, and who they were. The task of mere eulogy, compared with this, if it be true, or founded on truth, is but a vain effort to construe actions which speak better for themselves. If it be *more* than true; — if it labor to conceal the real errors of systems, or the real weaknesses of men; — it fails of its own purposes as much, at least, as if it were *less*, — by suppressing the very obstacles which most of all, perhaps, — more than the elements, more than their enemies themselves, — were the trials the Pilgrims were called on to encounter, and to surmount. It was not only what they were, but what they did despite of what they were and what the age was with them, which gives them a title to our admiration. This we magnify in proportion as we magnify their faults and their misfortunes.

At all events we wish to know them as they were, and to appreciate, as it merits, the claim, which has been advanced for them, to the remembrance and the reverence of men. An extraordinary race they were, at least; such as the world never had known before, and never will know again. Extraordinary circumstances, which never can be revived, surrounded, nourished, educated, and impelled them. Consequences, most extraordinary of all, have resulted already from the lives, which their character and their circumstances together induced them, and enabled them, to lead; consequences developed, enough, long since, to prove them the founders of a new dynasty in the destinies of the race. We know not all as yet, indeed. We cannot know. We may not speculate even, with a tolerable plausibility, into the vast mysteries which veil the coming fortunes of the descendants of the Puritans. The existing spectacle, as Mr. Everett remarked at Plymouth, does not suggest even an idea of what must be. And yet, we see enough to feel, more and more, that the past, at least, must be secured; that the beginning, if nothing else, should be disclosed; that it is history, which must give us not only the sole clue we *can* have to prophecy, but the best interpretation of what we are ourselves, and what we owe, and have to do. And knowing and doing this, the rest may be left to those who may follow us. Time alone can tell the sequel of the story. Posterity must live it out. B. B. T.

Art. IV. — *Sartor Resartus.* In Three Books. Boston: James Munroe, & Co. 1836. 12mo. pp. 299.

N L Frothingham

In giving our readers some account of this singular production, we will begin by reversing the usual method of our vocation, and instead of a review utter a prophecy. Indeed the book is so very odd, that some departure from the common course seems the most appropriate to any notice of it. We predict, then, that it will not be read through by a great many persons, nor be liked by all its readers. Some will pronounce it unintelligible, or boldly deny that it has any good sound meaning. Some will be deterred by its Latin porch and German decorations from having any thing to do with what seems not intended for their accommodation; while perhaps their neighbour, attracted by the quaintness of the title, "Sartor Resartus," — *The Tailor Sewed Over,* — and thinking only of being amused in a passive way, will soon find his mistake, and declare himself imposed upon. The taste of some will be offended by what they will call its affectation and mannerism, and you shall not easily dispossess them of the notion, that the style is a jargon and the philosophy stark nought.

These are they that will rise up to defame and vilipend the elaborate and mystic book of The Philosophy of Clothes, by Dr. Diogenes Teufelsdröckh (Asafœtida), Professor of Things in General at the University of Weissnichtwo (Know-not-where), and living in the attic floor of the highest house in its Wahngasse (Whimsey Street). Even his choice phrases and profoundest speculations shall be as unsavoury to them as the drug, from which he has rather unaccountably, — to say the least of it, — taken his name.* But then we plainly foresee that there will be others, who will make very different account of our Professor's lucubrations. They will admire his wildest extravagances, and discover in his most playful disportings a hidden wisdom; even as the worshippers of Goethe found, and find still, a perfect system of philosophy and a whole canon of Scripture in the wondrous *diablerie* of the *Faust*. They will admit nothing in him to be obscure, nothing tedious. They will talk rather mystically about him at times, and as if they would form round him a special school of the initiated. Every novelty of the least pretension being now-a-days "a new revelation of man to himself," they will adjudge this "philosophy of clothes" to be among the leading phenomena of modern thought. Its style will be copied by young aspirants for literary fame. It will be quoted from the pulpit. It will be read aloud to enthusiastic circles of most intelligent persons.

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* An ingenious friend has just surmised, that there might be a secret design in the composition of this most un-euphonious proper name; as the Grecian part of it means *heaven-born,* and the German one the vilest of earthly or even infernal productions. This conjecture may seem to be confirmed by the character of our Professor, who is a great radical, and seems to be made up of violently opposite elements. "And yet, thou brave Teufelsdröckh, who could tell what lurked in thee? In thy eyes, deep under their shaggy brows, and looking out so still and dreamy, have we not noticed gleams of an ethereal or else a diabolic fire, and half fancied that their stillness was but the rest of infinite motion, the *sleep* of a spinning-top?" — p. 14. And again, p. 65. "Through all the vapor and tarnish of what is often so perverse, so

For our own part, we shall not be much surprised either at the neglect and aversion that it will experience in some quarters, or the unqualified admiration that it will excite in others. We think that they may both be explained equally well, without impeaching the critical acuteness of either of the parties; though we by no means profess ourselves to stand indifferent, or as a middle term, between them. We retain the lease of a small tenement in the *Wahngasse* ourselves, and frankly own that this book has great charms for us. It is written with an earnest and full spirit, though under a freakish form. It is the work of a contemplative, fervent, accomplished mind. It abounds with just and original thoughts, mixed up with the most diverting fancies, and expressed in a style which, though rather grotesque, is of extraordinary copiousness, beauty, and power. The peculiarity, indeed, of the style is just that which will be most objected to and most relished, according to the tastes of different readers. We see nothing to forgive in it, though it is one of the last to be proposed for imitation. It certainly could not be changed without destroying the whole harmony of the performance. It is not only the appropriate dress, but a part of the very substance, of the work. If any will persist in calling it affected, we can only say that it seems

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mean in his exterior and environment, we seem at times to look into a whole inward sea of light and love; though, alas, the grim, coppery clouds soon roll together again, and hide it from view." "One knows not whether to hate or to love him." — p. 64.

to fall very naturally from the pen that employs it, and that such affectations are not often to be met with. If any should wonder how it came to be adopted by the author of "The Life of Schiller," we think that, if they will but turn to the same author's masterly translation of John Paul's (Richter's) "Life of Quintus Fixlein," the mystery will be found solved at once. It seems to have been caught from familiarity with that strange genius, and suits perfectly the assumed character which he here undertakes to sustain.

Mr. Carlyle, who is well understood to be the only Professor Teufelsdröckh we are to think of, has published nothing as yet under his own name. His translations from the German novelists did not tell the English public to whom it was indebted for them. "The Life of Schiller" was anonymous. His chief reputation, both here and at home, arose from several remarkable articles in the British Reviews, of which the parentage would never have been known, if they had not excited the general curiosity. "Sartor Resartus" first appeared in several successive numbers of Fraser's Magazine. He collected it into a volume for the gratification of his friends; and of that volume this is an exact reprint, with the exception of a preface by the American editors, which is short and neat and just what it should be. The last literary announcement of his is a work on the French Revolution. We are looking for it among the pleasant things that are to come, and should have been favored with it perhaps before now, but for one of those disasters which Sir Isaac Newton has been famed for enduring so patiently. One of the volumes was confided in manuscript to a friend, and was burnt up,—by what ravenous chance we never learned. The contents had to be reproduced. It remains to be seen what the result will be of that most heart-sinking of all toil. We are happy, however, to have his own assurance that "the burnt ashes have again grown leaves, after a sort"; though almost two volumes were still to be gone through with, at mid-summer of the past year. The last rumor we heard of his more personal projects was, that he was thinking of making a voyage before the next winter to the United States.

"Sartor Resartus," according to its *form*, is a dissertation on clothes, or rather, selections from such a dissertation, composed by the German sage whose name we do not desire again to repeat, and interspersed with extracts from his autobiography. It is fragmentary of course. Its desultory starts and unlooked-for combinations remind us sometimes of Sterne, though it does not imitate, nor is it indebted to him.* It is more easy and serious than he. It is never on the strain after mere singularity. It carries a deeper significance in its vagaries. We need hardly say, that it is every way above him in elevation of sentiment and reach of thought, in heart and conscience, as well as in invention and imagery and wealth of expression. That unscrupulous humorist has the impudence to say, in a preface to his Sermon on Conscience, that the sermon had "already appeared in the body of a *moral* work, more read than understood." Our author's work is indeed a moral one. It is never loose and indecent in its sportiveness; and if you now and then meet with what is less refined than you can desire, it will have at least a sober intent, and probably the coarseness will be somewhat wrapped up, as it is in the Latin of Count Zähdarm's epitaph.

It loves to bring together the low and the lofty, the learned and vulgar, the strange and familiar, the tragic and comic, into rather violent contrasts. We cannot say that it is always clear and sprightly. The words are often unusual, the digressions bewildering, the objects in view not very manifest. But it will seldom fail to repay a careful attention. The device of making a book by pretending to edit the papers of another person may appear to be rather a stale one, and has certainly been of late pressed quite unconscionably into the service. But in the present instance it was absolutely essential to the management of the author's plan, and has been so ingeniously availed of as quite to reconcile us to it.

If it were worth while to spend a moment upon verbal niceties, we should say that we were struck with the frequent recurrence of certain favorite turns of phrase, which has sometimes an unpleasant effect. There can be no reasonable objection to the roughest Germanisms, abundant as they are, for they are fairly in place; but the blemish we allude to is one to be avoided by a writer, whose English, though highly characteristic, is so sterling and deep with the true old stamp. We have, for example, more than sufficient of the word "enough." The use of what may be called a negative and a half, such as "not without," "not un—" is repeated to satiety. "To go" dead, — forgotten, — dumb, — silent, &c. are liable to the same reproof. But these are trifles, mentioned only because they happened to attract our notice.

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* This is more, we fear, than can be said with truth of a very clever book called "The Doctor." It overflows with learning and good things; but we hardly know how to pardon its rambling prodigality. Its drollery savours strongly of second hand; and its copious sweepings of a most industrious portfolio, in scraps from almost every language of ancient and modern Europe, are in danger of being found as dull as an excellent jest-book.

From the form of "The Tailor Sewed Over," we pass to what is of chief importance, and interest also, — its *matter.* We have already intimated that the whole fiction about Clothes and the Jena Doctor with the disagreeable name, was designed to dress up and set forth a series of reflections on Society and Religion, on Man and the Universe. These are the substance of the work, and they are combined *not un*naturally with the clothes-metaphor. The object of the author is to present the Inmost, the Essential, the Absolute, the Idea. Every thing that is outside of this may therefore be considered, in very simple propriety, as its garments. It is of those outsides that he seeks to divest it. The outermost that belongs to men is their literal clothing. Take that away, and they are still "clothed with skin and flesh, with bones and sinews." Their social *habits* also, — what are they but the integuments of a hidden nature? And so he goes on, though not in the homely prose fashion in which we are endeavouring to explain him, till he arrives at Space and Time, those two mighty envelopes of the soul and of being.

"And now," he cries, "does the spiritual, eternal essence of man, and of mankind, bared of such wrappages, begin in any measure to reveal itself? Can many readers discern, as through a glass darkly, in huge, wavering outlines, some primeval rudiments of man's being, what is changeable divided from what is unchangeable? Does that Earth-Spirit's speech in *Faust:*

'T is thus at the roaring loom of time I ply,
And weave for God the garment thou seest Him by;

begin to have some meaning for us?" — pp. 268, 269.

There is a paragraph, also, on the 73d page, which we may take hold of as a sort of key for the unfolding of the whole general plan:

"Why multiply instances? It is written, 'The heavens and the earth shall fade away like a vesture;' which indeed they are, —

the time-vesture of the Eternal. Whatsoever sensibly exists, whatever represents spirit to spirit, is properly a clothing, a suit of raiment, put on for a season, and to be laid off. Thus, in this one pregnant subject of CLOTHES, rightly understood, is included all that men have thought, dreamed, done, and been; the whole external universe and what it holds, is but clothing; and the essence of all science lies in the PHILOSOPHY OF CLOTHES."

Such is a brief and extremely imperfect account of "Sartor Resartus," with its strange subject, and its still stranger method. Whether congenial or not with our tastes and intellectual habits, it is certainly one of the most extraordinary works of our day. It is wrought with great learning and ingenuity, though without the appearance of effort. It throws out the noblest conceptions as if at play, and its sparkling expressions seem kindled by the irrepressible fervor of a brilliant mind. It has imagination enough to give a poet renown; more sound religion and ethics than slumber in the folios of many a body of divinity; more periods that one would copy down in his note-book, to read and read again, than are to be found in all the writings together of many a one who has made himself famous everywhere for having written well. It is not equally sustained in every part; how should it be? — but we can scarcely look where we shall not find something of tenderness or sublimity or wit or wisdom; — something that makes us feel, and makes us reflect too, as deeply as some more pretending "Aids to Reflection." *

What we chiefly prize in it is its philosophic, spiritual, humane cast of thought. It is in thorough opposition to the materialism and mechanisms of our grooved and iron-bound times. It resists the despotism of opinion seeking to rule by crowds and suffrages and machinists' devices. It soars away far beyond the theories of Utilitarian calculators. It spurns every thing shallow. It expands and lifts itself above every thing contracted. It places us at a free distance from the turmoil of vulgar and selfish life. It exposes many an abuse and illusion of the passing ages. It is spirit. Warm with kind

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* A rather heavy book under this title is in many hands. It has at least the merit of appearing to be struggling *up* after something. It has excellent paragraphs, but is all in pieces, like the rest of its author's works, and unhappily like his own life also. "Hadst thou not Greek enough to understand thus much: '*The end of man is an action, and not a thought,*' though it were the noblest?"

affections, and almost wild with generous aspirations after the broadest truth and the highest good, it is elevating when it most amuses us. It even perplexes us to some wholesome intent. It rebukes the hard dogmatism of conceited disputers, till it makes it look as poor and as ridgy as it really is. Here are true "Materials for Thinking," while much that circulates with that label is but an insisting that men shall think perversely. *

But it is time that we should permit the author to speak for himself. Here is a night scene:

"*Ach mein Lieber*," said he once at midnight, when we had returned from the coffee-house in rather earnest talk, "it is a true sublimity to dwell here. These fringes of lamplight, struggling up through smoke, and thousand-fold exhalation, some fathoms into the ancient reign of Night, what thinks Boötes of them, as he leads his hunting dogs over the zenith in their leash of sidereal fire? That stifled hum of midnight, — when traffic has lain down to rest, and the chariot-wheels of vanity, still rolling here and there through distant streets, are bearing her to halls roofed in and lighted to the due pitch for her, and only vice and misery, to prowl or to moan like night-birds, are abroad, — that hum, I say, like the stertorous, unquiet slumber of sick life, is heard in heaven! Oh, under that hideous coverlid of vapors, and putrefactions, and unimaginable gases, what a fermenting-vat lies simmering and hid! The joyful and the sorrowful are there; men are dying there, men are being born; men are praying, — on the other side of a brick partition men are cursing; and around them all is the vast, void Night. . . . . . Gay mansions, with supper-rooms and dancing-rooms, are full of light and music, and high-swelling hearts; but, in the condemned cells, the pulse of life beats tremulous and faint, and blood-shot eyes look out through the darkness, which is around and within, for the light of a stern last morning. . . . . . Riot cries aloud, and staggers and swaggers in his rank dens of shame; and the mother, with streaming hair, kneels over her pallid, dying infant, whose cracked lips only her tears now moisten.— All these, heaped and huddled together, with nothing but a little carpentry and masonry between them; — . . . . . *such* work goes on under that smoke-counterpane! — But I, *mein Werther*, sit above it all; I am alone with the stars." — pp. 20, 21.

A word for the arts:

"Man is a tool-using animal. Weak of himself, and of small stature, he stands on a basis, at most, for the flattest-soled, of some half square-foot, insecurely enough; has to straddle out his legs lest the very winds supplant him. Feeblest of bipeds! Three quintals are a crushing load for him; the steer of the meadow tosses him aloft, like a waste rag. Nevertheless, he can use tools, can devise tools. With these, the granite mountain melts into light dust before him; he kneads glowing iron, as if it were soft paste; seas are his smooth high-way, winds and fire his unwearying steeds. Without tools he is nothing, with tools he is all." — p. 40.

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* See, who will, two volumes of impudent trumpery under this title, by one William Burdon. 5th edition! London. 1829.

The following paragraph may serve to illustrate the leading idea of the book.

"To the eye of vulgar logic, what is man? An omnivorous biped that wears breeches. To the eye of pure reason, what is he? A soul, a spirit, and divine apparition. Round his mysterious Me, there lies, under all those wool-rags, a garment of flesh (or of senses), contextured in the loom of heaven; whereby he is revealed to his like, and dwells with them in UNION AND DIVISION; and sees and fashions for himself a universe, with azure, starry spaces, and long thousands of years. Deep hidden is he under that strange garment; amid sounds and colors and forms; as it were swathed in, and inextricably overshrouded; yet is it sky-woven, and worthy of a God. Stands he not thereby in the centre of immensities, in the conflux of eternities? He feels; power has been given him to know, to believe; nay, does not the spirit of love, free in its celestial, primeval brightness, even here though but for moments, look through? Well said Saint Chrysostom, with his lips of gold, 'The true *shekinah* is man.'" — pp. 64, 65.

To illustrate the idea, that "thought without reverence is barren, perhaps poisonous," he says, on page 68th,

"The man who cannot wonder, who does not habitually wonder (and worship), were he President of innumerable Royal Societies, and carried the whole *Mécanique Céleste* and *Hegel's Philosophy*, and the epitome of all laboratories and observatories with their results, in his single head, — is but a pair of spectacles behind which there is no eye. Let those who have eyes look through him, then he may be useful. — Thou wilt have no mystery and mysticism; wilt walk through thy world by the sunshine of what thou callest truth, or even by the hand-lamp of what I call attorney-logic; and 'explain' all, 'account' for all, or believe nothing of it. Nay, thou wilt attempt laughter; — whoso recognises the unfathomable, all-pervading domain of mystery, which is everywhere under our feet and among our hands, — to whom the universe is an oracle and temple, as well as a kitchen and cattle-stall, — he shall be a (delirious) mystic; to him thou with sniffing charity

wilt protrusively proffer thy hand-lamp, and shriek as one injured when he kicks his foot through it? *Armer Teufel!* . . . . . Retire into private places with thy foolish cackle; or, what were better, give it up, and weep not that the reign of wonder is done, and God's world all disembellished and prosaic, but that thou hitherto art a dilettante and sandblind pedant."

We perceive that at this rate we should be long in coming to an end, and will therefore turn resolutely at once towards the latter part of the book. We leave untouched the images of a world without clothes, amusing "*enough*," but rather too fantastic for the gravity of our Magazine. We will repeat nothing about school-masters and school-days, though there are some things shrewdly spoken of them. We will not describe the boy's first bereavements, when his "mother wept, and her sorrow got vent, but in his heart there lay a whole lake of tears, pent up in silent desolation." We will stop to copy no flower from the bloomy pictures of young love. We will turn away from the battle-field, at page 175th, though seldom has it been, with a few vigorous pencil-strokes, so fearfully delineated. There is the admirable chapter, too, "The Everlasting Yea." We will but point to it. It makes Christian renunciation look attractive as well as obligatory, and beautifully describes that "low crypt, arched out of falling fragments," where the altar of the "*Worship of Sorrow*" may still be found, "and its sacred lamp perennially burning." Zollikofer has a sermon on the difference between *Glück* and *Glückseligkeit;* but he does not set forth the doctrine so glowingly as we find it here, that "there is in man a HIGHER than love of happiness; he can do without happiness, and instead thereof find blessedness."—We will not look over a stitch in George Fox's suit of leather; nor repeat a word of the dissertation on Symbols, that censures so sharply the "Genius of Mechanism," and man's "self-love and arithmetical understanding."

We will open at the 265th page, and extract a paragraph or two on the taking subject of Ghosts.

"Could any thing be more miraculous than an actual, authentic ghost? The English Johnson longed all his life to see one; but could not, though he went to Cock Lane, and thence to the church vaults, and tapped on coffins. Foolish Doctor! Did he never, with the mind's eye as well as with the body's, look round him into that full tide of human life he so loved? did he never so much as look into himself? The good Doctor was a

ghost, as actual and authentic as heart could wish; well nigh a million of ghosts were travelling the streets by his side. Once more I say, sweep away the illusion of time; compress the threescore years into three minutes. What else was he, what else are we? Are we not spirits shaped into a body, into an appearance; and that fade away again into air and invisibility? This is no metaphor, it is a simple, scientific *fact*. We start out of nothingness, take figure, and are apparitions. Round us, as round the veriest spectre, is eternity; and to eternity minutes are as years and æons. Come there not tones of love and faith, as from celestial harpstrings, like the song of beatified souls? And again, do we not squeak and gibber (in our discordant, screech-owlish debatings and recriminatings); and glide bodeful, and feeble, and fearful; or uproar *(poltern)* and revel in our mad dance of the dead,—till the scent of the morning air summons us to our still home; and dreamy night becomes awake and day? Where now is Alexander of Macedon? Does the steel host, that yelled in fierce battle-shouts at Issus and Arbela, remain behind him; or have they all vanished utterly, even as perturbed goblins must? Napoleon, too, and his Moscow retreat, and Austerlitz campaigns! Was it all other than the veriest spectre-hunt; which has now, with its howling tumult that made night hideous, flitted away?—Ghosts! There are nigh a thousand million walking the earth openly at noontide; some half-hundred have vanished from it, some half-hundred have arisen in it, ere thy watch ticks once.

"O Heaven, it is mysterious, it is awful, to consider that we not only carry each a future ghost within him, but are in very deed ghosts! These limbs, whence had we them; this stormy force; this life-blood with its burning passions? They are dust and shadow; a shadow-system gathered round our ME; wherein, through some moments or years, the Divine Essence is to be revealed in the flesh. That warrior on his strong war-horse; fire flashes through his eyes; force dwells in his arm and heart; but warrior and war-horse are a vision, a revealed force, nothing more. Stately they tread the earth, as if it were a firm substance. Fool! The earth is but a film; it cracks in twain, and warrior and war-horse sink beyond plummet's sounding. Plummet's? Fantasy herself will not follow them. A little while ago they were not; a little while and they are not, their very ashes are not."

One word from the chapter on Dandies, who are defined to be "Clothes-wearing men, or men whose trade, office, and existence consists in the wearing of Clothes;" in which allusion is made to "an individual named *Pelham*, who seems to be a mystagogue, and leading teacher and preacher of the sect."

"Of their sacred books"—fashionable novels—"I, not without expense, procured myself some samples; and in hope of true insight, and with a zeal which beseems an inquirer into Clothes, set to interpret and study them. But wholly to no purpose. That tough faculty of reading, for which the world will not refuse me credit, was here for the first time foiled and set at nought. In vain that I summoned my whole energies *(mich weidlich anstrengte)*, and did my very utmost. At the end of some short space, I was uniformly seized with not so much what I can call a drumming in my ears, as a kind of infinite, insufferable Jews-harping and scrannel-piping there; to which the frightfullest species of magnetic sleep soon supervened. . . . . . Loving my own life and senses as I do, no power shall induce me, as a private individual, to open another *Fashionable Novel.*" — p. 278.

We here part with our author, hoping to meet him again in the book of the French Revolution. We shall probably leave many of our readers in the condition that he has himself described:

"Can it be hidden from the Editor that many a British reader sits reading quite bewildered in head, and afflicted rather than instructed by the present work? Yes, long ago has many a British reader been, as now, demanding with something like a snarl: Whereto does all this lead; or what use is in it?

" In the way of replenishing thy purse, or otherwise aiding thy digestive faculty, O British reader, it leads to nothing, and there is no use in it; but rather the reverse, for it costs thee somewhat. Nevertheless, if through this unpromising Horn-gate, Teufelsdröckh, and we by means of him, have led thee into the true land of dreams, and through the Clothes-screen, as through a magical *Pierre-Pertuis,* thou lookest even for moments into the region of the wonderful, and seest and feelest that thy daily life is girt with wonder, and based on wonder, and thy very blankets and breeches are miracles, — then art thou profited beyond money's worth, and hast a thankfulness towards our Professor." — pp. 270, 271.

We started with the acknowledgment that this book would be distasteful to many. But we fearlessly commend it to another many, who will find their hearts greatly in unison with it. It is not a work to be glanced at here and there. It should not be read through in a breath. It must be conned carefully, and not too much at a time. We do not say that it never put our very selves out of patience; but we declare in all sincerity, that we believe few books of its compass will reward the exercise of patience better.

N. L. F.

[For the Christian Examiner.]

Art. VI — *Thoughts on the Personality of the Word of God.*

To do good and to get good should be the desire and the study of the living man, so long as God continues his mental faculties. At this period of life and with my infirmities it is but little that I can hope to do; but to do according to the ability which God giveth is all that he requires. He yet continues to me some portion of mental vigor, and a heart to delight in the study of his revealed will. Recently my thoughts have been employed on the supposed personality of "the Word" — "the Word of God." To write any thing like a thorough review of the subject would be more than I could reasonably hope to accomplish. I may, however, be enabled to record a selection of thoughts, which may be in some degree useful to myself, and to some portion of my fellow men. I will therefore hope in the mercy of God, — and, with reliance on him, proceed to state some facts and thoughts relating to the subject, which shall appear to me both true and important.

1. I freely admit that Jesus, the Messiah, was properly a person, anointed of God, — one in whom the Father dwelt in a peculiar and intimate manner, — and that he is the person of whom it is said, "his name is called the *Word of God.*" Rev. xix. 13. Among the Jews it was a custom to give or assume significant names. The angel who appeared to Joseph, the reputed father of the Messiah, said to him, "Thou shalt call his name Jesus, — for he shall save his people from their sins." As Jesus signifies Saviour, it was properly given to him whom the "Father sent to be the Saviour of the world." As bread is food for the body, so the truths of the Gospel are food for the soul. As Jesus was the medium through which God was pleased to communicate this food to men, the Messiah in one of his figurative discourses said to his hearers, "I am the Bread of life" — "the Bread of God which came down from heaven" — "the living Bread." This was figurative language, and on the same principle he might be called the Word of God. When Jesus instituted the memorial of his death, he said — "This *cup* is the new Covenant in my blood." No Christian perhaps doubts, that by the *cup* Jesus meant the *wine* which the cup contained; this was an emblem of his blood. The body or flesh of Christ was the Bread of life, in

the same sense that the *wine* was called the cup. To give to a vessel the name of the thing which it contains is a common figure of speech.

2. What was written by John concerning the Word in the first chapter of his Gospel is supposed to have been the principal ground on which the hypothesis was formed, that by the Word is meant a second person in the Godhead. Had it not been for what John wrote, no such opinion perhaps would ever have been entertained. Cruden, the author of a celebrated "Concordance," was much disposed to favor this hypothesis; yet he has marked but six cases in which he thought the WORD meant a divine person. Four of these are in the first chapter of John's Gospel. One is found in 1 John v. 7,—the text, which at this day is supposed to be spurious. The other is Rev. xix. 13, were the Messiah has his name "called the Word of God," as significant of his office, or the errand on which he was sent into the world. When on trial, Jesus said to Pilate; "To this end was I born, for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth." This he did during his ministry; and this testimony he sealed with his blood.

3. Some learned men have supposed, that John employed the term *logos* or Word, in a sense which he borrowed from Plato's philosophy; but who can admit this, that duly considers how often the term "Word," had been used in the Old Testament? Unless John meant to mislead his readers, it is reasonable to believe that he used the term in its Scriptural sense. In the Old Testament as well as in the New, the Word is sometimes personified, or spoken of as though a person was intended. It is said "the Word of the Lord came" to one and another of the prophets, "saying." Then we are told what the Word said to them. Yet in the New Testament the matter is thus explained—"Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." 2 Pet. i. 21. Who can doubt that what Peter ascribes to the Holy Ghost is the same that was ascribed to the Word in the Old Testament. It is true, that in both forms of speech the agency of a real person is implied; and that person was Jehovah, the living Father. He came by his Word or spirit, and taught the prophets, what they should say or write. Had it been written "Jehovah came to Jeremiah saying,"—and then by Peter, that "holy men of God wrote as they were moved by the Father," the meaning would, I believe, have been the same that was meant by the forms of speech adopted

in the Bible. It is supposed, that David sometimes wrote by inspiration. Among his last words are the following. "The spirit of God spake by me, and his word was in my tongue. The God of Israel said, the Rock of Israel spake to me, He that ruleth over men must be just." 2 Sam. xxiii. 2, 3. Here, if I mistake not, we have four different forms of expressing nearly the same thing. What is said, spoken, or done, by "the spirit of the Lord," or "the Word," is spoken or done by "the God of Israel," and by "the Rock of Israel." What more does the whole amount to than this, that David spoke as he was taught by God, or by the spirit of God? Those who are fond of having a plurality of persons in the one God, may perhaps find four as clearly spoken of by David, as three are spoken of in any part of the Bible; "The spirit of the Lord,—the Word,—the God of Israel,—and the Rock of Israel." These four, it seems, united in teaching the same lesson—"He that ruleth over men, must be just." May I then go forth and proclaim that the one God is four distinct persons?

4. Is not the term Word, as well as the Spirit, of the neuter gender? are not its pronouns, *it, its, it,* not *he, his, him,* when they are grammatically given, except in a very few instances of personification? Had the rule of grammar now in view been duly observed in the common translation of the first chapter of John's Gospel, how very little there would have been of even the appearance, that, by the Word, was meant a person distinct from the God mentioned in the first verse. In translating the first four verses Dr. Campbell has observed the rule of grammar, which requires the pronoun to "agree with the noun in gender and number." The following is his translation:—"In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God; and the Word was God. *This* was in the beginning with God. All things were made by *it,* and without *it* not a single creature was made. In *it* was life, and the life was the light of men."—So far is this translation from representing the Word as a person equal with the Father, that there is scarcely the shadow of personification.

In further speaking of the last clause of the first verse Dr. Campbell says:—"The old English translation, authorized by Henry VIII., following the arrangement used in the original, says 'God was the Word.'" Perhaps this more correctly expresses the meaning of John, than saying, "the Word was God." John probably meant, that God was manifested in or by his word, — that word by which he spoke the world of creation into existence.

5. In my opinion Dr. Campbell was correct in saying that in the first verse "there was a manifest allusion to the account given in the first chapter of Genesis, where we learn that 'In the beginning God made all things by his Word,' God said 'and it was so.'" — But may I suppose that a "God *said*," or a word spoken by the Almighty, was a distinct person equal to himself? — It is my opinion, that by what John said of the Word in this chapter, he meant to teach Christians, that the same Almighty power, by which God in the beginning spoke the natural light into existence, had been caused to dwell in Jesus as the Messiah, to establish his mission as divine, that he might be the spiritual light of the world, — the light of men.

In other words, I think John meant to teach, that the same divine Power, Word, or Spirit, which gave existence to the first creation, had been displayed in the new creation, and that both were equally the works of God. The divine Word, or all-sufficiency of God, having been caused to dwell in Jesus as the Messiah, John proceeds to say; "We beheld his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father." Here we have the Word dwelling in the Messiah, in whom it pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell. The all-creating Word, the spirit not by measure, the fulness of the Godhead, and the Father dwelling in Christ, seem to me but different forms of expressing the same thing, each denoting the all-sufficiency which it pleased the Father should dwell in his Son. Nor have I the least doubt, that the Messiah was as all-sufficient as he could have been by union with a second person of Deity equal to the Father. Christ said expressly "The Father who dwelleth in me, he doeth the works." If all fulness dwelt in the Father, and he dwelt in Christ, what more could be necessary either to the dignity or the sufficiency of the Messiah? What addition is made to either by the hypothesis, that Jesus was united to a second person equal with the Father? The hypothesis seems to me adapted to confuse the minds of men, and greatly to obscure the real glory of the Messiah.

6. In the 4th verse of John's Gospel we thus read concerning the Word — "In *it* was life, and the life was the light of men." While this Word dwelt in Christ he said, "I am the light of the world," — "The words which I speak, they are spirit and they are life." It was by his words, by reveal-

ing the truths of the gospel, that Jesus was the light of the world. By the all-creating word of his power God gave life to the various tribes of animals. So when he had caused this Word to tabernacle in the flesh, Jesus was enabled to give natural life to some who had been dead; and to give spiritual life to many who had been dead in trespasses and sins. By the indwelling of the Father, — by his Spirit or Word, Jesus could say, "I am the resurrection and the life." The power of the divine Word was as really displayed when Jesus said, "Lazarus, come forth," as when "God said, Let there be light." In both cases the effects corresponded with the mandate, — with the Almighty Word.

7. It may be proper to inquire whether the Scriptures do not afford further evidence, than has yet been brought to view, that John, in the first verse of his Gospel, alluded to the first chapter of Genesis in what he said of the Word, and not to any hypothesis of a plurality of persons in the Deity. In speaking of the scoffers who are to appear in the last days, Peter says; "For this they are willingly ignorant of, that by the Word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water, and in the water, whereby the world that then was, being overflowed, perished. But the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same Word are reserved unto fire against the day of judgment, and the perdition of ungodly men." 2 Pet. iii. 5, 6, 7. "Through faith we understand that the worlds were made by the Word of God." Heb. xi. 3. "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the *breath* of his mouth." Ps. xxxiii. 6. In each of these passages there is probably an allusion to what is recorded in the first chapter of Genesis. To what other passage of the Scriptures could either of these writers have referred? They all, doubtless, had in view some well-known passage of scripture which related to the creation of the heavens and the earth; and I know not of any other which seems so probable as the account in Genesis. In the latter part of the verse quoted from the thirty-third Psalm, the "breath" of the Lord is the same as the spirit of the Lord; and is nearly the same as the "Word of the Lord" in the first part of the verse, as our words are the same as the breath by which they are formed.

By the call of Christ, — "Lazarus, come forth," life was given to a corpse which had been dead four days. Suppose that in another account of this event we should read that the

Word of Christ raised Lazarus from the dead; might we hence infer, that the word of Christ is a second person of the Messiah, equal with Jesus? If not, why should we from similar language infer, that God and his Word are two distinct persons? Whatever is done by the Word of a man is done by the man; in the same way we should infer, that what is done by the Word of God, or by the spirit of God, is done by God himself. All this is according to the common acceptation of language. When a writer departs from this use of language, he either writes incorrectly, or he uses the words in a figurative sense.

8. God communicates his revelations to us in the language of men, and we must suppose that he uses words in a sense known to men, or they would not contain revelations. For they would be to us words without meaning, and could communicate to us no idea. God is to us invisible, and we can have no idea of the manner in which effects are produced by him, otherwise than by supposing something pertaining to him analogous to those members or properties by which effects are produced by us. Hence God is represented in the Scriptures as having eyes and ears, arms, hands, fingers and feet, — a mouth, a tongue, lips, breath, and speech or Word. By the use of such members, or properties, we produce effects; and God is represented as producing effects in a similar manner. Yet it is possible, and perhaps probable, that what is called his spirit, includes all that is meant by most of the members he is represented as possessing, — such as his arms, hands, fingers, his mouth, breath, and word. For it is very certain that these are often used as synonymous with his spirit. His arm, hand, finger, breath, and word, are expressive of his power; and so is his spirit and his word. In Matt. xii. 28, Christ is represented as saying, "If I by the *spirit* of God cast out devils." In Luke xi. 20, the same idea is thus expressed, "If I by the *finger* of God cast out devils." What then can be more certain, than that in such cases the *spirit* of God means the same as the *finger* of God. So a man's spirit or power may often be represented as his hand or finger; or that may be ascribed to a man's hand or finger which is effected by his breath, spirit, energy, or word.

9. Every member or property of a man may be personified and spoken of as though it was a distinct person. How often do we personify his arm, his hand, his mouth, his tongue, his

breath, and his word. To each of these human agency is often ascribed, as though they were personal agents. In like manner, the arm, the hand, and the finger of God are personified, as well as his Word and spirit, or breath. But when we personify the arm or hand of man, or his breath or his word, it is seldom, I believe, that learned men make such mistakes as to suppose that by these members, or personified properties, are really meant several distinct persons in one man. Why then, should they not evince equal wisdom, or equal candor, when the attributes or properties of God happen to be personified in the Scriptures? This would be no more than judging from analogy as to the meaning of Scripture personifications. But when they convert such personifications into real persons, do they not in fact depart from all known analogies in the use of language? And have they not as good ground for affirming that a man is three distinct persons as for affirming this of God?

We read of "the Word of Christ," and of "the Spirit of Christ," as well as of the Word and Spirit of God. We also are informed that the Messiah is "the image of the invisible God." If then, God is three distinct persons, why may we not infer that the Messiah is also three distinct persons.

10. Is it not a solemn truth that the Hand of God is more frequently personified in the Bible, than either his Word or his Spirit? Besides, one of the principal arguments to prove that the Word and the Spirit of God are persons equal with the Father is this, that the same divine works are ascribed to the Word and the Holy Spirit as to the Father, — and particularly the work of creation. Let us then see whether, on the same ground, the Hand of God should not be regarded as a fourth distinct person of the Godhead. Let Jehovah himself be the witness in this case. "Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool, for all these things hath my Hand made." — Isa. lxvi. 1, 2. "Mine Hand also hath laid the foundations of the earth." — xlviii. 13. Hear too what God has said of his Arm, which perhaps implies the Hand. "Mine Arm shall judge the people, — and on mine Arm shall they trust." Can any thing short of a person equal with God be competent to judge the people, or be to them a proper object of trust? Yet who has supposed the Hand or the Arm of God, to mean a distinct person equal with the Father? Full evidence can be produced from

the Bible that the work of creation is ascribed to the Father, — to the Word of God, — to the Spirit of God, and to the Hand of God; why then have we not as good evidence that God is at least four persons, as that he is three. It is, however, my belief that as, when any work is ascribed to the Hand of Moses, or the Word of Moses, the meaning is the same as when it is ascribed directly to Moses; so, when any work is ascribed to the Word, the Spirit, or the Hand of the Lord, the meaning is the same as when it is directly ascribed to Jehovah himself. The explanation which has now been given respecting what is ascribed to the Hand of God, would doubtless be admitted as correct by those who believe that God is three persons. Let them then only extend the principle to what is ascribed to the Word and the Spirit of God, and they may find that the hypothesis that God is three persons, is as needless as the hypothesis that he is four persons.

11. Suppose that, on an impartial examination of the Scriptures, the following facts should be discovered as unquestionably true; — That in as many as thirty instances God is styled "the Holy THREE of Israel;" that in many other cases he is styled "the Holy THREE," or "the high and lofty THREE," but never "the Holy One"; that, in speaking of themselves, the Holy THREE are accustomed to the use of this language, "*We* are the God; and besides *us* there is no God," "Thou shalt have no other gods before *us*;" that there are several thousands of pronouns for God, Jehovah, the Most High, all of which are in the plural form, excepting three or four, as *we*, *our*, *us*, — not *I*, *my*, *me*; that all the prayers and every ascription of praise, which are found in the Bible as addressed to God, are addressed to the Holy THREE, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. Now what would be thought of learned Christians who should treat all this evidence as nothing, and boldly subscribe a creed which declares that God is one person only? Should we not think we had good reason to say, that they are remarkably blinded by their prejudices? Suppose once more, that these Unitarians should not only treat as of no weight such a flood of evidence that God is Three, but also treat the believers in that doctrine as unworthy of the Christian name; would not such conduct not only grieve but astonish all candid and well-informed men?

In making the preceding suppositions, I have only supposed the reverse of what is in fact true, as to the evidence which the Bible affords that God is but one person. He is thirty times styled "the Holy ONE of Israel,"—many other times he is called "the Holy *One,*" or "the high and lofty *One.*" He says, "*I* am God; and besides *me* there is no God;"—"Thou shalt have no other gods before *me*;"—and it is a solemn fact that every prayer, and every ascription of praise addressed to God in the Bible, is addressed to him as one person only, and he is never styled or addressed as the Holy Three. I shall therefore leave it to others to estimate the wisdom and candor of those who reject all this evidence,—subscribe a creed which declares God to be three distinct persons, and deny even the Christian name to those who believe that God is but one person.

12. For a long time it seems to have been taken for granted by a large portion of Christians, that the Word, as a distinct person of the Godhead, was united to Jesus of Nazareth, in a peculiar manner, and tabernacled in the flesh in such a sense as cannot be admitted or supposed to be true of the Father or the Holy Spirit. It may, therefore, be of great importance to inquire seriously, whether the Scriptures afford any clear foundation for this commonly received opinion. That the inquiry proposed may be answered correctly, I shall aim to exhibit the principal things which I have found in the Bible relating to the union of each of the supposed persons of the Godhead, with "the man Christ Jesus," or their dwelling in him.

First. In regard to the Word, we have the following declaration; "The *Word* was made flesh and dwelt among us." John i. 14. This, if I mistake not, is all or nearly all that can be found in the Scriptures, on which the opinion could have been founded, that the Word was in a peculiar manner united to the Messiah, so as to be with him one and the same person, and distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit, and of equal dignity with the Father.

What, then, is meant by the phrase "was made flesh"? It surely cannot be meant, that a person equal with the Father was transubstantiated, or changed into flesh. What intelligent person would not be shocked at such an hypothesis? Instead of "the Word was made flesh," Dr. Campbell gives the following translation: "The Word became incarnate." Admitting this to be a correct translation, we have still to ask, What is meant by becoming incarnate? "Clothed with flesh,—embodied with flesh," is the definition of Johnson and Walker. Any thing, therefore, may be said to be incarnate which dwells in flesh, or a human body, so as to be "clothed" or "embodied." Jesus spoke of his body as a "temple"; and it may perhaps be found, that the whole supposed family of divine persons equally dwelt in this temple, and were equally united to it.

Secondly. That the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, was united to Jesus and dwelt in him we have abundant evidence. His title, the Messiah, or the Christ, is expressive of this union; for it means "the anointed," and we are assured that "God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost." This anointing was foretold by Isaiah. John the Baptist had a sign or token revealed to him by which he was to know the Messiah. This token was a visible emblem of the descent of the spirit in the form of a dove. Jesus was baptized by John, and, as he "went up straightway out of the water, the heavens were opened unto him, and he saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and lighting upon him." Of this event John says, — "I saw and bare record that this is the Son of God." He further testified, "He whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God; for God giveth the Spirit not by measure unto him." To possessing the spirit of God, Jesus ascribed his power to cast out devils; "If I by the spirit of God cast out devils, the kingdom of God is come unto you." So perfectly was Jesus anointed with this Spirit, that he was enabled to baptize his Apostles, or endow them with miraculous powers. As an emblem of the manner in which they were to be baptized or immersed, Jesus "*breathed* on them, saying, Receive ye the Holy Spirit." As the spirit of God and the breath of God mean the same thing, this may account for his breathing on them as an emblem of the manner in which they were to be baptized with the Spirit. This Holy Spirit was what he personified under the name of the Comforter, which he promised to send them to be their guide after his ascension. Of this Comforter he said to the Apostles, "He *dwelleth* in you and shall be in you." Suppose then, that we are to regard the Word and the Spirit as two divine persons, is it not a clear case, that we have much more said of the incarnation of the spirit, than we have of the incarnation of the Word? By dwelling in Jesus, they equally became incarnate, — became embodied, or dwelt in human flesh, as in a temple consecrated by God to the purpose of manifesting his power, wisdom, and love.

Thirdly. What evidence have we that the Father was united to the Messiah and dwelt in him? In reply to this question, I shall regard the testimony of the Messiah himself as sufficient. During the memorable interview between Jesus and his Apostles, in the evening prior to his crucifixion, he made a remark which led Philip to say, "Show us the Father and it sufficeth us." Jesus replied, "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, and how sayest thou then, Show us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I speak, I speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in me; or else believe me for the very works' sake."—John xiv. 9, 10, 11.

No further testimony seems necessary to convince the impartial Christian that the Father dwelt in the Messiah in a most intimate and efficacious manner, so that the words uttered by Jesus were the words of the Father, and the miraculous works of Jesus were works which the Father "did by him."

For what important purpose, then, could it have been needful that one or two other divine persons should dwell in the Messiah? So far as either sufficiency or dignity was concerned, no addition would have been made by the indwelling of more than one infinite person. If the Father dwelt in Jesus by his own all-sufficient Spirit or Word, will not this account for all that is said of the union of the Word and Spirit with the Messiah? And does not this accord with Paul's testimony that "it pleased the Father that in him all fulness should dwell?"

13. Having some further inquiries to make, I shall mention two rules, which to me seem of importance to be observed in our attempts to ascertain the meaning of difficult passages of Scripture.

First. When a text seems to present two or more meanings, we should inquire which of the different meanings appears less to accord with the unquestionable and general meaning of other passages of Scripture relating to the same question or subject.

Secondly. To ascertain the meaning of a particular text, or of particular words and passages, as used in relation to God or the Messiah, we should consider what would have been their meaning had they been used in regard to Moses or any other eminent person.

With these rules in view, the following inquiry may be proposed:

Was not the Messiah a person properly distinct from any other person who is represented as dwelling in him? Moses said to the Israelites, "A prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you like unto me." The Spirit and the Word doubtless dwelt in Moses, for "the Law came by Moses," and God spoke by Moses. But was not Moses a person distinct from the Spirit or the Word? This will be answered in the affirmative. If then, the Messiah was like unto Moses, we may believe that he was truly a person distinct from the Word or the Spirit of God. But while I believe that Jesus was a person distinct from any person who dwelt in *him*, I think he was not the Messiah independent of God's anointing him with the Holy Spirit. By this anointing he became the Messiah, and was consecrated to that office. But as Moses was a person prior to his being endowed with miraculous powers, so I suppose it was with the Messiah.

When we read that the Father, the Word, or the Spirit dwelt in Jesus, the forms of speech clearly convey the idea that Jesus was a person distinct from any divine person, or divine attribute, which became united to him. When Jesus said, "The Father that dwelleth in *me*, *he* doeth the works," — the *me* and *he* are evidently different persons. When a parent speaks of himself and his son, or a son speaks of himself and his father, two persons are always presented to our mind. So when any one person speaks of himself and another person as united with him, two different persons are ever brought to view.

We have, to say the least, as much evidence that the Father and the Spirit dwelt in Jesus, and were united to him, as we have that it was so in regard to the Word. If then, like the Father, the Word and the Spirit are divine persons, will it not follow that in the Messiah there were four different persons, Jesus as one, and a Trinity of divine persons?

14. In view of the two rules of interpretation which have been mentioned, the following queries may be proposed with some confidence:

What appears to be the general meaning of the Bible in regard to the personality of the Word and the Spirit of God, and the number of persons in the Deity? As the Word and Spirit are nouns of the neuter gender, and have neuter pronouns, except in a few cases of personification, — and as the thousands of pronouns for God are of the singular number, except a very few doubtful cases, in which *us* is introduced; it seems to me that all candid and well-informed persons must admit that the Word and Spirit are generally spoken of in the Bible as *not* persons, — and God is generally represented as one person only. Such being the Scriptural facts, a creed which denies or contradicts the general meaning of Scripture language, needs such clear and direct proof in its support to render it credible, as I am unable to find in the instructions of the Scriptures, or in any of the dictates of reason.

15. Another query is this, Is it not an undeniable truth, that what John said in a very few verses respecting the Word which was in the beginning with God, is nearly the whole ground on which the hypothesis was formed, that by the Word is meant a distinct person equal with the Father? And is it not also true, that what John recorded of our Saviour's figurative discourse relating to the Comforter, is the principal ground on which it has been imagined that by the Spirit of God is meant a distinct person of the Godhead?

It is believed that these queries will be answered in the affirmative by all candid Christians who have carefully examined the subject. Let it then be remarked, that John is supposed to be the last of the inspired men whose writings have found a place in the Bible. Is it then probable or credible, that John advanced doctrines relating to the personality of God which contradict what had been written on the same subject by Moses and the prophets? Is it not much more probable, that a few figurative expressions, or a few personifications, in his writings, have been misunderstood and misinterpreted by fallible and uninspired Christians? If John taught that the Word and the Spirit of God are two persons equal with the Father, and that God is in fact the Holy Three instead of the Holy One, he has not only taught what was not taught by any of his predecessors, but has contradicted what they taught for truth. If he has done so, have we not good reason to doubt his inspiration, or the inspiration of Moses, and all the prophets who represent Jehovah as the Holy One? Both parts of such a condition cannot be true. If the learned Jews are made to believe, that John so contradicted their lawgiver as to teach that there are three divine persons in the one God, equally worthy of supreme worship, can we wonder that they deny the inspiration of John? and if they believe, that John obtained his doctrine from the testimony of Jesus, have they not a better excuse for rejecting his Messiahship than any which they have been supposed to possess?

16. An error in regard to the number of persons to be worshipped as the true God, is surely an error of a very serious nature. It is, indeed, pleaded by those who profess to worship three distinct persons, that they have but one object of supreme worship, because all the three persons are supposed to be but the one God. Is it not, however, equally true, that they profess to regard each of the three persons as the true God, and possessed of all divine perfections? Is it not also true, that one such *person* is one *object* of supreme worship? If so, does it not clearly follow that two such persons are two objects, and three distinct persons three distinct objects? I freely confess, that I have not discernment enough to perceive any incorrectness in these conclusions, except it may be on this ground, that the worshipper has no definite idea of what is meant in this case by persons, and of course worships the Father as but one intelligent being. But of what advantage can it be to profess to worship three *persons*, if we know not what is meant by the term? If any of us thus worship, may it not be truly said of us, "They worship they know not what."

I hope I shall never cease to praise God for his goodness in freeing my mind from what I now believe to be great errors respecting his personality. But, having known by experience the confusion and embarrassment of mind, which the triune views are adapted to produce, I wish ever to cultivate in my heart candid feelings towards those who still retain such views. While I regarded myself as a worshipper of one God in three persons, I am conscious that in general my worship was addressed to the Father only, as it now is, and to him as the only living and true God. So far as I am able to judge by the language I hear used in prayer by Trinitarians of the present day, I cannot doubt that in general their worship is paid to the Father as mine formerly was, and as it is now. I therefore do not and cannot impute to them idolatry, or the worship of more Gods than one. God looketh on the heart, and I believe that honest Christians, of every sect, mean to worship one God only. Happy would it be for men, if they were more like God in judging one another.

N. W.

Art. VII. — *A Discourse on Miracles, preliminary to the Argument for a Revelation:* Being the Dudleian Lecture, delivered before Harvard University, May 14th, 1836. By the Rev. Orville Dewey.*

Mark iv. 40, 41. And he said unto them, Why are ye so fearful? how is it that ye have no faith? And they feared exceedingly, and said one to another, What manner of man is this, that even the wind and the sea obey him?

The power of Jesus on the occasion here referred to, was undoubtedly miraculous. Without dwelling on the circumstances, — which are familiar to you, — I wish to call your attention to two points in the narrative, as fairly presenting the subject of my present discourse. One is the natural astonishment of the disciples, amounting almost to a reluctance to believe what their eyes beheld. "What manner of man is this, that even the wind and the sea obey him?" The other point, to which I wish to draw your attention, is the language of rebuke with which our Saviour addresses this feeling of incredulity. "How is it that ye have no faith?" And I may add that he frequently reproaches, in similar terms, the want of faith in his miraculous powers.

Now it is this presumption against miracles, — in other words it is the preliminary ground of the argument for Christianity, that I propose in this discourse to examine. And of such importance do I hold this preliminary view of the subject, that I think it will make all the difference, with many minds, between believing in Christianity, and not believing. That is to say, the evidences of revelation are strong enough to produce belief, if it were not for this presumption against them. Let there be no prejudice against miracles; let it appear, in any man's account, perfectly reasonable and philosophical to admit them; let him regard it as extremely probable that the Supreme Being would interpose for our spiritual relief; and then

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* We gladly avail ourselves of the author's permission to lay the entire discourse before our readers. — Ed.

I say, that he must feel the evidence, actually offered, to be ample and overwhelming. It is not from the weakness of the proof, but from the strength of the presumption against it, that it fails of producing conviction.

That there is this presumption against miracles, I hardly need say. It appears in many forms. There has always been a prejudice of this nature lurking in the bosom of science. The doctrine of philosophical necessity seems to me to proceed from the same source, though I am aware that its advocates do not deny the Christian attestation to those facts which we denominate miraculous. The modern system of German Rationalism is a standing and recorded proof of the same presumption against miracles. Nay, with some writers it has amounted to an assertion of the essential incredibility of such facts.* And where it falls short of this, it is still a

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* The essential incredibility of miracles, the impossibility indeed of such occurrences, has lately been argued by an English writer, the author of "Essays on the Pursuit of Truth," in the Third Essay. It is the old argument of Mr. Hume; but it is presented with great clearness, in a manner at once very calm and imposing, and without any of those terms that would indicate its purpose, or any consideration of the answers that have been, and may be, given to it.

The course of the author's argument is as follows. In the first place, he maintains that all reasoning, belief, and knowledge depend on the uniformity of causation; in other words, upon the regular succession of antecedents and consequents. That most of them do, is doubtless true. We could not anticipate the future nor interpret the past, but upon the supposition that the same principles have been, and will be in operation, that are now. But whether there is no other basis or source of belief, is the question. Most philosophers have persuaded themselves that the world had a beginning, — an event which quite breaks in upon their order of sequences.

In the next place, the author maintains that our belief in the uniformity of causation is instinctive, original, ultimate, and irresistible in the mind. That a general sense of preference of order is so, I believe; and that experience working upon this, or without it, must create a very strong conviction of the regularity of nature, is obvious; but whether any thing more than this is true, I must doubt.

But I am willing to give the argument the benefit, on both points, of any doubts that do not involve a begging of the question, and come at once to the conclusion. The question, then, of miracles is brought to the point of conflicting testimonies. Nature, on the one hand, testifies, it is said, to undeviating regularity. Change, then, is impossible. Man's testimony, too, is valuable, and has its regularity as truly as nature; but it is more liable to be mistaken, or we are more liable to mistake its marks, and therefore it can never counterbalance the testimony of nature. Therefore a miracle is impossible; and the belief in it, absurd.

This argument proves too much. For suppose now that I acquiesce secret reluctance to receive them. And I think this reluctance has some unusual developement among many reflecting persons in this country, at the present moment. It is seen in the disposition of many to turn from the miracles to what they call the internal evidence. It is not uncommon in society to hear the miracles spoken of slightly. There is in every age, a

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in the conclusion, and quietly take my seat in this pinfold of philosophy, what does this argument suppose me to say? Or what does the skeptic say, who strives to lift his head high enough (but cannot) above the machinery of causes, to declare their laws, and processes, and bounds?

In the first place, he says that God Almighty either *cannot* change the course of things, though he should please to do it, or else that He *will not* please to do it. For the reader will observe, that such a change is pronounced, without qualification, impossible! To know so much of the Omniscient purpose, — to know so little of the Omnipotent power, — presents a solecism in which it is difficult to tell whether the ignorance or the presumption is the most extraordinary.

In the second place, this argument would prove that the world and the universe are eternal. They could never have begun, they can never cease to exist; for either fact would be a deviation from the uniformity of causation. In the one case, there would be a consequent without any regular antecedent. In the other, an antecedent without any regular consequent. Nay, since the author holds that there is the same unchangeable order of sequences in the intellectual as in the physical world, the race of men can have, in his theory, neither beginning nor end. In short, this assumption seems to me to be compatible with nothing but Atheism. If there be no Power superior to nature, none that can interfere with its processes, then perhaps it is fair to infer that its processes must go on unchanged and unchangeable. But if there is a God, the *possibility* of change is equal to his *power*; it is unbounded and unquestionable.

In the third place, the argument proves too much, because it goes beyond all reasonable and known bounds of skepticism. The author who says to his fellow-men, "You cannot justly believe in a miracle; the thing is impossible, and faith is impossible," transcends the bounds of all human experience, if not of all human patience. Because almost all men, who have ever lived, *have* believed in miracles. And is not the very question before us, in fact, a question about experience? Could all men have believed in miracles, if, as our author contends, an original and fundamental law of the mind forbade their believing in them? Is it not as unphilosophical, as it is intolerable, to say that all mankind have been found believing in a thing which is plainly impossible? What is meant by its being impossible? That God cannot perform it? I will not impute to any one the intentional blasphemy of such an averment. Is it meant, then, that it is impossible that we should believe it? But we do believe it. We can believe it. All men do and can; all but the few, the very few who agree with our author. Is there any *remaining* idea, then, that can be attached to the word *impossible*? I know of none.

fashion of thinking; and the fashion of thinking at the present day, I conceive, is growing more and more adverse to these primitive, peculiar, and hitherto received evidences of revelation. It seems to be thought by some, that the day has gone by for talking about miracles; that they answered a purpose indeed in the primitive age, but have no longer any use. Not a few are saying, "Our feelings convince us, that Christianity is true; the Book convinces us that it is true; and we want no other evidence." It was in this feeling, obviously, that Coleridge exclaimed, "Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence." *

That this way of thinking is unphilosophical, that it does not properly perceive the very ground on which it professes to stand, that the reluctance to receive miracles, though natural and reasonable, to a certain extent, is unphilosophical when it amounts to a strong prejudice or presumption against them; nay more, that on a whole view of the case, the presumption ought, in fact, to be *the other way*, is what I shall now attempt to show.

But as this way of thinking arises in part, I believe, from a misconception of the place which miracles properly hold in the Christian system, let me employ a word or two of explanation on this point. A man says, that he cannot regard miracles as the great things in Christianity, since he assigns that place to its doctrines, and precepts, and spirit. Neither do we ask him to regard miracles as the great things. It has been well said of the miracles, that "they are like the massive subterranean arches and columns of a huge building. It is not on their account that we prize the building, but the building for its own sake. We do not think of the foundation nor care about it, other than to know that it has one. We dwell above in the upper and fairer halls. The crowds go in and out, and rejoice in their comforts and splendors, without ever casting a thought on that upon which the whole so peacefully and securely reposes. Such are the miracles to the gospel. They support the edifice, and upon a divine foundation. They show us, that if the superstructure is fair and beautiful to dwell in, and if its towers and endless flights of steps *appear* to reach even up to heaven, it is all just what it seems to be; for it rests upon the broad foundation of the Rock of Ages." *

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* Aids to Reflection, p. 245. Amer. ed.

This observation will apply, perhaps, to the case of those who say, that they do not feel the miracles to be necessary to their faith in Christianity. When they say this, they must mean by faith, that moral apprehension of the spirit and power of Christianity, that sense of the spiritual relief and comfort that it brings, which does not, it is true, depend on miracles; in other words, that view of the superstructure which does not, it is true, immediately depend on any view of a foundation. But this view presupposes a speculative or traditional belief in the Christian Religion; or, if it does not, then it is just like a faith in any other good writings; that is, simply a belief that they are good, and wise, and therefore true; and if true, accordant with the will of God. In this sense, we have faith in all the dictates of reason. But Christianity we receive as a special revelation, an authoritative record of God's will; and in this character it must have some attestation beyond its general consonance with our rational or moral nature; else every demonstration in the mathematics, and every undisputed principle in moral philosophy, would be a revelation. That attestation, I say, is miracle.

The state of opinion on this subject makes it necessary, perhaps, before proceeding farther, that I should define the word *miracle*. All Christians of whom I know any thing, in this country, hold to miracles in some sense. I wish distinctly to say this; because if the sense which I affix to this word, as the only one satisfactory to myself, is not received by others, I would by no means leave it to be inferred, that there is any professed difference of opinion between us as to the miraculous origin of Christianity. There is only a friendly question between us about the meaning which ought to be assigned to this word.

What then is a miracle? I answer, It is an interruption or ceasing of the regular and established succession of events, taking place in connexion with the mission of a person professing to be sent from God, and designed to give that proof of his mission. I say, an interruption or ceasing of the regular and established succession of events, and that for a specific purpose. A miracle is a fact, like to which nothing ever has occurred, or ever will occur but for the same purpose. I lay stress upon its being a simple fact. In regard to the succession of events, I say nothing of causation or necessity, of which we know nothing. I do not conceive that one event compels another, as the cogs of one wheel push on another wheel. I take the bare facts. Since the world began it was not known that a blind man received sight at a word, or that a man with a broken limb, or that a dead body, already in the first stages of putrefaction, instantly and at a word, recovered vigor and activity. Such events, we say, on certain occasions, and for certain purposes, without precedent, without parallel, have taken place. They are the miracles.

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* **The Rev. William Ware.**

Now the question is, What is the fair and philosophical description of these events? On this point there is a strong reluctance in many minds to admit that there was any thing, in these cases, out of the course of nature or contrary to it; any interruption of the order of nature or suspension of its processes, or departure from its regularity. They say, that there may have been causes in nature or in the mind, which, though unknown to us, are sufficient to account for the results in question. I object to the word "causes," as implying an efficient power in one event to produce another, of which we know nothing. And therefore I consider the word "interposition," though proper enough to be used in popular discourse, to be strictly speaking unphilosophical, since it implies that one event *has* an inherent power to produce another, and conveys the impresson of a hand thrust in to stay the event that would otherwise take place. This may be true, but we do not know it. We come then to the bare facts. And, if we deal with facts alone, I see not how it can be denied that a miracle is something out of the course of nature, and contrary to it; an interruption of its order, a suspension of its processes. On this point, a distinction is sometimes made between a real interruption and an apparent interruption; and it is contended that the interruption is only apparent. But in speaking of facts, submitted to the observation of our senses, it appears to me, that we must conceive of real and apparent as the same thing. That is to say, if such a fact or such an event, as one of the Christian miracles, never appeared before, and never shall appear again but at the intervention of some divinely commissioned agent, then it is a real departure from the order of nature,—that is, from the universally received and known order of events, which is all that we know of the order of nature. In other words, the whole thing is a peculiarity, — a special conjunction of events for a particular purpose. And, for myself, I certainly feel none of this strong repugnance to the idea of an interrupted succession of events. I have no respect for the mechanical order of nature, that makes me feel as if it could not be changed. I do not see that the moral purpose of that order is at all impaired by occasional departures from it. Surely, the Almighty Will is not bound in the chains of fate, or of nature, or by the powers of nature. I am unable to see, why the Infinite Parent may not change the course of his providence for the benefit of his children, as well as a human parent may change the course of his administration for a similar purpose. Not, indeed, that it would be an unforeseen expedient with the Omniscient Ruler; but I cannot see that its being foreseen alters at all the state of the facts.

But now let us grant for the sake of the argument, that the miracles are, as the modern interpreter proposes to consider them, only seeming miracles, — only apparent, not real interruptions of the order of nature. Would they then be valid evidence of revelation? When Jesus says, " Peace, be still," the winds and waves sink to an instant calm. It was wonderful; it appeared miraculous; but it was miraculous, say some, only to the ignorance or misapprehension of the observers. There was a sudden lulling of the winds and waves, which, to the disciples, seemed miraculous. Or there were causes in the bosom of those turbulent elements, however hidden from us, which produced that sudden calm; and such occurrences may yet come to be as well known, if not as familiar, as any of the phenomena of nature. But then, I ask, would there be any evidence of a special divine commission? To illustrate the case, let us make a supposition; or let us take a piece of real history. Soon after the arrival of Columbus on the shore of the New World, there was an eclipse of the sun. The rude inhabitants had never, perhaps, remarkèd such an event before. Columbus, for a certain purpose, informs them that the sun will be darkened, and he predicts the precise day, and hour, and moment, when it will happen. The people hold their minds in suspense till the hour arrives, and then, witnessing the results, they come to the conclusion that Columbus is a supernatural being, and they reverence him as such. It was to them a miracle. But, in after times, suppose that this people, or their descendants, should study astronomy. What *then* would be their conclusion? Would they not say, "We were deceived"? And what other than this could be the conclusion, if it should at length be discovered, that the miracles of Jesus belonged to the natural, though at that time unknown, order of events.

But let us see now, if miracles, in the sense which I contend for, do not inevitably belong to the Christian system. Is it possible that those who originally witnessed them, could have received them in any other light. "We never saw it on this wise; since the world began, such things were never seen,"— is their language. If all this belonged to the order of nature, must they not have been grossly deceived; and deceived too, with the knowledge, if not intention, of the first teachers of Christianity.

But further; is there any one branch of the Christian evidences that does not involve miracles of the character contended for? Does not the argument from prophecy, and does not the argument from the early spread of Christianity, clearly proceed on this ground? In the one case, more than the natural prescience of any human mind is supposed; in the other, more than any known powers of persuasion. Nay, do not the very attempts to explain away miracles still leave unexplained miracles,—unexplained departures from the order of nature? It is said for instance, in regard to the cases of the sick healed, and the dead raised to life, that we cannot aver that the powers of nature were suspended or modified, because we are not acquainted with all the powers of nature; because there may have been a secret power in the sick or the dead body suddenly to restore it to health or life. But, granting this, still the knowledge of the exact *time* when that event was to happen must have been miraculous. Let us take, for example, the miracle recorded in our text. Our Saviour arose and rebuked the wind and the sea, and there was a great calm. Will it be pretended by any *honest* believer in Christianity, that Jesus acted upon a very sagacious judgment with regard to the signs of the weather? Surely not. The only tolerable supposition of him who receives Christianity, but rejects the miracles, is that there were powers in nature, though beyond human penetration, which produced that sudden calm. But then, it is necessary, I repeat, to suppose a *miraculous knowledge* in him, who discerned either that power, or the moment of its operation. Or, if any one should say that there are powers in the *mind* with which we are unacquainted, and if he should maintain a natural, moral connexion between the mind of him who spake and that sinking of the winds and waves, then, I should say,—granting a connexion so entirely gratuitous and so utterly inconceivable,—that such instances occurring once, and never afterwards, were themselves miracles. If that were not a miraculous effect of mind on matter, we ought to see something of it still.

Miracle, then, holds its place in every honest explanation of the external evidences of Christianity: and I think the same is true of the internal evidence.

With regard to this branch of the argument, various and vague impressions are prevailing which seem to me to possess no weight whatever, as furnishing substantive proof. They may be useful preliminaries or auxiliaries to conviction, but they are not its foundations. Such are the ideas that are entertained of the moral charm and beauty of the Scriptures, or of their adaptation to human wants,—not to mention those enthusiasts, who profess to have a secret and intuitive perception of the divinity of those writings. But, granting the singular moral beauty and charm of the Scriptures, I see not how it constitutes proof. Suppose that a person had never heard of a revelation, and, seeking light and rest for his mind, were to take up some of the writings of Fenelon. Would he not feel the same kind of impression? Would he not be charmed with their beauty, and their adaptation to his necessities, and say, "This is just what I wanted; this must be the truth of God." And would he not very justly say this? What, then, would be the distinction between the writings of Fenelon and the records of inspiration? There is a difference between truth and revealed truth. A thing may be true, whether it is revealed or not: nay, it must be true independently of that consideration. But, Is it revealed to be true? is the question; and that question is overlooked in this view of the internal evidences. So in the writings of the "divine Plato" the reader will be amazed and charmed with the elevation, the exquisite moral discrimination and beauty of some of his thoughts; but will this prove that they are inspired? Indeed, it must be confessed, I think, that there is not one moral precept of the New Testament, but it may be found in the old heathen philosophers.

The only valid internal evidence which the New Testament contains of being a revelation, is found in the proposition, that these writings possess altogether a character, for which nothing but special divine illumination can account. If some rustic youth should come to you with Newton's Principia in his hand, and satisfy you that he was its author, the fact would not be more astonishing, than it is that the fishermen of Galilee should have produced such a book as the New Testament. The character of Jesus is itself a moral miracle. This *is* evidence: and it will be more and more convincing, as we more and more clearly understand the nature of moral phenomena, the power of moral prejudice, and the difficulty of moral progress.

Still, then, I find miracle in every species of satisfactory and substantive proof. And now I would ask, if there is any conceivable and sufficient evidence of revelation, but miracles? Suppose a man to stand before you and to say, "I am the bearer of a special communication from God." What would you — what must you ask of him, as the credentials of his mission? His air might be noble, his doctrine excellent, his speech divine. His communication might thrill you with awe, or with rapture. Would that satisfy you? If you were an enthusiast, it might; but if you were a philosopher, I am sure it would not. He might tell you things which above all things you wished to know. He might tell you, as Swedenborg has professed to do, of the very state of the blest who have departed from you, and of your own future state, — how you were to live in that unknown world, — and you might wish to believe it. What could make you believe it? I can conceive of but one thing, — *a miracle*. If he came from an earthly monarch, you would demand his credentials, — the signet ring, or the sign manual. The chosen seal of the Almighty Monarch is *miracle!*

But I hear it said, "Could you receive a communication as from heaven, if it were evidently of bad tendency? And if not, then is not the excellence of the communication a part of the evidence?" I answer, No; it is only something presupposed in the case; not the proof that makes out the case. If a man undertakes to prove any thing to me, he must undertake to prove something that is credible. I cannot listen to him but upon that condition. It would be incredible, — a case not to be supposed nor argued upon, that the Almighty had sent to me a communication of evil tendency. I demand this condition then, that the message be good, but the condition is not the proof. That a thing is credible is necessary to its being credited; but the credibility of a thing is not to be confounded with the belief of it. The former is one of the postulates; the latter is the conclusion. They are completely distinct. Thus the lawyer, who argues in behalf of his client to a jury, must make a case that is credible; but the credibility is no part of the argument. And the juror who should say, "I was convinced by the internal likelihood of the case, and not by the witnesses nor by the arguments," would be thought a very bad reasoner, however well-disposed a man.

I have dwelt longer on this point than I wished; but it seemed to me important to show, if it be true, that Christianity is really founded on miracles, and that all attempts to escape from them in the matter of revelation are vain, and are especially proved to be vain by the very efforts to explain them away, to which their rejectors are driven.

But now let us examine, in as few words as may suffice, that presumption against miracles from which these efforts have apparently arisen, and see whether the presumption ought not in fact to be the other way.

And, first of all, I must beseech the inquirer to approach this subject in the purest spirit of philosophy. It is the constant suggestion of unbelief, that, to support the argument for a revelation, prejudice is necessary. Now I say, that is precisely the aid that we do not want. Nay more, I say that prejudice is the very obstacle, and the main obstacle, to true faith. I ask the skeptic to lay aside *his* prejudices. I ask him to be a philosopher; and yet more distinctively I say,—a philosopher of the inductive school. Let him reason upon facts. Let him take nothing for granted. Let him assert nothing which he does not know; and deny nothing which, for all that he knows, may be true.

Now let us see how much is cut off from the ground of this inquiry by these discriminations. You are not to deny the possibility of miracles. Evidently, he who made and who controls all things, can modify and change them if it be his pleasure. The act of creation is but the grandest of miracles.*

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* "The act of creation is but the grandest of miracles." This idea occurs in some of the French writers. I have met with it, I think, in Necker's "Morale Religieuse," and in the French preachers. But it

Again, you are not to say or suppose, that there is any difficulty in the performance of miracles, or that it requires any extraordinary, or any new exertion of divine power to produce the changes in question. You do not know but that every event in the universe springs from an immediate exertion of divine power, and, therefore, that one result is as naturally and easily produced, as another. In other words, you are not at liberty

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seems to be used by them, rather as a figure of speech than otherwise. I do not introduce it as such. I hold it to be a philosophical truth. The act of the creation is the producing of new forms of being, out of the usual course of production. It is an event without any antecedent in the processes of nature. It is "a deviation from the uniformity of causation." And that is the definition of a miracle. That it is the *commencement* of a *series* of events does not affect this conclusion. The point of departure from the ordinary modes of production is none the less deviation, — none the less miracle, — for the regularity that follows. If the earth were suddenly arrested in its course, and made to take a retrograde movement through its orbit, for thousands of years, the point of change would be miracle, and none the less miracle for the regularity that followed. And surely it would be no less a miracle, if a world were suddenly created, — if solid matter instantly, at a word, filled the void space, and were launched forth upon its mighty career. All the difference in the cases, with reference to the point in hand, is made by an unphilosophical idea of causes; as if there were a tendency in antecedents to produce their consequents, — a pushing on of one event by another, — of which we know nothing. And yet even then we might say, that there were causes in that void space to keep it void, and that those causes were arrested by the creative act which filled that space with matter.

When life is communicated to a dead body, what is that but the creation of life? Suppose that a human being were instantly created before our eyes, in full size and strength, would not that be just as great a deviation from the usual and natural course of production, as it is to raise a dead body to life?

I have supposed, in another part of the Discourse, a world to be created in our sight. But, to present a more palpable case, and one directly beneath our eyes, suppose that, as we were looking upon a barren and blasted heath, it were suddenly covered with a crop of grain, ripe for the harvest. That would be creation, and that would be a miracle. And if we and many more saw that miracle, and knew moreover that it was wrought in attestation of a divine commission; — nay more, if we harvested the grain, and ground and ate it, it would not only be philosophical to believe, but impossible to doubt. Thus, if I may speak so, did the Christian witnesses handle the evidence of the miracles they record.

But I am not now to pursue this argument beyond the point which is immediately before me, — to wit, the credibility of miracles. And for this credibility, on the strictest grounds of philosophy, I say that the fact of creation is a sufficient warrant.

in the spirit of true philosophy, to regard nature as a piece of mechanism, — as a clock for instance, which is wound up and has a natural or necessary tendency to run down. And you are not to say, that the need of a miracle to answer the purposes of the Author of nature implies some imperfection in the machinery of nature. The idea of machinery is a pure assumption. Des Cartes might as well have argued from those vortices, or whirlpools of ether, by which he supposed the heavenly bodies were moved, as we may argue from the notion of any other mechanism. Once more; all ideas of miraculous interference, as if it were derogatory to the Infinite Being, all presumptions on this point, drawn from the infinity of the universe, and the comparative insignificance of the earth and of man, are to be laid out of the question as entirely unphilosophical.

With these reasonable disclamations then, we come to the simple and unprejudiced experience of facts. We see an order in nature, not mechanical, not necessary, but appointed. *Can* that order be changed? Doubtless it can. To assert the impossibility of change, is to go far beyond our province. The power that ordained the succession of events, can modify them. *Has* the order of nature been in any instance interrupted? That is the great question. I am not now to discuss it. I have only to ask, if that question may not be fairly entertained; if it is not open to argument; if witnesses may not be called to testify; and if we are not bound to listen to them without setting up any bar of presumption against their testimony. Certainly, if there is no intrinsic and ascertained impossibility in the events alleged to have taken place, we *are* bound to listen.

But in what spirit shall we listen? With an extreme and almost insurmountable prejudice against miracles? This is the assumption of unbelief. And on what is this assumption founded? "On experience," is the answer. And what now is this boasted experience? Is human experience the measure of divine power? Can a limited experience set bounds to possibility? What is this life's experience, but a childhood amidst the ages of eternity? Suppose that we were hereafter to be placed, for the correction of some mental errors, in a scene of being where *all* should be miracle, *all* change; where every thing should reveal the immediate action of Almighty Power. Where would be experience then? Or, to illustrate the same point, let us revert to the truly philosophical, the primitive, experience. Suppose that the first man had been created before the heavens were spread forth, or the earth hung in the empty space, and that he had beheld those awful effects of Omnipotence. Would he, at the close of the first day of his existence, find it difficult to believe in miracles? Why then, should the experience of forty years, amidst regular successions of events, make him forget that miracles might again be a part of the course of nature? The experience that makes a man feel as if there could be no more miracles, seems to me narrow, and if I may say so, provincial; like that which makes an ignorant and home-bred rustic feel as if every thing in the great world must be just like what he had seen in his father's house, and fills him with astonishment, amounting to incredulity, at every thing new and extraordinary.

What is the spirit of a real and studious philosophy, in cases which, so far as the facts are considered, are precisely analogous to miracles. An extraordinary, unheard-of, and before unknown fact is presented in nature. Water, for instance, is produced by the intense combustion of two invisible gases. There are many men in the world who would say on the first proposition of such a marvel, that they would not believe it. But does the philosopher say so? Or does he wait, before he will believe, till he can resolve that fact into some order of nature? By no means. The fact has been submitted to the test of experiment, and he is satisfied. And he believes it, let me add, not because it belongs to any *order* of things, but because it has been proved by satisfactory experiments. The King of Siam would not believe, that the liquid and flowing water could become a solid body under his feet. He took the very ground of the skeptic about miracles. He had never seen water frozen; nobody in his country had ever seen it; and he would not believe it. Was that the ground of philosophy, or of prejudice? A man says, that he cannot and will not believe in miracles. And yet every object in the universe around him, had its origin in a miracle. And suppose that it were given us again to witness such displays of power. Suppose that another sun were created and placed in the heavens before our very eyes. Should we not believe the fact till we perceived that it was produced by some preëxisting, world-making machinery of causes? And yet I verily believe that that wonderful creation would not be more extraordinary, than to the discriminating moral eye is that great Light which burst upon the darkness of the world, eighteen centuries ago!

If, then, the strong and almost insuperable presumption against the doctrine of miracles, which many feel, is not justified by a strict philosophy, let us now proceed a step farther.

I am willing to concede something to this presumption; I wish to give it all the weight that it deserves; but I do not conceive that it possesses the broadest characters of philosophy. It appears to me instinctive rather than rational, hasty rather than deliberate, and narrow rather than comprehensive. And I believe that the rational, deliberate, and comprehensive view of things is more than sufficient fairly to rebut the narrow, the hasty, and the instinctive view.

It is said, that nature and experience are against miracles. That a part of nature and experience is so, I admit; but I desire special attention to the remark that it is only a part. That the whole is so, I deny. Nay, I would invite your still more particular attention to the observation, that the parts of nature and experience which are against miracles are the lowest and humblest. It is the mechanical order of nature which is opposed to miracles, and not its grand, comprehensive meaning and principle. And it is a less cultivated experience, which, — feeling less the need of those truths that revelation discloses, — is less disposed to admit of such a revelation, than the mind in its highest developement.

Let us then, go into the broad field of nature and experience, — into that very field, where skepticism has found its strong-hold, — and see what it teaches us.

The particular course of things in nature is order; the great principle is beneficence, — the adaptation of all things to the happiness of sensitive beings, the supply of all wants, the relief of all sufferings. Nay, order itself has its chief value in its uses; it is designed for the improvement of rational beings; and it has been well argued, on a former occasion in this place, that, "if the great purposes of the universe can best be accomplished by departing from its established laws, those laws will undoubtedly be suspended, and, though broken in the letter, they will be observed in the spirit;" and hence that "miracles, instead of warring against nature, would concur with it." *

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* Channing's Dudleian Lecture.

But let us cast a glance, first, not at human experience, but at the condition of irrational natures. The most striking feature in that condition is the adaptation of means to beneficent ends, — of supplies to wants, of reliefs to unavoidable sufferings. Among all the tribes of animate life, there is not a creature so small, but contains within it a world of wonders; and wonders not of skill only, but of beneficence. The anatomy of a fly, the instinct of a spider, the economy of a hive of bees, the structure of an ant-hill, are each of them subjects which fill many ample pages in the books of philosophy; and fill them constructively with this one theme, — the goodness of the Creator, his gracious regard to the humblest thing that lives. If you rise higher in the scale of the creation, you find everywhere, multiplying and crowding upon you, the proofs of unspeakable goodness. In heaven, on earth, and abroad upon all the pathless seas, are innumerable creatures, possessing frames filled with the most exquisite adaptations of part to part, guided by kindly instincts, supplied with bountiful provisions, arrayed, as Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed, and provided with habitations, more perfect for their purposes, than palaces of cedar or marble.

To illustrate the argument which I design to draw from this appeal to nature, let me make a supposition entirely *at variance* with the facts to which we have now adverted. Suppose, then, that you had found any one tribe of the animal creation unprovided for. Suppose, that it had no appropriate food, or that it had no instinct to guide it to that food, that it knew not where to seek its sustenance, whether in the water, or the air, or the earth. If we had seen any species of beings in this situation, if, for example, every summer should bring into existence a certain kind of bird, for which there was no suitable provision, or no guiding instinct, if we should see them flying about us, as if uncertain, destitute, and suffering, with wild screams testifying their anxiety and distress, apparently ignorant whether the night or the day was appointed for them, now rising into the air, now plunging into the water, and then madly dashing against the earth, — if, I say, we had thus seen them holding a precarious and painful existence for a few weeks, and then miserably perishing; we should feel as if such a phenomenon was most extraordinary and astonishing, — at war with the whole system of nature, and with all the proofs of divine benevolence. We do unhesitatingly pronounce the facts embraced in such a supposition impossible. If we were to study nature for ever, we should never expect to meet with any thing like this.

Now I apply this to the case of human nature. And I desire you to suspend your judgment of the comparison for one moment till I can fully lay it before you. Consider, in the first place, the dignity of the being, to illustrate whose condition this comparison is brought. Consider all the difference between animal sense, and a being so "infinite in faculties" as man. Suppose, in the next place, that this being, acting according to an unquestionable law of his nature, should improve his faculties to the highest degree conceivable, without the knowledge of a future life. And finally, suppose him, with all the craving wants, the soaring aspirations, and the exquisite, varied, and multiplied sorrows of refined thought and feeling, to stand upon the earth, as it rolled in silence through the mighty void of heaven, — with death all around him, and without one voice from beyond the realms of visible life to assure him, that he should live hereafter, — and then say, whether this would not be a condition more mournful, more disastrous, more at war with the order of divine beneficence, than any catastrophe that ever could befall animal natures.

If any one distrusts this comparison, I must beg leave to doubt whether he fairly comprehends it. The truth is, that all the world has held to revelations in one form or another. By communications direct or traditional, by the voice of augurs or of prophets, by open miracle or inward light, all mankind have deemed themselves to have special guidance from above.

It is an important inference from this fact, that no one can very well estimate the case of supposed utter destitution; and, therefore, that it is extremely difficult for any individual to feel the whole and legitimate force of this argument. Every man has been trained up from childhood by a system of communications; and now, upon the very strength of these communications, or of the convictions they have inevitably inspired, he deems himself able to stand without them. But difficult as the task is made by the unfair position of the objector, I shall offer two or three observations, in close, tending to show the need, and therefore the likelihood, instead of the often alleged improbability, of an extraordinary revelation.

Leaving other communications out of the account, then, we, as Christians, say that about eighteen centuries ago, at a period at once of unprecedented intellectual developement and equally prevailing skepticism, there appeared an extraordinary teacher from heaven. I am not now to offer any of the arguments for his divine mission, that seem to me so abundant and overwhelming; but I think I am fully entitled by the circumstances to say, that there ought to be no presumption against it. For it is undeniable, that, amidst all the lights of Grecian and Roman civilization, the most important truths, — the unity and paternity of God, and the immortality of man, — were obscured; and it is but a reasonable inference, that without a revelation, they would have been overshadowed with doubt till now. And even the belief that prevailed in the minds of a few philosophers, seems to me singularly to have wanted vitality. There is more reasoning than conviction apparent in their discourses; and certainly their faith had but little influence on their lives. Cicero, we know, and others, amidst all their hopes, had strong doubts. And I maintain, not only from these examples, but from the experience of every powerful mind since, that no reasonings can relieve that great question from painful, from distressing uncertainty.

My argument, then, is from human experience, and from cultivated human experience. It is easy to see, that a rude age might less need the relief which a revelation on this point would give; and for this reason, as I hold, to rude ages it was not given. My argument, then, is from cultivated human experience. And this is the form into which it resolves itself. God is the author of life, and the former of the mind. It is fair to presume, that he, who has provided for the wants of the humblest animal life, would not doom the noblest creature he has made on earth, to overwhelming despondency and misery. Now I say, that, without a revelation, this result is inevitable. I maintain, that no scheme of a virtuous, improving, and happy life can be made out, which leaves the doctrines of God's paternal and forgiving mercy, and of human immortality, in great and serious doubt.

My friends, I bring home the case to myself, and to you. I know what it is to doubt, and I say that no man should judge of the effect of that doubt, till he knows by experience what it is; till, crushed by its weight, he has laid himself down to his nightly rest, too miserable and desperate to care whether he ever raised his head from that pillow of repose and oblivion; till every morning has waked him to sadness and despondency darker than the gloomiest night that ever clouded the path of earthly sorrow. It is not calamity, it is no worldly disappointment, it is not affliction, it is not grief, that I speak of; nor is it any of these that gives the greatest intensity to this doubt; it is a developement of our own nature; it is the soul's own struggling with the mighty powers with which it is made to grapple; it is the longed-for and almost felt immortality, struck from our eager grasp, — the light gone out, — the heaven of our hope all overshadowed and dark. Yes, it is the consciousness of infinite desires and capacities, all blighted and broken down; it is the aspiring which suns and stars cannot bound, all shrunk and buried in a coffin and a grave! In short, it is the proper and legitimate state of a mind following the premises of the case to their just result; and not that worldly condition of the mind, which is no more fit to judge of this subject than childhood is to judge of the interests of an empire. And now I say, Is it hard to believe that God would interpose for humanity, so circumstanced? Is it incredible that he should send a voice into that deep and dark struggle for spiritual life and hope?

I appeal to *you*, my brethren. I appeal to the youth who are before me. It is thought that this age is witnessing an unusual developement of infidel principles. One whole nation, indeed, has fallen a victim to them. And what is new and striking, it is said has a kind of fascination for youth. But I hold that this is an age, too, which is witnessing an extraordinary developement of sensibility in the young. This arises from an earlier, I had almost said, a premature education; from an exciting literature; and from the character of enterprise and expectation which now invests all the interests and prospects of society. But I ask, Is this an age, when you can safely break the great bond of faith and hope? If you were a dull and sluggish youth, or a youth amidst rude and barbarous times, it might not yield me the argument which I now seek. But I know that in this age, ay, and in this assembly, there is many a youthful heart, whose daily experience is the strongest possible proof of the need, and therefore of the likelihood, of a divinely sanctioned religion. Ay, I know, and many a sorrowing parent in this land knows, that the period of youth cannot be safely passed without it. Those thronging passions, those swaying sympathies of social life, the deeper musings of solitary hours, the imaginations, the affections, the thoughts, unuttered and unutterable, — all the sweeping currents that bear the youthful heart it scarcely knows whither, — all show that it cannot be thrown without infinite peril, to drift upon a sea of doubt.

Humanity, in fine, and especially in its growing cultivation, has too hard a lot, it appears to me, if God has not opened for it the fountains of revelation. Without that great disclosure from above, human nature stands, in my contemplation of it, as an anomaly amidst the whole creation. The noblest existence on earth is not provided with a resource even so poor as instinct. On the heart that is made to bear the weight of infinite interests, sinks the crushing burthen of doubt and despondency, of fear and sorrow, of pain and death, without resource or relief, or comfort, or hope. The cry of the young ravens, the buzzing of insect life in every hedge, is heard; but the call, that comes up from the deep and dark conflict of the overshadowed soul, dies upon the vacant air; and there is no ear to hear, nor eye to pity. Oh! were it so, what could sustain the human heart sinking under the burthen of its noblest aspirations? "The still, sad music of humanity," sounding on through all time, would lose every soothing tone, and would become a wail, in which the heart of the world would die!

And why must any man think that the world is left to that darkness and misery? Because he cannot believe, that a communication has been made from heaven in the only conceivable way in which it *can* be made and *proved;* by miracles. For I affirm, that, if that great preliminary difficulty were over, all difficulties would vanish before the stupendous proofs of a revelation. He that thinks, then, that the world is left to nature's darkness, thinks thus, I repeat, because he cannot believe in miracles; because he cannot admit that the order of nature which is itself not an end, but a means to an end, may be interrupted for the greatest of all ends; — because he will not admit, that the infinite Power is superior to the laws itself has made; because he will not allow, in his philosophy, that liberty to the Infinite Parent, in changing and adapting his provisions to the wants of his children, that he allows to every earthly parent. Is this the childlike and trustful, the deep-searching and discerning, the expansive and unprejudiced spirit of true philosophy, or is it the shallow and skeptical spirit of bondage to the mere outward forms and processes of things, regardless of their higher meanings and ends?

Here for the present I leave the subject. I have not undertaken in this discourse to prove the truth of Christianity; but, if I have succeeded in removing the great obstacle, — in opening the door to the argument, the conclusion, I think, will easily follow. I have not undertaken to prove that there have been miracles; but I do hold myself entitled to say, as the close and inference of this discourse, that I should wonder if there had not been miracles. The philosophical presumption is for, rather than against them. Nature is for, more than it is against them, — its mechanical order only being against them, while its whole spirit is in their favor. Man's necessity, God's mercy, is for them; and against them is — what? What is against all legitimate wisdom and conviction? Why, only a doubt, — which is mostly vague and irresponsible, — which, because it is a doubt, holds itself scarcely bound to give a reason, — and which, though it is a doubt, sits immovable, as if it held the very seat of knowledge, and throne of reason. To allow it to sit there undisturbed, is to yield more deference to a shadow, than to the very substance of reason and truth.

ART. VIII. — *The Library of American Biography.* Conducted by JARED SPARKS. Vol. V. *Life of John Eliot, the Apostle to the Indians.* By CONVERS FRANCIS. Boston: Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1836. 16mo. pp. 357.

A WORTHIER literary enterprise has not been projected amongst us than this "American Biography." Mr. Sparks was fortunate in the first conception of the plan, nor has he been less so in the execution, the subjects chosen, and the contributors obtained. The time, too, is propitious. The country is not so new as to make the catalogue scanty of those deserving such memorial, or to give to their biographies a contemporaneous character; nor yet is it so old as to preclude system and considerable completeness in the undertaking. An editor, so well versed in our annals as Mr. Sparks, and, we may add, so judicious in selection, and indefatigable in accomplishment, with such assistance as it appears he can command, need not despair of providing some satisfactory notice of all the really important and conspicuous names that occur in the first three quarters of the two centuries of our history. The time has arrived, we may suppose, when such names may be put into the balance, with the hope of impartiality, as far down at least as the origin of the present constitution. Political or other prejudice does not now reach back beyond that period. Contemporaneous biography, though a good service in its time, yet, for obvious reasons, needs to be re-written long after, in most cases in which it proves worthy to have been written at all. The whole extent, therefore, of our brief American antiquity seems open to this excellent enterprise, inviting a thorough survey. We trust the editor finds encouragement to persevere in a project so well begun.

A complaint has proceeded from a high critical quarter, that, the Novel species being on the decline, literature is running too much to Biography; meaning that we are likely to be overrun with lying and gossiping memoirs of men, women, and children, who may be very good or very wicked in their spheres, but have no special claims to be commemorated beyond the narrow circle in which they move. If all the types of the Harpers and their kind should be withdrawn from fiction, and go to practising their wondrously rapid permutations upon "Real Lives" and "True Narratives," then, doubtless, would be a time for all insignificance to be magnified, all low things to be exalted, a little one to become a thousand, and the reign of foolish tattle and pompous imposition be more extended and potent than ever before. Evils of this sort do impend; neither is the peril new. But, while we would not have all writers write lives, or the lives of all who have lived be written, still we would mark some goodly number of names in every age of every people to be fully chronicled, and we would reserve some of the most philosophical and choice minds to do it. Such lives furnish some of our best books. They are the best chapters of history. Biography recognises human individuality, what the individual is and does; and we esteem the characters and doings of individuals as such, quite as instructive and healthful subjects of contemplation as those of masses and organized bodies of men; less needful indeed in the study of policy and expedients, but more so in that of humanity, and the higher expressions of the moral sentiments. And while we would pay due honor to the great moral energy and achievement of the present times, as manifested in the resolves of Societies and the reports of Executive Committees, we are also well pleased to go back with Mr. Sparks and his coadjutors to the times when men moved more of their own motion, and were more individual in character and action, — times when the established relations and ordinary sympathies of life sufficed for union, — and the separate energies, conscience, and vocation of a man served for guidance and machinery, — more simple and natural, however less wonder-working and omnipotent.

None who know any thing of the character and apostleship of John Eliot will deny, that he holds a rightful place in this "American Biography"; and those, who may never have heard of him before, will be satisfied by the work of Mr. Francis, that the place in the series could not have been better filled. Mr. Eliot was a young Puritan preacher in England; but being made uncomfortable there on account of his Non-conformity, he came to New England, and was established as teacher of the church in Roxbury, Nov. 5th, 1632, as colleague with Mr. Welde,* who appears to have been settled there a few months before. He exercised a long and faithful parochial ministry. He became early and deeply interested in the moral condition of the Indian tribes of his neighbourhood, — an interest "inspired by his sanctified love of doing good, and increased probably by his belief, that the Indians were the descendants of the lost tribes of Israel." He visited them and received their visits; preached to them, and taught them the facts and principles of the Christian faith; studied their language, and used it in his intercourse with them, and finally translated the whole Bible and several other books into it, and made an Indian Grammar. He acquired a great influence over many of the chiefs and people, and made many converts. He labored to introduce the arts of civilized life among them. In due time he collected a great portion of his converts from various tribes into a settlement of their own, called Natick, where a church was formed and municipal authorities were instituted, still under the paternal and apostolic guidance of Eliot. We can easily imagine what zeal, combined with prudence and patient industry, was required in doing all this. And there is abundant evidence that on none of these points was he wanting.

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* Mr. Francis makes Eliot the first minister of Roxbury. It is of no moment to correct the slight error, but we believe the highest chronological authorities assign the priority to Welde.

> " The design seems to have sprung up amidst the silent workings of his own mind. No voice of invitation or encouragement, at the first, came to him from without. No eloquent appeal to his piety or his compassion was made by others. No one had gone before him in the enterprise, and returned to tell the story of the red man's wants, and to arouse the white man to supply them. He hearkened in silence to the admonition within his breast, which he revered ' as God's most intimate presence in the soul,' and which told him, that a work of benevolence must be performed for the neglected and forlorn barbarians. He went forth to perform it amidst discouragements and obstacles, which were ever driving back his spirit on the resources of faith; amidst suffering, danger, and personal exposure, which were ever making large demands on his power of endurance.
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> " No trace of spiritual ambition, no mark of self-complacency, no word of vanity appears in the whole course of the labors of more than forty years. He cared not who had the praise, so the work of God were done. There have been achievements more brilliant than his; there have been enterprises more susceptible of attractive embellishment in the description than his; but none more unequivocally marked with the spirit of Christian disinterestedness. We cannot hesitate to yield a full assent to the testimony of Gookin, when he affirms, that ' Mr. Eliot engaged in this great work of preaching unto the Indians upon a very pure and sincere account.' "— pp. 298, 299.

Such is the outline of Eliot's life and labors. It would be superfluous in us to show how the outline was filled out. We should have to draw wholly from Mr. Francis; and we prefer that our readers, such as have not already anticipated us, should draw from him themselves, in justice both to the biographer and his subject. To say that Mr. Francis has performed his task well, would be small praise. The memory of Eliot has been singularly fortunate in finding such a biographer. We doubt if any other literary man amongst us possesses so intimate an acquaintance with New England antiquity, united with such a hearty and reverent sympathy with its peculiar spirit, so keen a relish for its quaint old conceits and phraseology, and at the same time that enlarged and elevated philosophical view, which measures the real value of all men, of all times, by the same standard of everlasting and unchangeable truth. Few men would have gleaned so much curious and interesting matter from such various and fragmentary sources, and made us so much at home with Eliot and his civilized and savage cotemporaries. A true antiquarian thoroughness of research, combined with the freshness and wisdom of a philosophic scholarship, have raised a worthy monument to the apostle and his noble enterprise. We take the liberty to enrich our pages with some paragraphs from this volume. We need not apologize for the length of the following, concerning the famous Indian Bible. Our author has given a full account of its character and history, of which we copy the conclusion.

"The Indian Bible has become one of those rare books, which the antiquarian deems it a triumph to possess. The copies in private or public libraries are very few. It has acquired the venerable appearance of an ancient and sealed book; and, when we turn over its pages, those long, and harsh words seem like the mysterious hieroglyphics in some time-hallowed temple of old Egypt. It failed to answer the pious purpose, for which the translator labored in preparing it. But it has answered another purpose, which was perhaps never in his mind, or, if it were, was doubtless regarded as an inferior consideration. In connexion with his Indian Grammar, it has afforded important aid as a valuable document in the study of comparative philology. Though the language, in which it is printed, is no longer read, yet this book is prized as one of the means of gaining an insight into the structure and character of 'unwritten dialects of barbarous nations,' a subject which, of late years, has attracted the attention of learned men, and the study of which, it is believed, will furnish new facts to modify the hitherto received principles of universal grammar.

"On this account scholars of the highest name in modern times have had reason to thank Eliot for labors, which the Indians are not left to thank him for. While the cause of religion missed, in a great degree, the benefit designed for it, the science of language acknowledges a contribution to its stores. Mr. Eliot translated the Bible into a dialect of what is called the Mohegan tongue, a language spoken by all the New England Indians, essentially the same, but varied by different dialects among the several tribes. By Eliot and others it was called the Massachusetts language.

"There is, besides, a moral aspect, in which this translation of the Scriptures should be viewed. It must be regarded as a monument of laborious piety, of painstaking love to the soul of man. Would the translator have had the spirit to undertake, still more the perseverance to carry through, a work so wearisome and discouraging, had he not been animated by the deep, steady, strong principle of devotedness to God and to the highest good of his fellow-men? The theological scholar, who translates the Bible, or even one of the Testaments, from the original into his vernacular tongue, is considered as having achieved a great task, and as giving ample proof of his diligence. Yet such a work is easy compared with the labor which Eliot undertook and finished amidst a press of other employments, which alone might have been deemed sufficient to satisfy the demands of Christian industry.

"Among the many remarkable doings of the Apostle to the Indians, this bears the most striking testimony to his capacity of resolute endurance in the cause of man's spiritual welfare. We justly admire the moral courage, the spirit of self-sacrifice, which sustained him in the tasks of preaching, visiting, and instruction, never deterred by the dark squalidness of barbarity, never daunted by the fierce threats of men who knew no law but their passions, never moved by exposure to storms, cold, and the various forms of physical suffering. But when we represent him to our minds, as laboring at his translation of the Scriptures in the silence of his study, year after year, in the freshness of the morning hour and by the taper of midnight, wearied but not disheartened; continually perplexed with the almost unmanageable phraseology of the dialect of the barbarians, yet always patient to discover how it might be made to represent truly the meaning of the sacred books; doing this chapter by chapter, verse by verse, without a wish to give over the toil; cherishing for a long time only a faint hope of publication, yet still willing to believe, that God in his good providence would finally send the means of giving the printed word of life to those for whom he toiled and prayed, — we cannot but feel that we witness a more trying task, a more surprising labor, than any presented by the stirring and active duties of his ministry among the natives.

"It was a long, heavy, hard work, wrought out by the silent but wasting efforts of mental toil, and relieved by no immediately animating excitement. It was truly a labor of love. When we take that old dark volume into our hands, we understand not the words in which it is written; but it has another and beautiful meaning which we do understand. It is a symbol of the affection, which a devoted man cherished for the soul of his fellow-man; it is the expression of a benevolence, which fainted in no effort to give light to those who sat in darkness and in the shadow of death; and so it remains, and will ever remain, a venerable manifestation of the power of spiritual truth and spiritual sympathy.*" — pp. 237 - 242.

"* 'Since the death of the Apostle Paul,' says Mr. Everett, 'a no-

We quote the following to illustrate the sort of influence which Eliot exercised over his converts. It was the time of Philip's war, when the colonial government deemed it necessary to resort to some severe measures of precaution with respect to the Indians professing to be friendly, as was always the case with the Christian converts, or "praying Indians," as they were called.

"In consequence of the prevalent excitement, the court passed an order, that the Indians at Natick should be forthwith removed to Deer Island, having first obtained the consent of the owner of that Island. Captain Thomas Prentiss, with a party of horse, was appointed to superintend their removal. He took a few men to assist, and five or six carts to carry away such commodities as would be indispensable for the Indians. When he arrived at Natick, and made known to them the pleasure of the court, they sadly but quietly submitted, and were soon ready to follow him. Their number was about two hundred, including men, women, and children. They were ordered to a place called *The Pines* on Charles River, two miles above Cambridge, where boats were to be in readiness to take them to the island. At this place, their spiritual father and ever faithful friend, Mr. Eliot, met them, to say a few kind and consoling words before they embarked. While he sympathized in their sorrows, he exhorted them to be patient under suffering and firm in their faith, reminding them that through much tribulation they must enter into the kingdom of God.

"There is an affecting moral beauty in the scene. That settlement, towards which the heart of the good apostle had yearned alike through seasons of discouragement and of hope; the foundations of which were laid by his own hands and hallowed by his own prayers; where the tree of life, as he believed, was firmly rooted in the wilderness; where, by the patient labor of years, he had made the word of God understood, and had reared civil and social institutions; that settlement, which probably next to his own home he loved better than any thing else on earth, is suddenly

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bler, truer, and warmer spirit, than John Eliot, never lived; and taking the state of the country, the narrowness of the means, the rudeness of the age, into consideration, the history of the Christian church does not contain an example of resolute, untiring, successful labor, superior to that of translating the entire Scriptures into the language of the native tribes of Massachusetts; a labor performed, not in the flush of youth, nor within the luxurious abodes of academic ease, but under the constant burden of his duties as a minister and a preacher, and at a time of life when the spirits begin to flag.'—EVERETT's *Address at Bloody Brook*, p. 31."

broken up, in consequence of a misguided excitement, and its inhabitants are hurried away from their fields and homes into what is little better than an imprisonment. At the hour of their departure, the venerable man, on whose head more than seventy winters had shed their frosts, stands with them on the bank of the river to pour forth his prayers for them, to mingle his tears with theirs, and to teach them the lesson, not of resentment against man, but of submission to God, the lesson of meekness and of strong endurance. The whole company present were deeply affected to see the quiet resignation "of the poor souls, encouraging and exhorting one another with prayers and tears." On the 30th of October, 1675, about midnight, when the tide served, they embarked in three vessels and were transported to their destined confinement on Deer Island." — pp. 277-279.

We cannot allow ourselves to withhold the following just and very beautiful reflections upon the enterprise to which our apostle devoted so much time and energy.

"The question has been, and will be again, asked, What after all was the use of this difficult effort, this hard toil? Was it not a wasted labor? Were the Indians benefited, or was Christianity planted with an abiding power in their wigwams and villages? Did not the whole disappear, like the snow-wreath in the sun? These questions are sometimes put in a sneering and contemptuous spirit, which becomes neither the Christian nor the philosopher. If the natives of our forests derived no permanent benefit from the exertions of Mr. Eliot and others, let it be remembered that these natives vanished from among men, before the experiment could be tried on a large scale, and for many successive years. They dwindled away in presence of the ever-restless enterprise of the New England settlers; and well might they say of "the pale race" around them,

"They waste us, — ay, like April snow
  In the warm noon, we shrink away;
And fast they follow, as we go
  Towards the setting day, —
Till they shall fill the land, and we
Are driven into the western sea."

I do not say that blame is necessarily to be attached to those, by whom they were crowded out; for, the world over, it is, and has been, generally a law of human progress, that civilized man must overtop and displace uncivilized man. But I say, that it ill becomes us, who have taken possession of the broad and fair lands of New England, to ask in derision, what was the use of all the Christian zeal displayed in behalf of the race that once roamed over our hills and plains, when we recollect that they disappeared, to make room for us, too soon for the great and final results of that zeal to be fairly unfolded.

"But the question may be asked, on the other hand, Was there no good done? It is true, indeed, that both the red man and his Christianity, such as it was, vanished ere long from the roll of existing things. But while he remained, did the religion, which he had received, do nothing for him? True, it was a very imperfect and rude exercise of faith; his conceptions of what he had learned under the name of Christianity were, as we should expect, coarse and narrow. But was even such a form of moral life useless to him? God has endowed spiritual truth with a power, which, when it has once found its way to the heart, cannot be wholly suppressed or extinguished by any rudeness of apprehension, or any poverty of knowledge.

"Who the line
Shall draw, the limits of the power define,
That even imperfect faith to man affords?"

I cannot readily believe, that any portion of spiritual culture is entirely lost. Somewhere and somehow it has worked, and will work, for good. Even in the comparatively faint moral life kindled among the Indian settlements founded by Mr. Eliot, before they were broken up by war and discord, there was far more of the substantial good that belongs to man in his true attributes, than among all the tribes, who still roamed in vaunted freedom through the forests, unchained by any restraints of order or religion.

"But even if not one of the Indians had been personally benefited by the labors of the apostle Eliot, still those labors, like every great benevolent effort, have answered a noble purpose. They stand as the imperishable record of good attempted by man for man; and such a record, who, that values the moral glory of his country, will consider as a trivial portion of her history? It constitutes a chapter in the annals of benevolence, which every Christian, every friend of man, will contemplate with pleasure, even if his gratification be mingled with the sad reflection, that so much was done for so small results. When the settlers of New England came hither, and built new homes on these shores, they and the natives, the stranger emigrant and the old inhabitant, stood side by side, each a portion of God's great family. Had our fathers never cast one kind regard on these wild men, had they never approached them in any office of kindness or any manifestation of sympathy, had they stood off from them in surly or contemptuous indifference, except when occasion might serve to circumvent or crush them, a melancholy deduction must have been made from the reverence, with which every son of New England loves to regard their character and doings.

> "But it is not so. The voice of Christian affection was spoken to the savage. The accents of pious kindness saluted his ear. For him benevolence toiled, and faith prayed, and wisdom taught; and the red race did not pass away, carrying with them no remembrance but that of defeat, and wrong, and submission to overpowering strength. The Christianity of the white man formed a beautiful, though transient, bond of interest with them. The light, which Eliot's piety kindled, was indeed destined soon to go out. But there his work stands for ever on our records, a work of love, performed in the spirit of love, and designed to effect the highest good which man is capable of receiving. Nonantum and Natick will ever be names of beautiful moral meaning in the history of New England." — pp. 301 - 305.

It is always a pleasure to record with honor, instances of self-forgetting benevolence in our fellow-men, and not the less so for its being sometimes chargeable with improvidence. We have to thank our author for preserving a characteristic anecdote in the next extract.

> "In the performance of his duties among his congregation and elsewhere, he was eminently remarkable for his free and self-forgetting bounty. The pecuniary resources of a New England clergyman, slender enough at any time, were then scanty indeed. But Mr. Eliot, in the unchecked freedom of his liberality, made the most of the little he possessed, in works of benevolence. To the poor he gave with an open hand, till all was gone; and they looked to him as a father and a friend. The amount of his personal charities in this way alone, at different times, was many hundred pounds. He did not wait for suffering to come in his way, but sought it out diligently. As other men would search for hidden treasures, he searched for opportunities of raising the wretched and relieving the miserable. When his own means were exhausted, he applied to those who were blessed with abundance, and begged of them contributions for the children of want. His bounty, to be so profuse, must sometimes doubtless have been indiscriminate and injudicious. With a benevolence too incautious, he often distributed his salary for the relief of others, before the wants of his own family were supplied.
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> "On this subject there is a well-known anecdote, which, though probably familiar to many readers, is too characteristic to be omitted. When the parish treasurer was once about to pay him his salary, or a portion of it, knowing his habitual propensity, he put it into a handkerchief, which he tied in several hard knots, in order to prevent Mr. Eliot from giving it away before he reached home. After leaving the treasurer, the benevolent man called at the house of a family who were poor and sick. He blessed them, and told them God had

sent relief by him. His kind words brought tears of gratitude to their eyes. He immediately attempted to untie his handkerchief; but the knots had been so effectually made, that he could not get at his money. After several fruitless efforts to loose the handkerchief, growing impatient of the perplexity and delay, he gave the whole to the mother of the family, saying, 'Here, my dear, take it; I believe the Lord designs it all for you.'" —pp. 316–318.

Mr. Francis has two or three chapters on the private life and personal traits of Eliot. We copy a few paragraphs.

"His habits with respect to personal indulgence were of the most simple and severe kind. He had attained a complete mastery over the pleasures of sense, and held them in despotic subjugation. The lessons of self-denial, which he had thoroughly learned and daily practised, and his indifference to outward accommodations, fitted him to endure without complaint the privations, to which he was often exposed in his ministry to the Indians. He allowed himself but little sleep, rising early and beginning his labors in the freshness of the morning. This habit he recommended to others, especially to those who were engaged in intellectual pursuits. He would often say to young students, 'I pray you, look to it that you be morning birds.'

"His food was always the plainest and most simple. Rich viands and highly seasoned varieties, it seems, were not unknown in New England even at that time. For these Mr. Eliot had no relish himself, and but little mercy for the taste in others. When he dined abroad, he partook of but one dish, and that the plainest on the table. He was habitually a water-drinker, and seldom deviated into the use of any other liquor. The juice of the grape he did not denounce, but rarely tasted it himself. 'Wine,' he was accustomed to say, 'is a noble, generous liquor, and we should be humbly thankful for it; but, as I remember, water was made before it.' He thought very justly, that intemperate eating deserved to be severely rebuked, no less than intemperate drinking. In his correspondence with Baxter, he remarks, 'I observe in yours a thing, which I have not so much observed in other men's writing, namely that you often inveigh against the sin of gluttony, as well as drunkenness. It appeareth to be a very great point of Christian prudence, temperance, and mortification, to rule the appetite of eating as well as drinking; and, were that point more inculcated by divines, it would much tend to the sanctification of God's people, as well as to a better preservation of health, and lengthening of the life of man on earth.'

"Extravagance or finery in dress was likely to draw from Mr. Eliot a witty or a serious rebuke. His own apparel was not only without ornament, but frequently of the most homely kind. It is said that, like John the Baptist, he sometimes had a leathern girdle about his loins; but this, it is likely, was worn only or chiefly during his missionary excursions. In some men, habits like these might justly be supposed to proceed from an affectation of homeliness; for there is a pride of plainness, as well as a pride of finery. But Mr. Eliot was too guileless a man to be suspected of such folly. His negligence of external appearance, and his contempt for the pleasures of the table, were the result of an unaffected love of simplicity, strengthened by a studious life and by intense engagement in absorbing duties.

"Mr. Eliot had a few whims, to which he was pertinaciously attached. One of these was an unsparing hostility to the practice of wearing long hair and wigs. He could not endure it; he regarded it as an iniquity not to be tolerated. The man, and especially the minister of the Gospel, who wore a wig, he considered as committing an offence, not only against decency, but against religion. His zeal about 'prolix locks' was warm, but unavailing. He lived to see the practice prevail in spite of his remonstrances, and at last gave over his warfare against it with the despairing remark, 'The lust has become insuperable!' The readers of New England history will remember, that in 1649 an association was formed, and a solemn protest published, against wearing long hair, by Governor Endicot and the other magistrates.

"In this punctiliousness we see the influence of sympathy with the English Roundheads carried even into trifles. In England, periwigs were permitted quietly to cover the head soon after the restoration of Charles. But for more than thirty years after that time, they were deemed by many a sore grievance in New England. Gradually during that period they were coming into use; but they needed all the authority derived from the practice of such divines as Owen, Bates, and Mede, to find protection at last. The intolerance they experienced from Mr. Eliot was not, therefore, a singularity in the good man; he only persevered in his stern hostility against them longer than many others.

"To the use of tobacco, the introduction of which had caused no little disturbance in New England, he had likewise a strong aversion, and denounced it in the severest terms. But his opposition in this case was as ineffectual, as in that of the wigs. 'In contempt of all his admonitions,' says Allen, 'the head would be adorned with curls of foreign growth, and the pipe would send up volumes of smoke.'" — pp. 320 - 323.

"This aged servant of Christ sat waiting, as it were, in the antechamber of death, quiet and full of hope. He used sometimes pleasantly to say, that he was afraid some of his old Christian friends, who had departed before him, especially John Cotton of Boston and Richard Mather of Dorchester, would suspect him to have gone the wrong way, because he remained so long behind them. His full share of work seemed to have been done; but even now he could not consent to be idle. He looked around for some labor of benevolence and piety, such as the remnant of his powers might allow him to perform. The care of the ignorant and the neglected was still the ruling passion of his heart. He saw with grief the great want of concern for the moral welfare of the blacks. He proposed to many of the families within two or three miles of his house, that they should send their negro servants to him once a week, to be instructed in religion. In this humble, but truly benevolent work, he rejoiced to occupy some of his last hours; but death intervened before much could be accomplished." — pp. 332, 333.

We have already trespassed largely upon the pages of our author, and will pass on to the closing scene of our apostle's life.

"While death was fast approaching, his mental powers, though dimmed and broken, were still retained. He rejoiced in the thought, that he should soon carry to his friends in heaven good news of the prosperity of the New England churches. When some one inquired how he was, he replied, 'Alas! I have lost every thing; my understanding leaves me; my memory fails me; my utterance fails me; but, I thank God, my charity holds out still; I find that rather grows than fails.' One of his last remembrances lingered sadly among those, to whom he had given so much of his strength and life. 'There is a cloud,' he said, 'a dark cloud upon the work of the Gospel among the poor Indians. The Lord revive and prosper that work, and grant it may live when I am dead. It is a work, which I have been doing much and long about. But what was the word I spoke last? I recall that expression *my doings*. Alas, they have been poor and small doings, and I 'll be the man that shall throw the first stone at them all.' When, a short time before his death, Mr. Walter came into his room, he said, 'Brother, you are welcome to my very soul; but retire to your study, and pray that I may have leave to be gone.' Mr. Eliot died on the 20th of May, 1690, aged eighty-six years. The last words on his lips were 'WELCOME JOY!'

"Such was the life and such the end of John Eliot. New England bewailed his death, as a great and general calamity. The churches, whose growth and prosperity had always been among the things which lay nearest to his heart, felt that they had lost a spiritual father, whose venerable presence had been to them a defence and glory. So deep was the sentiment of reverence for his character, that Mather observes, 'We had a tradition among us, that the country could never perish as long as Eliot was alive.' One, who for a long series of years had filled so large a space with eminent usefulness, on whom the confidence of the best men in church and state had reposed without wavering, and over whose name, age and great services had shed a saintly consecration, could not depart from those, with and for whom he had acted, without leaving a community in mourning. The Indian church at Natick wept the loss of their venerated instructer, as rough men in simplicity of heart would weep for one, who had loved them, who had prayed for them, and guided them to the things of their everlasting peace." — pp. 334 - 336.

We lay down this book assured that every thing has now been done for the memory of John Eliot that lies within the legitimate province of biography. History has now done her utmost for him ; and those who love to know as much as may be known of such a man, and his work, will be fully satisfied. But without disparagement to the interest and thoroughness of this work, and others like it, we think that there is still a great popular want unsupplied with respect to the early times and first heroes and saints of New England. We have heard the idea set forth, and we sympathize with it, that those times and men have become fit themes for the historical novel. While such men as our author lead the way, and with learned accuracy and philosophical investigation set up the landmarks of truth concerning them, we would gladly see some genius follow and clothe them in a fitting garb of romance. We would propose to such an one no light or insignificant task, no vapid story of Indian murder, or Puritan rigor, or wild love, to relieve the ennui of a frivolous and jaded sentimentality ; but, catching and bodying forth the spirit of the time, to take hold of the strong heart of the people, and kindle it with a hallowed and healthful enthusiasm for the old heroic age of the country.

G. P.

NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

The Outcast, and Other Poems. By S. G. Goodrich. Boston : Russell, Shattuck, & Williams. — In the Preface to the volume before us, the author leads us to infer that he has not served a regular apprenticeship to the muses, and that he lays claim to no higher title than that of an amateur in verse. Had he indulged in more pretence, we should not have been disposed to find fault with him for so doing. His work is more than respectable; and, though there are some evident tokens of haste, and a few passages which betray a want of finish, yet we cannot but hail the collection as a handsome accession to this department of American literature. The leading poem in the volume, "The Outcast," is in flowing but irregular verse, chiefly octosyllabics, and is intended to portray the workings of remorse in the mind of an individual of a noble and sensitive nature, who, actuated by notions of false honor, has in a moment of reckless excitement made himself in the eye of God and his own conscience, though not of the world, a murderer, having shot his friend in a duel. The interest of the story is well sustained, and the poem abounds in passages of genuine power, and in bursts of impassioned eloquence. The language is in one or two instances exaggerated, but never feeble. It is always rich, expressive, and harmonious. "The Spirit Court" is the title of a poem, half satirical and half didactic, in which the author has happily hit off some of the prominent follies of the day. The "Dream of Youth," the "Fortune-Hunter," and the lines to Lake Superior, are worthy of more than one reading. Had we room to analyze, and to find fault, we doubtless might do so; but the beauties of these poems so far counterbalance the defects, that we are inclined to be extremely lenient towards the latter, in consideration of the pleasure which the former have afforded us. We regret that we have but room for the following extract, which we select rather for its brevity than as an adequate specimen of the varied powers of the author. It also displays his turn for making nature a mirror, to reflect into the heart the beautiful images of religion.

"SONGS OF NATURE.

"I hear the ocean bursting on the shore, —
What melancholy music in that roar!
What wailing voices swell upon the breeze,
What phantoms come and whisper of the seas!
Wild tales they tell of misty ages flown,
Of depths unfathomed, and of shores unknown;
Of ever toiling tides, where tempests frown,
Of trackless deeps, where God alone looks down.
And these, the legends of the speeding wave,
Come to the heart like music from the grave.
Sad is their tone, and answering deep to deep,
The soul gives back an echo to its sweep.

The forest tosses in the autumn gale,
The leaves are scattered, and they shroud the vale.
Voices are on the breeze, — and in its breath
Spirits are singing, but they sing of death.

And who hath tuned these harps of nature? Who
Makes the deep bosom feel their music true?
Oh, God! we hear the anthem of the sea
And land, — and listen, for they speak of Thee!
They speak of Thee, and man's predestined doom,
Yet lift the shroud that shadows o'er the tomb:
They sadden, but they soothe the troubled soul,
And strike hope's anchor strong, though billows roll."

1. *The Rev. Mr. Loraine's Faith Examined and Changed.* By the Author of "The Sunday School Teacher's Funeral." Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1836. 16mo. pp. 59. — 2. *Forms of Morning and Evening Prayer, composed for the Use of Families.* By JONATHAN FARR. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1836. 16mo. pp. 168. — These, like all the publications of Mr. Farr, are intended for use, and not for show. The first little work traces the successive changes of opinion, through which an Orthodox minister, settled over an Orthodox church, is gradually led by a devout study of the Scriptures, in becoming a consistent Unitarian, and indicates the effect which these changes have on the tone of his preaching, on his pastoral fidelity, and ultimately on the spiritual condition of his flock. It is, in some respects, an unfinished sketch; but parts of it are so ingeniously done, and so feelingly withal, as to create in us a strong desire to hear the rest of Mr. Loraine's history, and to know a little more about "poor Mr. Hawbry's papers." The "Forms of Morning and Evening Prayer," are among the best that have come under our notice, — at once calm and fervent, scriptural and rational; for which reason we doubt not that they will find general favor among those, who are accustomed to avail themselves of such helps to private or domestic devotion. The volume is very neatly printed and done up, and contains prayers for every day in a fortnight, and eight morning and evening prayers for any day in the week, and a great variety of occasional prayers for families, and for individuals.

Report on the Magnetical Experiments made by the Commission of the Royal Academy of Medicine, of Paris, read in the Meetings of June 21st and 28th, 1831. By M. HUSSON, the Reporter. Translated from the French, and preceded with an Introduction, by CHARLES POYEN ST. SAUVEUR. Boston: D. K. Hitchcock. 1836. 16mo. pp. 172. — As Animal Magnetism is beginning once more, under a modified form, to make some noise in the world, we are glad that such among us as are curious in these matters, will now have an opportunity to become acquainted with the facts and experiments on which the pretended science is founded. Nobody need apprehend any harm from this second translation into English of the famous Report of the French *savans;*

for we can hardly conceive it possible for any one to read it over ever so attentively, or ever so cursorily, without perceiving that the evidence adduced in support of the wonderful discovery is poor and weak to the last degree. After reading M. Poyen's little book we suspect that most persons will be content; otherwise, we commend them to Colquhoun's version of the same Report, (8vo. Edinburgh, 1833,) "with an Explanatory Introduction, and an Appendix," as being much more full, amusing, and ridiculous, and therefore more satisfactory.

Orthodoxy in England. — Everybody knows that Orthodoxy in this country has long been a house divided against itself. From the following extract, which makes part of the Summary of Intelligence in the (London) Christian Reformer for May, it would seem that the prospect of things in England is still worse for the party.

> "In the religious world all is agitation. The old Bartlett's Buildings' or Christian Knowledge Society, is an arena of faction; the Evangelical clergy nose the bishops and insist upon it that the Church of England is Calvinistic, and must, on pain of perdition, support Calvinism. Dr. Maltby's elevation from Chichester to Durham has alarmed the total believers in the Thirty-nine Articles. Some of the rural clergy are for taking the *congé d'élire* from the Crown. — Oxford is in an uproar. The new Regius Professor of Divinity, Dr. Hampden, once pleaded for the admission of Dissenters to the University, and once allowed that Unitarians might be Christians. He has since confessed much more than is commonly required for orthodoxy, but his humiliation does not appease the Oxonians, the majority of whom seem to be a compound of Toryism, semi-popery, and fanaticism. — The peaceful Quakers are waging with one another a direful war, and in the battle between old light and new light all is darkness and confusion. — There is a rent in the Wesleyan garment; schism extends through the connexion; John Wesley has had his century. In this dispute a real principle of liberty is involved, and the seceders are, in a sense as yet partially understood by themselves, reformers. — In the Bible Society, the Baptists are beginning to agitate the question whether they can conscientiously belong to an association which sends out translations that turn plain dipping into pouring or sprinkling. This is probably one of the results of the late Baptist Deputation from this country to the United States, where the Baptists have parted company from the other Evangelical sects, in order to have pure Baptist Bibles. — The Tabernacle is rent in twain, and placards announce that the spirit of Whitfield has fled from its old *habitat* in Moorfields. — Cloven, too, are the tongues of the Irvingites; and Boatswain Smith cries out from Aylesbury Gaol, where he has taken apartments amongst the Debtors, that none will come to the help of the Lord against his oppressors, the orthodox Dissenting ministers of the metropolis and their disciples and agents. May not these divisions, accompanied by so many exhibitions of the worst spirit of the lowest of mankind, suffice to teach the pretenders to preternatural light and purity, that they are a little mistaken and are not infallible? This lesson learned and orthodoxy dies."

Glasgow Edition of Dr. Channing's Works. — It is but justice to the publishers of this edition to say, that they are not responsible, as we supposed in the notice in our May number, for originating the mistake of giving as Dr. Channing's, a long article which does not belong to him. It was copied from the London edition of Dr. Channing's writings, published by Mr. Rich in 1834. Messrs. Hedderwick & Son will issue another edition of the Glasgow collection, in which this error, and the others complained of, will be corrected, and the later publications of Dr. Channing, including that on Slavery, will be inserted.

New Publications. — "An Accurate Reprint of the first Edition of the New Testament in English, translated by William Tyndale, in the reign of Henry VIII. 1526," has just been issued from the press of Mr. Bagster, London. It is given in Roman letters, with the ancient orthography, and a fac simile of the original title-page, from the celebrated copy belonging to the Museum of Bristol College, supposed to be the only perfect one of the first edition now in existence. A full and interesting biography of Tyndale is prefixed. Mr. Bagster proposes also, if sufficient encouragement should be given, to republish Coverdale's Bible, 1535, (the first entire English Bible ever printed,) from a copy in the possession of the Duke of Sussex.

The ninth volume of the "Biblical Cabinet," published by Thomas Clark, Edinburgh, has just appeared. It contains the first volume of Rosenmueller's "Biblical Geography of Central Asia," translated by the Rev. N. Morren, A. M. with notes by the translator. The publisher of the "Cabinet" has also favored us with the *first* volume of Menzies' translation of Tholuck's "Exposition of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans," the *first* volume of the same gentleman's translation of Tholuck's "Exposition, Doctrinal and Philological, of Christ's Sermon on the Mount," and the *first* volume of Forbes's translation of Pareau's "Principles of Interpretation of the Old Testament." We hope that the time is not far distant, when *second* volumes of some of these works will be forthcoming.

Gould and Newman, of Andover, advertise as in preparation a translation of Eichhorn on the Apocalypse by A. Kaufman, Jr. Also Rosenmueller on the Psalms, Pentateuch, Isaiah, Ezekiel, &c, translated and edited by C. E. Stowe, Prof. of Bib. Lit. in Lane Seminary, Cincinnati. Perkins & Marvin, Boston, are reprinting, from the second English edition, Dr. Bloomfield's Greek Testament, with English notes, critical, philological, and exegetical.

THE

CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

No. LXXVII.

THIRD SERIES — No. VIII.

NOVEMBER, 1836.

Art. I. — *The Works of the Rev.* John Gambold, A. M., late One of the Bishops of the United Brethren. *With an Introductory Essay,* by Thomas Erskine, Esq., Advocate, Author of "Remarks on the Internal Evidence of the Truth of Revealed Religion." Second Edition. Glasgow. 1823. 12mo. pp. 300.

In the very lively and pleasing novel entitled "Destiny," (whose author enjoys the high praise of being designated by Sir Walter Scott* "a brother, or perhaps a sister shadow,") a short poem, called the "Mystery of Life," is quoted as "those verses of Gambold." Our attention was thus called to an author of whom, in our ignorance, we had not before heard; and, judging according to the old rule *Ex pede Herculem,* we inferred that a specimen in itself so beautiful, was not, probably, an insulated production of the author. It seemed to us irrational to suppose that a mind so obviously rich and fertile in poetical sentiment as his, should bloom and produce such exquisite fruit once, and remain thenceforth flowerless and barren. It was in this manner we were led to the examination of the book before us; and we now propose to record here, very briefly, the result of our inquiries.

The volume contains an "Introductory Essay, by Thomas Erskine, Esq., Advocate," an anonymous "Life of Gambold," and a collection of his principal works.

The "Introductory Essay" is, essentially, a homily on what is technically called "the free grace of the Gospel." It is not far removed, in any direction, out of the ample field of common-place discussion on this subject; and is by no means free from that very miserable species of affectation ordinarily called cant. As a specimen of the enlargement and tendencies of the author's mind, we quote the following;

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* Concluding paragraph of "Tales of My Landlord."

> "We remember at present only one passage in Shakspeare which is directly and unequivocally *Christian*, (?) and that occurs in 'Measure for Measure,' in the scene between Isabella and Angelo. — She is persuading him to pardon her brother, and she says,
>
> 'All the souls that were, were forfeit once;
> And He that might the 'vantage best have took,
> Found out the remedy,' &c." —p. xxiii.

Now if the writer meant, as he doubtless did, by the term "Christian," *Calvinistic*, it is of little importance to us whether his remembrance is correct or not. We should hope, however, that he was entirely authorized in his assertion, since we should estimate the omission he thus alludes to as a new proof of the perspicuity and justness of the Bard's mind, which seem to us as not among the least glorious of his transcendent gifts. But to cite this as the only "Christian" passage in Shakspeare, is an instance of extreme arrogance and injustice. We shall not go into an elaborate defence of the great poet on this point. He requires it not at our hands with any who read his pages in the spirit in which they ought to be read. Passing by all but countless examples, we need not go beyond the very scene here quoted to find, in our apprehension at least, several *Christian* sentiments. Does not Isabella talk very much like a *Christian*, when she says,

> "Well, believe this,
> No ceremony that to great ones 'longs,
> Not the king's crown, nor the deputed sword,
> The marshal's truncheon, nor the judge's robe,
> Become them with one half so good a grace,
> As mercy does."

And again: this sounds to us Christian-like;

> "O, it is excellent
> To have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous
> To use it like a giant."

And again: we must refer to that glorious passage, which we cannot stop to quote at length, beginning —

> "Merciful heaven!
> Thou rather, with thy sharp and sulphurous bolt,
> Split'st the unwedgeable and gnarled oak
> Than the soft myrtle;" &c.

And then, once more, the passage where she appeals to Angelo's conscience, beginning with

> "Go to your bosom;
> Knock there, and ask your heart," &c.,

seems to us to be conceived precisely in the spirit of the Author and Examplar of our faith, when he said, "He who is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone."

All this occurs in that single scene, which according to "Thomas Erskine, Esquire, Advocate," contains the only passage "in Shakspeare which is directly and unequivocally *Christian*"! But we dismiss this topic. It is not worthy the attention we have already bestowed upon it. Thus to select a single sentiment from all the works of Shakspeare, and call it the *only one* that is "Christian," simply because it seems to recognise one of the technics of the writer's own arbitrary definition of Christianity, proves to us nothing so clearly as the narrowing and belittling influences of an exclusive creed upon a narrow and exclusive mind.

Passing then this "Introductory Essay," without further remark, we next come to the "Life of Gambold." This is an interesting memoir, comprising the principal facts of the "earthly residence" of Gambold, written in a simple and unaffected style, though evidently proceeding from a spirit, which, like his own, was pervaded with the peculiarly mystical views of the Moravians, to whom he belonged. He was born, April 10th, 1711, at Puncheston, in Pembrokeshire, South Wales. His father was an estimable clergyman of the Church of England, and gave the benefit of his personal instruction and pure example to his son until he was fifteen years old, when he was entered as Servitor in Christ Church, in the University of Oxford. He soon became eminent for his diligent application to study. "He was naturally of a lively and active spirit," and, until the age of seventeen, occupied all the leisure he could command from his severer studies, in reading poems and plays. At this period his father died, when this event, together "with the edifying exhortations he received from him in his latest moments, so affected him, that a real seriousness of mind, and a solid concern for his salvation, took place in him." He then "renounced, from a principle of self-denial, all the pleasure he had received from books calculated to gratify the taste of the polite world," and fell into a melancholy state of mind. In March, 1730, he formed an acquaintance with some students in the University, who, aiming at higher spiritual attainments than those which prevailed around them, formed themselves into a society for mutual religious edification. Though it is not so stated in the Life before us, yet the circle of young men here referred to, was doubtless that, out of which the wide-spread sect of Christians called Methodists proceeded.* It consisted, at first, of a few persons, about fifteen in number, and comprised some names, which afterwards attained great notoriety. It comprised Morgan, who died an early victim to his self-sacrificing philanthropy, severe habits of life, and gloomy and mistaken views of religion; the two Wesleys, Charles and John; George Whitefield; and, to name no more, it included James Hervey, the author of that popular book of shallow thought, and "tinsel style," and affected sentiment, entitled "Meditations." They were all distinguished for their ascetic manner of living, frequent fastings, and an almost exclusive observance of the internal and external means of religion. It might be supposed, that, in a society like this, Gambold might have found that sympathy and support which his peculiar sickness of soul required. But in this he utterly failed. "Not being able," says his biographer, "by the use of such means only to gain that which could make him happy, he gave way to those desponding thoughts from which he had formerly suffered so much, totally neglected his person and apparel, confined himself as much as possible to his room, and applied, in search of information and comfort, to the works of such authors as he supposed could satisfy his inquiries, namely, the Fathers of the first ages of the Christian Church. Of these the most abstruse were his greatest favorites, and particularly those which are called Mystics." He was, at length, so infatuated with those early Fathers, and "became so much like one of them, that his cast of mind bore a nearer resemblance to that which was peculiar to them, than to any that appeared among the moderns." His melancholy, however, still continued, since he found it vain, after all his efforts, to realize, in his own person, that sinless and impeccable state of character, at which, by his favorite authors, he was taught to aim.

In September, 1733, he was admitted to holy orders, and was instituted to the living of Stanton-Harcourt, in the diocese of Oxford. His parish was small, his residence sequestered, and his leisure for his favorite studies ample; so that there was little to interfere with that "philosophical and Platonic kind of religion, wherein the imagination could amuse and entertain itself in high flights, deep speculations, intense reflections, and metaphysical reasonings, to which his natural disposition inclined him." Such were his course of life and habits of mind for nearly four years.

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* See Southey's "Life of Wesley," Vol. I. p. 70. Amer. edit.

In the year 1737, he had the "happiness," says the account before us, "of becoming acquainted with the late Peter Boehler." This celebrated minister of the Moravians, or *Unitas Fratrum*, or United Brethren, as they are indifferently called, was then waiting for a ship, in which he was to embark for this country. Through his instrumentality Gambold became a convert to the peculiar doctrines of the Moravians. It was at this period, also, that Wesley, the founder of the Methodists, first became acquainted with this teacher; and it is no small proof of the ascendency of Boehler's influence, that he bent such minds, as Gambold's and Wesley's, to the superior guidance of his own. It was now that Gambold first found rest and peace for his spirit. "It then appeared to him, that the chief point of Christianity, which every one who wishes to enjoy the benefit thereof, should be concerned to obtain, was a lively faith in the Redeemer of the world, and, in consequence thereof, the forgiveness of sins, a conquest over the corruption that naturally dwelleth in us, and a conformity to that state of mind which was in him. These privileges, he found by his own experience, were not to be obtained by a *legal strife* and the helps that Philosophy could administer." After many and severe spiritual conflicts, the "gloom, which like a thick cloud, had long enveloped and depressed his mind, was dissipated;" and to prevent a recurrence of his mournful misgivings and mental darkness, he determined to take leave of his parish, and give himself entirely to a communion with the "Brethren." This he accomplished in the beginning of October, 1742. From this period he ardently devoted himself to the interests of his new associates. In addition to his public labors as a minister, he was employed in preparing many pieces for the press; and was very useful also in repeating *extempore* in English, the sermons which Count Zinzendorf, the great patron and apostle of the Moravians, preached in German. The fact is not mentioned in the Life before us, but we learn from Nichols, that some hymns, and a small hymn-book for the children of the "Brethren," were printed by Mr. Gambold's own hand, in Lindsey House, Chelsea.* Nichols also observes, that he was "not only a good scholar, but a man of great parts, and singular mechanical ingenuity." And in a letter to this writer, by Daniel Prince, who claimed to know him well, he is said to be a "singular, over-zealous, but innocent enthusiast. He had not quite fire enough in him to form a second Simon (Simeon ?) Stylites."

In the year 1754, he was chosen and consecrated Bishop of the *Unitas Fratrum* in England; † and in indefatigable labors for the spiritual and temporal welfare of those thus committed to his watch and care, he passed the remainder of his days. In 1768, he was seized with a very distressing sickness, but he still continued, in the intervals of severe pain, to perform his official duties. And when he could no longer attend the public congregation, he did not cease to preach to those who were privileged to be near him, even more effectively than in words, by the sweetness, composure, and trustful state of his spirit, during all the increasingly sad vicissitudes of his disease, for the space of nearly three years; when "He, whom his soul loved, took him into his eternal security, September 13, 1771. His residence here on earth lasted sixty years."

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* See that very singular book, entitled "Anecdotes of William Bowyer, Printer, F. S. A. By John Nichols, his Apprentice, Partner, and Successor. Lond. 4to. 1782." It is also stated in Nichols's "Literary Anecdotes" that Gambold was "employed by Mr. Bowyer in correcting the press." In this capacity he edited (among many other valuable publications) the beautiful and very accurate edition of Lord Bacon's Works, in 1765. He was also author or editor of the following works among others. History of Greenland by David Crantz, 2 vols. 8vo.; a neat edition of the Greek Testament, published at the Oxford University press, but without his name, "textu per omnia Milliano, cum divisione pericoparum et interpuncturà A. Bengelii," 2 vols. 12mo.; A Short Summary of Christian Doctrine; Maxims and Theological Ideas, collected out of the several Dissertations and Discourses of Count Zinzendorf, from 1738 to 1747.

† In the striking but not very correct account of Mad. de Staël, of these "Monks of Protestantism," as she calls them, it is said that they "were without priests." But beside the fact related in the text, it is well known, that, when they outgrew their first establishment at Hernhut, (Watch of the Lord,) in Saxony, it became expedient to establish colonies in other countries, where they might be unmolested. Nitschmann was consecrated at Berlin, by Jablonsky and his colleague, to be a Bishop of the Moravian Brethren; and afterwards Count Zinzendorf was by them consecrated as a Bishop. See Southey's "Life of Wesley," Vol. I. ch. 5.

These are the prominent facts in the life of John Gambold. Considered in a psychological point of view, it presents some anomalous features. It is not strange, indeed, that a young man of tender and impressible mind, of ardent temperament, secluded from society and singular in his habits, having little sympathy with the living world around him, and absorbed in self-communings, should find, in the mystical lore of the Platonizing Fathers of the early period of Christianity, the precise aliment that his excited and diseased imagination craved. It is not strange, that, having thus become smitten with a love of the *ideal* in character, which, from the very nature of the case, can never be realized on earth, and seeing continually, in consequence, a painful disparity between his aims and efforts, he should sink down into all but hopeless despondency.* It is not strange, moreover, that, while in this deplorable state, he should be glad to welcome any implicit, unquestioning faith, which should promise relief; and especially one which, by substituting the merits of another, should atone for the sad deficiencies of his own. All this is not difficult to be understood. But it is more difficult to comprehend how a man of an intellect so original, perspicacious, and self-relying as his appears to have been in many respects, should, at the mature age of thirty-one, have yielded himself to the guidance of such persons as Boehler, Zinzendorf, Nitschmann, and their coadjutors; and thenceforth have remained satisfied with a form of faith, which, confessedly, was rather imbibed from them than formed for himself; and one too that rested, mainly, on a mere impulse, which he could give no other account of, except that he felt that he felt it. This is one of those spiritual idiosyncracies, which, we must confess, we do not comprehend, and shall not attempt to analyze. They are matters of individual consciousness, which, not having experienced, no self-introspection of ours will adequately explain. Happy, however, are we, that he did gain rest to his excited mind at last, — that the troubled waves of his soul were calmed, even by a halcyon of religious peace like this; and that he did not, like Cowper, a kindred spirit in many respects, sink down into a condition of remediless gloom and despair.

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* When will that interesting class of minds, which are striving after a spiritual perfection, learn, that there must ever be an impassable distance between their exertions and the object they pursue; that their highest attainments *must* ever be regarded by themselves as miserable failures; and that this very capacity of placing before themselves an indefinite idea of perfection, was intended by their Creator only as a means of continual *progress* towards Himself; and that the only Perfection of which man is capable is summed up in the humbler term Effort, unwearied, always onward, never-ending Effort?

Of his moral characteristics it is easier to speak with confidence. He exhibited a beautiful personification of much that was pure, lovely, self-denying and self-devoted, in the interesting class of Christians to which he attached himself. Though he was a man of refined and elegant taste, and highly accomplished as a scholar, and was, moreover, engaged in the anxious duties of a spiritual instructor and Bishop of the "Brethren," he was yet not unfrequently employed in manual labor for the subsistence of himself and family. He might well have appropriated the language of the great Apostle to the Gentiles, whom, in singleness of heart and purpose, as well as in holy zeal, he greatly resembled, — "With these hands have I ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me;" and like him, too, he might have said, "though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself a servant unto all, that I might gain the more."

The distinctive traits of Gambold's mind, and his peculiar tone of thought and sentiment, will best appear from the extracts from his works, which we now proceed to give. With the single exception of the piece entitled "The Mystery of Life," none of his works, considered as a whole, appear to us of very high, certainly not of equally sustained, excellence. There are gems, however, scattered through them all, both plain and set, that is, (by interpretation,) both in prose and poetry, that are both rich and rare. These we propose to select from the general mass, and lay before our readers, connecting them together by a thread-like commentary of our own.

The longest of his poetical works is a drama, entitled "The Martyrdom of St. Ignatius," which was not published until after his death, and seems never to have received an accurate revision by its author. Judged by the common rules of the Drama, it is very imperfect. There is a total disregard of the unities of action, place, and time, which Aristotle supposed he found in the Iliad, and prescribed, in consequence, for the observance of future epic and dramatic writers in all ages; and we suppose that a French critic would be as much shocked with our author for this departure from prescribed rules, as he would be at seeing an actor, in any scenic representation, though even in the "very torrent, tempest, and whirlwind of his passion," turn his back upon the audience. It is, in fact, nothing more than a description, in a dialogue form, of the sad but triumphant journey of St. Ignatius from Antioch to Rome. The whole drama, moreover, is pervaded with a solemn air of stiffness and formality, which, though proper enough to the *dramatis personæ,* where the interlocutors are bishops, presbyters, messengers of the churches, deacons, deaconesses, philosophers, catechumens, penitents, and confessors, yet is, of course, fatal to all facile turns of expression and to all conversational ease. Still it is by no means devoid of interest. It bears the impress of strong reality. It carries us back to the Christians of the first and second centuries; introduces us at once into their society; makes us, for the time, their cotemporaries, sharers of their trials, dangers, and sufferings, and partakers of something of their spirit. The whole plot, if plot it may be called, is this. The Emperor Trajan, in the nineteenth year of his reign, returning from the conquest of the Scythians and Dacians, and thinking it necessary to the security and stability of his empire, that he should subdue the spirit of the Christians, and oblige them, as the account says, to "worship the devil with all other nations," instituted against them a violent persecution. It was at this period, while at Antioch, on his way to Armenia and Parthia, that he was voluntarily sought, at least, not shunned, by Ignatius, then more than eighty years old, in that false spirit of martyrdom, which prevailed *after* the death of the Apostles, in the early ages of the Christian church. This interview, as might well be expected from the temper and bearing of the parties concerned, only seemed to exasperate the Emperor the more; and Ignatius, having avowed himself "Theophorus, or one who carried about, within himself, him who was crucified under Pontius Pilate," he was sent by Trajan to Rome, "there to be thrown to the beasts for the amusement of the people." This act of unnecessary and atrocious cruelty, will affix itself, as an indelible stigma, to a name, which was not otherwise gratuitously stained with blood. But it was met on the part of Ignatius with triumphant gladness. He thanked God, that he was deemed worthy thus to "put on iron bonds with the apostle Paul." He considered and spoke of them as "spiritual jewels." He deprecated the unceasing efforts of numerous churches in Asia Minor, in endeavouring to procure for him any abatement of his punishment. "I fear your love," said he, "lest it should do me an injury. I shall never hereafter have such an opportunity of attaining unto God. I am willing to die unless you hinder me. I beseech that you show not such an unreasonable good-will towards me." And when, as is supposed, his friends represented the peculiar horrors of the death which awaited him, for the purpose of shaking his resolution, his reply was, "Nay, I *enjoy* the wild beasts that are prepared for me, which I wish may exercise their fierceness upon me, and which for that end I will encourage." He finally "attained unto the end he longed for," — that of being speedily destroyed by these wild beasts, at the conclusion of one of the horrid spectacles of human butchery in the amphitheatre at Rome, which were common in that age.

It is impossible for us, either as sober men or Christians, to feel any very strong interest in a tale like this. Whatever we may think of a true self-devotion to principle, this self-sacrifice of Ignatius partakes too largely of a diseased excitement of mind, of mere extravagance and enthusiasm, to address itself to the healthy sympathies of our common nature; and for the same reason, it seems to us of very little value as an authentication of Christianity. Martyrdom, even in the best of causes, is only an heroic, or laudable, or, indeed, an excusable act, when it is undergone as a last and dire necessity, and when the only alternative is the sacrifice of life or the sacrifice of principle. But when it is sought as a high and enviable boon, as in the case before us, it discovers nothing more clearly than the morbid excitement and brain-sickness of the sufferer. Such was *not* the spirit that led his apostles and immediate followers to die for Jesus' sake. Nothing can be more unlike, than, for example, the conduct of Paul and that of Ignatius, though probably they were equally sincere followers of a common Lord, and both went to death for his sake. But the former avoided this awful consummation of his mission in every worthy way, and as long as he worthily might. He cast himself upon the succour of his friends; he abstained from any gratuitous offence of his enemies; he availed himself of his privileges as a Roman citizen; he did not think himself a recreant from his principles, in resorting to any innocent means of saving his life.

But when escape became impossible but by faithlessness to his Master's cause, and by a disavowal of his discipleship, he then did not hesitate to jeopard life, and all that he held dear, in the maintenance of his Christian profession. Now it seems to us, it is this calm, clear apprehension of the issues of conduct, united with an undeviating purpose; this submission to danger and death, only when it becomes a lesser evil than a sacrifice of conscious rectitude; which constitute the true heroism of the Christian martyr. But the conduct of Ignatius was very different from this. He sought, he rushed upon, a horrible death, with such an unnatural, such a lover-like eagerness, that he inevitably impresses us with the conviction that the balance of his mind was destroyed, and he thus is reduced to the vulgar level of those fanatics and *monomaniacs*, who, in all ages of the church, have been found willing to lay down their lives in the defence of almost any favorite, and, as they deem, essential religious doctrine.

And still less is this example of Ignatius of much value, considered as an evidence of the truth of Christianity; since, in the same degree as the equipoise of the mind is impaired, is the testimony of the witness discredited. It shows, indeed, the self-conviction of the confessor; but this self-conviction is of little value as *proof*, any farther than it is connected with a settled, sober, and discriminating state of the intellect. In a word, it seems to us but one manifestation of that enthusiastic state of the mind, which widely pervaded the Christian community immediately after the death of the Apostles, and was exhibited in monachism, self-maceration, and a thousand other uncommanded modes of self-denial and self-torture.

What, then, it may be asked, is the value of the drama against which we have adduced such grave objections? We have already hinted at the answer to this question in part, when we observed, that, considered as a whole, it lays before us a very vivid picture of the temper and conduct of Christians in the earlier age of the church. It is interesting, because it places us, as it were, in the visible presence of those confessors, who infinitely preferred the thorny crown of martyrdom before the diadem of kings; and who, from the midst of the prophetic visions of a spiritual Faith, looked down on all the common objects that men pursue, as unmeasurably meaner things. In these days of safe, and easy, and lax religion, it may be well worth reading on this account alone. And when we follow Ignatius, now on the verge of decrepitude, on his journey of willing death, from Antioch to Rome, rejecting all the overtures of his friends for the alleviation or avoidance of his sufferings, and rejoicing that he was thus permitted to die for the cause of his Master, it may teach us, by the mere force of contrast, perhaps, better to estimate our spiritual supineness at the present day, our low apprehension of our religious privileges, and our half reluctant, and often stinted provision for their support.

But the principal attraction of this drama to us is some beautiful, or just, or striking thoughts which occur, though we must confess at rather long intervals. Those we deem best worth preserving in the pages of this journal, we shall now quote.

The realizing power of faith is thus described:

"The friends of Christ
Strive not with sin, but trample under foot
Its poor exploded antiquated strength.
They don't rely on some benign event
From the wide wheel of things, but pierce directly
Where Jesus now admits them, and ordains
Their thrones in bliss. Hence they in spirit stand,
Free from all spot, amidst the train of heaven,
And see God's face, whose full and constant smile
Doth so attend them through the wilds of life,
That natural dejection, flitting fears,
And all vicissitude is swallowed up
In one still dawn of that eternal day." *

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* We take leave to quote, in connexion with the extract in the text, a similar train of thought, from the "Story of Justin Martyr, and Other Poems, by Richard Chenevix Trench," — a volume we should be glad to welcome from the American press.

"O be sure of this, —
All things are mercies while we count them so;
And this believing, not keen poverty,
Nor wasting years of pain or slow disease,
Nor death * * * * *
Shall ever drift our bark of Faith ashore,
Whose steadfast anchor is securely cast
Within the veil, the veil of things unseen,
Which now we know not, but shall know hereafter."

Since we have thus alluded to this delightful volume, may we be permitted to quote one short stanza more from the "Lines to a Friend entering the Ministry"?

"And for the rest, in weariness,
In disappointment, or distress,

The reply of Dirce to the suggestion, that she might fall one of the earliest victims of Trajan's persecution, is spirited and Shakspearian, and well shows the temper that animated the female converts of this period.

"Welcome the day!
I think I have some blood about my heart,
Though cold and withered in this outward frame,
That would not shun to be poured out for Jesus."

Indeed, the fealty and high-souled devotion of women to the church of Christ are not peculiar to the age here brought before us. The worthy successors of those, who were

"Last at the cross, and earliest at the tomb,"

are found in all places and times; and but for them, we might long since have had occasion to repeat, that "the ways of Zion mourn, and all her gates are desolate."

The parting scene of Ignatius with his friends, the Catechumens and the Penitents, before leaving Antioch, is interesting. His addresses to each are fraught with holy unction. We simply refer to it, it being too long to be quoted. The last exhortation is to Christian union.

"But above all, that blessed knot be kept
Of peace and love within ourselves. 'T is this
Detains our Lord amongst us; who departs
Soon, like the soul, from torn dissevered limbs.

* * * * *

Christ in each other see and serve."

Polycarp's description of the apostle John, from personal recollection (as is presumed), is very graphic and pleasing.

"He oft repeated
One lesson, 'Love the Brethren.' *'T was we know
A thought extracted from a world of thinking.*"

And the following sentiment is as just as it is beautifully expressed.

"The man
That could surround the sum of things, and spy

When strength decays, or hope grows dim,
We ever may recur to Him,
Who hath the golden oil divine
*Wherewith to feed our failing urns,
Who watcheth every lamp that burns
Before his sacred shrine.*"

The heart of God, and secrets of his empire,
Would speak but love: with him the bright result
Would change the hue of intermediate scenes,
And make one thing of all theology."

Again, when the loved apostle thought of his crucified master,

"He would drop a tear,
As for an old acquaintance; then correct it
With a *mild smile, that let down his whole soul*
To simplest posture and a strange repose."

The conversion of the Roman soldier, who had before outrageously struck Ignatius while a helpless prisoner, is related in a striking manner, though the process is somewhat too violent and sudden to suit either our taste or our orthodoxy. The doubt and irresolution of the first steps of his penitence are very true to nature.

—— "A softness creeping o'er his hardy face,
Now *all the longing that an eye can carry*
He darts at you; then checks himself, and droops
Fixed as the earth. One step he just has taken,
But fears to add a second."

His question, after his conversion was consummated, in regard to the consistency of his vocation, as a soldier, with his Christian profession, is pertinent and well put.

* * "But how can I be his, [Christ's,]
O tell me, in a soldier's rough profession?
Must I kill men? "

But, like others, from his day to ours, who have not the same personal interest in the inquiry, he was not so fortunate as to get an explicit, still less a satisfactory, answer.

There is much thought condensed in the single line,

"Nothing that can be seen is fully right."

This is even better expressed, though in prose, in the Epistle from Smyrna:

"Nothing is good that is seen."

The concluding scene of the drama is well sustained and interesting; and the appearance of Ignatius, meek in moral strength, when the lions were rushing on to tear him limb from limb, strikes us as partaking of the true sublime.

"He first
Looked up to heaven, and then let gently fall
His eyes to earth, as one whose suit was heard,
Nor needed that he should solicit more."

The piece entitled "Religious Discourse,"* reminds us of some of the best satires in Cowper's too much neglected first volume of poetry. He would not, we think, have been ashamed of lines like these:

"But who must talk? Not the mere modern sage,
Who suits the softened gospel to the age:
Who ne'er to raise degenerate practice strives,
But brings the precept down to Christian lives.
Not he, who maxims from cold reading took,
And never saw himself but through a book:
Not he, who hasty in the morn of grace,
Soon sinks extinguished as a comet's blaze:
Not he, who strains in scripture-phrase t' abound,
Deaf to the sense, who stuns us with the sound:
But he, who silence loves, and never dealt
In the false commerce of a truth unfelt.

Guilty you speak, if subtle from within
Blows on your words the self-admiring sin:
If unresolved to choose the better part,
Your forward tongue belies your languid heart:
But then speak safely, when your peaceful mind
Above self-seeking blest, on God reclined,
Feels Him at once suggest unlabored sense,
And ope a sluice of sweet benevolence.
Some high behests of heaven you then fulfil,
Sprung from his light your words, and issuing by his will."

Again,

"To love's habitual sense by acts aspire,
And kindle, till you catch the gospel-fire."

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* This poem was ascribed to John Wesley by the Rev. Samuel Badcock, and said by him to be a striking delineation of his (Wesley's) disposition and character. (See Nichols's "Literary Anecdotes.") But by a writer in the "Gentleman's Magazine," A. D. 1784, p. 353, this is said to be an error, and the piece is asserted to be Gambold's. We suppose there is no doubt of the fact. We may add, for the especial gratification of those who are curious in such matters, that, by the same authority, Gambold is said to be "the very model in person and in mien, of the celebrated Dr. Samuel Johnson," &c. &c. If this be so, we must think that the meek, and bland, and heaven-eyed portrait opposite the title-page of the book we are reviewing, was placed there by mistake.

The following remarks on "manner," as the common phrase is, we believe to be essentially correct, as they are certainly felicitous in the expression. Archbishop Whately, at least, will corroborate them.

"All rules are dead; 't is from the heart you draw
The living lustre, and unerring law.
A state of thinking in your manner show,
Nor fiercely soaring, nor supinely low:
Others their lightness and each inward fault
Quench in the stillness of your deeper thought.
Let all your gestures fixed attention draw,
And wide around infuse infectious awe;
Present with God by recollection seem,
Yet present, by your cheerfulness, with them."

The lines,

"Some gentle souls to gay indifference true,
Nor hope, nor fear, nor think the more for you,"

remind us of the uncivil observation of John Wesley, — "Oh, how hard it is to be *shallow* enough for a polite audience!"

The following passage from the piece entitled, "On listening to the Vibrations of a Clock," is much in the manner of Young.

"How the past moment dies, and throbs no more!
What worlds of parts compose the rolling hour!
The least of these a serious care demands;
For though they 're little, yet they 're golden sands:

* * * * * *

Cease, man, to lavish sums thou ne'er hast told!
Angels, though deathless, dare not be so bold."

The poetical paraphrase of the words, "*She that liveth in pleasure, is dead while she liveth,*" is very powerfully conceived and uttered. As has been said on another occasion, it is "indeed poetry by the mere force of truth." Some persons, whose eyes will rest on the lines we shall quote, may possibly peruse therein the phenomena of their own consciousness. And if they do this in the spirit in which it ought to be done, they may experience wholesome pangs of soul, analogous to those which are said to attend the return of palsied bodies to life. May they, in like manner, prove to them the sign and promise of awaking spiritual sensibility!

The movement of the opening lines will remind the reader of a well-known passage in the letter of "Eloisa to Abelard."

"How hapless is th' applauded virgin's lot,
Her God forgetting, by her God forgot!
Stranger to truth, unknowing to obey,
In error nursed, and disciplined to stray;
Swoln with self-will, and principled in pride,
Sense all her good, and passion all her guide:
Pleasure its tide, and flattery lends its breath,
And smoothly waft her to eternal death!

"A goddess here, she sees her votaries meet,
Crowd to her shrine, and tremble at her feet;
She hears their vows, believes their life and death
Hangs on the wrath and mercy of her breath;
Supreme in fancied state she reigns her hour,
And glories in her plenitude of power:
Herself the only object worth her care,
Since all the kneeling world was made for her.

"For her, creation all its stores displays,
The silkworms labor, and the diamonds blaze:
Air, earth, and sea conspire to tempt her taste,
And ransacked nature furnishes the feast.
Life's gaudiest pride attracts her willing eyes,
And balls, and theatres, and courts arise:
Italian songsters pant her ear to please,
Bid the first cries of infant reason cease,
Save her from thought, and lull her soul to peace.

"Deep sunk in sense th' imprisoned soul remains,
Nor knows its fall from God, nor feels its chains:
Unconscious still, sleeps on in error's night,
Nor strives to rise, nor struggles into light."

A tone of sweet and confiding piety pervades the first Hymn. It was probably written after his spirit had found repose in the bosom of the "Brethren." We should like to see those parts of it which are not marred by any peculiarities of doctrine, in the hymn-books of our churches. We must confine our extracts to the following verses.

"No, my dear Lord, in following thee,
Not in a dark uncertainty
This foot obedient moves;

'T is with a Brother and a King,
Who many to his yoke will bring,
Who ever lives and ever loves.

"Now, then, my Way, my Truth, my Life!
Henceforth let sorrow, doubt, and strife
Drop off like autumn leaves;
Henceforth, as privileged by thee,
Simple and undistracted be
My soul, which to thy sceptre cleaves.

"Let me my weary mind recline
On that eternal love of thine,
And human thoughts forget;
Childlike attend what thou wilt say;
Go forth and do it while 't is day,
Yet never leave my sweet retreat."

There is a quick, stirring movement, in many of the hymns of the Methodists and Moravians, which we should be glad to see introduced into our more staid and precise religious assemblies. Some of these hymns, we are happy to notice, have actually found their way into the collections which have been lately made for public worship. It is not, we believe, a wholly strange phenomenon, that the slow and heavy progress of a long, long-metre tune is so sedative in its effects, that it proves to be little better, as an aid to devotional trains of thought, than a solemn lullaby. Might it not be well to intersperse among these "cantus somniferi," as Virgil would call them, something a little less persuasive to repose? The following short extract from the next Hymn of Gambold, may illustrate our meaning.

"O tell me no more
Of this world's vain store;
The time for such trifles with me now is o'er.

"My soul, don't delay,
He calls thee away!
Rise, follow thy Saviour, and bless the glad day.

"No mortal doth know
What he can bestow,
What light, strength, and comfort: go after him, go!"

The "Epitaph on Himself" contains some striking thoughts in condensed language.

"Ask not who ended here his span?
His name, reproach, and praise was man.
Did no great deeds adorn his course?
No deed of his but showed him worse:
One thing was great, which God supplied,
He suffered human life — and died.
What points of knowledge did he gain?
That life was sacred all — and vain:
Sacred how high, and vain how low?
He knew not here, but died to know."

And now we close and crown our poetical extracts with the whole of that short piece, which first directed our attention to Gambold. He who can read it without intense interest, without recognising in every line of its sad strain, the betokenings of his own spirit in its self-questioning moods, may be sure that he has, as yet, lived only in the lower part of his nature; that there is still a world of slumbering thought and sentiment in his bosom, of which he has not the slightest conception; and one which, if awaked, would give an unearthly, and hitherto unimagined interest to this present life, and lift his God-inspired soul to that brighter and better state, which "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man" fully "conceived." It is one of those suggestive and prophetical strains of true poetry, like the "Lines written in a Church-yard," attributed to a school-boy, and a few others, that the mind selects by a sort of elective affinity, which, when once read, are never afterwards forgotten, but are found hymning on as a vocal accompaniment to the soul in its thoughtful and antedating hours.

"THE MYSTERY OF LIFE.

"So many years I' ve seen the sun,
And called these eyes and hands my own;
A thousand little acts I 've done,
And childhood have, and manhood known:
O what is life? and this dull round
To tread, why was a spirit bound?

"So many airy draughts and lines,
And warm excursions of the mind,
Have filled my soul with great designs,
While practice grovelled far behind:
O what is thought! and where withdraw
The glories which my fancy saw?

"So many tender joys and woes
Have on my quivering soul had power;
Plain life with heightening passions rose,
The boast or burden of their hour:
O what is all we feel! why fled
Those pains and pleasures o'er my head?

"So many human souls divine,
So at one interview displayed,
Some oft and freely mixed with mine,
In lasting bonds my heart have laid:
O what is friendship! why impressed
On my weak, wretched, dying breast?

"So many wondrous gleams of light,
And gentle ardors from above,
Have made me sit, like seraph bright,
Some moments on a throne of love:
O what is virtue! why had I,
Who am so low, a taste so high?

"Ere long, when sovereign Wisdom wills,
My soul an unknown path shall tread,
And strangely leave, who strangely fills
This frame, and waft me to the dead:
O what is death! 't is life's last shore,
Where vanities are vain no more;
Where all pursuits their goal obtain,
And life is all retouched again;
Where in their bright result shall rise
Thoughts, virtues, friendships, griefs, and joys."

The principal prose writings in the volume under review are two sermons. One is entitled "Christianity Tidings of Joy," and Mr. Erskine says of it, "that it was preached at a time when the free grace of the gospel was not much known in England," (that is, about the middle, probably, of the last century!) "and never did any uninspired sermon give a plainer or sweeter exhibition of it." The other, on "Religious Reverence," he observes, "contains some striking thoughts, couched in most powerful phraseology." As he gives no analysis or references in support of these assertions, our readers will estimate their value according to the confidence they place in Mr. Erskine's authority.

We quote one or two short passages, as being, in our opinion, the best in the sermons, and which, being insulated ones, will explain themselves.

"Nothing more justly keeps man in a perpetual awe, than the inscrutability of his own soul, in its nature, capacities, and manner of acting. A tame and feeble bird, that accidentally has hatched an eagle's egg, and is afterwards affrighted at the strength and impetuous tendency of what has been fostered under its own wings, cannot find itself in a more critical case, than a man, when holding dialogue, like Adrian, with his own soul."

"Could we conceive any principle so low and unelevated, that the person is able quite to come up with it, and owes it no blushing reverence of this sort; it would, at the same time, cease to be what we call a principle. A man of principle, therefore, be it of what nature it will, is a bashful man, dissatisfied with himself, and a true devotee."

"He that reverences nothing, has at the same time no worth."

"In becoming Christians, though we love some persons more than we did, let us love none less."

The letter addressed to E. V., Esq., though apparently written with much pains-taking, contains some affecting sentiments pleasingly expressed. Its whole strain is pensive, and contains the gems of several of those thoughts which are so beautifully developed in the "Mystery of Life."

The dependence of the aspect of outward things on the state of the percipient soul; or, to use the modern phrase, the connexion between the "objective" and "subjective," is thus manifested in a description of youth.

"The paradisiacal bloom that did then, to the fresh and innocent imagination, dwell on the whole face of things; the soft and solemn delight that even a balmy air, a sunny landscape, the beauties of the vegetable world, hills and vales, a brook or a pebble did then excite. And surely there is something mysteriously great and noble in the first years of our life; which being my notion, you will not be offended that I speak to you, a young man, more as young, than as man, for the former implies something very happy, and the latter something very miserable."

In this, and in the following letter to a "Studious young Lady," he takes a strange pleasure in depreciating human knowledge. The following remark, however, will, to use his own expression, "keep."

"There is no such lumber in the world as our last year's notions, which yet, in their day, were wonderfully fine and delightful. The fruit of the tree of knowledge will not keep: it is pleasant enough when you first pluck it; but, if you pretend to lay it up, it will rot."

We close our remarks and extracts here; happy if our readers shall find any thing approaching to the same pleasure in reading, that we have had in making them; and in the hope that we may have done something to introduce a highly amiable, pious, and gifted man of genius, to the acquaintance of any to whom he has heretofore been unknown.

J. B.

Art. II. — *On the Origin of Allegorical Interpretation.*

[The subject of Allegorical Interpretation is of essential importance to be attended to in the study of the history of opinions, especially of opinions concerning religion. Some remarks have been made upon it in a former volume of the Christian Examiner (Vol V., for 1828; p. 37 *et seqq.*) The following article is translated from the First Part of Dopke's *Hermeneutick der neutestamentlichen Schriftsteller*, a work treating, as a translator might entitle it in English, "Of the Manner in which the Writers of the New Testament have quoted the Old Testament." The extract here given is, perhaps, the best written and most important portion of the book. In the discussion of its subject the writer is much indebted to the paper of Eichhorn to which he refers.]

As regards the origin of allegorical interpretation, it is a fact of the greatest importance that we can trace it in various directions, and discover in all of them the same causes operating to produce it, though we can ascertain nothing respecting the time of its introduction but that this belongs to the remotest antiquity. We find it among the Greeks, Jews, Persians, Turks, and Christians; and in order correctly to determine its origin, we must discover some uniform motive for it, at least among those nations by whom it was not borrowed, ready formed. It will facilitate our inquiries to begin with the Greeks.

As soon as man, awakened to consciousness, endeavours to rise above the rude state of nature, and to individualize himself as distinct from nature, he is compelled by an inward impulse to reflect on that nature which he has learned to be distinct from himself, and to observe the phenomena which it presents. He then discovers a web of causes and effects, and sees how one thing depends on another. But so many new phenomena continually occur of which he knows not the causes, and many are so imposing, that he cannot contemplate them without amazement. In his inmost soul he feels constrained to recognise something higher, he refers the being of nature to a higher being; but, as this conviction is produced by observing a variety of phenomena, he imagines various higher causes which, under the feeling of dependence, he honors as powers exalted above him. When the powers of nature have been thus personified, they are next brought into connexion and become the subjects of mythological fables. To the Egyptian, the revolutions of the Sun and the changes in the Nile became the history of Osiris. The Sun on the 21st of December grows faint, dies as it were, and is born anew. Even so Osiris is overcome by Typhon, put to death, and revives in the freshness of youth after overcoming the Evil One. Such legends originate when the mind is taking its first steps, and the images of the gods are stamped with the rudeness of the time. This is the period to which belong the creations of Homer. The only models for his delineations of the gods were men in a state of rude nature; and, if he represents his gods as infinitely exalted above men, they possess only those qualities in an elevated degree, which he deemed the chief excellences of men. Rude strength swayed by violent passions, courage often united with brutality, which tramples on rights and humanity; arrogance, ambition, lust, intemperance, stain alike his gods and men. But the boundless charm of his unsurpassed poetry gave him an immense influence over the characters of his countrymen; his verses were in every mouth, every writer took him for his model. From the dawn of Grecian civilization to its noon, his poems were the great text-book used in the education of youth, and he was regarded as the source of all knowledge and wisdom. Meanwhile, civilization had advanced so far, morals had become so refined, philosophical speculation had reached such a height, that the difference between his ideas and those of the time was very obvious. Notwithstanding the progress of the intellect, however, the Greeks could not contemplate Homer with reference to the rude age in which he lived; their notions of his wisdom had been raised too high, and they sought to find in him the enlightened ideas of their own times. Another circumstance is to be considered. The writings of Homer were used not only as a means of training the intellects, but of forming the morals, of youth. And in this point of view he harmonized ill with the conceptions of a cultivated age. He often seems to be without a proper reverence for the gods, to contradict all sound ideas of their nature and sanctity, to countenance violent passions and vices, and to look with contempt on the duties of a man and a citizen. The reading of Homer, therefore, came to be considered hazardous for the young; it was apprehended, that his rude manners would endanger the refinement of the time, that the vices and passions which he treated with approbation would be injurious to the good order of society, and that the scandalous stories which he tells of the gods, might detract from the reverence due to them.*

Plato, who in the second and third books of his Republic treats of the education of youth by means of gymnastics and music, severely criticizes the mythological stories as immoral in their tendency, and wishes to have them purified so as to correspond to his ideas of right. All the *mythoi* which make death appear dreadful, which awaken terror or laughter, which express disobedience to those in authority, or tend to rouse violent passions, were to be banished from his republic. The absolutely good was to be the only poetry allowed there. Homer was therefore excluded, though with all possible respect.

There is a passage, however, in his Republic, (Lib. II., pp. 377, 378,) in which Plato mentions a mode of making Homer's poems harmless to youth. He is speaking of those who in "discoursing of gods and heroes represent them as ill, as a painter whose pictures have no resemblance to the objects imitated." Such things, says his fellow dialogist, deserve blame. But in what respects are they to be blamed, and what are the descriptions censured? "In the first place," Plato replies, "he did not fabricate well who told what Hesiod relates; — the greatest falsehoods concerning the greatest beings; what Ouranos did, and how Kronos punished him; and the doings of Kronos, and what he suffered from his son. These stories, even if they were true, I think ought not thus lightly to be told to the simple and young, but, as far as possible, to be kept concealed. Should it become necessary to relate them, *it ought to be done under the seal of secrecy, and to as few as may be.*" The expression δι' ἀποῤῥήτων (translated above "under the seal of secrecy") probably signifies that the stories spoken of should be treated as religious mysteries, to be explained to those only who are capable of comprehending them. Soon after, he expresses himself more clearly.

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* Eichhorn's allgemeine Bibliothek der Theol. Litteratur, Band V., p. 225.

"The tale of the fettering of Juno by her son, that of the hurling of Vulcan from heaven, upon his coming to the assistance of his mother when beaten, and the battles of the gods described by Homer, are not to be allowed in the republic, whether understood literally or as allegories; for young people cannot distinguish what is allegorical from what is not." Hence it appears to have been a practice to give an allegorical sense to religious *mythoi* of an offensive character, and that this was done previous to the age of Plato, who is usually considered the inventor of the method. Plato himself (Ion, p. 530,) mentions three others who interpreted the *mythoi* in this manner, Nesimbrotus, Glaucon, and Metrodorus. The first was a citizen of Lampsacus and a contemporary of Themistocles. From the work of Glaucon, which interprets the *mythoi* as being allegories relating to physical subjects, a passage is extracted in the Venetian Scholia, on the sixty-first verse of the 20th book of the Iliad, with the observation, that "this kind of allegory is very old, and originated with Theagenes of Rhegium, the first writer on Homer, who lived in the time of Cambyses in the 63rd Olympiad." Of Metrodorus, Tatian says, in his "Discourse to the Greeks" (page 160 B), that he explains the characters of Hector, Achilles, Helen, and Agamemnon, as personifications of physical elements. In addition to these professed interpreters of Homer, it is known that the earliest Grecian philosophers, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus, explained the *mythoi* in a similar manner. According to Syncellus (Chronolog. page 149 D, ed. Paris), and Cedrenus, (Hist. Compend. I. page 82,) the allegorical interpreters have the general name of Anaxagoræans, because Anaxagoras was said to have introduced this mode of explaining Homer. (Diog. Laert. II. 11.)* The invention of allegorical interpretation is therefore ascribed both to Theagenes and Anaxagoras, which shows only that they were among the earliest interpreters of this sort. Afterwards too the Stoics, for instance, Zeno, Chrysippus, and Cleanthes, particularly endeavoured to attach a physical meaning to the *mythoi* of Orpheus, Musæus, Homer, and Hesiod,† which was strenuously opposed by the Academic Cotta. (Cicero de Naturâ Deorum, Lib. II. cap. 28.) But later writers took much pleasure in these senseless interpretations, especially the grammarians of Alexandria, of whose mode of explanation we have many specimens remaining, particularly in Plotinus, Porphyry, Heraclides of Pontus, in the biography of Homer attributed to Plutarch, and in Eustathius. See the work of Heraclides of Pontus (ed. Nic. Schow, Göttingen, 1782. 8vo,) which is accompanied by a treatise, entitled "Allegoricæ Veterum Interpretationis Origo et Causæ" (p. 214–241).

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* These notices of the ancient Greek allegorists are borrowed from Ohlshausen's "tieferer Schriftsinn," p. 42.

† See the "Apology" of Minutius Felix, cap. 19.

From what has been said, it is evident that allegorical interpretation among the Greeks had its origin in philosophical refinement, which introduced higher ideas of the nature of the Deity, and could not tolerate the popular faith with its mass of fables about the gods. As it was dangerous to attack the popular religion, attempts were made to render it less offensive by giving a physical or moral meaning to the *mythoi;* and, as nothing is secure from exaggeration, the lovers of allegory attributed to the old poets all the artificial subtlety which a man accustomed to it is so ready to find and make everywhere.

The origin of the allegorical interpretation of the sacred Scriptures among the Jews, has been derived by some from an imitation of the mode adopted by the Greeks in explaining their mythology: for instance, by J. Alphons. Turretin (de Sacræ Scripturæ interpretandæ, etc. Tractat. Bipart. Traj. 1728, page 94, seq.); Eichhorn (in his General Library of Theological Literature, Vol. V., pages 203–253); Poelitz (Pragmatical View of the Theology of the later Jews, Leipsic, 1795, Part I.); Rosenmüller (Historia Interp. Libror. Sacror. in Ecclesiâ Christ. Hildburg., 1795, P. I. p. 22, seq.); Schütz (Program respecting the Origin of the Allegorical Interpretation of the Scriptures, Jena, 1795); Flügge (History of the Theological Sciences, Part I. p. 281, seq.); and others.*

And there are strong grounds for this opinion, which are exhibited in the clearest light in the Letters treating of Biblical Exegesis in Eichhorn's Library, referred to above. They may be set forth thus. As the religious constitution of the Jews rested on written documents, the essential ideas of their religion might remain settled, but they were nevertheless modified and extended in the course of time and adapted to the increasing cultivation of the people. The religious system of Moses was fitted to the infancy of a people; but, as they became more cultivated, they advanced perceptibly beyond it. Even the old poets and prophets had spiritualized its material representations, as far as they could, and given a moral meaning to the forms of its ritual. But this sufficed only while the old Hebrew state existed. If the Jews had remained in their own country, always observing the ancient law of Moses, without being exposed to the influence of foreign manners, they could not have escaped the effects of a literal observance of the law. But the Babylonian exile, the transplantation of the Hebrews among nations differing from them in manners and customs, in modes of thinking, religious philosophy, and political and intellectual advancement, while at the same time, the whole sacrificial service, the basis of the Mosaic religion, was suspended, had greatly affected their character; so that after an absence of seventy years they returned with a new set of ideas to their native country. Not long after, when the conquests of Alexander had spread the Greek language and learning over the whole East, the Jews became scattered in single families among the Greeks, who were far before them in intellectual culture and habits of life. "Received among them as a foreign caste, they would, through their obsolete national religion, have incurred the reproach of being a rude race, obstinately attached to ancient usages and hereditary notions, and incapable of a high degree of cultivation, and thereby subjected themselves to the contempt and ridicule of their witty Greek neighbours, unless, to avoid this, they acquired as much of the manners, the wisdom, and philosophy of the Greeks, as they could, without entirely giving up their established religion and religious usages." This was particularly necessary in Alexandria, the seat of Greek wisdom and learning, where a large number of Hebrews had settled, not merely of the lower class, but respectable and wealthy men, who had voluntarily repaired thither on receiving the rights of citizenship from Alexander the Great.* There they had built splendid synagogues, as Philo testifies in his book "de legatione ad Caium";† and the Rabbins cannot say enough in praise of their magnificence.

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* Planck, Comment. de Princ. Interpret. Allegor. p. 9. seq.; Brucker, Hist. Philosoph. Crit. II. p. 634. seq.; Spencer, de Leg. Ebr. Rit. I. c. 11. p. 153. seq.

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* Antonii van Dale super Aristea Dissert. cap. xxv.

† Vid. Campeg. Vitringa de Synagogâ Vet. Lib. I. P. I. cap. 14.

Their religious ceremonies, which were performed with great solemnity, could not escape the ridicule of the Greeks, unless some changes were made in them.* But such changes were forbidden by the reverence which the Hebrews felt for their lawgiver, and by the sanctity derived from long-continued usage.

Another circumstance made the situation of the Jews in Alexandria still more difficult. To converse with the Greeks, they were obliged to acquire the Greek language; so that their mother tongue fell into disuse, and the knowledge of the old Hebrew was almost entirely lost. This gave rise to the translation of the Scriptures of the Old Testament into Greek, about the year 285 B. C. Till that time, the religions of the Asiatic nations were almost entirely unknown to the Greeks, because in all that related to them the old languages of the different countries were used. Now the Septuagint opened to them the religious monuments of the Jews, and gave at the same time to the more intelligent part of the Jews themselves, a perfect view of their own religion. They themselves, yielding to the general tendency of the time toward the New-Platonic philosophy, felt themselves out of their element among the material ideas of the old Mosaic law.† Such a conflict of the antiquated popular belief with the ideas of a more enlightened period gives rise either to a union of the old with the new, or to an entire rejection of the more offensive part of the old system. But the Jews were too strongly attached to their hereditary institutions to adopt the latter course. The former was rendered easier by the way in which the Alexandrians were accustomed to treat the heathen religions. As they habitually sought for a secret meaning in the fables of their mythology, the Jews could meet their Greek opponents with the same weapons,‡ and vindicate, for their old religious monuments, the praise of the highest wisdom.

This is, generally, the explanation which has been given of the introduction of allegory among the Jews, and it must be allowed that it contains much truth, though it does not afford a full account of the matter. We will now pursue historically the traces of allegorical interpretation among the Jews; and, as

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* Philo de Circumcis. p. 210.

† Concerning the ridicule of the Greeks, see Philo de Plantat. Noe, p. 340; De Confus. Ling. p. 405; De Nom. Mutat. p. 587.

‡ Philo de Confus. Ling. p. 407; De Migrat. Abraham. p. 450.

Philo may be regarded as affording the most distinguished example of the tendency of mind, which led to it, and was also, according to Photius (Cod. CV.), anciently esteemed the inventor of it, we will begin with him.

Philo lived, as is well known, in the first century of the Christian era, and during the reign of Caius Caligula was sent as an ambassador to the emperor by the Jews of Alexandria, of which mission he has given an account in a separate work. He was born at Alexandria, about twenty years before Christ, of a distinguished family belonging to the priestly order. (Joseph. Antiq. Jud. Lib. XVIII. c. 10.) He was devoted to the philosophy of Plato, though he mingled with it ideas borrowed from the mystical philosophy of the East; so that it was said of him *Ἢ Φίλων πλατωνίζει, ἢ Πλάτων φιλωνίζει* (Either Philo Platonizes, or Plato Philonizes.*) It is obvious that such a turn of mind must have had an important influence on his views of the Mosaic religion. Allegorical interpretation appears in his writings in its highest state of refinement. In his explanations of the Old Testament, he uses in general only the Septuagint, which he believed, according to the high ideas of it then prevalent, to agree perfectly with the original. (De Vitâ Mos. II. p. 510. ed. Mang.) It is observable, however, that he comments almost exclusively on the works of Moses. We have formerly remarked, that these were especially esteemed among the Jews,† and were also the first translated into Greek; and this is confirmed by the works of Philo, which, notwithstanding their extent, contain only ten citations from the prophets, about fifteen from the historical books, and as many from the Psalms. Moses he esteemed the only truly enlightened man, initiated into all divine mysteries, into which he supposed himself also initiated.‡ The other scriptural writers he considers less enlightened, and is surprised, when he happens to examine the writings of Jeremiah with care, to find him also initiated into the great mysteries. (De Cherub. p. 116.)§ According-ing also to his theory (which was subsequently adopted by Christian writers) of an esoteric and exoteric religious system, fitted respectively for the *πνευματικοὶ* and the *ψυχικοὶ*, Moses in his laws intends to convey a double meaning, so as to meet the wants of all, however different in intellectual advancement. One is suited to the great mass, and represents God like a human being with limbs and passions, because they are incapable of forming a higher idea of him. The other is intended for persons whose philosophical minds and virtuous lives qualify them for initiation into the divine mysteries.* These can comprehend the meaning concealed under the material images; they recognise the spiritual sense of the description, and are driven to search for it by certain things that give offence, and are stumblingblocks (*σκάνδαλα, προσκόμματα*); for the divine spirit has purposely introduced what to the mass of men is wholly unintelligible; and even improper and blamable transactions and offensive doctrines, which the multitude receive without question or displeasure, but which stimulate the initiated to seek for the hidden meaning.† This secret meaning, which Philo finds in the Mosaic scriptures by means of arbitrary allegories, consists only of Platonic speculations, mixed with old Oriental mysticism; but at the same time he does not deny the truth of the literal meaning; he looks upon it, not as the most important, but as a subordinate sense. He even contends, in his book "de Migratione Abrahami," (p. 480,) against those who treat the literal meaning as of no account, and, thinking they must confine their attention to the higher general ideas, reject all external ceremonies, saying it is of no consequence to keep the Sabbath if the inward rest which it signifies is only observed. But he does not always remain consistent in his opposition to Idealism, especially when he has a historical difficulty to remove.

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* Of the cultivation of his mind by the reading of the Greek poets, by geometry, music, and astronomy, he speaks, De Congr. quar. gr. p. 550; De Leg. spec. p. 299; Quod omnis Prob. lib. p. 467; De Ebrietate, p. 364.

† Comp. the gloss on Cod. Schabbath, fol. 115, col. 1.

‡ Planck, Comment. pp. 20 – 22.

§ He quotes Isaiah, De Somniis, Lib. II. Tom. I. p. 681. De Mutat. Nom. Tom. I. p. 604, ed. Mang.

The height which allegorical interpretation had reached in the time of Philo leads to the supposition, that he must have had many predecessors, and in fact he refers frequently to the writings of esteemed men who had preceded him in this path. In his tract "de Septenario et Festis Diebus," (Tom. II. p. 292, ed. Mang.) he says, in reference to the explanation given of the origin of the feast of the Passover; "These things are explained according to the ancient allegory; those who are accustomed to allegorical interpretation consider the sacrifices of the passover as denoting purification of heart." So likewise he adds, after his explanation of circumcision; "These things then, have come to our ears, spoken of old by inspired men who have interpreted with care the works of Moses." (De Circumcis. Tom. II. p. 211. See also, De Leg. spec. II. p. 805; De Cherub. I. p. 143; De Alleg. Leg. 1. p. 54; Vita Abrah. II. p. 15; Quis rerum divinarum Hæres, I. p. 513; De Josepho, II. p. 63; De Septen. et Festis Diebus, II. p. 293.) Philo does not name these persons; but it is highly probable that they were Therapeutæ, whom he held in high esteem. In his treatise "De Vitâ Contemplativâ," (Tom. II. p. 483,) he says of them, that they compare the whole law to an animal, and consider the literal commands as the body, the secret sense as the soul. And on page 475, he says; "When they occupy themselves about the holy scripture, they connect therewith philosophical speculations, giving an allegorical meaning to the doctrines of their hereditary religion; because they seek under the text secrets of nature, which are mystically concealed there. They have also interpretations handed down from former times, the writings of the founders of their sect, who have left many memorials respecting the ideas to be developed by means of allegories, which their followers imitate." So far Eusebius, in his "Ecclesiastical History," (Lib. II. cap. 17,) cites this passage from Philo, and adds, that these ancient interpretations of the Scriptures of the Old Testament resemble the critical expositions in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and in several of Paul's epistles.

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* De Abrahamo, p. 19; De Somniis, p. 655; Quod Deus sit immut. p. 280; Alleg. Leg. III. p. 131; De Plant. Noe, p. 333; De Confus. Ling. p. 425. These allegories are, further, to be imparted only to the initiated. De Sacrific. Abel. p. 188; De Profug. p. 558; De Cherub. p. 116; De Abrah. p. 22, 29, 34; De Sacrificant. p. 255; De Leg. spec. p. 329.

† Eichhorn's Allgemeine Bibl., Band 5. p. 250; Band 4. p. 785, seq. Planck, Comment. de Interp. Philon. Alleg. p. 30.

Another Alexandrian of earlier date, by name Aristobulus, is mentioned by old writers as an allegorist. In modern times, indeed, Richard Simon, in his "Critical History of the New Testament," (Vol. II., page 189, and Vol. III., page 499,) also Hody (Contra Historiam Aristeæ de LXX Interpr. p. 53,) and Eichhorn, in his "Library of Theological Literature," (B. V. p. 253, seq.), have not only disputed the genuineness of the fragments remaining under the name of Aristobulus, but the very fact of his having existed. Valkenaer, however, in his "Diatribe de Aristobulo Judæo," (Lyons, 1806,) has adduced sufficient grounds to establish the genuineness of these fragments. Aristobulus lived about 180 B. C., was tutor of king Ptolemy Philometor, and belonged to the school of the Peripatetics. He wrote an allegorical commentary on the books of Moses, which he dedicated to king Ptolemy Philometor. The fragments of this work still remaining are mostly collected by Eichhorn, in his General Library, (B. V. pp. 281 – 298.) He openly manifests therein his zeal to vindicate for the writers of the Old Testament, all the wisdom which was admired in the Greek philosophers; he remarks at the same time, how many different nations have taken the same road to truth. Cyril of Alexandria, in his work against Julian, (Lib. IV. p. 134. Opp. Tom. VI. Paris, 1638,) says, "Aristobulus, the Peripatetic, somewhere remarks, that 'all things which have been said respecting nature by the ancients, have been said also by philosophers living out of Greece; some among the Indians by the Bramins, and some in Syria by the people called Jews.'" According to Clement of Alexandria (Strom. I. p. 342, ed. Sylburg.), Aristobulus sought to prove what is so frequently asserted by the Fathers of the church, that even the Greek philosophers derived their wisdom from the Old Testament. "And even Plato" he says, "followed our laws." Nay, the Hebrew sages are represented by him as far superior to the Greek. Eusebius (Præp. Evang. Lib. VII. cap. 13, 14,) quotes him as saying; "This may also be applied to Wisdom, for from her proceeds all light; on this account the Peripatetics affirm, that she has the character of a lamp, and that they who follow her steadily are unshaken during the whole of life. More wisely and beautifully says one of our progenitors, Solomon, 'She existed before heaven and earth,' (Prov. viii. 22); corresponding with what has already been alleged." In another fragment, preserved by Eusebius (Præp. Evang. Lib. VIII. cap. 9, 10), he defends Moses against the charge of a material representation of God; he shows to the king that there is another meaning concealed therein. Such figurative expressions, says he, are usual even in common life. Thus, when the king sends forth a force to execute something, it is said, *Μεγάλην χεῖρα ἔχει ὁ βασιλεύς* (The king has a mighty hand), and, in the same manner, Moses also says; "With a strong hand has the Lord brought you out of Egypt." This expression originates from the circumstance, that the strength of man lies particularly in his arms. Then he proceeds to the giving of the law on Mount Sinai, and shows that all the phenomena described by Moses, the fire, the thunder, the sound of trumpets, were real, but produced by God without the aid of material organs, God thus manifesting the supremacy of his power. The same spirit appears in another fragment found in Eusebius, (Præp. Evang. Lib. XIII. cap. 11, 12,) where he treats of the creation, and of the institution of the Sabbath. The account of the creation of the world in six days, has no other object than to establish a division of time; and yet he passes to a philosophical speculation respecting the sacredness of the number seven, "in which we have knowledge of human and divine things: on the number seven, turns the whole world both of animal and vegetable life."

From all the fragments of his writings which remain to us, we can get but a small insight into his mode of allegorical interpretation. Thus much, however, is certain, that Aristobulus was an acute man, who could not satisfy himself, like the rude and ignorant, with the representations of the doings of God in material images, but sought to ascertain the true ideas to be drawn from them. He also shows a very correct conception of the object of the revelation contained in the Old Testament, which he looks for, not in a dealing-out of mysteries, but in the promotion of the fear of God.

After the passage last cited, he says, "The whole ordering of our law is intended to promote piety, righteousness, temperance, and all other things truly good." And I should almost doubt the propriety of considering him as one of the founders of allegorical interpretation, if we had not the most indisputable testimony of ancient times to the fact; for instance, Origen in his work against Celsus (Lib. IV. cap. 51,) says; "It appears to me, that he (Celsus) has heard of writings containing allegorical expositions of the law;" — "he seems to speak of the writings of Philo, or of still older ones, such as those of Aristobulus." But, even in the fragments preserved by Eusebius, an allegory is presented (Præp. Evang. Lib. XIII. cap. 12), where, in treating of the creation of the world, when he comes to the origin of light, he says, "This may also be applied to Wisdom;" that is, to Wisdom hypostatized. I believe, therefore, that we find allegory in its earliest state in Aristobulus. The philosophy of Aristotle gave him a disgust for the representation of the Deity under a human form; but his interest as an apologist led to a farther infusion of the Aristotelian philosophy into the books of Moses. In doing this, however, he seems to have proceeded timidly, as is shown by the example adduced.

Of the Alexandrine Jewish school we have still two representatives remaining, namely, the authors of Ecclesiasticus and of the Book of Wisdom. The translator of the former, who, in his preface to the work of his grandfather, professes to have translated it in the thirty-eighth year of King Evergetes, probably Evergetes Physcon, lived, we may conclude, in the year 131 B. C.; and the author of the book, therefore, was nearly contemporary with Aristobulus. The author (chap. xxiv.) glorifies wisdom, considered as hypostatized. It is through her, that God governs all things. She has, at the command of God, chosen the Israelitish people as her especial residence; she bears the choicest fruits of knowledge and of life. Afterwards he proceeds thus (verse 23): "This is all, even the book of the covenant of the highest God; the law which Moses has ordained, as an inheritance to the assemblies of Jacob. It sheds wisdom, like the Phison and the Tigris in the season of spring; it gives fulness of knowledge, like the Euphrates and the Jordan in the days of harvest; discipline beams from it like light. The first cannot fully know it, nor the last explore it. For its meaning is richer than the sea, and its counsel deeper than the abyss."* From verse 30th, he goes on describing how he has drawn from this source of wisdom little streams for his own use. This passage I cannot look upon as furnishing any traces of allegory, as do Ohlshausen (in his Tieferer Schriftsinn, p. 57), and Rosenmüller (in his Hist. Interpret. Lib. Sac. I. p. 17). Without entering into the consideration of the conceptions concerning Wisdom, or the later conceptions respecting the Logos, I need merely refer to the mode in which the Scriptures of the Old Testament are here treated by the author. There is no trace of allegory; the wisdom which flows for him from the source of the Holy Scriptures, is of a purely practical kind; it guards men from sin. (Chap. xxiv. 22.) I can, therefore, only look upon the whole passage as an expression of the highest reverence for the Holy Scriptures. A more distinct exhibition of his views is

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[* We give the translation of the author, (who omits the 24th verse,) though it does not appear to us correct.]

contained in chap. xxxix. v. 1—3. He insists that, "in order to study the law, a man must be exempt from other labors, for he must search out wisdom and occupy himself with prophecies; he must consider the treatises of distinguished men, and penetrate into the hidden sense of parables, and solve dark sayings and riddles." Here the author states expressly, how he would have the Scriptures of the Old Testament used. He has, indeed, devoted himself much to ancient history, and even extracted the most remarkable parts of it; but moral sayings, enigmas, and parables are what he most esteems; and, therefore, he imitates especially the Proverbs. Here is nothing that looks like allegory. How would what follows the passage just quoted be consistent with allegorical studies? "He (who seeks wisdom in the manner described) can serve princes, and be attendant on lords; he may be sent into foreign lands, for he has tried what is useful to a people, and what is not."

The author of the Book of Wisdom is not to be ascertained, but he appears to belong to the time of Philo. He shows (chap. x.) how wisdom has ruled the pious from the creation of the world, particularly the people of God. This was a favorite subject, derived from the Proverbs. The author shows, also, on the other hand, the fate of the Egyptians and Canaanites, who were forsaken by divine Wisdom. (Chap. xi. – xix.) But the traces of allegory are hardly to be discovered. Scarcely any thing appears but a philosophical reasoning on the Old Testament history. We will examine more closely the two passages which have been appealed to, as affording specimens of allegorical interpretation. In chap. xviii. 21—25, the author refers to the destruction of the troop of Korah, Numbers xvi. 46. Aaron interposes between the people and the angel of death, arrayed in his sacred ornaments, before which every one must bow; but he overcomes the destroyer, not with bodily weapons, but with those of his office, prayer and sacrifice, alleging the sacred oath of God to the ancient patriarchs. This is only the Mosaic account embellished, according to the taste of the period. The pestilence is the destroying angel. The expiation is made by the priest, arrayed in his sacred ornaments; these and the sacrifices, however, do not restrain the wrath of God, but prayer and the appeal to the promise. That this is rather a piece of reasoning than an allegory, must be confessed by every one who is acquainted with the writers of the allegorical school. Of the same character is the passage, chap. xvi. v. 5. seq.; where it is said of the brazen serpent, "It was a symbol of salvation, to put men in remembrance of the command of the law; whoever turned himself to it, was delivered, not by the sight of it, but by God, the saviour of all." The philosopher does not admit the magical operation of the brazen serpent, but God delivered from death those who, by gazing on the serpent, showed their readiness to obey his command. Is this allegory?

Thus far we have only followed the traces of the allegorical exposition of the Old Testament among the Jews of Alexandria; but this is not sufficient fully to explain its origin; and hence the view which Eichhorn gives, is to be censured for not alluding to the Jews of Palestine. It will be best to begin this part of our subject with a well-known Jewish scholar, Josephus, who lived in the earliest age of Christianity. He was son of Matthias, of a priestly family, born in the first year of the reign of the Emperor Caius. As early as his fourteenth year he had acquired so much knowledge, that he was visited by priests and men of rank, to obtain information of him about the more abstruse parts of the law. (Josephi Vita, § 2.) In his sixteenth year, he resolved to make himself acquainted with the three most celebrated Jewish sects. He therefore resorted to the Essenes, and passed three years among them, conforming to their ascetic mode of life. He afterwards attached himself to the sect of the Pharisees. In his twenty-sixth year he went to Rome, and on his voyage narrowly escaped with life from a shipwreck, in the Adriatic Sea. He undertook the voyage in order to defend some priests, whom Felix, the governor of Judæa, had sent in confinement to Rome, and succeeded in his object, by the favor of Poppæa, wife of Nero. During the Jewish war he commanded a body of Galilæans, but was taken in the fortress of Jotapata. Vespasian carried him to Rome, where he received the privileges of citizenship, and lived during the reigns of Titus and Domitian. Titus had a particular regard for him, and even Domitian exempted his estates in Judæa from taxation. That he was well instructed in Greek learning is obvious from his writings; and he himself declares the fact, at the end of the twentieth book of his Jewish Antiquities, where he says, that no one of the Jewish nation by any effort, could have written the work in so good Greek as he, for he must state openly that his education was far superior to that of the rest of his countrymen. As to his interpretation of the sacred Scriptures, we can say but little with certainty. He observes, in the preface to his Antiquities, that Moses in his works has barely hinted at some things, has communicated others under the form of serious allegories, and others, which it was desirable should be readily understood, has spoken out clearly. Those who wish, he says, to examine the causes of all that he has instituted must make a profound investigation; but this he would defer for the present, and treat of the subject hereafter, in a particular work relating to the signification of the law. In his Antiquities (Lib. I. cap. 1), in discoursing of the history of the creation, he observes again, that much remains to be said on that subject, and that he will treat of it particularly in future. It appears from this, that he was inclined to allegory; but it cannot be determined whether he had any thing in view other than to indicate the value even of the apparently unimportant laws of Moses. At any rate, he sought, in the structure of the temple and in the garments of the priests, to find symbols of physical objects; (see Onymus de Usu Interpret. Alleg. p. 29. 1803); and it shows a literal understanding of the history, that allegory could not lead him to the extravagances of the Alexandrine school. In his work against Apion (II. § 37,) he says, that the Greek philosophers were not ignorant of the frigid allegories of the *mythoi*, but that the true philosophers rightly despised them. Josephus was a Pharisee, and the principal occupation of his sect was the exact interpretation of the law. He himself attributes to them a careful elucidation of things relating to the law (De Bello Jud. II. 8, 14; Antiq. XVII. 2, 4); but likewise a philosophy, which was probably mingled with elements from the old Oriental mysticism (Antiq. XVIII. 1; XIII. 5. § 9). Now it may be easily imagined, that if they wished, together with their philosophy, also to adhere firmly to the external character of their hereditary religion, they would easily be led to allegory. Nor is it any objection to the supposition to maintain, that they might have borrowed this mode of interpretation, so serviceable to their purpose, from the Alexandrines. We will see how far we can follow the traces of allegory among them.

According to the preface to the Antiquities of Josephus (sect. 3), and Eusebius (Præp. Evang. VIII. 1, 2), King Ptolemy obtained from the high priest Eleazer the assistance of learned men, to translate the Scriptures of the Jews into

Greek. But Eusebius, (Præp. Evang. VIII, 8, 9,) wishing to give an idea of the allegorical way of interpreting the Old Testament among the Jews, quotes for this purpose, the high priest Eleazer and Aristobulus. In the fragments given from Eleazer, he speaks of the commands respecting clean and unclean animals, and observes, very correctly, that Moses intended by such strict laws to separate his own people entirely from all others, and thereby to preserve them from the worship of idols. In itself nothing is unclean, but God intended by these laws to remind men that they should do nothing without reflection, that the whole of life should be consecrated to him. "When the Greeks questioned the high priest," says Eusebius, "respecting the ideas allegorically conveyed in the sacred laws, he gave such explanations as the above to those who wished to be instructed in the internal senses of the law." This is the manner, too, in which Josephus understood the law. In both writers, a disposition to apologize to their Greek readers is obvious, but it is impossible to overlook the great difference between them and the Alexandrines. They have scarcely dared to advance any thing more than sober reflections on the object of the Mosaic law; the literal sense is always the most important in their eyes; and the mythical was with them, perhaps, a sort of practical application of it.

Of the older sects of Palestine, we can touch only upon the Essenes. They are related to the Therapeutæ, and may have resembled them in their views of the sacred Scriptures; their secret doctrine, which embraced particularly their ideas of the classes and orders of angels, might incline them to allegory. Philo says of them, in his book entitled "Quod omnis probus liber," (Tom. II. p. 458,) "Then one takes the books and reads them, and another of the most experienced comes forward, and explains what is not understood. For most parts are expounded by them as philosophical symbols, after an ancient fashion to which they are attached." And Josephus (De Bello Jud. II. 8, 6,) speaks of ancient writings which they studied diligently. Both of these passages refer, probably, not to the sacred Scriptures, but to old works of the founders of their sect; and if we draw our conclusion from the analogy of the Therapeutæ, these books may have been allegorical interpretations; but this inference is by no mean certain.

If now we turn to the Rabbinical writings, we find them abounding in allegory. Sotah, folio 49, column 1, it is said, that, from ancient times, a third part of instruction has consisted of traditions, allegories, and parables. And there is no doubt that this judgment is correct. Not only the oldest Cabalistic books, the Zohar of Rabbi Simeon ben Jochai, and the Jezira of Rabbi Akiba, the later commentaries, the Rabbot, and Jalkut Chadasch, but also the Mishna and Gemara and the Targums, are entirely filled with allegory; and even the interpreters, whose proper office is to explain only the literal sense of the words, as Aben Ezra, Kimchi, and Rabbi Solomon, frequently give, after the historical, an allegorical interpretation. Rabbi Solomon, in particular, is very fond of allegory. Whence comes this great proneness to allegory? We cannot ascribe it to a philosophizing spirit, to a desire of finding shelter from the ridicule of the Greeks, or to an imitation of the interpreters of the Greek *mythoi*. It may be replied, that the oldest of these books does not reach beyond the second century; and that allegory might have passed from Alexandria to Palestine more than a century before Christ. This is possible, but it is not necessarily the fact. The system of the Rabbins contained, not merely a legal, but also a mystical element. From the former sprang the Talmud, from the latter the Cabala. Shortly after the Babylonian captivity Ezra was distinguished for his scriptural learning, and from Chaldæa the Jews brought with them remains of the old Oriental philosophy, and the whole system of the different classes of angels and of the kingdom of evil spirits. We see, even in the oldest Targums, a strong disposition to represent God as acting incorporeally, and with this view the word מימרא, and the ministry of angels were devised. To this was added the establishment of synagogues, wherein discourses were delivered from texts taken from the Scriptures, (Campeg. Vitringa de Synag. Vet. Lib. I. P. II. chap. xii.; P. Dan. Huetii Demonstr. Evang. Propos. ix, cap. 171, sect. 7, 8, 9; Joan. Spencerus de Leg. Ritual. Hebr., Lib. 1, cap. 11.) The notions of men both on legal and religious subjects, had become very different from the system of Moses, and yet there was a strong wish to preserve a perfect agreement with him.* In order to confirm all these new ideas, by the authority of passages from the Scriptures, an artificial system of interpretation was required. In the case of legal relations, nothing was necessary but subtilties in the interpretation of words; in regard to religious conceptions they begun, undoubtedly, with the passages which describe the Deity as having a human form, and gave them another sense. Their high ideas of the wisdom of their lawgiver, made them assume, that the ideas which appeared to them most rational must have been his.* On this highway to allegory, they had good guides in the Old Testament itself. Of Moses it is said, that he made all things after a celestial model. (Exodus xxv. 9.) In some parts of his system of religious worship, he has himself referred to an interior meaning. See Deut. x. 16, xxx. 6; Exodus xxviii. 38; Lev. x. 17; where reference is made to the circumcision of the heart, as well as to the transfer of guilt from the people to the priest. The prophets frequently contended against merely external sacrifices, and insisted upon purity of heart; they frequently applied images, drawn from celebrated histories of persons, to the description of events to be expected in future. Under the sanction of these examples, the Jews might seek a hidden meaning in other ceremonies, where it was not pointed out by the lawgiver; and they might, with little trouble, attach to the original narration, as its secondary meaning, those images of persons and events which had been derived from it. With such high conceptions of the Scripture, in which every syllable was thought to have a meaning, it was necessary to seek for a hidden sense even in the most insignificant expression. How far all this may have proceeded before the Jews came into connexion with the Greeks cannot be ascertained; but in Alexandria, at all events, the system was carried to the greatest perfection.

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* Concerning the influence of the philosophy of Zoroaster upon the Jews, especially those dwelling in Babylonia, see Eichhorn's Einleitung in d. N. T., II. 160–169.

From the preceding investigation it may be considered settled, that allegory sprang from the conflict of philosophy with the hereditary religion, which, resting on written monuments, could not advance with the progress of the people, and was besides founded merely on local and political grounds.

We need not dwell on the history of allegory in the Christian church. It is merely an imitation of the system of the Alexandrine Jews, rendered so much the more necessary by the fact, that the Fathers of the Christian church were always obliged to prove their new doctrines by the authority of the Old Testament. Being so ready to borrow from Jewish opinions, they were almost compelled to take this course; and the interpretations of the Old Testament, by Barnabas, Ignatius, the author of the Apostolical Constitutions, and Origen, are partly borrowed from Philo, and partly formed on the model of his; as Rosenmueller in his History of the Interpretation of the Sacred Books, has very clearly proved. From the same source were derived the strange interpretations of certain Gnostics, for instance, the Nicolaitans and Basilidians, who from Isaiah xxviii. 10, קו לקו ("line upon line") formed the Æon *καυλακάυας* or *καυλαυκαύχ*. (Irenæus, ed. Massuet, p. 102; Epiphanius, Hær. xxv. Opp. I. 79; Brucker Dissert. de Caulakau Basilidianorum in Museo Helvet. Part xxi. p. 229; Neander über die gnostischen Systeme, p. 85.) In general, allegory prevailed throughout the Christian church with but few exceptions; such as the author of the Recognitions of Clement, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Dionysius of Alexandria. Even the great progress of exegesis since the last ten years of the last century has not entirely banished allegorical interpretation.

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* Brucker, Hist. Phil. Crit., II. 731. Lüder's Geschichte der vornehmsten alten Völker, p. 47.

It still remains for us to investigate the origin of allegorical interpretation among the Persians and the Turks. Among them too, it sprang from the conflict of philosophy with the popular religion. The mystic wisdom of the Persian and Turkish Sufis reached its height a considerable time after the diffusion of the Mohammedan religion, but its principles may be traced to the remotest antiquity; it appears to have grown up in part on the soil of India. It has a mixed theoretical and practical character, and seeks, partly through speculation and partly by the way of feeling, to reconcile the opposition between the divine unity and the existence of individual beings. The greater part of these mystics must be allowed to have a high degree of religious fervor. When this mystic philosophy comes in contact with Mohammedanism, it either takes an attitude of open opposition to it, or seeks to give its own spirituality to the sensual ideas of the Koran. In the midst of their religious fervor, most of them hold Mohammed in great esteem, and therefore the latter course is the more usual one. This process is very much facilitated by their custom of using a symbolic language, dealing in images drawn from objects of sense.

They represent the divine unity as the object of supreme love, in which the individual longs to be swallowed up. The aspiration after a union with God is called by them ardent love; the enjoyment of the mystic union is typified by intoxication, kissing, or sexual intercourse. (See Tholuk's Sufismus, sive de Religione Persarum pantheisticâ, p. 94 et seq.) It is easy for them, therefore, to spiritualize the sensual pictures in the Koran of the joys of Paradise, &c. But what is more remarkable, this mysticism has been carried so far, that now, in the East, it is common to give a mystic meaning to the acknowledged love songs of Nisamis, Leila, Mejnoun, Youssouf, Zuleika, Hafez, and others. The Turks are particularly fond of this practice. Certain conclusions too have been drawn from it respecting Solomon's Song, but such as show an ignorance of the true character of that work.

From the preceding investigation, I think we may with some confidence draw the conclusion, that when philosophical refinement comes in conflict with an antiquated form of popular faith which it dares not openly oppose, allegory is the result. Religious interests give rise to it; but it may subsequently be used and abused in various ways. Ignorance of languages and facts, inability to discriminate between the successive steps in the progress of mankind, and to contemplate an intellectual production with reference to the time of its origin, and as unaffected by the influences under which one's own intellect has grown up, continually give rise to allegorizing; while an opposite state of things is the best security against such a disposition.

E. W.

Art. III.—*A Discourse at the Funeral of the* Rev. John Prince, LL. D., *Senior Pastor of the First Church in Salem, on the Ninth of June,* 1836. By Charles W. Upham, surviving Pastor. Salem: 1836. 8vo. pp. 31.

It is with no ordinary regret and sadness of heart, that we behold that venerable company of ancients, whose hoary heads have so long graced the Massachusetts Convention of Congregational ministers, and who, there and everywhere, have so nobly lifted up their voices and borne their testimony for truth and freedom, falling away one by one. It is sometimes numbered among the final causes of that law of Providence, according to which one generation passeth away and another cometh, that thus the prejudices of every successive generation are buried with it; — those prejudices by which, otherwise, the progress of society and the human mind would be obstructed, and the world continue entangled for ever in the errors of the past. But the men of whom we are now speaking, can hardly be said ever to have had any prejudices, in the bad sense of that term. For, to the last, who amongst us all have been less disposed than they, to come to a period in religion; or who more ready, or more happy, to welcome from time to time whatever new light has broke forth out of God's holy word. This consolation, however, we have, that, after living through one of the most perturbed and eventful epochs in the history of the world, their sun has been permitted to go down in tranquil and serene heavens; and, as they have rested from their labors, they have not wanted those who knew how to cherish and record their virtues.

A summary of the principal incidents in the life of Dr. Prince is thus given by Mr. Upham.

> "He was born in Boston on the 22d of July, 1751. His parents resided in the north part of the city, and were worthy and excellent members of the religious society now under the pastoral care of the Rev. Dr. Parkman. They were of Puritan descent, and, as was the case with all who worthily claimed that name, were careful to give their son a good education, and to impress upon his mind a reverent sense of religious truth and duty. His father being a mechanic, the son naturally was intended and directed by him to similar pursuits. He was early bound out as an apprentice to a pewterer and tinman, and continued industriously and faithfully to labor in his calling until his indentures had expired.
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> "But his genius, from the beginning, had indicated a propensity to a different mode of life. From a child his chief enjoyments were found in books. He was wont to retire from the sports of boyhood. There was no play for him to be compared with the delight of reading. During the hours of leisure in the period of his apprenticeship, he sought no other recreation than in the acquisition of knowledge.
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> "It followed of course that, upon becoming free, he abandoned his trade and devoted himself to study. In a very short time he was prepared to enter college, and received his bachelor's degree at Cambridge in 1776, at the age of twenty-five. After leaving col-

lege he was engaged for some time in the instruction of a school. He pursued the study of divinity under the direction of the Rev. Samuel Williams, of Bradford in this county, a clergyman highly distinguished for talents and attainments, afterwards Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in Harvard University. He was ordained over this church on the 10th of November, 1779; Mr. Williams preaching the sermon, Mr. Diman of the East Church delivering the charge, and the late Dr. Barnard of the North Church giving the Right Hand of Fellowship. On the 8th of December, 1824, a colleague was settled with his concurrence. He died on the 7th of June, 1836, having nearly completed his eighty-fifth year. His ministry lasted fifty-seven years and seven months." — pp. 6, 7.

Dr. Prince early distinguished himself by his mechanical ingenuity in improving the means and instruments of science. His friends will not claim for him extraordinary powers of rapid combination and generalization, by which new laws are discovered, and new theories and systems invented. Though well versed in Experimental Philosophy, and in some branches of Natural History, his mind was apt to rest in details. Hence his fame is left to depend, for the most part, on the sagacity with which he contrived, by mechanical means, to supply particular defects, or obviate particular difficulties, by which others had been baffled and foiled. Of this nature was the first successful effort of skill which brought him into notice; — an important improvement in the construction of the Air Pump then in use, which he communicated to the scientific world in 1783, "just four years from the day of his ordination, when thirty-two years of age."

> "The American philosopher," says his eulogist, "was allowed to have surpassed all former attempts in the same department. His name is recorded by an eminent writer, in connexion with that of the famous Boyle, among 'those who have improved the instruments of science, and of whose labors we are now reaping the benefit.' The machine is still called by way of distinction, 'The American Air Pump,' and its figure was selected to represent a constellation in the heavens, and imprinted upon celestial globes." — p. 10.

His last work was of the same general nature. We can speak with lively recollections of the grateful, self-satisfied air, with which the venerable octogenarian would exhibit to his friends this proof that still his eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated. It consisted in a newly constructed stand for a large telescope.

"This," as Mr. Upham remarks, "was a great desideratum in science. As telescopes must be so made as to revolve in every direction, horizontally and perpendicularly, it had always before been supposed necessary to support them on a point, upon which it was found impossible to prevent a greater or less vibration, thus introducing uncertainty, to some extent, into the observations of astronomers. Dr. Prince contrived a stand, on which the telescope rests in a solid bed, with perfect firmness, and at the same time is movable in every direction and by the slightest touch of the finger. The following is the conclusion of the description given by him of this ingenious structure, as published by the American Academy, 'I made the brass work myself, and finished it on my birth-day, — 80 years old.'" — pp. 10, 11.

Mr. Upham, in speaking of Dr. Prince's philosophical and literary correspondence, brings to light some facts, which illustrate in a striking manner his singular modesty and indifference to fame, and show, at the same time, that British ingenuity has been more indebted to suggestions from this quarter, than it would care publicly to acknowledge.

"It was his custom, when he had made an improvement in the construction and use of a philosophical instrument, instead of publishing it to the world, to communicate a full description of it, by private letter, to the principal instrument-makers in London. During his whole life, down to March 19th, 1836, the date of his last letter, to Samuel Jones, of London, he has, in this manner, been promoting the interests of science, while his agency, to a very great extent, has been unknown to the public.

"A long letter, occupying ten closely written pages, is found under the date of November 3d, 1792, addressed to George Adams, of London, and containing a full description of an improved construction of the Lucernal microscope. On the 3d of July, 1795, he wrote another letter to Mr. Adams, describing still further improvements in the same instrument. Without making any public acknowledgment of his obligations to Dr. Prince, Mr. Adams proceeded to construct Lucernal microscopes upon the plan suggested by him. Shortly after the death of Mr. Adams, which occurred in the latter part of 1795, an article appeared in the 'Gentleman's Magazine,' signed by John Hill, a distinguished cultivator of science, in which the importance of these improvements was shown at large, and illustrated by a plate. The writer stated that he had procured his instrument from Mr. Adams a short time before his death, and that Mr. Adams intimated to him, at the time, that he had been indebted for some important suggestions in its construction to a 'clergyman.' The purpose of Mr. Hill's communication seemed to be, in part to make known the improvement, and in part to draw out the clergyman who had invented it. Dr. Prince's attention was directed to Mr. Hill's publication by his London correspondent, but I do not find that he answered the inquiry, at the time, or took any steps to secure the credit, with the readers of the 'Gentleman's Magazine,' of the beautiful and truly ingenious construction which had attracted so much curiosity and admiration. He, probably, preferred to let the subject drop, rather than keep it before the public to the disadvantage of the memory of his friend.

"After the death of Mr. Adams, his successor in business, Mr. Wm. Jones, sought Dr. Prince's correspondence in language of which the following is a specimen, extracted from a letter, dated London, Feb. 18th, 1797:

"'A correspondence with you, Sir, will be as flattering to me as it is desirable. I have long heard of your knowledge and expertness in science, and shall be happy to receive any communications that have resulted from your study and experience.'

"In a letter, dated July 3d, 1797, Mr. Jones repeats his solicitations, as follows: 'Your celebrity as a philosopher is not a little known in this country. Mr. Jefferson, many years ago, mentioned your name to me, and showed me the description of your air pump. A correspondence with you respecting science and instruments, will be highly gratifying to me; and what small leisure an unremitting attention to business will permit, I shall be happy to snatch occasionally for your information.'

"The correspondence thus commenced with this enlightened and philosophical mechanician, was continued with him, and after his death, with his brother, without intermission, to the close of Dr. Prince's life, and became the foundation of a sincere and most interesting friendship. It is indeed delightful to witness the genial influence of scientific pursuits upon the affections, binding together the hearts of those between whose persons an ocean had always rolled.

"The letters of Mr. William and Samuel Jones are full of expressions of admiration and gratitude towards Dr. Prince. In one of them, dated March 3d, 1798, Mr. Jones says, 'It is to you that the Air Pump and Lucernal owe their present state of perfection and improvement.' In another, dated September 29th, 1798, he says, 'In all respects I think you have made the Lucernal as complete and as simple as it can be made.' Under the date of March 4th, 1798, Mr. Jones acknowledges the adoption of Dr. Prince's 'very useful and ingenious emendations' in the construction of the 'astronomical lanthern machinery.'" —pp. 11 – 13.

Dr. Prince's reputation as a divine, has doubtless suffered unjustly, as Mr. Upham intimates, from his greater eminence as a philosopher. In theology, however, it may be proper to say, that, from the peculiar habits of his mind, he was more remarkable as a reader and an observer, than as an original and profound thinker. But such was his fondness, and such his opportunities for reading and observation, that he has left few persons equally conversant with the history of religious inquiry during the last hundred years, or with the men and books, so far as England and this country are concerned, that have figured in it. We copy from the Discourse the following just and discriminating estimate of his merits as a preacher.

> " His preaching was rational, catholic, philosophical, and liberal, and although not calculated to be popular at the present day was duly estimated and admired by our predecessors. His appearance in the pulpit was venerable and impressive in the highest degree, and the tones of his voice were truly noble and melodious. His figure was tall, and although very much bent by age, remarkably graceful and dignified. His dress was perfectly conformed to the fashion of the old school, and a full head of hair, perfectly whitened by time, was gathered in curls above his shoulders, so as to resemble the wigs worn by our ancestors, for which it was often mistaken. He preached his last sermon not seven weeks ago, in the afternoon of the 17th of April; and the image of his hoary locks and benevolent countenance will not soon grow dim on the memories of those who have seen him in this desk." — p. 16.

In his personal character, Dr. Prince happily illustrated the distinction, on which Dr. Spurzheim used to insist, between natural and acquired goodness. The result may also be appealed to, in confirmation of the remark of the same sagacious observer, that, however we may respect and revere men distinguished for the latter quality, we commonly, and for good reasons, select our friends and intimate associates from among those who possess the former in an eminent degree. Rarely, if ever, have we met with a man who had less of suspicion or harshness in his temperament, or of that morbid self-consciousness which haunts some men, perpetually tempting them to put the question to themselves, " What effect will this have on *me?* " In company, whether large or small, whether of the old or young, whether of scholars or men of business, he was the life of the circle, taking great pains to please, and finding great pleasure in being able to please. To this end he had a fund of anecdotes and reminiscences never exceeded, which he knew how to narrate with a simplicity, a liveliness, a truth, and a dramatic effect, hardly ever equalled; and this, too, without sacrifice of dignity, or kind feeling, or clerical propriety. It is sometimes said, that the story-telling race of ministers are dying out;—an event which would be much more to be deprecated than it is, had all resembled the subject of these slight sketches in his care never to let a word, or suggestion, or allusion escape him, that could give pain, or alarm the most sensitive and scrupulous delicacy. Then there were his books, and pictures, and curiosities, and his fine collection of philosophical instruments, many of them made or improved by his own hands. Who that enjoyed his intimacy, will ever forget the patience with which, even in his extreme years, he would stand hour after hour before the screen of one of his powerful microscopes, in order to afford instruction or entertainment to his visitors? Who will ever forget that kaleidoscope, which his own ingenuity had converted from a childish bauble into a philosophical wonder, or those nicely adjusted magnifying reflectors, or that diamond beetle? In this connexion the language of Dr. Parkman, in the Appendix to the Discourse, is not too strong.

> "I might speak," says he, addressing the congregation on the afternoon of the Sunday immediately following the death of Dr. Prince, "what your hearts I am certain will cordially attest, of the *kindness and benevolence of his spirit*, not quenched or discouraged by the experience or infirmities of old age, disposing him always, and to the last, to acts of friendship and substantial goodness; combined with singular freedom from malice and distrust; with willingness to be pleased, slowness to take offence, and something like eagerness to forgive. Nor may I omit what even my imperfect opportunities have not failed to impress,—and what you, my friends, of this society, have continually witnessed,—the edifying spectacle of colleague-pastors united as father and son in mutual confidence and affection; where filial respect has been repaid by paternal love, and the labors, influence, and reputation of the younger have been invariably sustained by the friendship, counsel, and hearty satisfaction of the elder. This is a spectacle rare as it is attractive; and when you consider the undeniable difficulty and delicacy as well as sacredness of this relation, while such a union reflects a mutual honor, you must have regarded it as no ordinary indication of that generosity of soul, which none that knew Dr. Prince could fail to recognise among the traits of his character.
>
> "Nor shall any of us soon forget, since they were the indications of the same benevolence, his venerable form and aspect; the be-

nignity of his countenance; his dignified, but gentle manners of the ancient school, expressing, by an exterior politeness, the good-will he felt: conciliating the confidence of the young, so that while they 'waited for his wisdom,' they were not afraid to utter their own. Nor may I wholly omit, among these familiar recollections, his ancient costume, retained to his death amidst all the changes of the times, the graceful and appropriate ornament of his old age, connecting for us of a younger generation the days that have been with the days that are; and preserving for us, as it were, a living portrait of the Fathers." — p. 28.

Dr. Prince, at his death, was one of the oldest clergymen in the country. How little it was expected when he was young, that he would attain to such longevity, may be gathered from the following note.

" Dr. Prince was, in early life, of an apparently infirm constitution. His parents were apprehensive that they might not be able to rear him. At the time of his ordination his health was very delicate. One of the members of the society, before the vote inviting him to settle was put, observed in the parish meeting, that he concurred with all the rest of the society in admiring Mr. Prince very much, as a preacher and as a man, but that he doubted about the expediency of settling a minister, whose complaints were so alarming that the society would in all probability very soon be called to bury him. Dr. Orne rose in reply, and admitted that Mr. Prince was in feeble health, but stated that he did not apprehend his condition to be so immediately alarming as the other gentleman supposed, and concluded by saying, that Mr. Prince might get over his infirmities, and live to bury them all. He did live to bury them all." — pp. 7, 8.

Another statement is given in the printed Discourse, which is worth inserting for the remarkable coincidences it records. Dr. Prince, in a note to his Sermon on the death of Dr. Barnard, has said with reference to that excellent man,

"It is a singular concurrence in our walks of life, and one that has some effect upon the social feelings, that we were educated at the same university, and after we graduated kept the same schools in the same town; studied divinity with the same clergyman; settled in the ministry in the same town; the same person preached our ordination sermons; and we received honorary degrees from the same university.

"It is a singular continuation of this series of concurrences," says Mr. Upham, "that, without any knowledge of the fact, on my part, at the time of the funeral of Dr. Prince, the same text

was selected, from which the late Dr. Wadsworth, of Danvers, preached Dr. Barnard's funeral sermon. It is still more singular, and as affecting as it is singular, that, owing to some error at the time, Dr. Prince's remains were carried down into the wrong tomb, and laid by the side of Dr. Barnard's. He followed him, literally, from the cradle to the grave." — p. 17.

Dr. Prince, especially in his declining years, had the common allotment of trials and infirmities, yet who could refrain from pronouncing him, in the intervals of his distressing malady, a fortunate old man; — fortunate from the many interesting recollections of his early days, when, as a Boston boy, and with the curious and active habits of his mind, he mingled with the popular movements of 1765, stood in King's Street on the fatal night of March the Fifth, 1770, saw the tea thrown overboard in 1774, and was an eyewitness of almost every intensely exciting incident, which in this quarter preluded and introduced the Revolution; — fortunate from his settlement over a church, the first which our fathers gathered on these shores, and second to none in the kindness and generosity it has always felt and practised towards its pastors, and from his connexion with a colleague whose truly filial regard for him was as manifest while he lived, as in the affectionate tribute he has here paid to his memory; — fortunate from the circle of enlightened and liberal-minded men, into whose society he was cast by his situation, and whose intimacy he enjoyed for so many years, and from the tender and untiring assiduities with which he was watched over, as life was wearing to a close; — fortunate, above all, from his own gentle, tolerant, and trustful temper, and from that rational and unaffected piety, which did so much to alleviate his sufferings, and to smooth and cheer his passage to a better world. Ed.

ART. IV. — 1. *The Way of Salvation: a Sermon, delivered at Morristown, New Jersey, Feb. 8th,* 1829, *by* ALBERT BARNES. Seventh Edition. Together with Mr. BARNES's *Defence of the Sermon, read before the Synod of Philadelphia, at Lancaster, Oct. 29th,* 1830; And his "*Defence*" *before the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia, in Reply to the Charges of the* Rev. GEORGE JUNKIN. New York: Leavitt, Lord, & Co. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1836. 12mo. pp. 226.

2. *The Vindication, containing a History of the Trial of the* Rev. ALBERT BARNES, *by the Second Presbytery, and by the Synod of Philadelphia. To which are appended, New-Schoolism in the Seventeenth, compared with New-Schoolism in the Nineteenth Century:* By the Rev. GEORGE JUNKIN, D. D. Philadelphia: Wm. S. Martin. 1836. 12mo. pp. 159.

FEW events have occurred in this country, since its settlement, of a nature to give to liberal sentiments such an impetus, as the prosecution and acquittal of Mr. Barnes. This will probably be among the last trials for heresy, which will ever occur in this land. The Angel of Truth is now unbound. Every man may now investigate the Scriptures for himself, as well in as out of the Presbyterian church, with none to molest or make him afraid. Heresy is a word which can no longer shake the nerves of the most timid inquirer. A few years ago, Mr. Barnes was an obscure individual, with considerable talent, some learning, and more independence than was thought to be allowable under the iron yoke of Presbyterianism. There he would have remained, useful in his sphere, but incapable of extensively influencing the church, either for good or evil. But persecution has made him a Hercules, or rather a Briareus, with his hundred hands, to pull down the bulwarks of Orthodoxy, from one end of the continent to the other. He has powerfully enlisted the sympathies of the religious world, first as a confessor, and now as a conqueror; and it is hard to say in which capacity he is most glorified. His books are circulated through the length and the breadth of the land; and thousands are now thanking him in their hearts, for vindicating for them the freedom of thought.

In the sketch we now intend to give of the prosecution and acquittal of Mr. Barnes, it will not be necessary to enumerate the causes which have led to the present troubles, which distract, and threaten to dissolve, the Presbyterian church. We have already, in a former number of this work,* given, at some length, the train of events, which, in the opinion of the best informed of that denomination, has led to the present state of things. That Mr. Barnes should have been the individual selected to bear the sins of the whole liberal party in that communion, seems to have been a matter of pure accident. The sentiments for which he was arraigned and tried, have long been held in it, and, in many instances, without any effort to conceal them.

Mr. Barnes is a graduate of the Princeton Theological Seminary, and was first settled in Morristown, New Jersey. In February, 1829, during a revival in his congregation, he preached a sermon, which was afterwards published "by request," entitled "The Way of Salvation," in which he attempted to give an outline of the Christian system, as he understood it. It contained the germ of all he has since developed in his various publications, and was orthodox enough, one would suppose, to satisfy any reasonable man. But so thought not some of his brethren.

About this time he received an invitation to become the pastor of a very ancient, numerous, and respectable society in Philadelphia, in the place of Dr. Wilson, lately deceased. This invitation he accepted, and preparations were made for his removal to the metropolis. In the mean time the sermon had been circulated, and weighed in the balances of orthodoxy and found wanting. Some passages, in particular, gave so much alarm to certain of the strictest sect, that they were determined to prevent his installation. They therefore sent in a protest against the leave granted by the Presbytery of Philadelphia, to the First Presbyterian Church, to prosecute the call. This protest, however, was overruled, and Mr. Barnes was installed.

It ought here to be said, that there had been a difference in opinion, and no little alienation of feeling, among the Presbyterian clergymen of Philadelphia and the vicinity, before this time, which had been carried so far as to result in a separation, and the formation of a new Presbytery, on the principle of *elective affinity*, or, in other words, similarity of sentiments.

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* For November, 1834.

It was the New-School Presbytery, it will be readily understood, who received and installed Mr. Barnes.

Of this a formal complaint was made to the General Assembly, as an irregularity, and the authors of the protest were proceeding to take summary measures with the offenders, when they discovered, to their utter astonishment, that there was a majority of the whole Assembly in favor of what they, in their haste, were about to put down as heresy! Nay, as on their own principles a majority can decree what orthodoxy is, they were in fact the heretics.

In this position the affair rested for some years. In the mean time, New-Schoolism, as it is classically called, was understood to be on the increase. The Old-School men sounded the alarm that "the church was in danger;" but the more they sounded it, the more the heresy grew, and the wider the schism became. Mr. Barnes was publishing a popular work on the New Testament, in which the Apostolic writings were interpreted in consistency with his system, and it was meeting with unexampled reception and success. When he reached the Epistle to the Romans, the grand magazine of Calvinism, and was taking text after text from the foundation of that system, the zeal of the Old-School men could no longer be restrained. It was resolved that Mr. Barnes should be prosecuted for heresy, and his party put down; or, at any rate, it should be ascertained whether the doctrines held by him "were any longer to be tolerated in the Presbyterian church." The instrument chosen on this occasion, was the Rev. George Junkin, D. D., president of Lafayette College, in Pennsylvania, — a man very well calculated to be the champion of Calvinism, by the especial fact of having apparently been asleep, like Rip Van Winkle, for the last twenty years.

Notice was likewise given to the Presbytery to which Mr. Barnes belonged, that charges were about to be preferred against him. But it was decided by them, that a notice by letter was not sufficiently formal, and so they refused to consider the case. This objection was afterwards waved, and the charges were received. They are ten in number, as follows:

I. Mr. Barnes teaches, "That all sin consists in voluntary action."

II. Mr. Barnes affirms, "That Adam (before and after his fall) was ignorant of his moral relations to such a degree, that he did not know that the consequences of his sin would or should reach any farther than to natural death."

III. Mr. Barnes teaches, "That unregenerate men are able to keep the commandments, and convert themselves to God."

IV. Mr. Barnes teaches, "That faith is an act of the mind, and not a principle, and is itself imputed for righteousness."

V. Mr. Barnes denies, "That God entered into covenant with Adam, constituting him a federal or covenant head, and representative of his natural descendants."

VI. Mr. Barnes denies, "That the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity."

VII. Mr. Barnes denies, "That mankind are guilty, i. e. liable to punishment, on account of the sin of Adam."

VIII. Mr. Barnes denies, "That Christ suffered the proper penalty of the law, as the vicarious substitute of his people, and thus took away legally their sins, and purchased pardon."

IX. Mr.Barnes denies, "That the righteousness, i. e. the active obedience of Christ to the law, is imputed to his people for their justification; so that they are righteous in the eye of the law, and therefore justified."

X. Mr. Barnes also teaches, in opposition to the standards, "That justification is simply pardon."

Such are the charges which have occupied the time and attention of the grave and reverend body of the Presbyterian church, for two years past. Such are the doctrines attempted to be convicted of heresy, and, of course, their opposites established as orthodoxy, in the nineteenth century. The latter remind us of some old man we occasionally meet in the streets, belonging to the middle of the last age, in his stockings and small-clothes, shoe-buckles and cocked hat, apparently unconscious that he belongs to a generation for ever passed away. Nor can we doubt that many of our readers will be nearly as much surprised, on conning them over, as if they were on some fine Sunday morning to see Duns Scotus or John Calvin appear in the pulpit, arrayed in all the quaint and grotesque habiliments of their days. In these charges, if we were permitted to conjecture, we should recognise the handiwork of the venerable Dr. Green, of Philadelphia. They bear a strong impress of his mind. Besides, his is the only mind, of which we have any knowledge, except that of the President of Lafayette College, which has stood absolutely still, amidst the advancement of the last fifty years.

In substantiation of the first charge, — that of teaching that all sin consists in voluntary action, — Dr. Junkin thus proceeds:

"Now it would greatly relieve and shorten this discussion, if he would expressly admit or explicitly deny. Which does he do? Examine, critically, all he has said on the subject, and see how he comes up to the question; Do you teach this doctrine? He gives no answer. You cannot tell whether he admits or denies. No man can tell. His whole answer is equivocal. He does not meet the question.

"The relative value of this charge may appear inconsiderable. It is nearly allied, however, to more important errors. If man has no sin upon him legally, for which he is punishable, prior to the period of moral agency or voluntary action, then, as we shall see, our Confession is in error. But, if *all* sin consists in voluntary action, and man is not liable to penal evil but as he is a sinner, so charged in law; then it will follow, that, prior to voluntary action, he cannot be a sinner: original sin he has none. So that the maintenance of this doctrine is a denial of the doctrine of original sin. That he teaches it, see 'Notes,' p. 249: 'In all this, and in all other sin, man is voluntary.' Here is language too plain to be misunderstood or explained away: it affirms the very point to be proved. Voluntary action is necessary to sin in man. It will surely not avail to assert 'that its design was not to teach any thing about the doctrine of what is commonly called original sin.' — It does teach something, — it denies that doctrine. It is a general proposition, — the fifth in numerical order. If the sole object was, to show that in moral actions, man is *voluntary*, and not *compelled* like a mill-wheel, that object would have been attained without generalizing so as to deny original sin. The idea of *compelling* a *voluntary* agent is an absurdity, and need not detain us.

"Proof 2, p. 123. 'There is no reason to believe that they [men] are *condemned* to eternal death, or held to be guilty of his [Adam's] sin, without participation of their own, or without personal sin, any more than there is, that they are approved by the work of Christ, or held to be personally deserving, without embracing his offer, and receiving him as a Saviour.' Here personal transgression, — voluntary action on their part, must precede the possibility of condemnation to eternal death, — or being held guilty of Adam's sin. Prior to voluntary action, there is no liability to condemnation, — no guilt. Comment here is unnecessary, but you will bear with a remark: and in making it, I wish to excite, in the brother accused, a salutary fear; and do not intend to insinuate that he is a thorough Pelagian. I know that heresiarch held doctrines which this brother abhors. But in one or two points of his heresy, our brother is with him; and my fear, which I am anxious to transfer to his bosom, is, that as a consistent reasoner, he cannot hold the ground which now he does hold in common with that ancient disturber of the church's peace, without following him in other dangerous positions. The remark is, that the argument of the above quotation is borrowed from Pelagius; not indeed, I suppose, immediately, but really. It is his precise argument, and how nearly in his words, you shall judge. Pelagius says,

"'If Adam's sin hurt those who are not guilty, the righteousness of Christ profits those who believe not.'—*Milner*, II. 370.

"The only difference between this argument and brother Barnes's is, that is more pointed and pithy, because less burdened with verbiage. It is the same precise argument. Now, ought not a Presbyterian minister to be alarmed, when he finds himself inadvertently (if it so be) using the same argument with an acknowledged heretic, and for the same purpose? Can any thing possibly prove more conclusively unity of doctrine? But I have more of the same.

"'How can a man be considered guilty by God of that sin which he knows not to be his own? for if it is necessary, it is not his own; but if it is his own, it is voluntary; and if voluntary, it can be avoided.'—*Pelagius*, as quoted, Bib. Rep. Vol. II. p. 102.

"Take in connexion with this, Proof 4, p. 124, 'As the work of Christ does not benefit the race unless it is embraced, so does not the reasoning of the Apostle lead us to the conclusion, that the deed of Adam does not condemn, unless there be some voluntary act on the part of each individual?'

"'If Adam's sin hurt those who are not guilty, the righteousness of Christ profits those who believe not.'

"I have placed these last two quotations in juxtaposition, that their substantial identity might be seen at a glance. The righteousness of Christ does not profit the sinner, until he believes, says Mr. B., therefore the sin of Adam does not hurt the sinner until he voluntarily transgresses. The doctrine of both is, that there is no liability to penal evil, but in consequence of voluntary action, and 'previously to moral agency, there is nothing in man [nothing moral—no moral character] but that which God created in him.'—*Pelagius*, Bib. Rep. Vol. II. p. 105.

"Again: 'Children, inasmuch as they are children, never can be guilty until they have done something by their own proper will.'—*Julian*, an intimate friend of Pelagius, and advocate of his doctrine, as quoted Bib. Rep. Vol. II. p. 103.

"Proof 3, p. 192. 'They [Jacob and Esau] had *done* nothing good or bad, and where that is the case, there can be no character, for character is the result of conduct. (2.) That the period of moral agency had not yet commenced.' The *doing*, the voluntary agency, is necessary to character. Prior to this, there is no sin to expose to punishment. When this voluntary action occurs, it will be, he admits, sinful; and then, but not till then, are they sinners. Whether the point is proved, I leave with you, adding only, that brother Barnes does not say, 'I deny that I teach it.'

"Let us attend for a moment to the standards. Confession, chap. vi. 5 : 'This corruption of nature, during this life, doth remain in those that are regenerated: and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet *both itself* and all *the motions thereof are truly and properly sin.* 6. Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal.' Larger Catechism, Question 27: 'We are by nature children of wrath, bond slaves to Satan, and justly liable to all punishments, in this world and that which is to come.' Shor. Cat.: 'All mankind, by their fall, lost communion with God, are under his wrath and curse, and so made liable to all the miseries of this life, to death itself, and to the pains of hell for ever.'

"On these a remark or two. 1. This corruption of nature is *itself* sin, 'as well as all the motions thereof.' 2. This corruption of nature, which is sin, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner. It is not said, his voluntary action alone brings guilt; but their fall placed them under his wrath and curse, and exposed them to death and hell for ever. No! says Mr. B., all mankind are not under his wrath and curse, by their fall; they must first act voluntarily, and then, but not until then, are they liable to the pains of hell.

"What say the Scriptures? Ep. ii. 3. 'And were by nature the children of wrath.' Rom. iii. 19. 'That all the world may become guilty before God.' Psalms ii. 5. 'I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me.' These passages cannot be turned aside. They prove incontestably, that man is a sinner, independent of, and prior to, his voluntary action, and therefore, that 'all sin does not consist in voluntary action.' Farther proofs on this head are reserved until a future occasion; because, so intimately connected are those errors, that they are jointed into each other, so that the evidence on one often answers for others. All that will be adduced to show the guilt, i. e. the liability of man to punishment on account of Adam's sin, will be

> good on this point. For, obviously, if the infant human being, prior to voluntary action, is liable to penal evil, it must be viewed by the holy Governor of the universe as under sin." — *The Vindication*, pp. 34 – 37.

It is curious to remark in this connexion, what we do not recollect to have seen noticed, the unscriptural and unreasonable definition of sin, which the Westminster divines have thought proper to put into the minds of little children, in order to cover the doctrine of original sin. The Bible and common sense say, that "sin is a transgression of the law." Had they kept to that, the doctrine of original sin would have been cut up by the roots. What, then, do they say? "Sin is any want of *conformity to*, or transgression of, the law of God." So by a quibble, or an equivocation on the word *conformity*, it may comprehend both that which is *involuntary*, as well as that which is *voluntary*, and man is thus made guilty of his nature!

We omit the proofs of the second charge, as too inconsequential to be stated, and proceed to the third. "That unregenerate men are able to keep the commandments, and convert themselves to God." As this is the most material charge, we give the reasoning of the accuser and the accused at some length. This charge is sustained by the following quotations from Mr. Barnes's Commentary.

> "Proof 1, p. 164. '*The carnal mind.* This is the same expression as occurs in verse 6, (τὸ φϱόνημα τῆς σαϱκός.) It does not mean the mind itself, the intellect, or the will: It does not suppose that the mind or the soul is physically depraved, or opposed to God; but it means that the *minding of the things of the flesh*, giving to them supreme attention, is hostility to God.' '*For it* —. The word (it) here refers to the minding of the things of the flesh. It does not mean that the soul *itself* is not subject to his law, but that the *minding* of those things is hostile to his law. The Apostle does not express any opinion about the metaphysical ability of man, or discuss that question at all. The amount of his affirmation is simply, that the *minding of the flesh*, the supreme attention to its dictates and desires, is not and cannot be subject to the law of God. They are wholly contradictory and irreconcilable, just as much as the love of falsehood is inconsistent with the laws of truth; as intemperance with the laws of temperance; as adultery is a violation of the seventh commandment. But, whether the *man himself* might not obey the law; whether he has or has not ability to do it, is a question which the Apostle does not touch, and on which this passage should not be adduced. For whether

the law of a particular sin is utterly irreconcilable with an opposite virtue, and whether the sinner is able to abandon that sin, are very different inquiries.

" '*Is not subject.* It is not in subjection to the command of God. The minding of the flesh is opposed to that law, and thus shows that it is hostile to God.

" '*Neither indeed can be,* This is absolute and certain. It is impossible that it should be. There is the utmost inability in regard to it. The things are utterly irreconcilable. But the affirmation does not mean that the *heart* of the sinner might not be subject to God: or that his *soul* is so physically depraved that he cannot obey, or that *he* might not obey the law.'

"Page 165, 8. '*So then.* It follows, it leads to this conclusion.

" '*They that are in the flesh.* They who are unrenewed sinners, who are following supremely the desires of the flesh. Chap. vii. 18. Those are meant here, who follow fleshly appetites and desires, and who are not led by the Spirit of God.

" '*Cannot please God.* That is, while they are thus in the flesh, while they thus pursue the desires of their corrupt nature, they cannot please God. But this affirms nothing respecting their ability to turn from this course, and to pursue a different mode of life. That is a different question. A child may be obstinate, proud, and disobedient; and *while in that state*, it may be affirmed of him, that he cannot please his parent. But whether he might not cease to be obstinate, and become obedient, is a very different inquiry, and the two subjects should never be confounded. * * * He [the sinner] is engaged in hostility against God, and if he does not himself forsake it, it will be endless, and involve his soul in all the evils of a personal, and direct, and eternal warfare with the Lord Almighty. * * * The Holy Spirit is often represented as dwelling in the hearts of Christians: and the meaning is, not that there is a *personal* or *physical* indwelling of the Holy Ghost, but that he influences, directs, and guides Christians; producing meekness, love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, &c. The expression *to dwell* in one, denotes intimacy of connection, and means, that those things which are the fruits of the Spirit, are produced in the heart.'

"Proof 2, p. 108. '*We were yet without strength.* The word here used (ἀσθενῶν) is usually applied to those who are sick and feeble, deprived of strength by disease. Mark xxx. 38; Luke x. 9; Acts iv. 9—v. 15. But it is also used in a *moral* sense, to denote inability or feebleness, with regard to any undertaking or duty. Here it means that they were without strength in *regard to the case which the Apostle was considering*, that is, we have no power to devise a scheme of justification, to make an atonement, or to put away the wrath of God, &c. While all hope of man's being saved by any plan of his own, was then taken away; while he was thus lying exposed to divine justice, and dependent on the mere mercy of God; God provided a plan which met the case, and secured his salvation. The remark of the Apostle here has reference *only* to the race *before* the atonement was made. It does not pertain to the question whether the man has strength to repent and to believe, now that the atonement *is* made, which is a very different inquiry.' " — *Ibid.*, pp. 40, 41.

Whereupon Dr. Junkin proceeds to animadvert in a strain, which, if it had not been common for these hundred years, we should suppose would put the reasoner out of the pale of responsible beings.

" 1. Against the doctrine, that man unrenewed has full and perfect natural ability, according to Edwards's definition of it, I object, because it is not true. The natural man does labor under a defect of understanding in the things of the Spirit of God. The Bible, and Confession, and all Christian divines, and all Christian experience, unite in the proof. The understanding is darkened, and without the illumination, — the *supernatural illumination* of the Holy Ghost, it cannot discern the things of the Spirit. This *fact* is undenied and *undeniable.* That man has a faculty of understanding, by which he can read and reason about scriptural truth, is admitted: but that this faculty is unimpaired by sin, is utterly denied. Nothing short of the Spirit shining into the heart can give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God. All the prayers of Christians for light and knowledge imply this. All men feel it. This very discussion shows it. If the understanding is not impaired by sin, why cannot we see things alike? Had man before he sinned any such perplexity? But will it be said, the very prayer for increase of light implies the natural powers to receive it. If we had not the natural power, how could we pray that our understandings may be enlightened? I answer, certainly it implies a natural understanding, competent to receive natural truth, but it implies not a deficiency of light absolutely, for it shines all around. It beams from the pages of God's word, and the natural man's not receiving, is not owing to its deficiency, but to want of capacity, — to defect in his perceptive powers.

" 2. It does not relieve the doctrine of full ability of understanding in the natural man, to say that this defect alleged exists in, or flows from, the corrupt affections. For my second observation is, that this very inability is itself a sin, and has its origin, not in the nature of man as he came from the hand of God, but in sin itself and its penal consequences. Now, if this blindness of understanding is a penal evil, it alters not the matter of fact. For our inquiry is not as to its origin, but as to the *reality* of it. Does it exist? And limiting our view to this, it seems to me impossible to maintain the position, that ‘ the natural man *can*, — that he *is able* — that he labors under no defect of understanding — to discern the things of the Spirit of God.’

“ 3. Man is not now in his original state and condition. This, you will say, is no information. And yet the opposite seems to be assumed in a large proportion of the discussion on this subject. Mr. Barnes's reasoning presupposes that man is now in a state of probation, and is therefore furnished now with all the means of a fair trial. The same assumption is almost everywhere made in similar discussions. And with that assumption, I too am ready to admit, that where a thing is commanded as duty, the implication is, that there is power or ability to comply with the command. But when the state of probation is ended, and the nature of man in ruins, the case is very different. Adam, in his pristine condition, had ability commensurate with his obligations. All the powers of his nature were perfect, and the right exercise of them was all his Maker demanded of him; and to have demanded of him more than the faculties of his being were adequate to perform, would not have comported with the nature of God's moral government. But now that he has reduced to ruins his intellectual and moral powers, and cut short the period of his probation, — *now* that he is poor, weak, fallen, corrupt, he has not powers commensurate with his duties. To affirm this, is to maintain one of the most ineffable of all absurdities, which it is the purpose of my

“ 4th Observation to deny, viz. That present ability is the measure of present duty. Or, in other words, that a man's inability to meet the requisitions of law, cancels his obligation; that a man cannot be bound to do what he is unable to do. This position I suppose to be among the most unspeakable of absurdities.” — *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 48.

But in a part of the argument under this head, he has his antagonist fairly at his mercy. The great advantage which the New-School men imagine they possess over the old fashioned Calvinists, is, that they explain inability in such a way as to leave man accountable for his disobedience. This they do by making a distinction between natural and moral inability. Natural inability is want of power. Moral inability is want of disposition and will, to exercise it. The former excuses, but the latter does not. Dr. Junkin treats the distinction as we think it deserves.

“ 5. But I observe again, if natural inability cancels moral obli-

gation, much more moral inability cancels moral obligation. Your respectful and special attention is invited to this point. It is an *ad hominem* against the ability doctrine. Taking these brethren on their own principles, let us see what the result must be. We contend that man labors under 'a defect or obstacle,' as Edwards says, 'in the faculty of understanding,'—that this faculty, in our present depraved state, is unable to discern spiritual things. This is called by many *a natural inability*; and the axiom of our brethren is, that this *natural inability* destroys moral obligation. Now, brother Barnes maintains that man has *natural ability*, but he lacks moral ability;—he labors under a moral defect or obstacle,—a defect, or obstacle, or inability, utterly unremovable, but by the power of God. Nothing but divine grace can remove it;—an inability in that very faculty which gives moral character to himself and all his actions,—an inability of will, removable only by the Spirit of God. Now, I repeat it, IF NATURAL INABILITY DESTROYS MORAL OBLIGATION, *a fortiori*, MORAL INABILITY DESTROYS MORAL OBLIGATION. Let the advocate of human ability make his election. Let him either admit man's total depravity in understanding, will, and affections, and thus become a consistent Calvinist: or let him go over entirely, and maintain moral ability, and thus become a consistent Arminian. How can a rational man hold this half-way course? Surely, the attempt to suspend himself between the horns of this dilemma, by a metaphysical hair, half sawed off, is sufficient evidence of defect in man's understanding."—*Ibid.*, pp. 49, 50.

He then goes on to state what we suppose to be the true Calvinistic doctrine on this point, and subjoins his reasons for holding and preaching it. These reasons we consider to be the most frank avowal which we have seen for a long time, and they confirm a suspicion which we have often indulged, but thought too bad to express; *that the whole Calvinistic system is preached, in a majority of cases, merely for effect, and to put power into the hands of the clergy, and what is technically called the Church.* It is the readiest means to subdue the timid, overawe the independent, and break down the human mind. It seems to be a sort of substitute for the superstitions of the Roman Catholic church. The infallibility of having been born again, is found quite as useful and convenient in tyrannizing over mankind, as the *jus divinum* of the successors of St. Peter. Our readers will perceive how far truth and the Scriptures, or mere expediency, are at the bottom of Dr. Junkin's support of the doctrine of human inability.

"8. I therefore object to the doctrine of human ability including the manner of its application. Because (a) It inflates the pride of the human heart. Tell men they are able to make to themselves new hearts, if they please; — that they have power to love God; — as much ability to love him as to hate him; — they can do the duty of repentance and faith, if they choose; — tell them this, and you swell their souls in vanity. No news more grateful can be poured into the carnal ear. Nothing can be better calculated to produce two effects in their proper time; which I mention as farther reasons of objection. (b) The man who thinks he can repent whenever he pleases, will, almost inevitably, fold up his hands and defer the duty until a convenient season. Every minister of experience must know, that to arouse men from the slumbers of this belief, is the first step; and Oh, how important and how difficult a step it is, to induce them to believe, that they are dead and their life is hid with Christ in God! This is the broad road of Arminian Antinomianism, along which the great mass of human millions are rushing downward to perdition. Tell them, 'You are in the road to ruin;' — 'We know it, and we don't mean to follow it long, — we *can* turn out *when we please*, and shall take good care to do it in time for safety.' Ah! Mr. Moderator, you know this is the ruin of the race. The pride of *free will* and *human ability* is 'the broad way' to hell. (c) When these believers in man's natural ability take the notion to be converted; when the time of their *choosing* has come, *if it ever come*, then they are the dupes of their own delusion. They convert themselves, and of course *they* can undo what *they* have done; they can convert themselves back again. I mean to say, that false hopes and consequently spurious revivals are a necessary result of the doctrine we oppose. Simple people, who were *born* Arminians, and believers in human ability, as all men are, considering themselves able, when they please, to repent, believe, &c., thus rest in their confidence; and upon a little excitement, take up false hopes and rush to the wildest extremes. For (d) the manner of teaching the doctrine of natural ability leads to delusion. Even if the distinction were unexceptionable and clear in itself; yet it is not kept up; but without qualification men are said to be able to repent, love God, &c. You have the example in the 'Defence' before you.

"9. All that is said about the tyranny of demanding of men duties beyond their present ability, may be said with equal force, and is daily said, against exacting the claims of justice at all. What cruelty! to demand of poor, imperfect creatures holy obedience, and to punish them for non-compliance. This is the most popular argument of Universalists and Unitarians against the doctrine of God's vindictive justice: and I can view the attempt to soften down these features of the Gospel, which make it unpopular with the carnal mind, in no other than the most unfavorable light. I know very well men do 'reject the system which professes to hold' the doctrine of total inability; they 'reject it with abhorrence,' and that because it is 'so much at variance with the great original impressions of truth, made on their minds:' but I know also that these 'great original impressions of truth,' are false impressions and impressions of falsehood; and I have no desire to mould the Gospel according to them. And I 'would dare to preach it to Mr. Barnes's people, or to any other people,' in its most abhorrent form. Because I know, that the tendency of it is to stain the pride of all human glory, to drive man out of himself, — to expel from his soul the pride of 'free agency,' and make him feel that he is totally helpless and undone,— that there is no ability in himself, or in any created being, to bring deliverance; and thus to compel him to fall down upon his knees, beat upon his bosom, and cry out, in the deep consciousness of his utter inability, 'God be merciful to me a sinner.'" —*Ibid.*, pp. 52, 53.

"Simple people, who were *born* Arminians and believers in human ability, as all men are." What an admission! Is this writer aware into what relation he is bringing God towards these same simple people, that of an Omnipotent Deceiver, creating them with falsehood interwoven into their very natures, and a falsehood which must involve them in perpetual, undeserved misery? Establish this doctrine, and all ground for confidence in the Deity is gone.

We pass over the fourth and fifth charges, as of less consequence, and come to the sixth. Mr. Barnes "denies that the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity." This is the head and front of his offending, as our readers will perceive by the burst of impassioned eloquence which it calls forth from the prosecution.

"Mr. Moderator, we now approach the more serious and solemn parts of our discussion. And as we advance I seem to hear the solemn sounds, 'Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground.' Yes, we come to the holy mount, — the sacred seat of the Most High, — the strong holds of truth divine.

"Our discussions heretofore have respected principles, important indeed, but, with the exception of the last, only relatively so; we have passed the out-posts, and the horn-work, and the crown-work, and now approximate the citadel of truth. Let us enter and examine the interior, and see whether every thing is in due order for successful defence, — her guns all well mounted and manned,— her magazine fully stored,— her rank and file thoroughly drilled, — her officers all at their posts. And where do we find brother Barnes? Where but at his proper station, as a good soldier of Jesus Christ should be. See him at his gun, with every thing in complete order, — his thirty-two well rammed home, — all primed and ready, — his match lighted and whirling round his head. — But hold! my brother, your gun points directly into the magazine! Discharge her, and we are blown up, — our citadel is in ruins, and our cause lost for ever. Yes, Mr. Moderator, the doctrine of imputation is fundamental in the Christian system. Destroy this, and all is gone. Deny this, and affirm what else you please, it is all to no purpose. Adam's sin is imputed, i. e. charged in law to his posterity; and Christ's righteousness is imputed, i. e. charged in law to his posterity — his spiritual seed. Do you not see and feel this to be the very essence of the Gospel? I see, or think I see it. I feel, or trust I feel it. Yes, nothing is more plain and undeniable. I *feel* sin upon me, — the sin of my life and the sin of my nature. Adam's sin imputed, and my own sin imputed. I am a condemned wretch. How shall I escape? Blessed be God! As in the first Adam, I became or was made a sinner; so in the second Adam, I became or am made righteous. His death takes away my sin, and his life or righteousness secures me in life. This is 'my title clear to mansions in the skies.' Take away the doctrine of imputation and the title is gone. Rob me of the imputed righteousness of the Son of God and I have no title to heavenly joy. Deny the representative character of Adam and the imputation of his sin to his posterity, and you must deny the representative character of Christ and the imputation of his righteousness to his posterity, — the Rock is removed from beneath the feet of my faith, — the foundation of my hopes for eternity is taken away. But thanks be to God, his love will never direct Omnipotence to create a Samson, with powers to tear away the pillars that sustain the throne of his mercy. His covenant is sure. It is established as the heavens, and confirmed by the oath of Him that cannot lie, — 'even the sure mercies of David.' It was advisedly and deliberately I said, concerning brother Barnes's denial of this doctrine, 'if it be true, then I cannot read my title clear to mansions in the skies;' for there is no *title*, nothing which gives the believing sinner a *right* to an inheritance on high." — *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 75.

This animated strain seems to have been called out by the point of a sneer, which Mr. Barnes could not resist the temptation of throwing out, as he passed the expression so early impressed upon our memories, "sinned in him."* "Men," says he, " sin *in their own persons*, — *sin themselves*, — as, indeed, how *can* they sin in any other way. The expression, to sin by imputation, is unintelligible, and conveys no idea. It is a violation, in almost express terms, of the principles of the divine government, laid down in the Bible. The soul that sinneth IT shall die. THE SON SHALL NOT BEAR THE INIQUITY OF HIS FATHER, NEITHER SHALL THE FATHER BEAR THE INIQUITY OF THE SON." He who dares to capitalize such a sentiment as this, even from the Bible, cannot hope to remain long unsuspected in the Presbyterian Church. *Fœnum habet in cornu; longe fuge.*

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* We lately heard a pious lady of our acquaintance observe, that the doctrine of Original Sin was for many years to her a great mystery;

We close this charge with Dr. Junkin's answer to the weighty objections which Mr. Barnes brings against the common doctrine of imputation.

" Mr. Barnes's ninth objection is, that this doctrine 'will greatly embarrass a man's ministry, produce ease in sin, and hinder the prayers of the gospel, and disgust men of common understanding with Christianity.' These are heavy objections, if true. But first, it is the doctrine of all the Reformed churches, as the 'Biblical Repertory' has most triumphantly demonstrated. Did it embarrass Luther, and Calvin, and Knox, and Owen? When did the church see such men before or since? Whose labors were ever more blessed? Did it embarrass Edwards? And does it embarrass the great majority of sound Presbyterians at this day? Secondly, I have shown that it is the very doctrine to make men feel the greatness of their sin. But the opposite system, which makes human nature not quite so bad, flatters man's abilities and pampers his pride. Thirdly, the truth of God cannot hinder the progress of the gospel. Fourthly, 'it disgusts men of common understanding with Christianity.' To this I plead guilty; it does so, I admit.

" Mr. Barnes, under the sixth remark on the next charge, advances the same idea. 'And is there no danger that men will regard the system which proclaims it, as at variance with all their just conceptions of a righteous government, and religion as opposed to the common sense of the world?' In both these cases the language is certainly unguarded. Are we then bound to square God's truth 'to the common sense of the world?' Must religion be made palatable to the world, and modelled to suit the world's conception of a righteous government? Are we bound to dress up Christianity that she may not 'disgust men of common understanding?' 'Let a minister proclaim that his hearers are one with Adam, and then common sense will revolt at it.'

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for, having been taught the catechism orally, she always thought that *sinned-in-him* was one word.

So it will. 'The world, by wisdom, know not God;'—'common sense will revolt at it.' Yes, the common sense of the world will; but the common sense of the *great mass* of Presbyterians in this country, who have heard this doctrine all their lives, is not yet revolted at it. 'The infidel will smile.' Very well, let him smile. Tell him of a just God, a coming judgment, and an opening hell, and he will smile. Tell him of a bleeding Saviour, and an opening heaven, and he will smile. Preach the terrors of the Lord, and the mercies of redeeming love, 'and the infidel will smile.' What then? 'Is the offence of the cross ceased?' Ah! my brother, there are many other things, besides the doctrine of our sinning 'in Adam and falling with him in his first transgression,' which 'disgust men of common understanding with Christianity,' and make 'the infidel smile.'"—*Ibid.*, pp. 94, 95.

The seventh charge is, that Mr. Barnes denies, "that mankind are guilty, i. e. liable to punishment on account of Adam's sin." To substantiate this charge, he quotes some sensible remarks from the Commentary.

"Proof 1, page 123. 'There is no reason to believe that they are *condemned* to eternal death, or held to be guilty of his sin, without participation of their own, or without personal sin, any more than there is that they are approved by the work of Christ, or held to be personally deserving, without embracing his offer, and receiving him as a Saviour.'

"Proof 2, p. 127. 'The word is *in no instance* used to express the idea of *imputing that to one which belongs to another*. It here either means, that this was *by a constitution of divine appointment*, that they in fact became sinners, or simply declares, that they *were* so in fact. There is not the slightest intimation that it was by imputation. The whole scope of the argument is, moreover, against this; for the object of the Apostle is to show, not that they were charged with the sin of another, but that they were in fact *sinners* themselves. If it means that they were condemned for *his* act, without any concurrence of their own will, then the correspondent part will be true, that all are constituted righteous in the same way; and thus the doctrine of universal salvation will be inevitable. But as none are constituted righteous who do not voluntarily avail themselves of the provisions of mercy, so it follows, that those who are condemned, are not condemned for the sin of another without their own concurrence, nor unless they personally deserve it.

"'*Sinners.*—Transgressors; those who deserve to be punished. It does not mean those who are condemned for the sin of another, but those who are violators of the law of God. All who are condemned are *sinners*. They are not *innocent* persons condemned for the crime of another. Men may be involved in the *consequences* of the sins of others without being to blame. The consequences of the crimes of a murderer, a drunkard, a pirate, may pass over from them, and affect thousands, and whelm them in ruin. But this does not prove that they are blameworthy.'

"Proof 3, p. 128. 'Various attempts have been made to explain this. The most common has been, that Adam was the representative of the race; that he was a covenant head, and that his sin was *imputed* to his posterity, and that they were held liable to punishment for it as if they had committed it themselves. But to this there are great and insuperable objections. * * * (3.) It explains nothing. The difficulty still remains. It is certainly *as* difficult to see how, in a just administration, the sins of the guilty should be charged on the innocent, as to contemplate simply the universal fact, that the conduct of one man may involve his family in the consequences. (4.) It adds another difficulty to the subject. It not only *explains* nothing, removes no perplexity, but it compels us at once to ask the question, How can this be just? How can it be right to charge the sins of the guilty on those who had no participation in them? How could millions be responsible for the sins of one who acted long before they had an existence, and of whose act they had no consciousness, and in which they had no participation.'" — *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 96.

Further quotations will be unnecessary, to give our readers an idea of the points in controversy between the two disputants, and, indeed, of the questions which now divide the Old and the New-School men. We cannot, however, refrain from making one more quotation from Dr. Junkin's closing address, in order to show whom the Old-School men suppose they have to thank for the innovations of which they complain, and where they suppose it will all end.

"Ah, Mr. Moderator, if the children of Judah speak half in the language of Ashdod, it is because they have formed unholy alliances with those who are not friendly to the peace of Jerusalem. There is a substantial difference in the sentiment, or our brethren would not be so unreasonable and so *uncharitable*, as to turn the otherwise peaceful domain of our Zion into an arena of perpetual strife. Oh, no, they *feel* that their *innovations* are worth contending for, or they, as honest-hearted men, would not contend for them, at *such* fearful cost. Had not brother Barnes been allied in sentiment with the New England Ashdod, he would not speak their language. Had he not found out their riddle, he would not plough with their heifer. Yes, Sir, the difference is substantial, it is vital, it is fundamental. Every one of these charges has been proved true. The principal ones, Mr. Barnes expressly admits to be true." * * * * *

"Now, Mr. Moderator, I do honestly, and in the fear of God, and in love to brother Barnes, declare my belief, that this leads by a straight-forward, direct, and short road, to downright, desolating, damning Socinianism. If this system is true, then I'll be a Unitarian. I'll embrace the deistical system of the perfectibility of human nature, as the easiest mode of escape from all these perplexing theological controversies. This system presents such of its advocates as are gracious men, to my mind, like a boat and crew suspended by a cable, a mile and three-eighths in length, from the lower extremity of Grand Island. There they hang on the bellying surface of the mighty river, just over Niagara's roaring cataract and the yawning gulf below; — there they hang and row with all their might *down* stream, and are only prevented from the fearful ruin by the strength of the cable. This cable, Mr. Moderator, is the grace of God, but for which this mistaken crew would speedily make the fearful plunge into the horrible gulf of Socinianism. Now cut this cable, and where's the crew?" —*Ibid.*, pp. 140, 141.

On the above charges Mr. Barnes was tried in Philadelphia, before the Second Presbytery, of which he is a member, and *acquitted*, on the 10th of July, 1835. Dr. Junkin immediately appealed to the Synod, which met at York, in the spring of 1836. There the judgment was *reversed*, and it was ordered, "That the said Albert Barnes be, and he hereby is, suspended from the exercise of all the functions proper to the gospel ministry until he shall retract the errors hereby condemned, and give satisfactory evidence of repentance." This was passed by a vote of 142 to 16. It was now Mr. Barnes's turn to appeal, which he did to the third and highest ecclesiastical court, the General Assembly. At the late meeting of this body at Pittsburg, the appeal was sustained by a vote of 134 to 94, and Mr. Barnes was again acquitted, and restored to his flock by a very decided majority. Thus, on the principle of majorities and the creed-making system, what was true in Philadelphia became false at York, and true again at Pittsburg! After the acquittal of Mr. Barnes an attempt was made to condemn his book. But that likewise failed, so that New-Schoolism is Orthodoxy for this year.

It is now commonly reported that there will be a division of the church, and that the minority will secede. But this has its difficulties. Who shall retain the funds, and the institutions? The Old School say, "Those who adhere to the creed." But who adhere to the creed? The New School have decreed that *they* do.

It may now occur to some of our readers to ask, What is all this windy war of words about? What are the causes of all this stir in the camp of Orthodoxy? What is the precise amount of innovation which is thought to threaten the very existence of the Presbyterian Church? The causes may be stated in few words. They are the intellectual progress of the age, and an attempt on the part of the more enlightened to explain the Calvinistic system, in consistency with the laws of our mental and moral nature, and the plain dictates of common sense. This can never be done. The system itself, though a castle built in the air, is most admirably framed together. The acutest minds have been for ages compacting and fitting together its parts. Now take away a single particle, and it all tumbles in ruins. If an air-built structure can be said to have a corner-stone, that corner-stone is the doctrine of Original Sin. Take away this, and, though the building for a while may seem to stand fast, if you consider it more closely, you find it tottering to its fall. This is the doctrine which is now attacked in different forms, and hence the whole hive is in motion.

The cause of the present disturbance is, that the more intelligent and cultivated of the sect found it impossible, on the old Calvinistic ground of entire inability, inability of every kind, to sustain man's accountability. Nothing could be more self-evident, than that no man can be bound to do that which he is utterly and entirely unable to do. At this point, the New-School men take their departure; and in order to save the system, insert a new distinction, unknown to their fathers, between natural or physical, and moral ability. This would have been very well and very honest, had they come out, and confessed that they had innovated somewhat upon the old system. But what shall we say of the integrity and plain dealing of men, who pretend to hang their system on the Westminster Confession by a mere quibble on the word *will?* That instrument declares, that "Man, by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly *lost all ability of will* to any spiritual good." But these men now come forward and say, that this means not that he has not *power* to choose right, but has not the *will*, or the *disposition.* Man may do right if he *will*, but he *will not.* It is difficult to conceive the manner in which negation of power could be more strongly expressed; and not one unprejudiced reader perhaps in five hundred would take any other meaning from it. Yet by such wretched quibbling is the Confession made to speak the language of the New School, and thus the odious name of heresy is to be avoided. It was by a quibble of this kind that Dr. Beecher eluded the toils which were laid for him, by Dr. Wilson, at Cincinnati. "*All ability of will*" evidently was intended to mean all power of will, or power to will, and by no explanation or play upon words can it ever be made to signify no more than a want of disposition. This interpretation is borne out by the old and most received Calvinistic writers, who, almost to a man, compare our inability, in the state of nature, toward any thing good, to the inability of a dead man to return to life. This, then, is one of the innovations, which the New-School men have introduced, to obviate the unanswerable objection to the consistent Calvinistic system, that it destroys accountability. How far it succeeds, we shall examine in another place.

The next important point, in which Mr. Barnes has departed from the old Calvinistic system, is in his explanation of the manner in which the sin of Adam affects his offspring. The old Calvinistic idea was, that the effect of Adam's sin upon his posterity was twofold: that they sinned in him as their federal head and representative, and were liable to damnation and punishment before they had done any thing themselves either good or bad; and secondly, that their natures derived from him were so corrupted, so vitiated in every faculty of body and soul, as to be incapable of doing any thing good, or of making the least motion, or originating any train of action, which might lead to good. These are dogmas which the age will no longer bear, so plainly do they impeach the justice of God. The first of them Mr. Barnes positively denies. The second he admits in a modified form. "All that is established here," says he, commenting upon the passage, *For, as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous,*—"is the simple fact that Adam sinned, and this makes it certain that all his posterity will be sinners. This fact is one that is apparent, and that accords with all the analogy of the moral government of God. The drunkard commonly secures as a result, that his family will be reduced to beggary, want, and woe." This is certainly very sensible language, and a great improvement on the old system. Here it would seem, that the commentator acted up to the very laudable and Protestant purpose of pursuing the sense of

Scripture, "whether it led him within, or without the frame-work which may have been erected around the Bible;" but he must have forgotten for the moment that he was a Presbyterian. For no sooner does he find himself without the lines, and a mark for both friend and foe, than he makes all haste to retreat, or at least to extend the lines so as to cover his ground. No sooner is he arraigned for heresy, and accused of denying the imputation of Adam's sin, than he comes off with this most ingenious distinction. "My general reply to this charge is, that it is nowhere taught in the Confession of Faith, that 'the first sin of Adam' was 'imputed to his posterity,' or that his sin at all was imputed. The doctrine is there stated to be, 'THE GUILT of this sin was imputed.'" Now what are we to think of a system of religion, and of ecclesiastical discipline, which drives a man to such subterfuges as this? Guilt he defines to be "obligation to punishment," and goes back to the Saxon to substantiate his definition. But his special pleading will not do. Guilt in that Confession, especially when taken in connexion with the phrase "sinned in him," will never convey to plain, unsophisticated minds, any other idea than personal demerit. It is a happy thing, that no web-work of creeds has been invented fine enough to catch all heretics. From the intrinsic ambiguity of language, there immediately arises as much controversy about the meaning of this creed, as the meaning of the Scripture; and as it must ultimately be decided by a majority, that majority may as easily unmake a creed as make it. So the mind, after all, and the church too, can burst its fetters. In another point, as we conceive, Mr. Barnes has struck at the foundation of the Calvinistic system, in dropping the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and teaching that justification means simply pardon, or acquittal. The doctrine of imputation has been long given up by the Orthodox of New England. But this is not so important in itself, as the consequence to which it leads, — a more rational view of the atonement. Nothing has ever more marred and disfigured the Gospel, or more fatally neutralized its moral influence, than the doctrine of the dependence of future happiness on any thing else than our own conduct. If the doctrine of atonement must be held in any unscriptural form, it is better that it should reach no further than a provision for the pardon of sin. Nothing, except atheism, can be so pernicious to society, as the idea that a murderer on the gallows can, in one moment, be as well prepared for the bliss of Heaven, as an aged and blameless Christian.

It may further be inquired, What advantage hath the New-School man? What has Calvinism gained or lost, by its amalgamation with philosophy and science; or, in other words, by its admixture with some portion of truth? We answer, It has gained nothing but a little show of plausibility, and has lost its symmetry and consistency. Like negative quantities in algebra, or the inverted images of things in water, it has a sort of *quasi* existence, and preserves its own parts and proportions till it is disturbed by examination, or the introduction of something true and real, when it all vanishes into nothing. Or, like that grim abstraction, which Satan encountered at the gate of hell, though an airy nothing, it has some lineaments of form and feature.

> "What SEEMED his head
> The likeness of a kingly crown had on."

Some things are discarded, which were getting too monstrous in the light of this age, and some truths are acknowledged, which before have been denied or kept out of sight. But these truths make the remainder of the system appear more deformed than ever from contrast. These attempts to patch up the old system, remind us of the fate of all patching predicted in the parable. This new piece in the old garment agreeth not thereto, and the end will inevitably be, that the rent will be made worse. These innovations are not so important in themselves as they are for the results to which they lead, as the prelude of an entire revolution in the popular theology of the day.

It may be asked, if the new concession of natural ability, really removes the overwhelming objection to Calvinism, arising from its leaving man irresponsible for his actions. We answer, that, retaining the rest of the system, it amounts to nothing. And we doubt whether Orthodoxy was ever exhibited in a form of more glaring inconsistency, than in the sermon which first called down the wrath of the Presbyterian Church. It is true, he makes a grand flourish about human ability, and "its requiring less physical power to love God than to hate him." But on examination we find that it is *mere* flourish, mere rhetorical ornament, which means nothing, and is intended to mean nothing. Indeed, there seems to be much in the discourse, written, evidently, *ad captandum*, — a show of falling in with the popular objections to some of the most abhorrent parts of Calvinism; and there is much exaggerated statement in it, as inconsistent with good taste, as plain dealing. He retains the system in the main, but lifts up his hands against all those parts which men will no longer bear. He declares, that men have power to obey God and embrace the gospel; but it is a power which no man ever did, and no man ever will, exercise! He stands, then, before his people, and urges them to repent, and at the same time tells them; "As the cold and putrid carcasses of the dead do not of themselves seek life; as the turf would not move, nor the tomb-stones shake, nor the pale, mouldering people open their eyes, *of themselves*, if I were to go and preach to yonder graves, even so it is when I preach to sinners." Yet he went on, we suppose, and finished his discourse! He wishes to make man responsible for his rejection of salvation, but says, at the same time, that it is an essential part of his scheme "that *God*, not man, *begins* the work." "It remains then, that it is the work of God. In the distributions of these favors he acts by a rule that he has not made known to us." He wishes to get rid of the absurdities of Original Sin. But he says, "I have so deep a sense of the utter and total wickedness of the human heart, of its entire opposition by nature to all that is good, and of the corruption of all its best efforts, even when aided, that I involuntarily shrink from every scheme that seems to mingle in merit the pure work of the Holy Ghost, with the crude and abortive energies of my own bosom." Whence came that corruption; is it induced by man's own agency? No. It is a corruption of *nature*. Whence came that corruption of nature? From Adam, to be sure. And what is this but the old doctrine of original sin brought back again, in its most revolting form?

He says, "no man is compelled against his will to be saved. The work of salvation, and the work of damnation, are the two most solemn acts *of choosing* that mortal man performs." And in the next line, "*The Spirit of God acts upon the will.*" What miserable quibbling! So the sinner is not forced against his will, *because* God by his omnipotence *changes* the will itself! This is really too bad.

What next? He claims it as an act of justice, that he, and his, are never more to be slandered with the doctrine, that

"God made men on purpose to damn them." Yet he says, "What God *does* he *intends* to do. There is no chance,—no hap-hazard. What it is right for him to do, it is right for him to purpose to do. What he does in my salvation or yours, he always means to do. In him is no change, no *shadow* of turning. He has no new plan." This moral inability, universal and unvarying, drives him as necessarily into the doctrine of arbitrary election, as the old system of physical or natural inability; and accordingly, he does not scruple to avow it. "If, then, God renews the heart by his Holy Spirit; if he begins and carries forward the work in all that shall be saved, and holds the power of doing this over all men, and does *not* thus incline all to come to him, and it be asked, as well it may be, why he does not renew and save all,—we have only to say,"—mark the pertinency, the relevancy, and the satisfactoriness of the reason,—"that all do not *choose* to be saved, and *will* not come to him! If it be asked, why the Great Sovereign of worlds does not *constrain* them to come, and bring all to heaven, I answer, my powers of reason here fail."

Still he says, "The rejection of the Gospel is to be traced to some cause, where man will be to blame, not God. It is impossible for the pure Gospel to have any fellowship with a scheme, which, in any sense, charges God with wrong. The fact that the Gospel is rejected, is then to be traced to the obstinacy of men; to a decided, deliberate purpose *not* to be saved in this way." If it were not that the same folly has been rung over and over again by greater men than Mr. Barnes, we should have been astonished to find on the same page, nay, immediately following, as a reason why men refuse the Gospel, and which exonerates God altogether in the transaction, "All men are supposed, by *nature*, to be insensible to the need of salvation by another. They are held to be so much opposed to God, that they *will* not submit to him. They are charged with being so much in love with sin, that neither commands nor threatenings, neither love nor vengeance, neither the offer of heaven nor the prospect of hell, will induce them to forsake it." And all this is said to be by NATURE! The question then recurs, Who makes men, God or the devil; or did Adam; or do they make themselves? Now we take God to be the Creator of men, of each individual as much as of Adam. No man is responsible for his *nature*, for this plain reason, that he had no hand in making it what it is. He is responsible for the use of it, and just in proportion to the viciousness of man's nature, is his responsibility for its right exercise diminished. If this viciousness amount to "total and utter depravity in all its parts and affections," particularly the will, then this defect of nature amounts to total disqualification for moral action, and moral inability becomes complete natural, physical inability, and a distinction is made where there is no difference. If in the unregenerate the will never acts right, in a single instance, then we have no evidence of its power to do so, and all possible evidence of the contrary. This appears moreover from the fact, as he states, that the first right exercise of this power is in consequence of the operation of the Holy Spirit. It appears, then, that the assertion of moral power previous to conversion, is made merely to get rid of the objection of man's irresponsibility, and not because it is consistent with the rest of the system. On this rock must all the New-School men split, who attempt to make up a compound system of theology out of the contradictory elements of Calvinism and Pelagianism. Either of them is logically inconsistent, but they can never amalgamate. One of them is inconsistent with the Divine attributes, and the moral phenomena of human nature, the other is inconsistent with both.

We might go on to notice other incongruities in the theology of Mr. Barnes; such as his maintaining that justification is simply pardon, and passing over the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness in profound silence; and then turning round when he wishes to show the Orthodox side of his face, and talking about being saved "through the merits of Christ." But we forbear. We have already exceeded the reasonable limits of a review.

In concluding, we say, that there is abundant reason for congratulation to all the friends of truth and liberty, in the rise, the progress, and termination of this controversy in the Presbyterian Church. It shows that the age is not standing still. The mind is bursting its fetters, and vindicating its birthright. That it should arrive at once at truth was not to be expected. It is enough to know that it is in progress towards it.

It is a curious fact, that the same discussion is going on, simultaneously, among the Orthodox sects in England, entirely unconnected with that in America, with similar results. A reprint of a work by a Mr. Hinton, shows that the whole subject of Divine and human agency, in the work of salvation, is there undergoing a thorough examination, and, to apply our phraseology, a New School is forming on principles similar to those advanced and maintained in this country.

One good symptom in the present movement towards more rational views of religion is, that the *people* are with it. This has been indicated in many ways. It appears, we think, in the very discourse which led to all this disturbance. It bears on the face of it, though delivered in the midst of a revival, the marks of compromise and concession, a willingness to sacrifice some of the most obnoxious points of an obnoxious system to the reason of his hearers, for the sake of being allowed to retain the rest. Then again, the spirited manner in which his congregation rose as one man to defend him, and express their willingness to cut themselves loose from the Presbytery rather than give him up. We read the popular character of this movement, likewise, in the title which Dr. Junkin prefixes to his book, as given at the head of this article. A prosecutor must feel a very strong current setting against him and his cause, before he entitles his attack, a *Vindication.* We conclude, therefore, as we began, by saying, that the cause of Liberal Christianity has received a powerful impulse from the late doings in the Presbyterian Church, and that the end is not yet.

G. W. B.

ART. V. — 1. *Geschichtliche und statistische Nachrichten über die Universitäten im preussischen Staate.* Von WILHELM DIETERICI, Königl. Geh. Ober-Regierungs Rathe, &c. Berlin. 1836. 8vo. pp. 188.

2. *Index Lectionum, quæ Auspiciis Regis Augustissimi Frederici Guilelmi Tertii in Universitate litteraria Frederica Guilelma per Semestre Hibernum a.* MDCCCXXXV-MDCCCXXXVI, *à die* XIX *Octobris, instituentur.* Berolini. 4to. pp. 30.

THERE is not a prouder nation on the face of the earth than the Prussian. We Americans are proud of our enterprise, of our commerce, of our free institutions, of liberty of thought and action, of our common schools, of our academies, colleges, universities, and above all and most justly, of the general intelligence and correct habits of thinking and acting among the people. We are eminently a practical nation. What is useful, what is serviceable to the individual and society, are with us the great questions. But these questions relate to immediate application, to the existing state of society and manners. Unquestionably there are men among us, who look beyond the spirit of the times, who rise above the demands of the age; — men who investigate principles, — who ask not so much what is popular, what is directly practicable, — as what is universally and permanently true and useful, what is suitable to man's nature, what must now and always promote well-being and happiness. Yet this is not our national character. A young and ardent nation, we direct all our energies, and concentrate all our affections upon the immediate interests and occupations of the present times and our own society. The best thinkers among us are educated more by the circumstances of their condition, by the direct influences and spirit of the community around them, than by their own reflections, and by study of the temper, character, and opinions of other people and past generations. Our schools, colleges, and universities are all planned and conducted with a direct and sole view to immediate effect. The kind and amount of instruction given, or intended to be given; the habits of thinking and acting formed and strengthened by them, are precisely those, and those only, which we apprehend to be necessary or useful for our probable or certain situations and duties in life. We are educated to live, and to live in our own narrow spheres, and within the compass of a contracted worldly existence, instead of living to be educated in all our capacities, and for the free, harmonious, continual developement of all our powers and affections. We are prepared for enterprise and action in the spirit and temper of the times; but are not peculiarly qualified to watch over, reflect upon, and correct, modify or conciliate, the spirit and tendencies that exist. We are educated to act with the age, but not upon it; to answer the demands actually made upon us, but not to create a new character in the people, — not to give a higher tone or different direction to the pursuits, inquiries, and affections of the community. We are educated, we say, to meet the demands actually made upon us, but not to tell what those demands should be; — not to supply real, though perhaps as yet unfelt, defects.

Our professions, — what are they? Practical, eminently practical. Our young men study their professions to practise them. It is to meet and satisfy the wants of the professions, that our young men enter upon and are trained up in the professions. It is action, practice, direct influence in society, and upon society, which constitutes the great single aim and object of professional study. No man among us thinks of devoting himself to a profession for the sake of the profession itself. It is not a science which he cultivates, which he seeks to improve, ennoble, and perfect. He does not apply himself to it, as the sole great end. He does not search into its methods, principles, and truths, with the enthusiasm of a devotee, whose being is bound up in love of his profession, as a study and science, worthy of the warmest interest and entire energies of the man. And of course the consequence is, that with us neither Law, nor Theology, nor Medicine can boast of thorough scholars. Each one of these professions numbers eminent men, men equal, possibly superior, to men of other ages and nations, in particular branches or departments of their professions; but where can we find one man, or many men among us, who understand their professions thoroughly in all their branches, or who have done much towards raising, or perfecting them as sciences. If there be such, they have done what they have done in opposition to the spirit of our country, and despite the lack of encouragement and assistance, which they ought to have received. The greater therefore their merit; the greater be their praise. We, as a nation, are practical; not scientific, not learned, not philosophical. What we want is, some men who shall devote themselves earnestly and exclusively to the several professions as sciences, who shall labor continually and eagerly to improve, ennoble, perfect them. Men enough there are to practise them, as now understood and taught among us; but let us have some men, to apply to them their full free energies, as sciences, capable of being more severely studied, more thoroughly understood, more correctly taught and practised.

Let us have some men to teach our teachers, to reëxamine, again and again, our conclusions, our principles, and doctrines, with the entire, exclusive devotedness of their whole lives.

This is the want which Germany has felt, and which Germany has done more than any other nation to meet and satisfy.

In every civilized community, there are men who are led by a natural bias of their minds, to a quiet, contemplative life, in preference to the enterprise of business, and the duties and anxieties of a profession. They are men of studious habits. They avoid the theatre of public action, and more or less exclude themselves from the sympathies of social existence, and in doing this, they follow the peculiar bent of their minds. Nature made them for a recluse life; she inspired them with love of retirement, meditation, study, reflection. Disgust drives them back from the world whenever they enter it, until at last a secluded, contemplative, studious life becomes settled habit and character. Yet these men need sympathy, the sympathy of congenial minds. They welcome encouragement, impulse, counsel, and assistance, in their favorite pursuits. And a University is, or should be, the assembling-place and chosen residence of these kindred spirits; — a place where they may meet to instruct, encourage, excite, and sympathize with one another, where they may kindle and feed a pure flame, where they may meditate, and commune, upon the highest good, — religion, morality, and science, — where they may discourse largely, and with common interest, and common benefit, upon their dearest pursuits, strengthen, inform, animate, and ennoble individual minds, and their own little circle. Our universities should meet and satisfy the wants of this class. They are and ought to be, designed chiefly to serve the public interests; but not singly, nor alone directly. They ought also to satisfy the wants, to elevate the character, to inform the mind, to cheer, encourage, and enlarge the heart of the individual.

Our universities are preparatory schools for the practice of the professions. Few men are educated in them who are not designed for some one of the professions, and no man stays in them, or by them, after he has got his profession. Is learning, then, and science, to be a mere instrument and tool, to be used only, and not to be enjoyed, and in some measure rested in, as a satisfying good? And are knowledge, information, discipline, which our universities give, or might give, necessary and useful to professional men only? Are not our engineers, our astronomers, our navigators, our mechanics, and our merchants in need of knowledge and mental discipline? And where can these so fully, so appropriately be imparted, as in and by our universities?

Besides, a university, to be what its name implies, must embrace all sciences, make provision for all inquiries, researches, speculations, that can interest the mind, — that tend directly or indirectly to benefit the individual and society. How many subjects are there in morals, history, languages; how many in philosophy, science, literature, that lie out of the department of common study, which yet are matters of most curious and useful investigation, and which also are of the utmost consequence in their last results and general bearings on other subjects of immediate interest and common pursuit. Still they require, in order to be successfully studied, an apparatus of rare and costly books, a series of instructive and learned lectures, which individual means cannot furnish, and which, therefore, the university, as a promoter of learning and science, is in a measure bound to supply. It is not alone the instant and pressing demands of the times which a university should satisfy. It is not alone the popularity of different branches of learning, or of particular departments in philosophy, which should determine what professorships should be founded. It is not the number of students alone that should fix the number and courses of lectures, the kind and sum of instruction, given in our universities; but equal regard, in our opinion, ought to be paid to the difficulty, importance, and recondite nature of the subjects investigated.

We have now hinted at defects in our best universities, and from a brief statement of facts it will appear, that these are the very wants, which the highest literary institutions of Germany aim especially to supply.

The University at Berlin, to which the details here given will be confined, was founded by order of cabinet given at Königsberg in Prussia, August 16th, 1809. Of the six universities in the kingdom of Prussia this was the last, save Bonn, in its origin, and has already surpassed the others in popularity and patronage, and in the extent of its means and advantages. It is in the centre of a royal city of more than two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, remarkable for their intelligence and pacific habits. The students do not occupy college buildings, but are dispersed over the whole town, living generally at the rate, including all expenses, of 300 thalers, or about 210 dollars of our money, *per annum*. The palace of Prince

Henry, brother of Frederic the Great, is now converted into the university-hall, and is adequate to the present wants of this vast institution. In Prussia, the government has, to a greater or less extent, taken on itself the support and care of elementary schools, seminaries, gymnasia, universities, and academies. The expenses of the elementary and district schools are borne in common by the government and by those who enjoy their privileges; but this is much less the case in regard to universities. The latter are far more dependent on the state in external and internal relations, and are endowed and mainly supported by the state. Professors and Teachers of every class are appointed by the state, and the former receive from the state their principal incomes. The University at Berlin now obtains from the public treasury 97,244 thalers, or about 68,070 Spanish dollars. Inclusive of fees, &c., her income and disbursements are set down at 99,846 thalers, or about 69,891 dollars.

Connected with this University for purposes of instruction, there were, in 1834, 149 teachers in all departments. In the Theological Faculty, 5 ordinary professors, 2 extraordinary professors, 8 private teachers. In the Law Faculty, 8 ordinary professors, 1 extraordinary professor, 3 private teachers. In the Medical Faculty, 16 ordinary professors, 10 extraordinary professors, 14 private teachers. Philosophical Faculty, 22 ordinary professors, 30 extraordinary professors, 23 private teachers. The philosophical department embraces all those studies proper to a university, which do not fall within the peculiar province of the other three. Philology, practical and speculative philosophy, civil and political history, geography, æsthetics, natural history, mythology, chemistry, astronomy, economy, mathematics, and many other subjects belong to this Faculty.

The average number of students in all the departments during the six semesters, from 1832 to 1834, was 1777. Of these, 1297 were natives; 480 foreigners. They were divided as follows: in Theology, 561; Law, 588; Medicine, 352; Philosophy, 275. In this account all those who hear Lectures, without being matriculated as regular students of the University, are not reckoned.

From the above statement it appears there are 149 teachers to 1777 students, or 1 teacher to about 12 students.

By dividing the University disbursements, 99,846 thalers, by the number of students, 1777, we obtain 56 thalers 5 groschen, or about 31 dollars, as the expense which each student costs the University.

Among the 149 teachers, only 74 received salaries. 65,550 thalers remain, after deducting the other expenses of the University, to be apportioned among these, which gives, on an average, 585 thalers 24 groschen, or about 620 dollars, to each teacher. The largest salary of professors is 2500 thalers, or about 1750 dollars; the smallest 100 thalers, or about 70 dollars. Ordinary professors average 1203 thalers, or about 842 dollars. Extraordinary professors 368 thalers, or about 233 dollars.

To this, however, are to be added certain perquisites growing out of matriculation, promotion, and similar fees, which vary every year. The whole amount according to the latest estimate was 14,401 thalers; of which 5,815 were divided among 15 professors, 5,727 were given to the University Rector and the deans of the several Faculties, 1080 went into the treasury, and the rest was paid to servitors. Three professors enjoy, moreover, other emoluments in their capacity of directors of particular University Institutes, which are estimated for each at 300 thalers.

The *Honorare*, or private lecture fees, paid by students, amounted, on an average during six semesters, to 45,450 thalers 10 groschen, yearly, to be divided, on an average, among 82 teachers. Accordingly, on an average, each would obtain 554 thalers 8 groschen. The highest *Honorar* in one semester, that is, the largest sum paid for the lectures of one man, was 1840 thalers, the lowest 5 thalers. On an average, in each semester, 3 teachers obtained from this source over 1200 thalers; 1 teacher, between 1000 and 1200; 3 teachers, between 800 and 1000; 5, between 600 and 800; 5, between 400 and 600; 13, between 200 and 400; 14, between 100 and 200; 41, between 50 and 100; and 24, under 50.

Instruction is given in the Prussian universities by lectures. Recitations are not practised. The Professor is the proper student. He comes before his audience with the fruits of long, patient, arduous research; and the words which he utters, in slow, distinct delivery, are caught up, and written out in full, by constant and devoted listeners.

Lectures are public and private. Public lectures are required only of Professors; and are understood to constitute that course of instruction for which they receive their regular salaries. Other teachers deliver public courses, but from choice, and without any other compensation than the reputation which they acquire by them. For admission to a private course the usual fee is a *Frederic d'or*, or about 4 dollars. In general, Professors read two or three courses in a semester, and each lecture occupies three quarters of an hour. The number of hearers varies with the popularity of the lecturer, and the importance and interest of his subjects. The most popular men, such as Dr. Neander in Theology, and Von Savigny in Law, usually attract 300 hearers. Of the students it may be observed, that they are remarkably constant and punctual in their attendance, although it is almost wholly voluntary, and unusually quiet, attentive listeners. Some among them contrive to hear six or eight lectures every day. The notes which they take are copious and accurate. In some cases, the books which we get from Germany, purporting to be the lectures of eminent Professors, are abstracts taken by students in the lecture rooms; and sometimes, but not always, revised and corrected by the Professors themselves.

The public courses do not fall much short of the private in interest and importance; for by them especially reputation is won and kept. The young lecturer knows, that it is his public course which will give him a name, and crowd the hall for his private lectures; and the veteran Professor does not willingly sink in respect and esteem, when a little more care and effort might prevent it.

The Berlin University numbers illustrious names among its teachers and Professors. Fichte, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Hegel, have laid their honors at her feet. Of these De Wette alone still survives, and toils industriously at Basle to heighten the glory that already crowns his days. The exile, though a bold innovator, is allowed on all sides to be one of the best critics and ablest writers in Germany. His works are but little obscured by the mysticism common to his countrymen, exhibiting much of the English pith, nerve, compactness, and point. Schleiermacher breathed life into the dry bones of Orthodoxy, gave a spiritual tendency to the character of his age, unnerved the paralyzing arm of Rationalism, and put vital power and a living soul into the dead theology of his times and country. Fichte, and, more than all, Hegel, were princes of metaphysics in the North of Germany, and deserve to be known and studied among us, if not for their own worth, at least for the power, influence, and dominion, which, though departed, they are still exercising over the character and speculations of the age.

But of living professors a word. The juridical department is graced by the names of Gans and Von Savigny. As a jurist the latter is preëminent at home and abroad; and the former is equally popular; less learned, indeed, but more graceful, fluent, and energetic, — obnoxious to government for his political principles, but formidable enough to be feared and conciliated. In the Medical Faculty, are the names of Hufeland, Rust, Busch, and Von Graefe. In the philosophical department, are Bopp, the Sanscrit scholar; Von Raumer, the historian, the author of "England in 1835," which has been translated by Miss Austin; Gabler, author of "*Propädeutik der Philosophie,*" and successor of Hegel; Bekker, editor of Greek and Latin classics; Zumpt, the grammarian; Ritter, the geographer; Lachmann, editor of a recension of the Greek Testament, now accounted in Germany the best; and Boeckh, the prince of philologists, and perfect master of Greek metres. In theology, is Hengstenberg, author of "Christology of the Old Testament." He is of the straitest sect of the self-styled Orthodox School, the editor of the *Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung*. He is a young man and diligent student, and at home has the reputation of being a well-read, yet not a sound and accurate scholar. His private lectures, are not attended by more than from 30 to 40 hearers. During the winter semester, 1835-6, he delivered a public course on our Saviour's passion, and two private courses on the exegesis of Matthew, and the interpretation of the Psalms. Marheineke is reputed the deepest thinker. He is a disciple of Hegel. All his lectures are imbued with the spirit, and obscured by the technics, of this newest philosophy. As an author, his reputation stands unrivalled in his department. His works are "*Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft,*" "*Christliche Symbolik,*" and "*Reformations Geschichte.*" He lectured, last winter, on Dogmatics and Practical Theology. Twesten is accounted the supernaturalist representative, as De Wette is the rationalist representative, of the Schleiermacher school. His "*Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik,*" is a fair exhibition of the spirit, taste, and scholarship of the man. He lectured publicly on the Hermeneutics of the New Testament; privately on Dogmatics, and on the interpretation of St. Paul's smaller epistles. He had above 200 hearers. He is a decided favorite. In his lectures he is clear, sometimes original, always instructive and spirited. Strauss is an eloquent preacher; more popular in the pulpit than in the lecture room. His two courses were on Practical Theology, and the Liturgy. Dr. Neander is the great man. He lectured on the Life of Jesus, on Christian Ethics, and on Church History. He belongs to no party, and forms none. He is independent, discriminating, impartial; an unwearied student, and not more honored as a Professor, than esteemed as a man. He always has from 300 to 400 hearers. No man has more of the confidence of the government, no man is more admired and beloved by the students.

In the theological department, there are Professors of every shade of opinion and sentiment from the most rigid Orthodoxy to ultra-Rationalism. In the philosophical department, there are Professors of every school. The views of all parties have their advocates, and are set forth and defended with perfect freedom. The same subjects are often discussed in the same semester by Professors of different schools; and students have the opportunity of hearing opposite systems stated, illustrated, defended, by the ablest men. Many, therefore, and great are the advantages which attend the study of theology, philosophy, or any controverted subject, at a university like this. The evils of narrow-mindedness, ignorance, bigotry, are lessened or corrected. Where there are many lecturers and a liberal spirit, students hear the best arguments on all sides; learn to know and respect different parties, as well as understand and defend their own. They come in daily intercourse with able men of an opposite faith; they get acquainted, in process of time, with the plausibleness of their reasonings, the honesty of their belief, the virtuous devotedness of their lives, and suggestions of bigotry and uncharitableness vanish. When from their earliest years they have been pursuing their inquiries side by side, when they have in company examined different schemes, and come at last to different conclusions, they still continue to esteem and respect each other; and difference of opinion rarely degenerates into bitter controversy, and personal bickerings. More thorough knowledge, and a kinder spirit prevail, when opportunity is afforded and improved, of studying all systems, and making acquaintance with people of every sect and party.

From what has now been said, it appears, that German universities are not so much places of mental and moral discipline, as schools of instruction. They are not so well calculated to form habits of independent and accurate thinking, as to inform the mind, and store it with useful knowledge. They are not institutions of education, but of science and learning. They presuppose riper years, and greater acquirements, than our colleges and universities require. The students who frequent them are older. It is rare to find any under eighteen or twenty: many have passed their thirtieth year; and, sometimes, even grey hairs and tottering steps attend these halls of learning, with the ardor and enthusiasm of youth.

American universities furnish instruction and literary advantages for the several professions, in more or less liberal measure: German universities, on the other hand, do not limit their supplies to the wants of the professions. Every man can there obtain instruction on almost every subject that can interest the human mind, or fit him for any office or station in life. Students are not classed as in our colleges, and required to pursue one set of studies, simultaneously; but each one selects and multiplies his lectures at pleasure. The active mind is not kept back, nor the unprepared one tasked beyond its power. It is common, to spend two years at one University, and a third, and, perhaps, a fourth, at another. Students congregate here from all parts of Germany; and also from Russia, France, Italy, England, and America. Prussia, therefore, may well be proud of her universities.

We think, with Professor Dieterici, that respect for sound learning, such as the universities are capable of affording, pervades the nation, and has the public opinion of all classes in its favor. Elevated claims to thorough knowledge, an ardent desire to be numbered among the educated, extends to all circles of society. The more deeply and generally a sentiment of this kind penetrates every rank, so much the more surely does it elevate the character of the whole people, and make subordinate situations preparatory schools for the university. On the principle of a general connexion between the university and all inferior institutions; on the principle of regular progress from partial knowledge to thorough education, rest the acknowledged claims of Prussia, in respect of science and learning. Half knowledge leads to error. It is there, only, where highest esteem is shown for the most complete education, where the university goes hand in hand with the general direction and tendency of the whole people, where it coöperates, successfully, with all other institutions, that its good effects are manifested in all departments of society, and its influence felt, down to the lowest elementary schools. It is not professional men, alone, who visit the universities: military officers, mechanics, men of station in society, are seen in their halls. Incalculable gain for society, when knowledge, and the high-minded morality which usually accompanies it, are spread abroad among a people. And if it be true, that light comes from above; that, through well-ordered universities, whose teachers are eminent for learning and moral worth, general improvement and civilization extend to all classes; if it be true, that schools and academies are raised by the influence of these institutions, to a higher rank, and brought into a better condition; then, surely, it is a great glory,—an unspeakable praise for any nation, to have done as much as Prussia has, for the increase and support of her universities.

But it is objected, that the intellectual powers of a nation do not admit of being measured or reckoned. Certainly not. There is no weight or measure of knowledge and intellect. Yet much may be reckoned. We may tell how many study, how many have been studying, how many teach, how many have taught, and what the state is doing, and has done, for teachers and the taught. But what is gained? As to the real condition and prospects of science, nothing is found out when it is ascertained that many are attending to it, unless they attend to it in the right way, and from the right motive; unless they fetch out solid gold from the depths of the soul. The actual condition of science and intellectual life cannot be given in numbers. Because the expense is great, it by no means follows that much is done; because much is done, it by no means follows, but that much more might have been done, and, perhaps, ought to have been done, in the present state of science. From the fact, that many study, it does not follow that pure love of study moves them; but it does follow, that many are in the way of education; that the want of knowledge and mental discipline is felt to be one of the greatest wants, one of the most urgent necessities of the nation and age; it does follow, that what can be done, is done to supply this want, and to create, diffuse, and deepen intellectual life and energy.

H. A. W.

Art. VI. — *The Rationale of Religious Enquiry; or the Question stated of Reason, the Bible, and the Church.* In Six Lectures. By James Martineau. London, 1836. 12mo. pp. 256.

It is remarked, in the Preface to these Lectures, that "there are systems of Christianity in abundance, as, before the time of Bacon, there were systems of natural science; but the Organon of theology yet remains to be written." A distinction is here pointed out, the neglect of which explains, in some measure, the present degraded state of theological science in England, compared with other departments of intellectual research and discovery. While physical science, political economy, the theories of government and social institutions, the application of the useful arts to the purposes of life, and the higher branches of literature, have been cultivated with singular industry and success, it has been the fate of that master science, which the author of the "*Novum Organum*" designates as "sacred and inspired theology, the sabbath and port of men's wanderings and labors," to languish in utter neglect, or to be left in the hands of religious artisans, who had neither the taste to perceive its richness and beauty, nor the skill to further its progress. It seems to have been taken for granted, that this was a sphere of thought, on which no new light could fall, which was absolved from the great law of advancement that binds all other human affairs. The idea of infusing any fresh life into its aged veins has been deemed chimerical; so that theology alone, in the midst of scientific progress, nay, of revolution, retains the withered form and rigid features of the past. It is not true, indeed, that there has been any period of English history, in which religion has failed to excite a lively interest. It has been incorporated with the most valuable institutions of our mother country; it has pervaded, in some form or other, her laws, her social habits, her domestic feelings, her language, and her literature; it has found upon her soil, that is so fruitful in all the noblest products of humanity, many of the most glorious specimens of character which it seeks to call forth; and, after all that is said of the decay of piety in modern times, we believe that it maintains a strong hold in the true, substantial English heart, from which it will not easily be dislodged.

Still, upon looking at the condition of theology in England, merely in its relation to the present state of science, in the civilized world, we must note a striking and lamentable deficiency. Theology, in that country, has not been elevated to the same plane, which is now occupied by the other branches of liberal study; and the consequence is, that it presents few attractions to the most scientific minds; and the spirit of philosophical investigation, which is becoming more and more the order of the day, is almost exclusively turned in a different direction. There is a great deal written on theological subjects, but scarcely any thing with the precision and depth of true science. Even the reforms which have been attempted, are rather the spontaneous protest of reason against absurdity, than a profound discrimination between error and truth. They have consisted, principally, in setting aside some traditional dogmas, which, regarded in a literal point of view, were too preposterous for reception, but without laying open the central source from which such errors proceeded. There has been no thorough discussion of the philosophy of human nature, in reference to religion, of the ultimate criterion of truth, of the history, position, and value of the Scriptures, as the records of revelation; and hence, with all the systems which have been presented, there is no one that has commanded universal assent, or, we might almost say, that has been considered a fit subject for philosophical examination. We are not aware of a single effective endeavour to advance theology to the rank of a free, intellectual pursuit; to bring it into harmony with the progress of scientific culture, and thus to secure it a permanent place in the unity of speculation. It remains, in fact, for all scientific purposes, nearly in the condition that it was in when the wisdom of Cranmer was embodied in the articles of the church, and a code of doctrinal theories established in a form, as cold, as lifeless, as petrified, as any that ever darkened the worst days of Catholic predominance.

It was supposed that the science of theology sprang at once into perfection from the heads of the Reformers; and every attempt to modify its character, was regarded as an offence, and almost as a blasphemy. In this way, it has been left encrusted with ancient errors, while the work of purification has been going on in every other department of inquiry and thought. Astronomy has been separated from astrology, chemistry from the search after the philosopher's stone, medicine from the incantations of magic; but between theology and mythology, a sharp line of distinction yet remains to be drawn. It is a problem, which we who speak the English tongue have hardly looked in the face; but one which we must be prepared to meet, before the claims of science and religion can be reconciled, — before "an open and solemn marriage between faith and reason can be celebrated." The time has come when a revision of theology is demanded, as the commencement of a reform; when no solemn mutterings can present a charm to keep away the hand of bold research; when the veil must be wholly lifted up from the face of the statue, before which men have so long bowed in darkness and dread, and a clear, piercing light be admitted into the temple of our faith and the mysteries of our worship. Systems of divinity we have, indeed, had in abundance; but how unworthy of the name! Where can we find one which has not failed in the very thing that science demands as essential to a system, — a rigid method and a comprehensive unity? The science of Divinity, regarded in its true light, is the noblest that the mind can be conversant with, for it is the science of the Divine, of the Infinite, of God in Nature, in History, in Humanity, in the Heart of Man. It should be filled with the dewy freshness of the morning, it should breathe an atmosphere of unclouded light, it should move with the freedom and grace of conscious inspiration, and gather around itself all that is attractive, beautiful, and glorious, in the whole compass of creation.

But what are our prevailing systems of theology? What claim do they present, as now organized, upon the attention of the philosopher or the lover of nature? It is hard to imagine a study more dry, more repulsive, more perplexing, and more totally unsatisfactory to a scientific mind, than theology, as it is presented in the works of by far the greater part of English writers on the subject.

It is no wonder that the heart is pulverized, that the freshness of life is exhausted, under their influence. It is no wonder, that the most vigorous efforts of sacred eloquence have been made by those, who have avoided, as much as possible, the hard abstractions of our technical systems; who have studied divinity in communion with their own nature and with the universe or who have not studied it at all. We respond, with living sympathy, to the earnest voice that comes to us from beyond the sea, calling for a new organ of theology, and presenting us a specimen of its scientific culture. We long to see the educated mind of England awaking to the importance of this subject, seeking for an instrument wherewith this vast and holy science may be raised to its becoming rank among other intellectual pursuits, redeemed from the petty subtleties which have planted thorns around it, and brought out of bondage and darkness into the stately light of day.

It is a great merit of the work before us, that it distinctly asserts the necessity of a fundamental reform in English theology, before controversy can cease to resemble a contest in the dark or a philosophical exposition be given to the primary truths of religion. The author confines himself to a single question connected with the evidences of Christianity, — but that one which involves many topics of great moment, — and if he does not contribute any original discoveries in aid of the reform which he has at heart, it is but justice to him to say, that this is not the design of the present volume. "The popular form," he remarks, "required for public delivery, precluded any very systematic or philosophical treatment of the subject: and if one or two just logical principles, corrective of common and mischievous fallacies, are brought out with tolerable clearness, all the service to truth, of which the writer and his plan are capable, will be accomplished." This attempt is entirely successful; and, though we are inclined to controvert some of Mr. Martineau's positions, in the spirit of frank discussion which pervades his book, we must acknowledge the uncommon pleasure we have taken in its perusal, and the admiration we feel for the independence, manliness, and wisdom, with which it is written.

The inquiry in which Mr. Martineau engages, has for its purpose, to settle the method of investigating the character of Christianity, and to estimate the value of the materials, from which a judgment on the subject may be formed. The first Lecture opens with a graphic description of Palestine at the time of our Saviour's appearance. The principal events of his life are then summed up in a brief sketch of exquisite beauty.

"In a hamlet of this country, sequestered among the hills which enclose the Galilean lake, a peasant, eighteen centuries ago, began to fill up the intervals of worldly occupation with works of mercy and efforts of public instruction. Neglected by his own villagers of Nazareth, he took up his residence in the neighbouring town of Capernaum; and there, escaped from the prejudices of his first home, and left to the natural influence of his own character, he found friends, hearers, followers. He mixed in their societies, he worshipped in their synagogues, he visited their homes, he grew familiar with their neighbourhood, he taught on the hill side, he watched their traffic on the beach, and joined in their excursions on the lake. He clothed himself in their affections, and they admitted him to their sorrows, and his presence consecrated their joys. Their Hebrew feelings became human when he was near; and their rude nationality of worship rose towards the filial devotion of a rational and responsible mind. Nor was it altogether a familiar and equal, though a profoundly confiding sympathy, which he awakened. For power more than human followed his steps; and in many a home there dwelt living memorials of his miracles: and among his most grateful disciples there were those, who remembered the bitterness of the leper's exile, or shuddered at the yet unforgotten horrors of madness. That the awe of Deity which was kindled by his acts, and the love of goodness which was excited by his life, might not be confined to one spot of his country, twelve associates were first drawn closely around him to observe and learn, and then dispersed to repeat his miracles, report, and teach. They were with him when the recurring festivals summoned him, in common with his fellow citizens, to leave awhile Capernaum for Jerusalem. They beheld how his dignity rose, when his sphere of action was thus enlarged, and the interest of his position deepened; — when the rustic audience was replaced by the crowd of the metropolis, and village cavillers gave way to priests and rulers, and the handful of neighbours in the provincial synagogue was exchanged for the strange and gaudy multitudes that thronged the vast temple at the hour of prayer. In one of these expeditions, the fears of the established authorities, and the disappointment of a once favoring multitude, whose ambition he had refused to gratify, combined to crush him. It was soon done; the Passover at Jerusalem was its assizes too: the betrayal and the trial over, the execution was part of the annual celebration, a spectacle that furnished an hour's excitement to the populace. But there were eyes that looked on with no careless or savage gaze; — of one who knew what he was in childhood; — of many that had seen his recent life in Galilee. The twelve too lingered closely around the event; and *they* say, that he came back from death, spake to them oft for forty days, and was carried before their view beyond the precincts of this earth." — pp. 3 - 6.

Mr. Martineau then asks, What was the mission assigned by Providence to these events? The answer to this question will furnish us with the true idea of Christianity. But how are we to engage in the investigation? What are our materials, and what must be our method? Our problem is, to determine what was the intent of Christ's coming; our preliminary question is, What are our instruments for its solution, and what kind and degree of value must be set on each? The instruments with which we are supplied, are, 1. the books of the New Testament. 2. The traditions of the Catholic Church. 3. The creeds of Protestantism. 4. The decisions of Reason, in the province of natural religion and in the history of civilization.

The first question, concerning the best method of solving the problem, What is Christianity? relates to the books of the New Testament. Let us take them up, as if for the first time, with no knowledge about them, but that they are the genuine productions of the age of Christ, and of disciples who had won by bonds and death a title to be believed. We should perceive, at once, that the New Testament is a composite work, with no other than a purely nominal unity, of which different churches possessed different portions, and which was not entirely completed within a century, at least, from the first introduction of Christianity. We should find in it a description of the two successive periods in the original developement of Christianity, namely, the personal biography of Christ, and the first planting of the Church. Our final conclusion would be, that the book was a casual association of faithful records, the production of the fresh and earnest time of Christianity, born in the midst of its conflicts, and impressed with the energy of its youth.

We should perceive, moreover, that every thing in this book bore the stamp of reality. No one but a Hebrew of that age, could so conduct us through the country, as it then was, any more than a German could be our guide through Rome. The truth of the narratives is confirmed by the very discrepancies which they exhibit. Amidst them all, one impression is fixed upon the mind with perfect unity. A single image of Christ is reflected from each in unclouded brightness and purity. This is the solitary universality amid all the traces of time and place; the single line of moral unity which runs through the varieties of the Christian records. We accordingly conclude, that the books of the New Testament, as compositions, are perfectly human, though recording superhuman events; and that the facts which they relate are entitled to credence, on the authority of good and competent men, who reported from their own memory, reasoned from their own intellect, and received impressions modified by their own imagination. This belief is evidently all that is necessary to constitute a disciple of Christ.

Mr. Martineau then discusses the theory which has been received of the plenary inspiration of the New Testament writings. As this has generally been represented, it involves the supposition that the ideas of their authors were infallibly correct and the natural causes of error altogether excluded. But two things are at once obvious with regard to this theory; first, that it must be proved; and secondly, that its proof must be attended with great difficulty. The only adequate proof, according to Mr. Martineau, would be an audible voice, clearly supernatural, heard by a sufficient number of witnesses, and announcing a person to be infallible. If, however, the inspiration be not universal, extending to every conception of the mind, and precluding every form of error, the department to which it is restricted must be specified. This proof, Mr. Martineau argues, does not exist in the case of the Apostles. No such voice fell upon them. Such a voice did fall on Christ, and authenticated, not his universal inspiration, but the perfection of his moral character. "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased," were the words heard at his baptism and his transfiguration, and they indicate the one infallible point, on which his divine mission is sustained.

The second Lecture, on "Catholic Infallibility," commences with a masterly though brief delineation of the historical relations of the Roman Catholic Church.

> "No instructed man can deny, that the Roman Catholic Church presents one of the most solemn and majestic spectacles in history. The very arguments which are employed against its rites, remind us of the mighty part which it has played on the theatre of the world. For when we say, that the ceremonies of its worship, the decorations of its altars, and the evolutions of its priests are conceived in the spirit of Heathenism, — how can we forget, that it was once the witness of ancient Paganism, the victor of its decrepit superstitions, the rival, yet imitator of its mythology? When we ask the use of the lights that burn during the mass, how can we fail to think of the secret worship of the early Christians, assembled at dead of night in some vault beyond the eye of observation? When we wonder at the pantomimic character of its services, its long passages of gesticulation, are we not carried back to the time, when the quick ear of the informer and persecutor lurked

near, and devotion, finding words an unsafe vehicle of thought, invented the symbolical language which could be read only by the initiated eye? Long and far was this church the sole vehicle of Christianity, that bare it on over the storms of ages, and sheltered it amid the clash of nations. It evangelized the philosophy of the East, and gave some sobriety to its wild and voluptuous dreams. It received into its bosom the savage conquerors of the North, and nursed them successively out of utter barbarism. It stood by the desert fountain, from which all modern history flows, and dropped into it the sweetening branch of Christian truth and peace. It presided at the birth of art, and liberally gave its traditions into the young hands of Color and Design. Traces of its labors, and of its versatile power over the human mind, are scattered throughout the globe. It has consecrated the memory of the lost cities of Africa, and given to Carthage a Christian, as well as a classic, renown. If in Italy and Spain, it has dictated the decrees of tyranny, the mountains of Switzerland have heard its vespers mingling with the cry of liberty, and its requiem sung over patriot graves. The convulsions of Asiatic history have failed to overthrow it; on the heights of Lebanon, on the plains of Armenia, in the provinces of China, either in the seclusion of the convent, or the stir of population, the names of Jesus and of Mary still ascend. It is not difficult to understand the enthusiasm which this ancient and picturesque religion kindles in its disciples. To the poor peasant, who knows no other dignity, it must be a proud thing, to feel himself the member of a vast community, that spreads from Andes to the Indus; that has bid defiance to the vicissitudes of fifteen centuries, and adorned itself with the genius and virtues of them all; that beheld the transition from ancient to modern civilization, and forms itself the connecting link between the old world in Europe and the new; the missionary of the nations, the associate of history, the patron of art, the vanquisher of the sword." — pp. 34 - 37.

The Lecture then examines the claims of the Catholic Church to any peculiar and infallible sources of information, by which we may be put in possession of the Apostolic ideas. These claims are founded on Scripture and tradition, neither of which, as Mr. Martineau clearly shows, affords them any legitimate support.

The subject of "Protestant Infallibility" is discussed in the third Lecture. We cannot refrain from quoting the following fine description of the uses of the Bible.

"That was a noble fight which was fought by Luther and his printing-press, when they rescued the Bible from the grasp of priests, and turned it from the charter of an incorporated tyranny, into the patent of universal freedom. If the most solemn era of the world's history was that in which Christ himself walked its fields in Palestine, and refreshed its weary heart with the living spectacle of heavenly virtues, and entered death that he might illustrate life, and, as he ascended, bequeathed to all generations the dignity and responsibility of an immortal hope; the next in interest is the period, when the *true record* of those things was brought again beneath the eye of men, and to the ear of thought the voice of Christ was made to speak once more, and the image of his mind was sent round the homes of the people, and went about, like himself, doing good. If that book is to fulfill its appointed function, as the sinner's conscience and the mourner's friend, and the oppressor's foe, it must be accessible to all men, in all stations of life and moods of mind; — not dealt out only in the place of pulpits, and spoiled by the voice of preachers, and selected by the will of priests; but abandoned, whole and entire, warning and promise, history, parable, miracle and prophecy, to the reason and the heart of all whom it may concern. The inquirer must have it, whenever the anxiety of doubt, or the spirit of speculation, urges him to its page; and he can borrow from it the solution of some perplexity, or shed on it the illumination of fresh thought. The sorrowing must have it, whenever the waywardness of grief may make it welcome, and to the touched heart there may be gentleness in its voice of comfort, and a brilliancy in its scenery of hope, that may make them sacred to the memory for ever. The proud must have it, that, when no eye is on him but that of God, he may hear the withering words with which Christ could blight the Pharisee, and witness how mean is every distinction, compared with that moral dignity, which could raise the outcast from the dust, and seek the friendship of the publican, and praise the virtues of the Samaritan. The penitent must have it, that, at the happy moment, the eye of Christ may look into his heart, and bid it sin no more; and when the first effort is tempted to relax, his spirit of untiring duty may put weariness to flight; and, when the self-gratulation of victory creeps in, the immense ambition of future progress may absorb the silly vanity of present attainment. The tyrant must have it, — he that tramples on happiness and life for his own vile greatness, and hews a way of guilt and woe to an eminence of praise and hate; — that he may learn of a tribunal above, which frowns while it forbears, and waits only till the last drop of his brother's blood shall have cried to it from the ground. The slave, too, must have it, — to tell him the incredible story of his origin and his end, — to whisper to him (if he can but believe so strange a thought to be a truth and not a mockery) the equal responsibility of all men; to persuade him that the end is not yet, nor this earth an image of the skies; that while here he is degraded, abandoned to an animal nature, sometimes pampered, and sometimes tortured, left without duties because without rights, he goes in the great multitude of bond and free to that world, where he will discover what he is worth in the creation of God, feel the mighty stirrings of a moral nature within him, and find in verity, that of one blood, of one law, of one destiny, has God made all nations." — pp. 67-70.

So far then as the Reformation contributed to the wider diffusion of the Scriptures, Mr. Martineau observes that it should be regarded with gratitude by all times. But, he continues, there is much delusion in the fashionable panegyrics on the Reformation. In order to produce its beneficent effects, the Bible must come in direct and living contact with the minds of men. There must be no meddling with its genuine and simple impressions. Yet of this freedom we are without experience to this day. The Reformers emancipated the Bible from Catholic theology, but it was only to enslave it to their own. With all their boasting, not a book exists of which Protestants are so much afraid as the Bible. Hence, they take care to keep it surrounded with a whole atmosphere of commentary, invisible in itself, but coloring every thing. The evil consequences of this procedure are exhibited by Mr. Martineau with a masculine strength of logic, which seems to us to leave nothing further to be said. He concludes, that the pretensions both of Catholic and of Protestant infallibility are alike untenable and absurd, and that we are forced to seek some higher standard of truth, before we can obtain a satisfactory solution of our problem.

The fourth Lecture is entitled "Rationalism." It maintains that the Gospel encourages the unreserved application of our understandings to its records, and their various contents of history, miracle, and doctrine. In the interpretation of the Scriptures, it is the office of the understanding to abandon itself freely to the impression which they produce.

"That the impression may have the greatest chance of being correct, two conditions are needful; that the mind be charged with ancient knowledge, and emptied of modern theories. We must become penetrated with the sentiments of the age of Christ; feel the impatient expectation of those who were looking for the consolation of Israel; burn with hope at every new rumor of the Deliverer, and despond again as the rumor dies away. We must go forth to labor in the fields of Galilee, and overhear the peasants' talk of the new prophet of Nazareth; — how some are elated by the thought, that their despised district had perhaps given birth to the Messiah, while others plead against this meek claimant the splendor of the royal race of Judah; and provincial vanity gives way to national ambition. We must tremble with the superstition, that turned madness into an incarnate fiend, and treated the diseases of this upper world as stray terrors escaped from the invisible abyss. We must mingle with the caravan of pilgrims to the holy city, that winds its way from the heights above Capernaum, and bears through the plains below, and to Jerusalem, the first tidings of the deeds of Christ. The localities, the passions, the controversies, the forms of social life in that city of priests, must be familiar to us as household memories. The ravine of Kedron, and the Mount of Olivet, must be like an evening walk, and the shady rills of Siloam, like a noon-day rest: the 'Beautiful Gate' must be too familiar to dazzle us with its golden reflexion of the dawn: the levelled rock of Moriah our feet must daily climb, and pace the cloister of Solomon in frequent meditation; and before our eyes the cloud of the morning-offering must curl and kindle in the sun, and the veil of the temple wave, as if from a breath within the Holy of Holies. We must share the party feelings of the times; and listen to Jesus with eagerness to learn, whether he favors the intellectual conceit of the Sadducee, or the sanctimonious ambition of the Pharisee; and see them both retire abashed from his prompt dignity, or crouch before the rending invective by which he tare open the 'whited sepulchres.' With Paul flying in rage from Jerusalem, and arriving humbled and blind at Damascus, and for three days beholding nothing but the vision that had struck him to the earth,—his conflict of emotions must become ours. Watching him at his work as a tent-maker at Corinth, or hearing him in the school-room at Ephesus, or restraining him from rushing into the theatre in that city of Diana, that he might confront the craftsmen of superstition assembled there;—wrecked with him on the rocks of Malta, or in audience before the Emperor at Rome;—we must adopt his experience, encounter his dangers, study with him the varieties of character and the attitudes of society, and lose the sympathies of the present in the vivid creations of the past." —pp. 107-110.

But the more important question remains, How are we to treat the original ideas of the sacred authors, after we have ascertained them by a fair process of interpretation? Mr. Martineau replies to this, that they must be judged of by their intrinsic evidence and merits. If we should discover what appears to us absurd, in the writings of a man, whose inspiration we admit, we cannot receive the absurdity because it is an inspiration, but on the contrary, must discard the inspiration because it is an absurdity. No apparent inspiration whatever can establish any thing contrary to reason, but reason is the ultimate appeal, the supreme tribunal to the test of which even Scripture must be brought. These positions are defended by Mr. Martineau in a different train of thought, but one leading to a similar result with that set forth by President Marsh, in his admirable Preliminary Essay to Coleridge's "Aids to Reflection."

The fifth Lecture is on the "Relation of Natural Religion to Christianity." The universality of the religious sentiment in man is exhibited by Mr. Martineau in a series of striking illustrations, which lead us to the conclusion, that revealed religion comprises the ideas of God derived from the miraculous events recorded in the Bible, while natural religion includes the ideas of God derived from every other quarter. These two great branches of religious instruction are by no means opposed to each other; a perfect harmony unites them in their direction and their results, and revealed religion so far from interdicting the study of natural, invites to it. This intimate connexion has been often forgotten: philosophers, although in many cases imbued with a love for Christianity, have been especially attached to natural religion; while divines, for the most part, have cherished an exclusive interest in the Gospel. The extravagance of which certain theologians have been guilty, in undervaluing the importance of natural religion, is pointed out by Mr. Martineau in one of the best portions of this Lecture. It closes with the following allusion to the manifestations of God in nature, history, and humanity.

"While I admit, and indeed earnestly maintain, that to Christianity we are indebted for the knowledge at an early period, and the diffusion by the power of its authority through myriads of minds, otherwise unreclaimed, of all the other great principles of religion; — though the blessed faith in a universal providence, would not, I believe, have descended from the inaccessible heights of a few philosophical minds, had not Christ told us of Him that paints the lilies of the field, and watches the sparrow as it falls; — though the inspiring anticipation of immortality would not have penetrated the heart of society, and illumined the recesses of misery, and nerved the arm of virtue, had not Christ achieved the triumph of the tomb; still, acknowledging the Gospel to be the *record*, the register of sacred truths, I cannot forget that creation is the scene of their exhibition, the residence of the reality. God's name is in the Bible; his presence is in the world. Inspiration *speaks* of his power; creation exemplifies it. Sacred men declare his wisdom; a more sacred universe displays it. In the delicate organisms of the animal world, whose variety outnumbers our computation; in the earth, which is prepared for their habitation, — its parts are no less various than they; in the relations which unite their instincts with its changes of light and darkness, and heat and cold; in that most wonderful model of sentient being, perceiving, reflecting, feeling, and prospective man; in the process by which he passes from the animal into the reasoning creature, from the selfish to the affectionate, from the mechanical to the responsible, from the earthly almost to the divine; in the knowledge which enraptures his intellect, and the ties which capture his affections, and the hopes which cheer his griefs; does that goodness of God *act*, of which Prophets and Apostles speak. And in the history of nations, in their birth from barbaric elements, but tendencies to progressive civilization; in the successive encroachments of arts on arms, and reason on force, and the welfare of the many on the interests of the few; in the mighty agencies by which tyranny is made to quail, and superstition beaten back in its triumph, and ignorance driven from its throne; in the raising up of gifted individual minds, and the adaptation of their genius and their characters to the wants of their generation; in the creation of a Luther to shake the sleep of corruption by the thunder of his voice; of a Washington, endowed with the imperturbable patience, and disinterested wisdom, needful to baffle the will and disappoint the arts of practised oppressors, and generate by the force of pertinacity the liberty of a new world; of a Scott or a Wordsworth, commissioned to refresh a people's heart with the sympathies of the past and the humanities of the present, and soothe the impatience for things yet to be, by drawing forth the beauty of what has been and what is, and thus breathe the spirit of reverence over the spirit of improvement; we behold the real and living operation of that Providence, of which Christ was the proclaimer and the impersonation. And in the quenchless capacities of human nature, in the aspiring of its understanding, in the peace of virtue, in the terrors of sin that cannot stand the calm gaze of God, we see the predictions which life gives of immortality, the signatures which our Creator has impressed on our constitution, of his glorious intentions, and our eternal progress." — pp. 160 - 163.

The last Lecture discusses the "Influence of Christianity on Morality and Civilization." This topic is more in accordance with the genius of the author, if we may venture to express the opinion, than those which had been previously considered. He treats it with the hand of a master, and in the course of his argument, presents some specimens of eloquent prose composition which it would be difficult to match in any theological writings of the present day.

From the new elements which Christianity has introduced into the world, Mr. Martineau observes that we may learn what is the errand on which it is sent, and the influences which it is its essential function to exert. It is no easy task, however, to determine what our religion has really effected in the world. The influence of other causes is so closely blended with Christianity, that it requires no small sagacity to decide, what are its peculiar and genuine fruits. This can be done only in one way. We must apply the tests of permanence and universality. The notions and practices that have prevailed only in one age or country must be rejected as accidental, belonging not to Christianity, but to the minds that received it.

"But those great universal peculiarities of thought and action which have either been constant companions of its spread, travelling with it from land to land, bursting forth alike in barbarism and in civilization, denizens of the East and of the West, common to the free and the enthralled, — or have never long been absent from its presence, as if incapable of separation, and waiting ever to obey its voice of recall; — these sentiments, if we can find such, may be fixed upon as the staple wealth of Christianity, — the central and indestructible ideas which God sent it forth to preach to the common heart of humanity. Conceive then the several pupils of Christianity, however various, to be collected into one spot; let a vast assembly be formed, with a representative from every school, every period, and every clime; let the voluptuous Asiatic come, whom the Gospel turned from luxury of the senses to luxury of soul, and who mused on the Invisible beneath the dreamy starlight of his native plains: let the degenerate Roman come, whose sterner qualities were kindled again by the power of the new faith, whose departed patriotism it inspired again with the love of a better country, and whose heroism it revived in the form of martyrdom; let the Northern chieftain come, in whom the peaceful Gospel is tinged with blood from his own passions, — who tramples on nations in the name of Christ, and in the wilderness he makes, uplifts his savage hands in prayer, and thinks his Christian veneration adequately proved, if, when he overwhelms the temple, he spares the church, and protects the Christian pastor, while he murders the Pagan priest: let the pilgrim come, who seeks relief from the burden of his sin in the toil of travel, and the out-break of local veneration at the sepulchre of the crucified: let the feudal baron come, whose piety appeared chiefly in devout bequests: the indolent anchorite of Egypt, with the stirring reformer of Germany: the gay Cistercian with the stern Puritan: — let all appear in one motley multitude to tell their story, and exhibit their type, of the Gospel; and when all are severally disrobed of their peculiar costume of mind, whatever common features of character and colors of sentiment remain still visible in all, must be pronounced essentially characteristic of Christianity." — pp. 168 - 170.

Of these universal sentiments, which Christianity has deeply imbedded in the human heart, Mr. Martineau confines his attention to two, namely, that of the natural equality of men, and that of the importance of speculative truth to the great mass of mankind. By the former phrase, he means, "not the metaphysical doctrine (which is false) that all men are born with the same intellectual and moral aptitudes; nor the economical doctrine (which is equally false) that all men should possess an equal amount of property; nor the political doctrine (which can rarely be true) that all men should be invested with the same civil privileges; but the religious doctrine that all are of one blood, children of one Father, protected by one providence, and, consciously or unconsciously, appointed to one life eternal." This sentiment has been expressed in the struggles of the injured for their own deliverance, in the spirit of universal philanthropy which characterizes the history of modern times, and in the internal morality of churches. By the sentiment of the importance of speculative truth to the great mass of men, Christianity has created the virtue of honest speech, and commenced the education of the multitudes.

We close our imperfect analysis of the contents of this volume with the following passage which closes the last Lecture.

"Who can cast his eye over the nations which profess, and those which reject the Gospel, without beholding in it the benignest of earthly agencies, and the divinest of Heaven's gifts? Who can compare the East which it has deserted, with the West which it pervades, — the uniform decrepitude of society in the one, with its various moral life in the other, the triumph of violence and superstition there with the gradual spread of knowledge and just government here, without recognising in it an influence preservative of the health, and conducive to the progress of the general mind? Whether or not its extension throughout the foremost communities of our world be the chief cause of their advancement, whether it be the germ or the fruit of their civilization, there is still an undeniable affinity between its spirit and the noblest tendencies of the human race. What religion ever produced so little misery in its corruptions, and so lofty a virtue by its native power.

It has presided, like a creative energy, over the moral world, and constructed new types of character, and new forms of genius, and new visions of ideal good. Science, poetry, and art have given it the homage of their mingled voices; the sorrowful, the anxious, and the happy have kneeled together at its shrine: the peasant has felt its nobility, and the sage rejoiced in its illumination: and if its name has sometimes spread a shield over the persecutor, in its spirit the persecuted have found the consolation of inward dignity, and the strength of quenchless will.

"Faith of our fathers! in the strength of whose virtue they toiled, and in the peace of whose promises they suffered; in whose hope they fell asleep in Jesus, and with whose providence they now dwell for evermore! Faith of bards and philosophers, of prophets, and martyrs, of the best friends of humanity, and foes of misery and wrong! Faith of Milton and of Howard, which inspired the muse of the one to breathe the strains of piety and liberty at once, and armed the spirit of the other to brave disease, and pierce the prison gloom, that no child of guilt might be without his solace! Faith of the people! whose generosity priests have been unable to extinguish, and with whose tendencies to freedom tyrants have grappled in vain! Not yet are all thy triumphs won; — not till the last and lowest victims of poverty, and ignorance, and sin have been redeemed, and raised to the consciousness of intelligence and the sense of immortality! In meek majesty hast thou been borne over the high places of our world, like thy great author on the Mount of Olives. Descend yet deeper into the vales, where human suffering hides itself and weeps. Still behold the city of our dwelling through tears and pity, and make us worthy to join in the exulting cry, Hosannah! to the son of David! Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord!" — pp. 189 - 192.

The copious extracts which we have given from this volume will enable our readers to form some conception of the important vein of thought which it opens, while they indicate our own sense of the ability and skill with which Mr. Martineau exhibits the fruits of his labors. A higher praise than this, however, should be awarded to him as an author, for the singular freedom and frankness with which he advances his opinions and pursues them to their legitimate consequences. No one can peruse his book without feeling that he is brought into fraternal communion with a sincere and earnest mind. Every page bears the marks of an honest love of truth, a hearty attachment to her for the sake of her own exceeding beauty and intrinsic worth. He writes like a man who cherishes an unquenchable faith in the exalted destiny of humanity, and who cannot fear that it will ever be injured by the boldest exercise of its divine powers. This is united with a faith of equal vigor in the authority of religion, its spontaneous growth in the nature of man, and the illustration and support which it has received from extraordinary revelations of the Infinite Mind. Hence, he recognises the great necessity of our times, — that of making a just, philosophical discrimination, between what is absolute and spiritual in religion and that which rests merely upon the outward and precarious letter. The direction which his inquiries have taken in this volume, can hardly be commended too much, and we hope that the assurance of respect and sympathy which ought not to be withheld from his labors, will encourage him to pursue it to its ultimate issues.

We are unwilling to finish this article without noticing one or two topics on which we differ from Mr. Martineau, and which demand a more complete and scientific discussion, than they have hitherto received, before the foundation can be laid for the progressive developement of English theology. Of course, we cannot intend within the limits of a review to engage in the discussion, of which we have here pointed out the necessity. We are compelled to restrict ourselves to a narrow space, and prefer to present the remarks which we may have to make, rather in the form of independent suggestions than of direct controversy with the author of this work.

In the first Lecture, as we have seen, Mr. Martineau discusses the subject of inspiration with reference to the sacred writers, and arrives at the conclusion, that we are not authorized to regard them as inspired teachers, or claiming any higher office than that of faithful and competent witnesses of what they had seen and heard. The natural effects of the mission to which they were called and the position which they occupied, are sufficient, he maintains, to explain their religious convictions and character, without the supposition of an extraordinary divine influence. But in the whole course of his remarks, Mr. Martineau appears to assume a particular theory of inspiration as covering the entire ground of debate, without attempting to examine the general question on broad and philosophical principles. He controverts this theory, which represents the writers of the New Testament as passive instruments under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and accordingly, exempt from the possibility of error, in a strain of vigorous reasoning, and in our opinion with complete success.

But if we have proved that the sacred writers did not possess absolute infallibility, we have by no means proved, at the same time, that they are not entitled to the claim of divine inspiration. It is one thing to demonstrate that an Apostle may fall into errors of opinion and practice, and quite a different thing to show that he was destitute of more than human sources of wisdom and light. These two points, however, are often confounded with each other. It is taken for granted, and that previously to any accurate and scientific examination of the theory of inspiration, that the claim to a supernatural divine influence involves the supposition of absolute freedom from error. This has been the mode of proceeding with the authors of the most plausible attacks upon the truth of the Christian revelation. It has been their policy to dwell upon the inconsistencies and mistakes of the sacred writers, to expose the imperfections both of their characters and arguments, to detect the prejudices of the times and the infirmities of human nature, that are exhibited upon their pages; and hence, to present the conclusion, that as their boasted infallibility is a delusion, their pretensions to divine inspiration are a deception or imposture. This mode of reasoning has had the effect to disturb the faith of many an honest lover of truth. He has always heard it reiterated, that the slightest shade cast upon the infallibility of the sacred writers, darkens all the evidences which they can present of the enjoyment of inspiration. But he perceives that many objections can be alleged against the former, and he cannot but infer that there is too much obscurity and doubt with regard to the latter. His difficulties are increased by the usual mode in which this subject is handled by theologians. He is assured by them, that inspiration and infallibility go together, and that he cannot discard the one without losing the other.

With these convictions, we cannot go along with Mr. Martineau in his denial of inspiration to the writers of the New Testament. We think that there is a wide chasm between his premises, that they were not infallible, and his conclusion, that they were not inspired.

It is essential to the success of the argument in this case to establish two points; first, that the idea of inspiration necessarily involves the collateral idea of infallibility; and secondly, that the Apostles cannot substantiate a valid title to this attribute. The latter point is discussed by Mr. Martineau, and as we have said, is clearly sustained; the former does not appear to have attracted his attention.

It is not sufficient to say, that the argument is directed merely against the popular idea of inspiration. In the present state of theological opinion, it is no easy matter to pronounce what is the popular idea on this or any kindred subject of inquiry. We know, that signal revolutions have taken place in many religious theories which were once firmly seated in the very heart of Christendom; we live, from day to day, amid the falling ruins of "thrones and principalities and powers," in our high places of theology; and who is authorized to assert, that in overthrowing a specific view of any doctrine, which has had the sanction of ages, he has destroyed the prevailing popular opinion with regard to it; or much more, that he has annihilated the massive foundations of the doctrine itself? It seems to us more consonant with the spirit of genuine science, after we have detected the unsoundness of a received theory, to establish a better one in its place, than to deny the facts upon which the discarded notions were sustained. It were better to admit the law of gravitation as illustrated by Newton, after rejecting the vortices of Descartes, than to call in question the motions of the heavenly orbs.

We have no dispute with the reasonings which go to demonstrate that the writers of the New Testament lay no claim to universal infallibility. On the contrary, it excites our amazement, whenever we reflect upon it, that a conception so widely at variance with the letter of the Scriptures, with the obvious characteristics of the human mind, and, we are inclined to add, with a just and discriminating analysis of the demands of religion, should ever have gained such an extensive prevalence, not only in formal systems of theology, but, to a great degree, in the habitual modes of religious thought.

But in denying the truth of this conception, we are far from according a slow or reluctant faith to the essential idea of divine inspiration. We believe that this was imparted, in a greater or less degree, according to the capacities of their nature, and the exigencies of their times, to the prophets and lawgivers of the ancient dispensation; that it was enjoyed, without measure, in entire and absolute completeness, by the only Being who could ever declare, without limitation or reserve, "I and my Father are one;" and that the divine gift continued to be vouchsafed to the disciples of Christ, in proportion to the needs of their mission, and the susceptibility of their souls.

It is clear, we think, from the current phraseology of the Bible that its writers were accustomed to regard every uncommon endowment as the immediate gift of God. This conception was carried to so great an extent, that even the products of extraordinary mechanical skill were considered as the fruits of the inspiration of God. The cunning of the artificer, the valor of the warrior, the genius of the poet, the power of the musician, the eloquence of the orator, as well as the wisdom of the sage, and the authority of the prophet, were all traced to a heavenly origin. The ground on which this conception rested, appears to have been the consciousness that such gifts were not the effects of the human will, but could proceed only from the Infinite Fountain of Good. Of course, a signal degree of illumination with regard to moral and religious truth was always referred to the agency of the Divine Spirit. Hence, the first teachers of Christianity, who found themselves in possession of light which was not kindled by their own efforts; whose eyes were opened to a clear perception of spiritual truth, such as they had never dreamed of before; whose hearts were charged and bursting with the flood of new and unutterable emotions which came pouring through them from the full fountain of Christ, naturally referred their condition to the influences of the promised Spirit. They could not but believe that the light which fell upon them was not from earth but from Heaven. They felt conscious of an extraordinary inspiration and they declared this inspiration to be from God.

We do not find that they claimed to be exempt from all error, in virtue of this divine gift. They stood upon the common level of humanity while the light from above was streaming into their souls. They were under the influence of a new and powerful agency; but they did not, therefore, cease to be men. A revelation of divine truth had been made to their minds; their understandings were opened to recognise its glory and loveliness, their hearts leaped to embrace it; but they were not, therefore, placed, at once, in possession of universal truth, endowed with an immunity from error, and lifted out of the reach of all the noxious influences of their education and their times. A heavenly treasure had been imparted to them, but it was a treasure in earthen vessels. We do injustice to the Apostles and vitiate their legitimate claims, when we maintain either that they were all vessels of silver and gold, or that no divine treasure had been confided to their keeping.

We believe, then, in opposition to Mr. Martineau, that the mental state of the Apostles involved, among other elements, that of divine inspiration. They professed to have received, not the gift of infallibility but an extraordinary illumination from on high. This claim, we think, is substantiated by all that we know of their character and history.

We will briefly indicate the process by which we arrive at this conclusion. The first step in the proof of supernatural inspiration is the admission of natural inspiration. The foundation for this is laid in the primitive elements of our being. The power of the soul, by which it gains the intuitive perception of spiritual truth, is the original inspiration that forms the common endowment of human nature. This, we maintain, is established by the testimony of the absolute and intuitive reason in man. Our own consciousness assures us that a revelation of great spiritual truths is made to the soul. There are certain primitive and fundamental ideas which compose the substance of reason, that exist, with more or less distinctness, in every intelligent mind. These ideas are the intuitive perceptions on which all moral and religious truth is founded, just as the whole science of mathematics is built up on a few simple definitions and axioms, which neither require, nor are susceptible of demonstration. These ideas, by the necessity of our nature, we refer to an origin out of ourselves. They are not created by us but they command us. They are not the products of our own will but should be its sovereigns. They are not limited to our own personality but bear the signatures of universal and everlasting authority. Now psychology and the history of man alike compel us to trace back their origin to God. We are conscious that they do not proceed from any act of volition, the personal causality which acts within us, nor from the influence of nature, the material causality which acts without us; and we are, therefore, compelled, by the authority of our reason, to refer them to the Absolute Causality,—the Infinite Author of Truth and Good. Hence they are not human but divine. They do not grow out of any deductions of our understandings but are the fruits of a spontaneous and original inspiration, without which, the understanding would have no materials to work upon.

The revelations of this natural inspiration are the absolute ideas of reason, which lay claim to necessary and universal validity. The primary truths which are independent of experience and demonstration, the perception of the Just, the Holy, the Perfect, the Infinite, upon which all religious faith is founded, proceed from this source.

Now when these ideas are developed, in any mind, so as to create a predominant conviction of the reality of spiritual truth, we say of that mind, by way of emphasis and distinction, that it is inspired. And just in the proportion in which the supremacy of these ideas transcends the ordinary, the natural effects of culture and reflection, we pronounce them supernatural. We say of the mind, in which the essential ideas of religious truth exist in signal perfection, independent of human agency, that it is supernaturally inspired. This, we believe, can be asserted of our Saviour, without any limitation. His soul was a sea of light. All that was human in the Son of the Virgin, all that belonged to his personality as a Jewish teacher, all that marks the secondary, derived, and fallible in the nature of man, as distinguished from the primitive, the oririginal, the infallible, the divine, was swallowed up, and, as it were, annihilated, in the fulness of the Spirit which dwelt in him, in those kingly ideas of Truth and Good, which sustain the authority of the Eternal Throne, and authenticated the man of Nazareth, as the Son of God, the visible tabernacle of the Word, which was made flesh, and dwelt among us.

Far below the incarnate wisdom of God, but far above the prevailing wisdom of their own day, the Apostles, whose writings have come down to us as indications of their character, exhibit the image of their Master, and lead us to the conclusion, that they were favored with an inspiration, similar in kind, though less in degree, to that which filled and animated his soul. Their characters are the problem to be solved. We find the most satisfactory solution in the supposition, that the Comforter, even the Spirit of Truth, which Christ promised, was actually present with them ; and this presence of the Comforter was, at once, the source of their inspiration, and the key to their characters. In other words, the spontaneous inspiration of the soul, by which we obtain all immediate and original perception of truth and good, and which is the direct agency of God upon intelligences kindred to his own, was vouchsafed to them in a high degree of perfection, and which, being above and beyond the ordinary experience of nature, may justly be called supernatural.

With regard to the criterion of such an inspiration, it can be no other than its agreement with the primitive and universal dictates of the absolute reason in man. In this way and in no other, can it be distinguished from the fancies of enthusiasm, or the reveries of superstition. Every thing which claims to be of an immediate divine origin in history, must be brought to the test of that which is admitted to be of immediate divine origin in the facts of consciousness. The natural inspiration which is possessed by all must sit in judgment on the supernatural inspiration which is imparted to an elect few. As a common degree of poetical genius is qualified to decide upon the merits of the great masters of song, so the divine sense of truth which is the property of the race, must pass sentence on the claim of its prophets and teachers to supernatural endowments. The light of the soul is of a kindred nature with the light of the spiritual sun which irradiates the universe of thought; and it enables man to recognise between the reflections of the primal luminary and the meteors, which, of impure and earthly origin, often flash over the gloom of night. We submit to the observer of his own nature, whether this be not a more convincing proof of the reality of inspiration, than any testimony of an external character. We submit to the author of these Lectures, whether our perfect veneration for the character of Christ, the solemn awe which possesses our inmost being when we contemplate his divine moral attributes, and the chastened exultation which thrills through our souls when we remember that such excellence and glory once dwelt in a tabernacle of flesh, could be increased by the sounding of that voice which was uttered on the banks of Jordan and the mount of Transfiguration? Would it not be as difficult, to say the least, to convince ourselves of the supernatural character of such a voice, as of the perfect moral beauty of our Saviour's character? Is not the correspondence of that with our most exalted ideas of divine perfection a better demonstration that he was of God and from God, than if we heard it thundered forth from the flames of Sinai, or saw it written by an angel's hand on the noon-day sky?

We are led by similar considerations with those which we have here suggested, to take a different view of the position and relative value of miracles, in a system of divine revelation, from that advanced by our author. It is rather a singular combination of opinions, to deny the inspiration of the sacred writers, and to defend the miracles which they record as the essential foundation of the Christian faith. He attaches so great importance to these outward signs, as to make a belief in them the exclusive ground of a title to the name of Christian. In our opinion, this criterion depends upon an erroneous view of the connexion between Christianity and the miracles which accompanied its introduction into the world.

We think no one will hesitate to admit, that miracles do not compose the essence of Christian revelation, but were intended to facilitate its reception and establish its authority; that the revelation is not for the sake of the miracles, but the miracles for the sake of the revelation. Our Saviour explicitly declared, that he came into the world to bear witness to the truth, not to exercise a marvellous power over the agencies of physical nature; and he more than intimates, that they who cherished the love of truth in pure hearts, would hear his voice and acknowledge his sovereignty, without reference to wonders and prodigies addressed to the outward eye. Hence we infer, that whoever believes the truth which it was the mission of Christ to announce, is entitled to the name of a disciple, whatever be the foundation on which he has been led to rest his faith. Christianity, as we understand it, is a revelation of spiritual life and truth, an exhibition of the grand moral laws of the universe, a developement of the relation between the Finite and the Infinite, between Humanity and Providence, the Soul of Man and the Primal Spirit; and whoever accepts this revelation as it was announced by Jesus Christ, may claim to be a Christian, for reasons which human decisions can do little to invalidate. If I believe in Jesus Christ as the visible manifestation of the Divine Majesty, if I behold in him the embodied wisdom and love of the Most High, if I recognise the stamp of Divinity in his whole character and history, if I listen to his words as the articulate utterance of everlasting Truth, must I be able to satisfy myself of the accuracy of certain traditions with regard to his power over nature before I can sign myself a follower of his religion and a member of his spiritual body? Is there any thing in the character or teachings of Christ himself to authorize such a supposition? We deny that there is. On the contrary, we maintain, that he ever enforced the paramount need of faith in his doctrine, which bore its own evidence on its face to those who would do his will; and that as a general rule, so far from requiring a faith in his miracles as the condition of receiving his word, he required a faith in his word as the condition of receiving his miracles.

It may be said that a profound and hearty faith in Christianity cannot be produced except by the evidence of miracles. But this assertion involves a fallacy in the logical procedure. It takes for granted the very point which we deny. We present an example of apparent Christian faith, where the reality of the miracles is not admitted; but the genuineness of the faith is denied because the evidence of the miracles is not perceived. But this is to oppose an arbitrary definition to the testimony of consciousness and experience. It is bringing facts to the test of our theory rather than framing our theory in accordance with facts. The question can be settled in no other way than by an appeal to universal Christian experience, so far as we are in a condition to avail ourselves of its testimony.

We ask then, if there be the least shadow of proof, that all the primitive believers were converted to Christianity on the evidence of miracles? We find that among the throngs who crowded around our Saviour, when a miracle was to be exhibited, few became convinced of his claims and attached to his cause. They gazed as a crowd gazes on any other spectacle, but the hidden springs of faith within the soul were not touched. As far as we can judge at this distance of time, it was the truth which Jesus Christ announced rather than the wonderful works which he wrought, that called forth the faith of his disciples, and gave it vigor and steadfastness. At all events, we are not authorized to maintain the contrary. We must know the secret workings of the heart, when the words of Christ fell upon the ear; we must be admitted to the retirement in which deep and solemn thoughts crowded together when the voice of the Son of God searched its dark places; we must see the movement of consciousness when it was first awakened to religious life by the touch of light from above, before we can pronounce, with certainty, that there was no faith in the Saviour except that which was founded on the contemplation of his dominion over external nature.

But not to dwell on sources of evidence, to which we can hardly be said to have immediate access, what shall we say of the recorded confessions of multitudes, who, in every age of the church, have testified that their faith in Christianity rested on their personal experience of its power, rather than on the traditional history of its miracles? We are compelled to number with this class many of the most gifted thinkers, and eloquent teachers, who have devoted their lives to the study and defence of the Gospel. According to the theory which makes the evidence of miracles the only foundation of faith, we must cease to think of them as Christians, and regard them either as dreamers or impostors, men who were deceived themselves, or who wished to deceive others. We flatter ourselves, that there is too much freedom and tolerance among a portion, at least, of the Christian Church, to suffer this. Yet, if we would preserve our consistency, we must adopt this procedure or abandon the theory.

Its fallacy, we are persuaded, would be still more clearly shown by an appeal to the experience of Christians, at the present day. Let the consciousness of individuals be examined. Let the processes of faith and piety be revealed. Let us watch the growth of religious feeling from its morning dawn in the slumbering soul to the evening serenity of its departing sun. Should we find that the warmest faith was quickened into life by the narration of any past changes in the physical world? Was it the fact, that miracles were wrought in Palestine, centuries ago, or that a revelation was made to our better nature, of perpetual duration and validity, which inspired faith in Christ? Can it be proved, that among the swelling throngs who bear the name, and profess the religion of Jesus, there is not one who was first led to him by a personal conviction of the divinity of his teachings, from its correspondence with all that is divine within his nature, rather than from the dim perception of historical events, which receive their significance from faith, instead of serving it for a foundation? But this is essential to the support of the hypothesis, that the evidence of miracles, and the belief of Christianity, are related to each other as cause and effect. If a single individual can be found who acknowledges Jesus Christ as the Son of God, and the Saviour of his soul, because he knows him as the way, the truth, and the life, without connecting his faith with historical events that are uncertain in their meaning, and difficult of proof, the experience of that individual is sufficient to vitiate the hypothesis.

But we would go still further than this. We deem it an error, under any circumstances, to rest a system of spiritual truth addressed to the soul, upon the evidence of miracles addressed to the senses. It is a matter of great surprise to us, that the foundation of religion has been placed upon this ground, for so long a time, without a suspicion, that it was in violation of the teachings of the Bible. It has been assumed, almost without asking a question in explanation, that the primary design of the miracles, recorded in the Scriptures, was to produce conviction of religious truth. It is said again and again, without so much as a whisper to indicate the mistake, that the revelations of truth, in the old Dispensation and the new, are established upon the foundation of miracles. Now we take leave to deny the fact altogether. We know what we are saying, and we assert that the design of the miracles, in the Old and New Testament, was not to confirm a revelation of spiritual truth, but to accomplish quite a different purpose. We would here point out a distinction, which has been strangely overlooked, but which is essential to a correct view of the miracles of the Bible. These miracles, we maintain, are proved by the historical accounts which relate them, not to have been intended for the demonstration of religious truth, but to authenticate the claims, or to accomplish the purposes of messengers of God, in a capacity other than that of religious teachers. The most remarkable series of miracles, on many accounts, are those ascribed to Moses at the court of Pharaoh. But he went there with no revelation of spiritual truth. It did not enter within the compass of his plan to convince the Egyptian monarch of the validity of any speculative doctrines. He was not sent as the herald of new ideas, which unveil the mysteries of the unseen world, but as the agent for accomplishing a practical effect. It was his mission to redeem the captive Israelites from bondage; to convince their oppressor that he had the authority of God for this design; and he, accordingly, exhibited before him the signs of preternatural power, the proofs which were best adapted to assure a sensual king that the credentials under which he acted bore the signature of the Almighty. The object which he had in view was action and not instruction; and he, therefore, addressed prodigies to the senses, instead of truth to the soul.

We have indicated the principle, but we have no space to follow it out. It will serve us well in explaining the miraculous events recorded in the early history of the Jews. We shall find, on examination, that whatever difficulties may exist as to their character, there is none as to their purpose. They were performed as incentives to action, and not as evidences of truth. They were intended to substantiate the claims of the heroes of the old covenant to special divine favor, rather than to shed any fresh light on the character of God or the destiny of man. When the prophets appeared, — those glorious minstrels who breathed forth the soul of harmony on a jangled age, — we find that miracles became less frequent, and instruction more constant. They anticipated, in many respects, the rising of Christianity over their misty mountain tops, and like the Redeemer, whom they predicted, trusted more to the essential power of truth, than to the collateral force of miracles.

With regard to our Saviour himself, we think it will appear, that his miracles of majesty and love were the free expressions of his character, rather than the formal supports of his mission. He exercised the divine power with which God had endowed him, not in the way of demonstration, but of philanthropy. He did not say, "Look at these miracles and believe what I declare;" on the contrary, he left his works to produce their own blessed effects on the body, while he put forth his truth to operate, in a similar manner, upon the soul. In some instances, it may be thought that he appealed to his miracles as an evidence that he was the messenger of God, and, therefore, entitled to be heard; but even this was not in confirmation of the truth of his doctrine, but of the authority with which he announced it. In the final appeal, he rested the claim of his truth on its intrinsic divinity and power.

Indeed, we do not see how our Lord could have adopted a different method, under the circumstances in which he was placed. The apparent performance of miracles was not peculiar to him. It was not sufficient to authenticate his mission as divine, without reference to other sources of conviction. The very records which describe the miracles of Christ, inform us that similar works were performed by others, who did not acknowledge his authority, but acted in their own name. It was an age in which portents and prodigies were not uncommon. How, then, was a true miracle to be distinguished from a false one? The Pharisees accused our Saviour of casting out devils through the Prince of the devils; how could this accusation be set aside, but by establishing the divinity of his mission on independent evidence. If it had previously been made clear that God was with him, there would be no difficulty in admitting that his miracles were wrought by the finger of God. The evidence of the miracles, alone, will not sustain the test of a searchng examination; for in themselves considered, they afford us no criterion to decide between the miracles of Christ, and the miracles of a pretender. We must view them from a higher point of vision, before they are made to stand out in contrast with all others, in their own peculiar beauty and grandeur.

In like manner, we know of no unerring test, by which to distinguish a miracle of religion from a new manifestation of natural powers, without a previous faith in the divinity of the performer. The phenomena of electricity and magnetism exhibit wonders surpassing the ordinary agencies of nature. Upon their first discovery, they presented all the characteristics by which we designate miracles, except their application to religious purposes. If a miracle is said to have been wrought by one whom we already know to be in possession of supernatural gifts, there is a strong presumption that it may be true; but if the evidence of supernatural endowments is made to depend on the miracle, we ask how we are to know that what appears to be a miracle is, in fact, supernatural, and not a new developement of nature.

If, then, a firm faith in Christianity may be cherished independently of miracles; if the purpose of miracles be to operate within the sphere of action rather than of thought; and if there be great difficulties in the proof of miracles, without a previous conviction of the divine authority of him who is said to exhibit them, we hold it to be an unsound method to make a belief in them the essential foundation of Christian faith, or the ultimate test of Christian character.

It will be perceived, that in the foregoing remarks, we have not been inclined to controvert the truth of the Christian miracles. They are subjects of historical inquiry, and are to be settled by historical considerations, including that of the character and position of their author. We wish only to maintain what we deem a better mode of examining the evidences of Christianity than that which is usually pursued in the study of theology. The adoption of this mode, we are persuaded, would remove some of the strongest objections of infidels, and convert the timid and wavering faith of multitudes into strong and masculine conviction. Let the study of theology commence with the study of human consciousness. Let us ascertain what is meant by the expression, often used, but little pondered, — the Image of God in the Soul of Man. Let us determine whether our nature has any revelation of the Deity within itself; and, if so, analyze and describe it. If we there discover, as we firmly believe we shall, a criterion of truth, by which we can pass judgment on the Spiritual and Infinite, we shall then be prepared to examine the claims of a Divine Revelation in history. If our inward eye is unsealed, we shall discern the glory of God in the Person of his Son. Our faith will embrace him, with a vital sympathy and certainty, as the bearer of the highest inspiration of Heaven. We shall experience in our own souls, the miracles of redemption and grace which he daily works therein, and with this conscious perception of his divine power, it will be easy to believe that he who has quelled our earthly passions, and raised us from the death of sin to a life in God, had authority to still the elements and restore Lazarus from the grave. G. R.

Art. VII. — *On the Proper Character of Poetry and Music for Public Worship.*

Poetry for public worship is *musical* poetry. To lay down the principles on which it should be constructed we have first to determine the connexion between music and devotion. A musical, religious service should preserve the *essential characteristics* of music, however modified by the particular subject or occasion. Music and Poetry, as well as the sister arts, Painting and Sculpture, have distinctive attributes, while they have a character in common, seeing that they all express the sentiment of the beautiful and perfect. Each of these noble arts supplies a want in our nature. In the world of sights and sounds, words are the "express images" (so to speak) of the world of thoughts, and feelings, and sentiments. Seen in certain relations and combinations, they address our practical and intellectual powers; seen in others, grouped together in those forms in which we recognise beauty, grace, harmony, they address our feelings and sentiments. What observation and logic are to the intellect, the beautiful, in shapes or sounds, is to the heart and its undying aspirations. Poetry and the Fine Arts belong to this latter part of our nature. They all work, essentially, the same effect upon the mind, but each in its own way. Whatever is called poetry, should be in the spirit of poetry; and whatever is called music, in the spirit of music, as distinct from other forms of expression. So in public worship, call not that *music*, in which it is not recognised that music has a character of its own, apart from the mere sanctity it derives from the church, and from the dignity of its subject; for, so far as these only are concerned, it might as well be preaching, or praying, or going through genuflections, or shouting. The effect of music is partly intrinsic, and partly borrowed from the subject, or occasion. It is partly, also, conventional; depending for its charm upon old associations. But it is plain, that its intrinsic ought never to be so merged in its adventitious power, as to negative its essential properties. Church music, besides a devotional, a solemn, a familiar character, should also have a *musical* character. The fact that certain music, (no matter what in itself,) has in the midst of the splendors of a Catholic Cathedral been identified in the minds of its hearers with a certain sublime effect, is no argument for introducing the same music into a plain Protestant Church. Again, the overpowering, all-blending effect produced by a mighty congregation in the open air, singing together a strain in itself tame and inexpressive, is no argument for having the whole congregation sing in our churches. For, in both cases, it may have been something other than the music, which wrought the effect. Inattention to this fundamental fact, is the fault which includes all the faults in our common church music.

We believe that this will always remain a dead branch in our church service, until loftier notions are held of music in itself; until men shall prize it, and reverence it, as they do poetry; as they do whatever is most pure, and beautiful, and refining; regarding it, not merely as a source of pleasant sensations, an innocent amusement, but as a thing worthy of serious and devoted pursuit: not as a thing to be called holy when constrained into the narrow forms of the church, and worldly when left to its natural variety as if its eloquence were of the devil, and it were bad merely because it gives pleasure.

Music is the form, in which have been presented to the world many of the sublimest conceptions of genius. It has been the whole material wherewith some minds, full of all the poetry, and faith, and sympathies of life, have wrought their immortal creations. The master-pieces of the art, whether in the solemn form of the Oratorio and the Mass, or in the little world of the Opera; in the imposing Chants of antiquity, or in the common Song: whether in the gigantic masses of sound with which Handel, Æschylus-like, has laid the first imperishable models of the higher orders of composition; or in the descriptive strains of Haydn, shifting through every hue of passion, in their inexplicable blending and intertwining of sensations, feelings, and images, all softened down into a general harmony and repose, and resembling the scenery of nature, simple amid the greatest profusion of ornament; or in the melancholy grandeur of Beethoven, who conducts us through dim, vast Gothic vaults, or under the stupendous caverns of earth, where we shrink before the infinite, yet long to tempt its depths, — who stirs those deepest waters in the soul, which roll on in darkness for ever, until the rays from some such master-spirit gleam over them, revealing what is in us; or in the bright summer tints reflected in the clear, laughing wave of a Rossini's happy spirit; or in the melting pathos of the young Bellini, whose short years sufficed to draw intensest tragedies from simple life making us to rejoice and weep with others, as if their fortunes were our own: *these* are works, which bear the sanction of heaven, and, as long as man is what he is, will cherish his noblest sentiments, keep his sympathies warm, fill him with the sense of invisible realities, make him to know the strength, the boundless capacities of his spirit, and render him a willing, an eager listener to the gospel of love.

Music has a meaning in itself. What are some of its essential qualities considered as to its spirit?

In the first place *expression*. It is the language of emotion, — the natural expression of certain feelings, and *those*, feelings which tend heavenward, which are the germ of religious faith. It springs from the same fount with poetry. It is the language of our far-reaching aspirations, our invisible communings; of all that is pathetic, of gratitude and love; — feelings which make the tongue to falter, and need a more delicate, a more flexible organ than speech.

It is *descriptive* too, — but not in the way that words, or imitations to the sight, are descriptive. It conveys no definite images. There is an essential vagueness in every musical conception; and the thoughts and writings of musical men are vague. It describes not objects so much as feelings; — and these are infinite. In the heart, — its loves, its longings, its overflowings of joy or sorrow, — is its empire. It sets the feelings to work; and these, working through fancy, *create* objects, surround themselves with scenes: in this way it is descriptive. Passionless, lifeless events it cannot command at will, and spread them out into a picture to amuse the fancy. It is wholly a *subjective* influence. It has always reference to the heart. True, it is in a manner imitative, and through imitative sounds calls up passages in human life, and operations in nature. But it imitates nothing as it *is*, only as it is *felt*. They claim too much for it, then, who talk of its faithfully representing every thing, like a *camera obscura*; — while they, on the other hand, seem to lack the sense of poetic reality, who say that its impressions are unreal because vague, and think it, therefore, idle and fantastical to let one's self be engrossed with it. The *beautiful* is always vague; though a beautiful *thing* may be distinct. This has struck many as so true, that they have denied to beauty any outward existence, and called it a creation of the mind, wherewith it invests the objects of sense. Music, then, with this qualification, is powerful in description. Nobler instances are not needed than the "Creation" and the "Seasons" of Haydn; or the wonderful Pastoral Symphony of Beethoven, which calls up such summer sensations, that the heart seems to spread itself out over the soft scene, and help make music with the evening breeze, the hum of insects, and the tinkling of little streams.

Again, music expresses and describes more than has any actual existence to the senses, except in the world of Art. Art is creative; and so it is with music. It idealizes all its objects, — it lifts them into a higher heaven of contemplation, — invests them with the dignity of things eternal, — and transports them out of the sphere of natural necessity into the sphere of the soul's freedom. It makes them *beautiful*. Touched by the wand of Art all things are beautiful. So music. — It is always a thing to be enjoyed. It could not be so if it merely described things *as they are*; if it only printed, not designed. In music grief ceases to be uninviting; — her voice is *beautiful*, though sad.

Such being the nature of music it will be easy to see its connexion with religion. The object of church music is to excite devotion; to awaken an intenser consciousness of the presence of that Being of all power and love, whose thought should fill every heart in worship; to develope this feeling not only in individuals, but to make it sympathetic till it shall pervade the crowd. This it does through the generous and tender feelings to which it appeals, through the deep fountains of association which it unlocks, and by transporting us from a world of doubts, and cares, and dullness, into an ideal world, where all is beautiful and intense, where ages of the soul's best experience seem concentrated into a moment.

Such is its object. — As to its style, it should of course be in some respects peculiar. It should not be that of the Opera, or the Military Band, or the merry Show. Employed in devotion it derives a peculiar character therefrom.

1. It should be *solemn*; — free from all associations which are light and trifling. It should not be fantastic, gay, frolicsome, the product of an *idle* fancy; it should not be triumphal or martial. But it should be the natural language of a heart, reverent, and glowing with love, with fortitude, and with an immortal hope. But this is not that *mock* solemnity so common. What is often regarded as the natural expression of reverence, is no expression at all; — a suppressing of all the beaming emotions; a confining of the features into a dolorous, inane, unsympathizing look; a pinching of the voice into a whine, as if the whole man must needs shrink up and wither, when he thinks of his God. Not so does Nature worship. The groves drop not their rich foliage; the birds hush not their glad notes; —but all seems to live and move with more grace and freedom, in recognition of its Maker. This feeling seems to have suggested, and now to tolerate our dull psalmody. It is stiff and monotonous with little of natural melody. A clumsy, long-drawn, uniform strain, seems to have been thought the only serious. Whereas true solemnity is not inconsistent with every variety of melody and time, and with every grace and refinement of Art. Antiquity has undue deference paid it. What is consecrated by old church usage, what bears the name of Gregory or Luther, is regarded as an absolute model, from which the composers of psalmody cannot reverently depart. Church music has suffered from its being too much restrained, too sanctimoniously guarded from the influence of secular music. Now history shows that secular music has had

the most spontaneous and natural growth, and from its many forms have sprung the most touching melodies; while, in the church, music has been more a thing of science; there it has been mechanically shaped, and kept laced up in a strait garment. It has been cherished rather as a *form* of worship, than as having any meaning in itself. And undoubtedly much of the efficacy ascribed to it in the first ages of the Church was as much a superstitious one, as that ascribed to the ringing of bells or the telling of beads. Shall we look there for the only natural models? or shall we not rather accept that music which, wherever heard, touches the heart?

2. Church music should be *simple and chaste.* Of this an equally false idea prevails. — Pieces are called simple, because in mechanical construction they are plain; because they are not difficult to perform, or to analyze grammatically. This is not the simplicity of nature. That is simple which comes from the heart; — and are not the heart's emotions infinitely intricate and changing, baffling all language? Is there not in all the creations of feeling an unaccountable beauty and grace, — a harmony amid variety? Disregarding this, it is common to complain of the highest compositions as too scientific, over-refined, and ambitious. Now church music should not be a mere display of skill. But then the most spontaneous and touching melody may be the most curiously woven, and the most difficult for the very reason that *feeling and conception* preceded *art* in giving it birth; whereas in many of those plainer psalm tunes *art* came first, and would fain force feelings to flow at the sound of its dull numbers. It is not hazarding much to say, that *two-thirds* of the common psalm-tunes are of purely artificial origin. Any one acquainted with the mere grammar of music might in the coldest mood multiply such to any amount. When we say, then, that music should be *simple,* we mean that it should exhibit a harmonious design, a unity of purpose; that it should be free from false and incongruous ornament, from impertinent and ambitious accompaniments, (as, for instance, when we hear Old Hundred accompanied with the twiddling and trilling of fiddles and flutes); that there should be one spirit in it all, to the full bringing out of which every part should contribute.

3. It should be of a *universal* character; such that, when heard in the best circumstances, it may find a response in every breast. It should be composed of popular elements, embody-

ing the sentiments and expressions common to man in all his estates. It should not express wild and strange moods, mere individual peculiarities, the idiosyncrasies of the composer's mind, which only those similarly affected can understand. As the religious element is universal, the expression of it should be as nearly as possible so.

It is plain that the style of sacred music, as long as it preserves these essential elements, admits of great varieties. Many styles are *appropriate*, though many may not be always practicable or expedient. According to the style and spirit of a composition should be the manner of performing it. Hence result the varieties of small choirs, and choruses of a whole assembly, singing in unison or in harmony, with or without accompaniments, and so forth. But here is room for a few cautions and practical suggestions.

To the advocates of an indiscriminate participation of all in the singing we would say, that many tunes lose all their power in this way, and that it was not in the composer's mind that they should so be executed; — he did not so conceive them. This is the case with all the more delicate and tender pieces, all that is pathetic rather than triumphal or merely solemn, — beautiful rather than sublime. Old Hundred or a Gregorian Chant, grand choruses of praise, should be sung by a multitude. Simple and massive in their structure, having little beauty or expression in themselves, they will bear the weight of a thousand voices; then they are truly imposing. Nothing but a multitude, who can *all* sing, can give them their effect. If we make this the only kind of performance, we narrow down the province of church music to the expression of a very few sentiments, and preclude that variety of style which natural devotion requires. Again, they who advocate this, mistake the nature of the influence of music. Its efficacy is not wholly in the *act* of performing it. This would make it a mere outward service. The service is in the heart. Worship through music is contemplative worship. He who hears and feels it, renders as acceptable service, as he who helps to produce the sound. Music is not merely an active service, a tribute of the worshipper to his God; — it is also an influence operating upon the worshipper himself, to elevate his thoughts and warm him into devotion. And this it does through the sense of the beautiful, as Poetry and the Fine Arts do. Its influence is very much the same with that of beautiful or sublime scenery, or of a statue or picture of ideal beauty. Now it cannot be beautiful, and can only edify in a low and coarser way, if it be only such a dull and naked strain, that any number may help to chant it as they please. If a musical taste were general, all audiences would prefer to listen even to the most exclusive choir, and forego the satisfaction of a physical participation in the matter. Let there be, then, a constituted choir, so that there may be the proper arrangement and distribution of voices, the proper proportions in harmony, and a due attention to expression. Let the congregation, when it shall be practicable, serve the purpose occasionally of a full chorus. There is indeed something pleasing in the idea of having all join in singing the praises of their Maker. But consider that often this would overload and crush the music, derange the proportions, introduce harsh or imperfect or discordant tones, render the whole unmanageable and heavy by the addition of so much dead weight which cannot be bent into expression. Besides, all *cannot* sing. Is it said, that the half-stifled voices issuing from all the corners of the church, while the choir are engaged, indicate a disposition for this; and that the music, which the people seem to want, is the music which they ought to have? It will be observed that these restless symptoms commonly proceed from the unmusical, and that in their attempts to join they are actuated, not so much by any proper sense of music, as by a sort of animal zeal to give "a long pull, a strong pull, and a pull all together." We have heard enchanting singing where there has been but a voice on each of the four parts. Is not this better than to string on voices *ad libitum* (in musical phrase), feebly aping the sublimity of a full choir, and dreadfully marring the delicate execution of a small one? A little reflection will show, that the objection on the ground of exclusiveness is unfounded. The music should not seem a personal thing; — we should attend to *it*, not think of the persons who happen to make it. It were well perhaps that the choir should be quite concealed; that the music should be identified with no person; but rather seem to float down from heaven, to exhale from the very ground, and pervade the atmosphere. This too would better accord with the essential *vagueness* of music.

We come now to speak of the words to be sung.

1. They should be *poetry*; — not argument, — not naked narration, — not cold, prosaic description, — not dry crumbs of thought, mechanically patched together; — but living, warm,

spirit-stirring poetry. If they are not such, they are not in the spirit of music.

2. They should be poetry of a *subjective* character, — the poetry of the heart, which paints things not as they *are*, but as they are *felt;* not full of accurately defined images and details, — but of sentiments vague, though real. They should awaken our aspiration to the unknown, the infinite, the unfathomable.

3. They should be *oft-repeated* and *familiar*, — hallowed by something of antiquity. The words, which are the theme of music, the nucleus about which music weaves its various web of feelings and fancies, had better be fixed and known. Herein is much of the power of the Catholic music. The *Miserere*, the *Stabat Mater*, the *Agnus Dei*, have been themes for innumerable composers, from Haydn and Mozart, down to the merest professors of thorough bass. And this is the office of music, to be the inexhaustible commentator upon the simple words in which are wrapped up infinite feelings and infinite imaginings.

We have vastly too many hymns. Every little rhymester feels himself competent to make them. Whoever has learned the mechanics of rhythm, and can measure off a verse upon his fingers and put two rhymes together, feels himself called upon to write, to supply the exhaustless demand of ordinations and celebrations. The rare Lyric, — the choicest flower on poetic soil, which is not *made* but *flows*, which cannot be imitated, for it is the work of nature, which springs from feeling, shapes itself under the most delicate touch of the purest sense of the beautiful, — every drop in whose composition is from the soul's depths, every tint and hue elaborated from wondrous machinery within, whose shadowy shapes suggested the eye but dimly sees, for it sees through tears, whose sound never comes to a determinate close upon the ear, for it touches the creative sympathies of every heart and lives on there for ever, — this wonderwork of genius has become the staple product of prosaic minds, who build it up mechanically out of commonplace thoughts easily rhymed, taking quaint exaggerations and far-fetched figures for poetry, mechanical measure for music, unmeaning and stale phrases of penitence, or joy, or praise, for feeling. Men do not blush to write and publish them by the *six hundred at a time!*

4. It should be the poetry of a *musical mind.* Not to

speak here of the peculiarity in the spirit of music, which should mingle with the poetic spirit in the production of poetry to be sung, we would urge this simple reason: that there are a thousand little correspondencies between the rhythm of poetic verse and of music, which can only be expected to be appreciated by him who combines in himself both poetry and music.

With regard to the adaptation of poetry to music but two things need be said; — they should correspond in sentiment and in rhythm. A barbarous practice is that of ours of repeating the same tune to all the verses of a hymn, however much they may differ in sentiment, and in the disposition of long and short syllables, pauses, and so forth. Every hymn should be composed for an express piece of music, or every piece of music for a hymn. And in most cases the music, instead of being a tune of just four lines, should vary with every part of the hymn. The time will be, we trust, when any exception to this will be regarded as a curious remnant of a rude and antiquated taste.

These are but hints about a great subject. If extravagant statements need to be qualified, abstract ones to be illustrated, or dim, distant ideas to be brought home to closer observation, it is because we must be brief. We have perhaps held up too high an idea of Church Music. It was because we could not go into details, or state the modifications our principles might undergo in practice. Entertaining a high ideal we are by no means disposed to quarrel with all that falls short of it. We hold, that the only way by which we can correct practice, is to work with a perfect *idea* before our mind's eye. In this view, we have given this imperfect statement of the philosophy of Church Music as a means of exciting and sustaining devotional sentiments, and of the general principles upon which its efficacy depends. J. S. D.

NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

Religion and the Church, by Charles Follen. Number I. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1836. 12mo. pp. 42. — Dr. Follen has here presented us with the first number of a series of original and profound disquisitions on some of the most important topics connected with religion and the church. He says, in the Preface:

> "My object is, to trace religion to its foundation in man; and to judge of religious institutions according to their adaptation to human nature. In my reasoning, therefore, I appeal to no external authority, however important, but solely to such facts as are within reach of the observation of every one, making use of his senses, and attending to the operations of his own mind. Those records which by different portions of mankind are considered as of divine origin, have been consulted so far as they contain any revelation of human nature; and no farther than the facts thus brought to light can be ascertained and proved, at any time, by the consciousness of each individual, — no matter whether the same truths could have been discovered or not, by the unassisted exercise of our own faculties. My inquiries and reasonings are addressed to observing and thinking men and women, whatever advantages of information they may have possessed, and to whatever results their own experience and investigation may have led them. Whatever assertions I advance, they must appear before the judgment seat of every independent mind. Whether the facts I assert, relate to the outer or the inner man, the senses and the consciousness of every one, are the competent judges of the facts. Whatever inferences I draw from them, his own reason, acting upon the verdict of his senses and his consciousness, must pass sentence on my conclusions." — p. vi.

The first chapter is given to the illustration and defence of his definition of Religion, which he makes to consist in "the tendency of the human mind to the Infinite." "Faith, in any thing that transcends the horizon of the senses, is," he tells us, "essentially of a religious nature; it is the manifestation of the same tendency to the Infinite, which leads man, from the worship of powers supposed to be infinite, on to the conception and adoration of one God." As a specimen of Dr. Follen's style of thinking and writing, we give the following:

> "The enlargement of man's knowledge is gradual and slow; yet his comparative ignorance does not prevent him from searching after objects that shall satisfy infinite desires. It is natural, therefore, as he by degrees extends the circle of his ideas, that he should ascribe a superhuman and supernatural character and origin to things which transcend only his own limited knowledge of the powers of nature, and of man. Nay, he will spoil and pervert his own sound powers of observation and judgment of common events, by a fond and confident anticipation of wonders. He will carry uncertainty into the safest calculations of science, by taking into account something that lies beyond all calculation. He observes the stars, not so much with a view to comprehend their appointed courses and eternal laws, or to find an unalterable standard for the division of time, and regulation of human affairs. He studies astronomy, in order to penetrate the meaning of all those points and figures which cover the dome of heaven with their mysterious splendor, — to find the key to all these brilliant hieroglyphics in which He who sees the end from the beginning, was supposed to have re-

corded the future history of man. Thus the profound calculations of astronomy give way to the magnificent dreams of astrology. — In the same manner he enters upon the study of chemistry as a novitiate for the wonders of alchymy. In the medical science and profession he is not content with inquiring into the natural causes of disease, and the powers of healing, which provident nature has laid up in her various works for her suffering children. He slights the simples used in ordinary, and resorts to magic antidotes and sympathetic cures, to remove the distempers brought on, as he believes, by unclean spirits or Circean draughts. In morals, the regular performance of every duty, amidst the changes and conflicts of life, does not come up to his ideal standard of holiness; in order to rise beyond nature, and above the world, he shuts himself out from the society of men, and subjects himself to the most unnatural and arbitrary abstinences and torments. The evidences of design in all the works of nature soon strike the awakening mind of man; but not being able to comprehend the whole series of means and ends in this vast system, and not sufficiently cultivated to take into account his own ignorance, he is apt to think that every event which has an influence upon his condition, is designed wholly or chiefly for himself. Hence he will cast the lot, or observe the flight of birds, and the entrails of animals, in order to find out the designs of Providence, and his own destiny. His mind not being enlarged and profound enough to trace to the Infinite One all the evidences of designing power in nature, he seizes upon its most striking manifestations. He personifies, that is, he considers those powers of nature which have a favorable or injurious influence on himself as designing beings; he pays them honor, strives to gain their favor and avert their displeasure by supplications and gifts, under the idea that the gods can be propitiated by the same means by which his superiors among men, kings and their satraps, the gods of this earth, are influenced.

"Who does not see in all these vague strivings and imaginings, the first unfolding of the seeds of infinity in the soul of man? These seeds only need a tender and judicious treatment, the influence of a religious education, to grow up into a rational, spiritual, and practical faith. All errors in religion, all mistakes as to the true object of worship, arise not from the principle itself, but from the ignorance, the false conceptions of other things; they are owing to a want of general correct information. Information, science, as I have before observed, instead of encroaching on the legitimate domain of religion, open to the awaking eye of faith an infinite instead of a finite sphere of contemplation. Thus the prediction of eclipses, the knowledge of the calendar, have been objects of religious awe to the ignorant multitude of men, as long as they were kept from them by selfish priests. But as the light of science puts to flight the visions of a deceived imagination, the religious principle, no longer dazzled by striking appearances, and engrossed by things and events that can be measured and calculated, presses on to the great First Cause of change and harmony in the universe. The workings of a fond, and credulous, and wonder-loving imagination seek refuge, and find a legitimate sphere, in poetry; while the principle of religion, no longer satisfied with the objects of childish awe and rapture, lives, and moves, and has its being in the infinity of truth." — pp. 25-28.

In the second chapter he takes up the question, "What is Theology?" This he answers by saying, that as "religion is the tendency of human nature to the Infinite, theology is the science of religion." He then goes on to show, that "theological learning deserves the name of a science only so far as it possesses these three essential requisites, — truth, universality, and order." In the tracts which follow, he proposes to discuss, in their connexion with "practical theology," "the nature and value of prayer, preaching, and discussion; the influence of poetry, music, painting, statuary, and architecture; the tendency of religious associations, established creeds, symbols, and forms of worship; and the advantages of a clergy distinct from the people." Until Dr. Follen has had opportunity to develope still further his plan, it would be premature to go at length into any criticisms on the work; but we cannot let the occasion pass, without expressing the high expectations which the first number has awakened, and the earnest hope that its reception by the public will be such as to encourage him to go on without delay with so good an undertaking so well begun.

The Old World and the New; or, A Journal of Reflections and Observations made on a Tour in Europe. By the Rev. ORVILLE DEWEY. In Two Volumes. 12mo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1836. — We have failed of obtaining a proper notice of this work for the present number; but our regret at the disappointment is the less, as the public have saved the critics the trouble of pronouncing judgment on its merits by anticipating a favorable decision, and acting accordingly. This decision we should be the last to wish to reverse, even if it were within our power. Hardly any book of Travels has appeared in this country, which has been read more generally and eagerly, or been quoted and referred to in the public journals in a manner more flattering to the author. If the reader has sometimes laid down the volumes with an unsatisfied feeling, we suspect that it has commonly been in consequence of his going to them in the expectation of finding what they are not intended, and do not profess, to give. Mr. Dewey has adopted the only course which seemed to leave open to a tourist in Europe at this day much chance or scope for original remark. Instead of filling up his "Journal" with the antiquities and statistics of the several places visited by him, or going into minute descriptions of localities, of all which other travellers have furnished us enough and to satiety, he has aimed rather to sketch the impressions made on the mind of an educated and liberal-minded citizen of the New World, by the scenes of the Old World, and to follow out interesting trains of thought suggested on the spot. And this he has done in the free, unstudied, and, we may add, unequal manner, which might be expected to mark compositions, " written for," as we are told in the Preface, " and sent, parcel by parcel, to his friends at home." Still the " Reflections and Observations " exhibit throughout the traces, and contain some striking specimens, of the earnest and fervid tone of thought and style peculiar to the writer, as well as of that quick sympathy with the living world, and that hearty faith in freedom and progress, for which he is so highly and so justly famed. The second volume contains much more matter of interest than the first; but it also contains much more matter for difference of opinion: we refer particularly to the speculations respecting Recreations, Roman Catholicism, and the Aristocratical System. Of this, however, we are sure, that no intelligent and fair-minded reader, though he may persist in dissenting from some of the conclusions, will hesitate to acknowledge the ingenuity and the generous spirit, with which they are urged.

Evangelical History; or, the Books of the New Testament; with a General Introduction, a Preface to each Book, and Notes Explanatory and Critical. In Two Volumes. By ALDEN BRADFORD. Vol. I. *Containing the Four Gospels.* Boston: Joseph Dowe. 1836. 12mo. pp. 400. — This is a re-publication of a volume, which appeared under the same title in 1813; but after a careful revision, and with many additions and amendments. Its object may be best stated in the author's own modest language, as thus given in the Preface: " He pretends not to offer any thing new to the biblical critic; nor does he expect to give satisfaction concerning all the obscure phrases and expressions which occur. He can only say, that he has read the original, and consulted learned commentators with attention; and proposes to exhibit, in a cheap form, whatever is material as to the meaning of the writers of the evangelical narrative, and of the epistles, which make a part of the New Testament." The General Introduction, as well as the Prefaces to the several books, are brief; but they contain as much information as ought perhaps to be expected in a popular work of this description; and the same remark applies to the Notes. In printing the text the divisions of the chapters are retained, but those of the verses are not; though for convenience of reference the old numbering of the verses is indicated in the margin. The Editor proposes to follow the readings of Griesbach in disputed passages; but this, we regret to find on comparison, he has not always done. The common version is adopted, but not without frequent variations, which in some cases give it quite a different complexion; as in the first verses of the Proem of John:

" THE LOGOS was in the beginning, and the LOGOS was with GOD, and the LOGOS was GOD. *I repeat*, this *intelligent power* was with God from eternity. By it all things exist, and without it nothing exists, which is. In it was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shone in darkness, and the darkness did not *fully* suppress it." — p. 305.

Most of the Notes do but contain practical or expository hints. The following may be taken as a specimen of those of a more elaborate and doctrinal cast. It is on the fourteenth verse of the first chapter of John, which Mr. Bradford translates thus: "Now the Logos was *united to* a man, who dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, (such glory as an only-begotten son receives from a Father,) full of grace and truth."

> "Literally, the *Logos* was flesh, or became flesh: that is, the Spirit of God was united to a man, who dwelt among us: was not merely imparted to him for a particular time, or a single purpose, as to John; but rested on him, (see 32d and 33d verses,) and was given to him not by measure, as to others. Therefore he is said to be in the bosom of the Father, and the Father to dwell in him and do the miraculous works which were performed. The glory he displayed proved him to be qualified and assisted by God, the fountain of truth and grace. His glory was that of doing good, working miracles of mercy, and revealing the paternal character of God, and the doctrines of pardon and immortality; and not of display for his own benefit or fame. See Philippians, ii. 7, 8; Acts, x. 38. To say of the *Logos* or divine spirit, which is uncreate and eternal, that it was *made*, is absurd: and to say that it became flesh, or was converted into flesh, would be equally incorrect and unphilosophical. But it is far otherwise to say, that the spirit of God was imparted to a man without measure, (see chap. iii. 34,) or was so united to him as to be with him at all times. And this appears to be the doctrine asserted by the writer in this verse. It is also taught in many other parts of scripture. See Isaiah, xi. 2; Luke, iv. 1; John, chap. viii. 28; Acts, ii. 22." — pp. 306, 307.

When the second volume appears, we shall probably go more fully into an examination of the whole work; our only object now being to commend it, meanwhile, to the public attention.

Didactics; Social, Literary and Political. By ROBERT WALSH. In two volumes. 12mo. Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, and Blanchard. 1836. — There are few to whom the literature of this country is under greater obligations, than to the author of these miscellanies. He has long been favorably known to the public as a writer on politics, and in criticism and biography; and as the editor, at different periods, of two ably conducted literary journals, and, for many years, of a daily newspaper remarkable for the general scholarship, and for the interest in the progress of letters and civilization, manifested in its columns. It is from the stores of edited and inedited materials, which have accumulated on his hands in these several occupations, that Mr. Walsh has compiled these volumes; partly, it would seem, at the suggestion of his publishers, and partly to beguile the weariness of a protracted indisposition. The pieces are, for the most part, short, and extremely various, both as regards their topics, and their merits in other respects; and some of them have lost a little of the freshness and interest they once had; but all bear the impress of the author's peculiar manner, are rich in allusion and quotation, and breathe the healthy spirit of what may be termed a liberal conservatism.

The Life and Travels of the Apostle Paul, prepared with Questions for the Use of Sunday Schools. Boston. 1833. 16mo. pp. 272. — This unpretending volume, written with great clearness and simplicity, seems worthy of recommendation to youthful readers, whether engaged in Sunday Schools or not. The very man whose talents, activity, and efficiency place him foremost among the promulgators of Christianity, and whose writings occupy so large a portion of the New Testament, repels the young and thoughtless by the obscurity of his style, is seldom read from choice, and still more seldom understood. Narrative is, of course, always engaging; and the "Acts" are therefore perused with interest: but we find children can hardly realize that he who shook the viper from his hand, on the bleak rock of Melita, was the author of those Epistles, to them so dull and unintelligible. Yet we believe that children, twelve years of age, may be made to comprehend the great charm of that man's history and character; to look upon the beautiful whole and appreciate the indefatigable enthusiasm, the deep emotions, the courage, the spirit of self-sacrifice, which from the period of his conversion till his death, carried him through such a variety of adventures, and displayed themselves in all he said, did, and wrote. Unassisted, the young mind may not take in all this, from the mere perusal of the Scriptures, though it is *there;* but the volume here recommended answers the purpose, we think, very well. Such a book cannot be a *substitute* for the "best of books"; nothing could be, or ought to be; but auxiliaries, which may render it more intelligible and interesting to a certain class of readers, are to be encouraged. The Bible will not be read the less, but the more, in proportion as such works are favorites among the young.

Children usually enter the Sunday School at an age so tender, that only the simplest catechisms, hymns, and oral communications can, with advantage, be employed by their teachers. The principal object at this period is, to form in their minds pleasant associations with religion and its outward observances, and to assist their parents in implanting early sentiments of piety. As they advance, it is the opinion of many teachers, that the Bible alone should be used as a text-book. We cannot think so. We believe that to do this with advantage, requires long and diligent preparation on the part of the instructer. If explanation is not to be attempted at all, the pupils may as well confine themselves to solitary study; if it is, too much caution cannot be used by a conscientious teacher. Questions will be asked by children of inquiring minds, which the instructer would be glad to answer as satisfactorily, as correctly as possible; and he will be himself surprised to find how many passages of the New Testament he has read again and again, without deriving any very definite meaning from them, or without understanding them as he does on more careful inspection. And even should his previous habits have familiarized him with the task of exposition, his pupils, we believe, will be better fitted to enter on this noblest, and most interesting of all studies, if they ascend to it gradually. Such admirable works as Miss Adams's "Letters on the Gospels," and Ware's "Life of the Saviour," are capable of being understood by children from eleven to thirteen years of age, will be sure to interest them, and prepare their minds for those researches into the word of God, which it is to be hoped will occupy not only the remaining portion of their religious pupilage, but many of their retired hours through life. Works calculated to employ the young mind, at this period of its progress, are scarce; but the "Life of St. Paul," before us, has been used with much acceptance, and we venture to recommend it for adoption by those who have felt the deficiency of some book, which might properly succeed Ware's "Life of the Saviour."

We are aware that some objections have been made to it; but they do not appear sufficiently weighty to exclude it from use. We doubt whether a leaning towards *credulity*, on the part of the author, is likely to affect very juvenile minds injuriously. Tendencies towards skepticism, induced by excessive demands on faith, seldom develope themselves until a period when the mind is sufficiently mature for such investigations, as in these enlightened days must lead to devout confidence.

Unitarian Hymn Book.—We copy the following notice from the August number of the London "Christian Teacher and Chronicle." We have no doubt of Mr. Beard's ability to make a collection on the principle here laid down, which shall contain many beautiful hymns, and be respectable throughout. At the same time, we do not participate, in the smallest degree, in his reluctance to use the hymns of Watts or Doddridge, of Bishop Kenn, or Henry Moore, or Charles Wesley, if unexceptionable in themselves, or if by abridgment, or some other slight alteration, they can be made unexceptionable. Accordingly, the plan systematically to reject, on the ground that the writers belonged to another denomination, the great majority of the very best hymns in the language for public worship, strikes us, we must say, as most extraordinary.

> "From the circumstance that the Hymn Books used in Unitarian congregations, contain in each case, a large proportion of compositions by authors holding what are deemed Orthodox opinions, occasion has been taken by the unfriendly, to cavil at Unitarians, as persons whose religious sentiments or literary skill were unequal to the task of composing a Hymn Book for themselves. And certainly some inconvenience has been experienced; perhaps some injury done to taste and feeling, if not to justice; in consequence of the alterations which a regard to truth has, in many instances, compelled those to make, who from Orthodox materials compiled Hymn Books for Unitarian worship. The natural resource is to prepare a collection of hymns composed exclusively by Unitarians.
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> "To those, indeed, who have not given close attention to the subject, this step may appear somewhat difficult. But materials have, for a long period, been accumulating of such abundance and worth, that with the aid he is receiving from many living writers, Mr. Beard has no doubt of being able to compile a work, which shall combine, in no ordinary degree, the several qualities which truth, devotion, and taste require; and when he recalls to the reader's mind the names of Taylor, Moore, Butcher, Roscoe, Smith, and Barbauld, and directs his attention to Ware, Pierpont, Bowring, Johns, Wreford, and Drummond, — not to mention other living authors whose aid he has, and others, again, whose aid he hopes to have, — he feels assured that his confidence will be shared by no small portion of the Unitarian public. And should he, as he fully expects, succeed in compiling a Hymn Book answering the demands which the various states of human and Christian feeling make, there will be supplied a practical answer to those who either deny to Unitarians the name of Christian, or charge their views of God, Christ, and eternity, with coldness and inefficacy; and at the same time no mean assistance will be afforded to all, who place the essence of Christianity in conformity to the image of Christ, for the developement and culture of the religious affections. In order that the work may bear the implied character, the compiler will spare no effort to make it, in the true sense of the word, *Evangelical*, both in its topics, and its tone, as well as ample in its contents; while, with a view to secure for it extensive circulation, cheapness will be studied with no less care than neatness of execution. As, however, the cost must depend, mainly, on the probable sale, the compiler will feel obliged if any congregation, who may contemplate adopting the work, will put themselves in correspondence with him, when further details may be ascertained. He also most respectfully solicits literary aid and suggestions from friends, to whom he may not have made a personal application, addressed to the care of the publishers of the *Christian Teacher*, by whom subscribers' names will be received."

A History of the Presbyterian and General Baptist Churches in the West of England. By Jerome Murch, Minister of the

Trim-Street Chapel, Bath.—This work is intended to do for a distinct portion of the Nonconformists in the West of England, what Walter Wilson, of the Inner Temple, did some years since, with such commendable research, for the whole body in the metropolis, in his "History and Antiquities of Dissenting Churches." No copies, we believe, have reached this country; but from the terms in which it is spoken of in the liberal journals at home, we are persuaded that it would be read here, as well as there, with interest and advantage.

The Sunday School Teacher and Children's Friend. Boston: Otis, Broaders, and Co. — This little work is published on the fifteenth of every month, each number containing 54 pages, 18mo. Three numbers have already appeared, many of the articles of which are written with skill, and the whole is edited with judgment and ability. It promises to be a welcome auxiliary to Sunday School teachers, and a valuable contribution to Sunday School libraries.

New Publications. — A work has recently appeared in Germany, and created considerable alarm, even in that country, for its extreme Rationalistic assumptions, under the following title: "*Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet* von David Friedrich Strauss, Dr. der Philos. und Repetenten am evangelisch-theologischen Seminar zu Tubingen.

In England, the Rev. J. B. White's *Law of Anti-Religious Libel reconsidered;* and Frederick C. Bakewell's *Natural Evidence of a Future State, derived from an Examination of the Properties and Actions of Animate and Inanimate Matter.*

In this country, Dr. Robinson's translation of Gesenius's *Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon,* and Professor Keith's translation of the first volume of Hengstenberg's *Christology.* The Rev. Mr. Cunningham's translation of Gieseler's *History of the Church,* in 3 vols. 8vo. is also announced.

We regret that a biographical notice of the Rev. Mr. Goodwin, of Concord, was not received in season for insertion in this number, without abridgments which we could not bring ourselves to make. It shall appear in our next.

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ART. I. — *A Memoir of the Rev. Hersey Bradford Goodwin.*

By the death of the late Rev. Mr. Goodwin of Concord, a large circle of friends have lost an object of uncommonly strong affection; his parish, an able, faithful, and devoted pastor; the community, the services and example of a truly good man. His memory will live, so long as any remain who have known him or had any connexion with him. The love which he inspired was strong and deep. The influence which he exerted in his own sphere was powerful. The traces he has left in the memories and characters of those who came under that influence will not soon be lost. We would provide for him a visible and more enduring memorial. We would record here, in simplicity and sobriety, our conception of his character and our sense of his worth.

Hersey Bradford Goodwin was born at Plymouth, Massachusetts, August 18th, 1805. His father, William Goodwin, was a highly respected citizen, and held many years the office of Cashier of the Plymouth Bank. His mother and step-mother were daughters of Captain Simeon Sampson, who was distinguished by his valor and success as a naval officer in 1776 and 1777. He received the rudiments of his education in his native town, and was prepared for College at the Sandwich Academy, where he was a short time under the instruction of that eminently useful man, the late Bernard Whitman, of Waltham, of whom he always spoke in the warmest terms of affection, as a teacher whom at the time he "looked upon as a personal friend." He entered Harvard University in 1822. In College he was distinguished for uniformly correct conduct, for the activity and versatility of his intellectual powers, and for his universal popularity among his cotemporaries. Very few have enjoyed that dangerous distinction in an equal degree, or won it by so unexceptionable and even unconscious means, or been so entirely unharmed by it. He maintained the purity and seriousness of his character amidst the various temptations of college life, and was graduated, with a high rank in his class, in 1826.

Immediately after the completion of his academic course Mr. Goodwin entered upon the study of divinity in the Theological School in Cambridge. The profession which he adopted was his early choice. His mind and heart had been directed in childhood to religion, and he entered the University with the intention of becoming a minister of the gospel. In the Theological School he devoted all the energies of his ardent and clear mind to the studies there pursued. He examined with anxious attention and great thoroughness the leading questions which divide the church, but the study in which he most delighted was the interpretation of the Scriptures, which he justly considered a necessary preliminary to a sound and enlightened faith. In the summer of 1829 he received the approbation of the Middlesex Association, and immediately began to preach. The first Parish in Concord, Massachusetts, had at this time determined to procure a colleague for their venerable pastor, Dr. Ripley, whose increasing age required the assistance of a younger hand. Their choice was soon fixed on Mr. Goodwin. He, however, was unwilling immediately to take on himself a pastoral charge, and before he would permit any decisive step to be taken by the people of Concord, complied with a request to preach for a season in Rochester, New York, whither he went in September, 1829. A body of Unitarians in Rochester had formed themselves into a religious society, and at that time were attending worship in a court-house. Great zeal was manifested by them in the cause they had espoused, and hopes were entertained, that, if they could obtain the services of an able and zealous minister, a large society might be established. They saw that Mr. Goodwin was well qualified to build them up, and to promote Unitarianism in that region, and were desirous of retaining him as their pastor. He was not insensible to their claims, but after having seriously weighed them, the result of his deliberations was a decision not to accept their invitation. "In regard to my call from Rochester," he writes in reference to this circumstance, "it was after mature deliberation, and prayer to God for direction, that I concluded to give an answer in the negative." He returned to New England, November, 1829, received and accepted a call from the parish in Concord, and was ordained February 17th, 1830.

Mr. Goodwin entered upon his ministry under the most happy circumstances. He had been chosen and received by his people with unanimity and enthusiasm. He was filled with zeal to do good, and was peculiarly fitted by taste and natural disposition for the discharge of pastoral duties, and for winning and retaining the affections of all classes of people. He thus expresses himself in a letter to a friend, written soon after his ordination. "I am now very happily settled; — far beyond my highest anticipations, and I feel grateful for the prospects that are before me. It is a large parish, and the duties are arduous; but I have a good people, fine in their social and intellectual as well as moral state, and all that I wish is that I were more worthy of my enjoyment." Mr. Goodwin was also very happy in his connexion with the senior pastor. That venerable servant of God, who survives to mourn the loss of his youthful colleague, bears witness in a manuscript notice of Mr. Goodwin's life and character, to which we are indebted for many of the facts contained in this article, "that between him and the senior pastor the most entire confidence and harmony existed. That they were so uniformly affectionate and united must be very much owing to his mild and amiable disposition, and is highly to his credit and honor." Those who were most intimately acquainted with Mr. Goodwin, best know that Dr. Ripley's parental affection and solicitude were most heartily reciprocated by Mr. Goodwin's truly filial feelings towards him.

In June, 1830, he was united to Miss Lucretia Ann Watson, of Plymouth, a lady whose warm benevolence, uniform cheerfulness of disposition, ready hospitality, entire openness of character, and vigorous intellect qualified her to promote the happiness of his fireside, and to aid him in his intercourse with his people, and in his labors for their good. With her he was permitted to live but a short time. She died suddenly, November 11th, 1831, deeply regretted by numerous friends, and by her husband's parishioners, by whom she will long be affectionately remembered. The effect of this bereavement upon him, and the spirit with which he bore it, will be best shown in the following extract from a letter written soon after the event.

"My very dear Friend,

"I received your kind letter expressing your sympathy with me in my recent affliction, and should have answered it immediately, had not the numerous engagements attendant upon such an event taken up all my time and attention. I need not speak of the comfort which your letter gave me; the voice of an old friend in such an hour of trial was soothing indeed. It was peculiarly so when it spoke the language of Christian consolation. I confess that I knew not before what trouble was. I had never before felt even for a moment, that I was left alone in the world. I lost my mother when I was but ten years old. I knew not the loss. My father died in his old age, when it was hardly desirable that he should continue longer. It was, as you remember perhaps, a little before we left College, when there was so much in our earthly prospects and hopes calculated to engross our thoughts and feelings. In the school, in my settlement and domestic establishment, I have been far happier than I had ever expected to be, and I must say, happier than I deserved. The thought of losing my wife had seldom, very seldom, come across my mind. I had often dwelt upon my own dissolution. I thought it was probable that I might be taken away in the midst of my days, perhaps in the morning of life; but as I was accustomed to see her uniformly so healthy and cheerful and bright, it had seldom occurred to me that I should be left to pass the rest of this pilgrimage alone. When my prospects, therefore, of domestic happiness seemed to be thus blasted in a moment, you cannot wonder that I felt for a time a feeling of dreadful desolation. But the strong sympathy of all my friends, the interest of my most affectionate people, my little child, so rich a memorial of her I loved and still love, and above all, our holy and glorious faith in God, in Christ, and in immortality, — these were enough to teach me very soon that I was far from being alone. I confess to you, my dear friend, that I never felt before the full power and reality, the entire sufficiency of our simple views. It is strong faith in simple truth that alone answers the purpose at such a time. My old friends seem nearer to me than ever, and I am bound to my people by renewed and stronger ties. I am enabled, I doubt not, to sympathize with them more fully, and to administer to them with more faith, the consolations of that religion, whose beauty and power I feel that I have experienced in my own bosom. I was denied the satisfaction of conversing with my dear Lucretia before she died, upon the subject of our separation, for the first very alarming symptoms we had, was the change which rendered her entirely insensible to all outward objects. I comfort myself with the thought that she is only separated from me for a little while, and I think I can rejoice in the belief that I have, that she has gone to the Father."

Mr. Goodwin's health was gradually but deeply affected by this event, and it was feared that his constitution, not naturally strong, would sink under it. In the spring of 1833 he left Concord on a journey to the West, for the benefit of his health. He was absent five months, and went to St. Louis, Missouri. On this journey he wrote letters which were first published in the Old Colony Memorial, some of which were afterwards copied into the Christian Register. He returned in September. The following extract from the first sermon which he preached after his return, will exhibit some of the impressions made by his travels, his feelings on coming back to his people, and the state of his health at that time. The text is from Romans i. 16. "For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ; for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth."

"In appearing before you for the first time after an absence from the public services of this house of more than five months, there are many associations crowding on my mind which I find it difficult to express. As I look back upon the variety of scenes through which I have passed since I last had the privilege of addressing you; as I think of the chamber of sickness, and of how little I was called to suffer, compared with what I might have suffered; when I think of the ordinary dangers and trials of a journey of near four thousand miles, and see to what degree I have been protected in the house as well as on the way, by land as well as by water, in the desert wilderness as well as in the crowded city; from the violence of the elements, from the imprudence or the passions of man, and from the scourge of the pestilence; when I think of the improved state of my health and spirits, to which you, my friends, have been instrumental in contributing much by the expressions of your Christian sympathy and kindness; when I think, above all, of the light and comfort and support I have derived from the great truths of our holy religion; when I think of the innumerable mercies with which I have been surrounded, — these rich tokens of the love of God, I feel that I should be unworthy of the name of a Christian, were I ashamed to utter the feelings of my heart. I can only express myself in the language of thanksgiving, and say, 'Bless the Lord, O my soul, and all that is within me, bless his holy name. Bless the Lord, O my soul, and forget not all his benefits, who forgiveth all thine iniquities, who healeth all thy diseases, who redeemeth thy life from destruction, who crowneth thee with loving kindness and tender mercies.'

"Again, when I think of the opportunity which your indulgence and a kind Providence have afforded me of visiting a distant and most interesting portion of our native land, of beholding something of the vast resources of that great valley which is known to us as the West, the beauty and grandeur of its natural scenery, declaring, as it does, the glory and bounty and goodness of Heaven, and calling forth the soul to the purest worship of Him who has built this temple and garnished it himself; the opportunity of seeing there what nature has done and art is doing for our country; when I think what man may become there under the influence of pure religion, and of what he must become without that influence, I feel a new interest awakened in life, and a stronger reason than ever to say with the Apostle, I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth. For notwithstanding the prosperity of that distant portion of our land, notwithstanding the richness of its soil, the luxuriance of its vegetation, the mildness of its skies, the extent of its rivers, and the unparalleled growth of its cities and villages, I must say that I turn back with greater satisfaction than ever to the hills and rocks of New England. Its village spires, its Sabbath bells, its domestic, civil, literary, and religious institutions were never dearer to me than at this moment. For in an intellectual, a social, a moral and religious view, at present

'Man is the nobler growth our soil supplies,
And souls are ripened in these northern skies.'

"And now, my people, let me express my gratitude, that I am permitted once more to behold you, and to speak to you. Having obtained help of God, I continue to this day. In regard to my health, I can say that it is decidedly and greatly improved since my absence. But whether it be sufficiently so to endure the changes of the coming season, is still doubtful, and time only can determine. While I shall endeavour to take that course which duty to you and myself shall require, I shall of necessity rely much upon your indulgence and advice, and shall endeavour to conform, as far as possible, to your wishes. Thus far, I am sensible, I have great reason for gratitude, and I fondly hope there is no event that can await me, which would diminish my trust or shake my confidence in God. I would give thanks to him for all past kindness to me and to you. Though since our separation some of us have been visited with sickness and sorrow, and have been called to part with near relatives and friends, still on the whole, as a religious society, we have been highly favored in this respect. While, therefore, we express our sympathy for the bereaved, let us not fail to be thankful that death and disease have done so little to diminish our numbers. Especially would I give thanks, that while I have been taken from the duties of my office, you have been so situated as not to be deprived of the benefits of religious institutions, that he, to whose voice you have been accustomed to listen from your earliest years, has been blessed with strength sufficient unto his day. I rejoice that I am again permitted to unite with him in the services of this house, and at the table of our Christian solemnities. May we all express by this act, not only our gratitude, but our resolution to conform in all things, to the spirit of our Master. And while we hereby profess that we are not ashamed of Christ or his gospel, may we show by our lives, by purity, by piety, and by charity, that we are his disciples indeed. For though the ordinance before us is to be regarded and used as a means of religion, and a mode of expressing our faith and our attachment, still of this be assured, that religion itself consists not in these things; that the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the holy ghost."

Mr. Goodwin's health now seemed to be established, and the fears, which were entertained by himself and friends, that disease was seated upon his lungs, were removed. He continued in the discharge of his pastoral duties with his accustomed ardor and energy. In June, 1834, he was married to Miss Amelia Mackay of Boston, who survives to mourn his loss; we are therefore only permitted to say, that this union contributed greatly to the happiness of the short remainder of his life. He continued to enjoy a good degree of bodily strength and a fair prospect of long usefulness, till October, 1835, when he went to Connecticut, to attend the sickness and death of a near connexion. He was much exposed to fatigue and watchfulness, and returned exhausted and asthmatic. From this time he found it necessary to keep at home in the evening, and to avoid meetings in close and heated rooms. He gave up attendance at the Lyceum except when he lectured himself. Nevertheless he attended very vigorously to the schools, which required many visits, preached regularly, and went to an ordination at Framingham, on the coldest day known for eighteen years, without apparently suffering injury. In March he delivered two lectures before the Lyceum, in the preparation of which he sat up late, which increased his asthma, and caused obstruction in the circulation. At the town meeting on the 4th of April, he read a long school report, spoke publicly, and seemed much exhausted. That night his pulse was high and irregular, and never recovered its tone. He then declined being on the school committee, because it interfered with his more immediate parochial duties, and he found that to do all he wished for the parish and the schools wore upon his health. In April, decidedly alarming symptoms suddenly appeared, which induced him to consult Dr. Jackson. His complaint was pronounced to be seated in the heart, and to render him constantly liable to sudden death, though by a careful avoidance of excitement he might live several years. After a few weeks' stay in Boston he returned to Concord, and, by permission of his physician, preached once. Unfavorable symptoms, however, soon returned, and it was thought expedient that he should seek quiet and relaxation in his native town. During his stay in Plymouth, his health, though variable, was prevailingly better. On Thursday, July 7th, after having spent the day in riding, walking, and society, he retired apparently as well as usual; but during the night was suddenly seized with paralysis, and never afterwards spoke or opened his eyes. He remained insensible through the day, and died early on the morning of Saturday, the 9th.

Mr. Goodwin possessed a strong and active mind. He was capable of investigating with thoroughness and accuracy any subject in which he was interested, or to which it became necessary to direct his attention. If any intellectual pursuit, unconnected with his profession, can be said to have been peculiarly congenial to his mind, it was the study of the antiquities and history of New England. He was much interested in the historical memorials with which his native town abounds, and in the history of the early settlement of the Old Colony, was well versed in the original authorities on that subject, and took pleasure in collecting books and pamphlets respecting it. He was not, after he became a settled minister, a systematic student. He was a practical and active pastor, and spent much of his time among his people, in parochial business and duty. Yet he read much of the better portion of the current literature of the day, and was accustomed to improve every opportunity of making conversation the means of acquiring information. He had a strong memory to retain what he had thus acquired, and a natural tendency to systematize and arrange it, so that he was continually adding to his stock of available and useful knowledge. He was a careful observer of passing events, and was fond of discussing the great moral questions to which they gave rise. His opinions on such questions were always formed upon the highest principles. He ever maintained to the utmost the purest and most elevated conception of the true and the right.

Yet in practice he was wholly free from ultraism. Though ever faithful to his own idea, he did not expect all men to adopt it, and act in accordance with it at once. He aimed to bring them to it gradually, and was satisfied when he had led them towards it as far as they were capable, at the time, of going. Hence, in efforts to be useful, he did not occasion offence and distrust by appearing visionary, but was popular and successful. On the subject of temperance he differed from many with whom he was connected. He thought that the principle, on which abstinence from ardent spirits is urged, applied with equal force to wine and all intoxicating liquors, and that the arguments for taking the pledge would be of little avail with the poorer classes, unless the obligation of total abstinence was acknowledged by all. Accordingly he totally abstained himself.

He had great intellectual independence. He was jealously watchful against all undue influences which he suspected might bias him in the formation of his opinions, and examined all questions by the light of his own mind, before making up his decision upon them. He was by inquiry and conviction a Unitarian; but he was not hampered by the fetters of any party. He did not feel himself accountable for the opinions of those who were called by the same name with himself, nor accountable to them for his own. On all subjects he pursued his speculations freely, and expressed them fearlessly.

To the stranger who saw Mr. Goodwin for the first time, as well as to his most intimate friends, the trait which appeared most prominent, and gave a tone to his whole character, was his overflowing and unfailing goodness of heart. It was expressed in his countenance, and in the tone of his voice, which at once inspired a confidence in his kindness that was never disappointed. It was in no way exclusive. It was checked by no fastidiousness of intellect or taste. It flowed out freely to all persons of all conditions and characters. The ignorant and the cultivated, the rich and the poor, the young, the aged, the sick, the infirm, the sinful, all felt him to be their friend, spoke to him with freedom, received his consolation and advice with gladness, and were comforted and improved by his presence. It was shown in all the various ways in which Christian love can manifest itself;—in the hospitality with which he welcomed friends and visiters to his home, and entertained them with his uniformly cheerful and often humorous conversation;—in his thoughtful attention to the welfare of every one about him;—

in his charitable construction of whatever might be deemed offensive;—in his zeal to promote peace;—in the ready sympathy with which he entered into the situation and feelings of others, and partook of all their joys and sorrows;—in the entire self-forgetfulness with which he cheerfully made every exertion and sacrifice by which he could render a service. His benevolence was not a mere natural impulse. It was directed by a sober judgment. It did not degenerate into a weakness; it was thoroughly commingled with moral and religious principle, and was exercised with strict integrity and sincerity. He never shrunk from the infliction of wholesome pain. He never flattered weakness or folly in others, nor disguised his perception of wrong in their character or conduct. He was very faithful in the duties of counsel, exhortation, and rebuke, and the perfect gentleness of his disposition, which failed not to make itself felt by all who conversed with him, prevented his plainness of speech from being attributed to any but the kindest intentions. He might well speak the truth, for he could not but speak it in love. These qualities peculiarly fitted him for the offices of private friendship. He was indeed such a friend as is rarely met with. Those who had the happiness of knowing him in that relation, feel that they have sustained a loss which they cannot hope to repair in the present life. But they have not lost him. Their intercourse with him was exactly of that kind of which faith may be most assured that it shall be renewed in heaven.

Mr. Goodwin received early religious impressions which he ever retained. His piety was a deep and settled principle, pervading and qualifying his whole character. He habitually saw God in all things. Nature was to his eye an expression of the Creative Mind, and he received all the events of life, great and small, prosperous and adverse, as the appointments of a benevolent Providence. His piety was a practical principle, leading to devotion and submission to the Divine Will. Conscience was to him God's most intimate presence in the soul, and he reverenced and obeyed it as such. And he rejoiced to enlighten conscience by the precepts, and to strengthen it by the sanctions of the revealed word. He was a sincere follower of Jesus, whose Gospel he prized as a treasure of inestimable value, and was a diligent inquirer into the truths it contains. He was a scriptural Christian. In the determination of all questions of truth and duty, his ultimate appeal was to the law and the testimony, and he rested in their decision as ascertained by a liberal and enlightened interpretation. He was not accustomed to speak of his religious emotions, but they were perceived to give a tone to his conversation, and to influence his whole life. How he was sustained by his religious faith under the most trying affliction of his life, we have already shown in his own words. It supported him also in the near prospect of death. He was not of that temperament to which submission to death is easy. The sunshine of his own spirit made this world a bright and happy place to him. Warm in all his affections, full of hope, sustaining all the most delightful relations of life, zealous and able to do good, he felt that he had much to live for. His first wish was for prolonged life. He would that, if it were possible, the cup might pass from him; but he was enabled to add, " Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt."

In his preaching he was sound, plain, and practical. It was not his habit to discuss deep subjects in the pulpit, or to rise into the highest regions of thought and imagination. He aimed at bringing home the truths he taught to the hearts and consciences of his hearers by familiar illustrations drawn from the common affairs of life. His manner was earnest and persuasive. Though he never preached extempore, the familiar tones of his voice, and the ease and freedom of his manner, gave to his discourses the effect of extemporaneous speaking. He was a popular preacher in his own and the neighbouring pulpits, and was listened to with delight by some of our most intellectual congregations.

He took a lively and active interest in every enterprise for the promotion of the moral, intellectual, and social condition of the town. The public schools received a large share of his attention. He was a laborious member of the committee for the supervision of them, and spent much time in examining them, and in preparing reports, and was indefatigable in suggesting and effecting improvements in their condition. At the Lyceum he was, when his health allowed, a constant attendant, and an occasional lecturer. He engaged in the superintendence of the town library. By an excellent regulation of that institution it was required that no book should be placed in it without having been read through and approved by a committee appointed for that purpose, and that brief accounts of the principal books purchased should be published in the newspapers of the town. Mr. Goodwin served on this committee, and wrote many of these notices. He gave his name and influence to an association formed a few years since at Concord, for the laudable purpose of beautifying the town by planting trees along the road sides. That these services were duly appreciated by his people, and were rewarded with a high degree of confidence and affection on their part, appears from the following extract from an obituary notice written by a parishioner and intimate friend, in the name of a committee chosen for that purpose, and published shortly after his death.

"Mr. Goodwin had become so much one of us, we have been so accustomed to the thoughts of him in our daily habits, to interweave him in our interests and affections, that he seemed to be almost a necessary part of our plans of life, of improvement, and of happiness, as well as of immediate enjoyment. By his death a dreary blank is left everywhere; the streets where we saw his daily sprightly walk, the domestic fireside where we enjoyed his cheerful conversation, the church where we heard his eloquent instruction, every place, lately so full of him, now sadly waste, reminds us how great a means of good is gone from us; and the fondness with which our souls dwell upon the past, the uncertainty and the dark gloom spread over the future, forcibly convince us how irreparable a loss we suffer in his death. But yesterday we were rejoicing in hope, in prayerful trust, that God would spare him for us; to-day we are cast down in grief. The mysterious hand of Providence removed him from us almost in the vigor of his usefulness. We saw not the pallid cheek, nor the sunken countenance, nor the faltering step, nor heard the whispering voice, and because we did not see them we vainly hoped they were not there. It would indeed have been a melancholy satisfaction to us, could we have smoothed the pillow of death; if we could have offered our dear brother and pastor our tender and sincere sympathies, if we could have heard his last dying instructions. It would have strengthened our spirit to have seen his soul triumphing over death, and to have witnesssed how the doctrines of his life, faith in Christ, and the hope of immortality, sustained him in the approaches of death."

We shall now add a few extracts from Mr. Goodwin's writings, for the purpose of giving, with as much fidelity as we may by such means, and within the limits of a single article, a specimen of his mind. The following extract from his last report from the school committee, exhibits his views of the importance of our system of public schools, and on the subject of education in general.

"Your Committee embrace the opportunity afforded by this Report, to offer some suggestions on one of the great obstacles to the improvement of our schools. They mean, the difficulty of obtaining a suitable number of well-qualified teachers. It cannot be denied that the office of a school teacher is in reality one of the most arduous, the most responsible, and the most important in results, to which a human being can be called. It is not knowledge merely, that is required for its duties. There must be aptness to teach, tact in communicating, and tact in governing. There must be also, if possible, a fondness for children, a general acquaintance with their habits and dispositions, a power of exciting their interests and their affections, and, above all, a high and true self-discipline. If it be true, that the instructer of our children is in the place of parent or guardian, during the hours of school, then there are few situations in life out of the domestic circle more deeply interesting, and involving a higher responsibility, than this. It is apt to be thought, if a school is doing no good, it can at least do no harm, and on that ground some parents rest satisfied with that from which no complaint is to be heard. But from this view your Committee dissent. If a school is not doing a positive good to the children that attend it, it must do, they are confident, a positive harm. If good habits of study and discipline are not formed, the child is not stationary, but is going backward.

"Now the difficulty which presses upon us, in common, we presume, with most of our towns, is the want of an adequate preparation in those who apply for the charge of our schools. For the source of this difficulty, we naturally look to the want of a sufficient inducement to make this preparation. The occupation in most of our schools is irregular, continuing only for a few months in the year, and the pecuniary compensation for the time it continues, is often less than is furnished by most of the branches of mechanical industry. Then we have no institutions where the business of teaching is made a separate branch of study, — where those who are disposed might resort to be fitted, and where we might look for a regular supply of well-qualified instructers. In this state of things, the selection of a teacher is altogether an experiment, and the question whether the experiment is to succeed or fail, cannot always be determined by the most diligent Committee, till a valuable portion of the time allotted to the children is past. This evil is a growing one, and it is time that we looked about for a remedy.

"In the kingdom of Prussia, which may boast, perhaps, of the best system of public school instruction in the world, the schools are entirely in the charge of the government, the business of teaching is elevated to the rank it so richly deserves of a separate profession, the preparation of the teacher is amply provided for, and an adequate support for himself and family till the hour of his decease is furnished and regulated by law.

"Whether something may not be done by legislative enactment in our own State to provide for the education of teachers, and for a more general and careful supervision of the schools by the appointment of one or more officers of public instruction, must of course be left to the wisdom of our civil fathers. It will not be the least of the benefits arising from the school fund of Massachusetts, if it shall serve as an inducement to the people and the legislature to adopt a more regular and uniform system in regard to all the schools in the Commonwealth.

"In the mean time, it is believed we have it in our power to do something at home towards elevating the rank of the teacher in our own and the neighbouring towns. It is natural and it is right, that the experienced and successful should demand more for their services, than those who engage in teaching for the first time, or those who, having engaged in it for a short period, have not acquired the highest qualifications. This is the ground for a distinction which may easily be made. The propriety or the policy of setting aside an experienced, a faithful, and a capable instructer, for one whose qualifications cannot be known, simply because the former is not to be obtained for the customary price, is not easily understood by your Committee. They believe, on the contrary, that by greater care in the selection of teachers, by a greater demand for high qualifications, by a more rigorous examination of such as apply, by increasing the compensation of such as prove to be satisfactory, and, in short, by encouraging through all the means in our power, those who are capable and faithful, the evils under which we are laboring may be greatly diminished.

"Your Committee have seen beneficial results from continuing the same teachers in a school for a term of years, or at least so long as they can be profitable to the children. The advantage of an acquaintance with the peculiar dispositions and habits of the children, and of a growing interest of the children in them, will, it is manifest, when other things are equal, give them a decided superiority. It will also tend to give more of the character of permanence to the employment, and may operate as an encouragement to many to enter it.

"With these views, your Committee dismiss the subject to their successors, sensible that they have been intrusted with a highly responsible and difficult service, one of the highest pleasures attendant upon which consists in the consciousness of trying to do good."

The following is a large part of a discourse on Atheism, from the text, "Without God in the world," (Eph. ii. 12.)

"How is it to be accounted for, that man, bearing in his own bosom the image of his Creator, and surrounded on every side with the proofs of his heavenly origin, can yet stand up in the face of them all, and deny that origin? This, I conceive, is a question which it becomes us to reflect upon with care and to answer with candor. That there may not be some cases, where, from a defect of natural powers, or from a peculiar derangement of the intellect, the tendency is strong to this species of skepticism, I pretend not to doubt. There may be an insanity on this, as on every other subject, which argues no moral defect. But, in the great majority of instances, my conviction is irresistible, that this speculative Atheism has its origin, not in any defect of reasoning, but in the moral character, the awful degradation of him who holds it. To doubt or deny the existence of Deity, I must doubt or deny the reality of my own spiritual nature, or I must set at naught the first principles of the plainest and soundest philosophy. That man can do this is evident. There is almost no absurdity so great, — there is no vagary so extravagant, that man cannot entertain it. There have been those who have questioned at times the reality of their own existence, and it is not more strange that any should question the existence of God. But by what process can they do this? I answer, by blotting out the image of the Deity within them, by so degrading their natures that they shall cease to be reflections of the Infinite and the Eternal, by stifling the admonitions of conscience, by checking their aspirations for an infinite good, by suppressing within them all those sentiments of love, and gratitude, and reverence, which point so unerringly to the Supreme Being, by blinding the mind and hardening the heart against all that is beautiful and true and good in the universe, — this is the process, the terrible process, by which a man comes to doubt of the reality of his spiritual nature, and the reality of God. And what is the most lamentable consideration of all, where this process has been completed, there is no process of reasoning which can reach the case. There is no argument which can convince the mind, there is no ordinary appeal to the feelings which can melt the heart. The voices of reason, and conscience, and sentiment, and feeling, have alike been stifled. The man is literally without hope, as he is without God, in the world. Surely if any one is deserving more than another of the commiseration of the community, — if any one calls loudly for the pity of his race, it is this poor, and blind, and infatuated man. Cheerless and rayless as his path may seem, it is not for the Christian to give him up in despair, or to speak of him in the language of ridicule, or contempt. The time may come, when God in his Providence shall speak to his heart with a voice that shall raise the dead to a new conviction of his spiritual relations and immortal destiny.

" But the expression in our text, 'without God in the world,' does not apply solely to the state of mind which has been described. As we look round upon the world, and see the great mass of mankind acknowledging at stated seasons that they believe in God, and yet living as if they believed him not, — going forth to the duties of the day, and lying down to the slumbers of the night, without one thank-offering for his goodness, without one prayer for his protection and blessing, — as we look at that indifference to God, and that negligence of duty and of truth, which are so often manifest in the words and the actions of men, we are compelled to say, there is a practical Atheism which is far more common, and no less dangerous, than any speculation which we call by that name. The belief in God, it is to be feared, is with very many but little more than a speculation, or a tradition. They may hold it, perhaps, as an irresistible conviction, — as a truth which cannot be denied, and ought not to be doubted, but they use it not as a principle of action, and it makes no impression on their hearts, or their lives. But we are emboldened to ask, where this is the case, of what advantage is such a belief? It may argue perhaps a little more soundness of intellect, it may show that reason and conscience are not wholly obliterated, but to what good purpose, to what useful end, is the speculation employed? We have spoken of Atheism as implying great degradation of mind and heart. There is one advantage which even Atheism possesses over this indifferent state of mind, and that is the advantage of consistency; of consistency between the inward principle and the outward life.

"From this view of our subject the appeal lies directly to our own hearts and consciences. You say, my hearers, that you believe in God. You believe, that he has created you and keeps you in being, — that it is strictly in him you live and move. But do you, let me ask you, acknowledge this dependence, — do you with each returning day, in your families or your closet, offer him your thanks for his goodness, and implore the continuance of his mercies? If you do not, let me assure you, you are living without him in the world, — your belief is little better than unbelief. If your own heart condemns you, remember that God is greater than your heart, and knoweth all things. Again, you believe in the presence of God. You say, that he is always with you, on your right hand and your left, and that the thoughts of your mind and the feelings of your heart are all open before him. Is your life, let me ask you, conformable to this idea? Are there not actions performed, and words spoken, and wrong thoughts and feelings indulged in secret, which, if they were blazoned to the world, would make you blush for shame? And is it nothing to affect the character of these things, that there is an eye which watches over you, and penetrates through you, in the darkness as well as in the light, — an eye which cannot look upon sin but with displeasure?

" Again, you believe in the providence of God. You admit that the world is governed by a wisdom that is higher than yours, and that all things are ordered to the best ends. But when you have discharged your duty according to the best of your knowledge and ability, are you not often over anxious about the success of your schemes? And when those events which are beyond your control have come to cut off your hopes, and disappoint your fond expectations, when the afflictions of life clothe you in sackcloth, do you not give way to murmuring thoughts, or speak of these events as matters of accident or chance? In proportion as these things are so, you need not be assured that your practice is a contradiction to your belief, and that you are so far living without God in the world.

"Once more; you believe in the unspotted purity, the holiness, and the justice of God. You acknowledge that his will and his law should be the rule of your life. It is a rule which no circumstances can change, which no condition can annul. But suffer me to ask, my hearers, is it so regarded and so used? Are there no occasions on which worldly policy and temporary expediency lead you to swerve from this great idea of what is right and true? Does the question, what is God's will, go with you to your farms, your shops, and your merchandise; is it present in your hours of business, and your seasons of relaxation? Or do you act upon the principle that religion should not be mingled with your worldly affairs? But remember, I beseech you, that God is as just as he is holy, and that the time is coming when you and all of us will be summoned before the judgment-seat of Christ, that we may give an account of the things done in the body.

"Finally, you believe that God is the proper object of your supreme affection, reverence, and love. These sentiments are of course inconsistent with every species of blasphemy or profane conversation. The man who indulges in the irreverent use of the name and titles of the Deity, — who vents his anger in curses, and interlards his conversation with useless oaths or impious jests, can hardly be said to recognise the existence of God. But these sentiments of affection and reverence for Deity require more than a negative virtue. You are engaged, it may be, in the business of the world. You acknowledge the obligations you are under to lead a devout and humble life; but as yet you have not time to think of these things. You intend, perhaps, at some future time, in some happy moments of convenience and leisure, to cultivate more carefully this sentiment of piety; but at present you are engrossed with the cares of business, and the anxieties of life. Rely upon it, my hearers, if this is your state of mind, you are yet without God, and your danger is, that you may continue without him to the end of your days. What! let me ask you, have you in reality no time now for piety? Believing, as you do, that God requires and deserves your best affections, is it right that you should bestow them upon these miserable elements of time? You receive to-day the proofs of God's goodness, — you are to-day dependent upon him; without his assistance you could not lift a finger in your daily occupation, and without his blessing your plans would be fruitless, your efforts unavailing. I put it then to your conscience, whether it be right and fitting that you should live this day prayerless, thankless, thoughtless. Is it right and fitting that you continue without God in the world, when it is God that upholds and supplies you from hour to hour? If you look upon Atheism as unnatural and unreasonable, how can you regard otherwise this indifference to acknowledged truths, this negligence of your avowed principles?

"Such, my friends, are the questions by which we can test the practical influence of our belief in God. They show us that there may be a renunciation of Deity, — an indifference to his character, — a negligence of his will, — which is in reality but little in advance of an absolute denial of his existence. Between this state of mind and the speculation called Atheism, there is a closer connexion and deeper sympathy, than we at first imagine. If it be true, as I have attempted to show, that the denial of God has its origin in the degradation of the character, then the first step in attaining to it is the habitual neglect of religious principle in the heart and the life. We are accustomed to speak of Atheism with the greatest abhorrence. Let us regard with equal abhorrence that state of thinking and feeling which is so evidently the preparatory and introductory step. We say the only remedy for Atheism is an elevation of the character, a new unfolding, a regeneration of the spiritual man. I lay it down therefore as a truth all-important to us to remember, that the surest safeguard against it in ourselves, and the strongest argument against it in others, are to be found in the steady cultivation of the religious nature, the habitual leading of a religious life. To the believer in God, the spectacle of an Atheist is a monument and a warning. The blindness of mind, and the hardness of heart, which can look upon this universe and see in it no author, are the natural consequences of habitually living without God in the world. It is the good man who has the strongest assurance of God's existence and perfections; for he has the witness in himself that cannot be controverted. The Spirit beareth witness with his spirit, that he himself is a child of God."

The last sermon Mr. Goodwin preached was from the text, "I know not the day of my death." It was occasioned by the death of his parishioner, the late Charles C. Emerson, Esq., whose extraordinary talents and beautiful religious character gave promise of high and extensive usefulness, which was disappointed by his early and sudden decease, before the community could have an opportunity of appreciating the loss it has sustained in him, but not before he had won himself a place in the hearts of many friends, by whom the memory of his generous, elevated, and holy character will never cease to be affectionately cherished. We subjoin the conclusion of the discourse. The admonitions and consolations it contains may with perfect appropriateness be laid to heart by all who are interested in the death of him who uttered them.

"We have been often taught, — the affecting lesson has been recently repeated to us, — it is not the old merely that should be exhorted to be ready; it is not to those who have ceased to be useful or vigorous or happy, that Providence speaks. Oh no! the voice is to the young, to the active, to those who are tenderly beloved, to those who have high hopes and bright prospects before them in life. The voice is to all. For we have seen one pass from us as a shadow, called suddenly away, in all the vigor of opening manhood, in all the brightness of earthly promise, and in the sunlight of friendship and affection. Bright hopes have indeed been withered, fond expectations have been blasted. To some this event may appear dark and mysterious. It is mysterious; for all change is mysterious, and we are surrounded with mysteries from the cradle to the grave. We are travelling amongst shadows, and we see but a little of the purposes of Providence. But then there is a Providence; there is a purpose; and that Providence is guided by infinite wisdom and boundless love. This is our faith; let us hold to it, and not let it go. And it is delightful to think, when the child of bright promise is taken from earth, that God has some use, some higher, some purer, some more glorious use for that spirit, in other portions of his dominions. Let us not think of him then as one whose usefulness is ended; for even upon earth the usefulness of the good does not end at their dying. Let us not speak of the separation as eternal. Above all, let us be careful that we are not selfish in our sorrow. In fine, let us always remember, that he is now as a treasure that is laid up in heaven, which nothing earthly can destroy, which nothing earthly can corrupt."

C. P.

Art. II. — *Fanaticism.* By the Author of "Natural History of Enthusiasm." New York and Boston. 1834.

The author of this work is a philosopher. His mind goes round in a large circle. He looks on men with a generous and sympathetic spirit. Though a theologian, a member of the Church of England, and sufficiently attached to his church, he is not a bigot. His mind is not the slave of his creed. If he is ready to condemn other sects, as for example the Unitarians and Catholics, and that too in unsparing language, his works are not wanting in severe strictures on his own church. But his denunciations are never those of a mere partisan; and when he is unjust in his condemnations, it is the injustice, not of bigotry, but of misapprehension and error. There is very much in his writings to which we should not assent; and yet there is not one of his volumes, we think, which does not disclose a sound heart, and a mind vital with freedom and the love of truth. Compared with the great crowd of English theological writers, he stands as a philosopher among bigots. He writes as a Christian, and not as a sectarist.

But while we ascribe to him this very high rank, we think that all general terms of admiration and praise bestowed on his works require large deductions. He is an able man, but not one of the ablest, — one of the first thirty, perhaps, but not one of the first three. He is one of the first theological writers of the day, but not of all times. His works are of a kind to be eminent in one age, but not through all ages. He is one of those who preface the way and herald the coming of a mightier one. With great excellences, he has also great faults both as a writer and a thinker. With great quickness of perception, and great range of knowledge, and great powers of generalization, he is still a loose thinker. He almost works out great general principles, but fails by this *almost*. You close one of his works, and vast thoughts float through your mind; but they are like the shapes seen in dreams, vague and indistinct. When you lay the book down, you say, What a glorious writer! A week passes, and you wonder why it has left so fleeting an impression on your mind. He stands on a high summit and overlooks a large field of thought, but sees with an uncertain eye. He is one who has ascended a high mountain on a cloudy day. The field of view is immense. The horizon is the circumference of a world. But below him the clouds float, and the mists hang, and all the distinct features of the prospect are lost. But now and then, with the shifting of the wind, the clouds part and the mists roll away, and a green valley, through which winds a shaded river, is revealed, or some rocky mountain summit shoots up through the haze and glows in the rising sun.

His style is obnoxious to much the same criticisms. It is that kind which is either best or worst. He has great power of expression, — an overflowing treasury of words, — an imagination that at once encloses and melts down scattered facts into general principles, and is most fertile with poetical illustration, — while all that he writes is alive with an earnest spirit. Many passages might be selected from his works, imbued with the very soul of eloquence. Yet having said this, it must also be added, that his style is often vague, — often diffuse and wordy, — often disclosing the place where the thought is, instead of disclosing the thought itself; like painted windows, through which you can see light and shade and indistinct forms moving, but cannot see what the moving forms are, nor what are the objects from which the light radiates, or which cast the shadows. The style is not a transparent medium for the thought, but a visible thing between you and the thought. It is a style which young readers would admire as a style, without reference to the thoughts. You never forget as you do sometimes with the best writers, that he is using words. Nor is this all. He sometimes seems to be writing, not to express a thought already clear to his own mind, but to get at it and make it clear. He writes as some extempore orators, who have rapid imaginations and fluent tongues, speak, who are thinking out the subject while they speak. When the thought is clear to their minds, they express it with beauty and power; but having uttered it, they are obliged to work their way for fifteen minutes through a mist of metaphors and words to the next idea.

It is not our purpose to write an analysis of the work at the head of this article. The work itself is worth being read. Instead, therefore, of commenting on the book itself, we shall make some remarks on a truth suggested by it, namely, that there is a reformation in the views and feelings of Christians in progress leading on to a greater union and harmony between them.

There is at this time a reform, (of which this and other works of the same author are both the signs and the results,) going on in the Christian church, not less important, though less conspicuous, than that which signalized the age of Luther. This reform consists in a growing disposition to dwell upon and value more highly the fundamental principles of Christianity, — those principles which furnish laws and motives for holy living, and to value less highly mere forms and technical terms of theology and those questions of controversy, that float like bubbles (as conspicuous and as empty) on the great sea of truth. The reformation of Luther, to use a phrase that may convey our meaning better than more accurate language would do, was a reformation of the *intellect* of Christendom; — there is now going on a reformation of the *heart* of Christendom.

Any one who has mingled much with men must have observed, that, amongst the intelligent, the interest in questions of mere sectarian theology is ebbing away. Such questions are confined mainly to Synods, Conventions, and Assemblies. The great mass of intelligent laymen regard them as vain triflings; and the rest, supposing that these questions involve the substance of Christianity, look on Christianity itself as an idle dream, having nothing to do with the waking world. Yet in all these men the religious principle is alive, but it demands something more than barren disputes about the Trinity, or Original Sin, to satisfy it. He who would have power over the beating heart of the present age in this country, must dwell on those great principles of Christianity which address the conscience, and stir the fountains of sorrow and joy, and reveal to men's consciousness the spiritual world. The controversial creeds of past times may sway the verbal faith; but they are losing their power over the hearts and lives of men. Theologians are beginning to be aware of this truth. The character of the disputes between High Church and Low Church, between orthodox and heterodox, are but indications of the necessity widely felt of dwelling on those parts of Christianity which address the common sense and common heart of man. Christianity is ceasing to be dogmatic and becoming practical. We should rather say, that men are beginning to view the doctrines of Christianity as valuable only so far as they have a bearing on the state of the heart, or the manifestations of the heart in the life.

And with this change there is springing up an increasing harmony between sects. A careless observer might say that the Christian world was never so divided as at this time; — a more careful eye would see that it was never so united. One of the superficial signs of this growing union, is the harmony between Presbyterians, and Methodists, and Baptists, and Episcopalians, and other sects deemed orthodox, but which not long since contended with each other, front to front, their ranks bristling with the array of war. We believe that the time is not far distant when even Unitarians and Catholics, who seem to be regarded as the antipodes in heresy, will be admitted into these United Sects, and the name of Christian be extended over all. And there is a still deeper principle of harmony and union in that great principle of Christian benevolence, which men of all sects are acting from, and acting out, as they never have in former ages of the world.

To further this good work, it is desirable that we should sometimes pause and consider the progress already made towards union, — the principles on which sects are founded, — their relations to each other, and the points of union that exist between them.

In a work on Spiritual Despotism, the author of the work at the head of this article has remarked, that the real is much greater than the seeming harmony between Christians. Our ideas about the relations of different bodies of Christians are derived almost solely from religious periodicals and controversial treatises. He who relies on them for any just knowledge of the Christian world must be deceived. Such works are the representatives of contested opinions, not of opinions generally received. Their existence depends on the continuance of sectarian strife. Supported, as each one is, by a party, it is the interest of all to exasperate party divisions. Of consequence, we find that religious periodicals dwell mainly on disputed questions, — that they keep out of view the points of agreement, while their representations of the differences of sects are full of exaggerations. There is a harmony in the feelings of private Christians, an agreement in their views of what constitutes the Christian character, and a unity as to the principles and the ends that should govern a Christian's life, which we should never suspect from reading the writings of mere theologians.

In the work before us, he has assailed that, which has, more than all things else, served to perpetuate and embitter divisions among Christians, namely, the authority of creeds. We refer particularly to the chapter on the *Fanaticism of the Symbol.* Were the principles which he lays down generally received, sects would still remain, but sectarism would be done away. Difference of opinion and different sects there will always be, and these may exist without harm. Creeds even may exist without evil consequences. He has stated the conditions which make creeds the source of evil, in speaking of their origin, in a single sentence. "The tremendous weight of God's sanction," he says, "truly believed to belong to the Canon of Faith, was claimed by each party in behalf of its exposition of the rule. So fatal an assumption effected a firm coalescence of every religious sentiment with the passionate workings of self-love, pride, jealousy, and the sense of personal and corporate welfare." He adds; "With an anathematizing Deity, an anathematized world, and himself safe in the heart of *the only Church*, the zealot wants nothing that can render him malign and insolent." The character and evils of creeds, here briefly intimated, the author developes at length. He expresses, as we believe, opinions that begin to be widely felt. It begins to be understood, that a creed is nothing but a human interpretation of the Bible. It is found that the interpretation has as much need of being interpreted as the original text. The Thirty-Nine Articles, once the symbol of truth, are now but articles of peace; the Confession of Faith is not enough for the Presbyterian till his explanation has made a new creed out of it; and all the standards of faith are beginning to be received only for *substance of doctrine.* Multitudes begin to suspect, that when God utters revelations to his children, it is not necessary to go to some self-appointed creed-maker to find out what he means. They believe that the waters of divine truth, that swell up from the source of life, are as likely to be pure at the fountain head, as after they have been filtered through some saint's brain, or council's passions, and been impregnated with all their philosophical follies, their errors, and superstitions. The verbal respect paid to creeds may be as great as ever, but their actual power is shattered. Their words remain; but, like grave-stones over dead men forgotten by the world, they speak of ideas and feelings that have almost vanished out of the mind of the present generation. The creeds of past ages are becoming obsolete, and surely in this country no body of men could replace them by new creeds, which would have a tithe of the authority formerly possessed by the Thirty-Nine Articles, or the Confession of Faith.

This decay of the authority of creeds does not indeed lead us to suppose that the number of sects will be less, but it indicates the decay of sectarism, — its mental inanition, its slavish subjection to words, its persecuting bigotry. As mind becomes more free, and technical words are held in less respect than ideas, and men value truth more than a prejudice inherited from their grandfathers, — opinions may be more various than now; but there will be a real intellectual and moral union among Christians, such as has not appeared in the world since the days of the first Christians.

It would serve to increase the feeling of brotherhood between Christians, were the origin of different sects remembered; for it would be seen that they spring from causes which ought to unite, rather than divide. The principal sources in which sects find their origin are three; — and we shall briefly examine them, to see what reason they furnish for making them hostile to each other.

1. Sects originate sometimes in different views entertained of religious truth.

Now, so far as differences of opinion result from inquiries prompted by the *love of truth*, there is, in such disagreement of intellect, no reason for disagreement of hearts. He who loves truth has vital bonds of sympathy and fellowship with all others who love truth. Their intellects are united, not by two or three speculative opinions, but by that principle which, in their case, controls the whole intellect. Their intellectual labors, though differently directed, have one object in view. They love to give and receive light. Like travellers lost in an unknown country, some mount a hill that they may discover the right direction, others seek it along the river's bank: as they scatter they fire guns and make signals, that none may be lost from his companions; and, when one has found the true path, how gladly does each hail his fellow, and how do all rejoice when again assembled together. The feeling of mutual dependence, and the disposition to aid each other, were probably never so strong as during the hours of doubt and peril. So would it be with sects, however different their views, were they, as they profess to be, faithful lovers and seekers of truth. It is not difference of opinion, but the love of power, and vanity, and the malignant passions blended with opinions, which produce the rancour and strife between sects. But, so far as Unitarians are concerned, all occasion for contention between them and the Orthodox, even in matters of opinion, seems rapidly disappearing, from the fact that the latter have given up a great part of the ground, for which they formerly most strenuously contended. The old banners may be retained, but they are planted on different walls. Old names may be preserved, but they mean different things. It is found that the phrases and doctrines of Calvin need careful explanation. It is discovered that "original sin" means, that "sin originated in man;" — that "total depravity" is only another way of saying that "there is no one who liveth and sinneth not;" — that the famous lines,

"In Adam's fall
We sinned all,"

are intended to express only the great and universal law of "Social Liability," and that Adam's sin affected his posterity, just as the conduct and character of any parent influence the conduct and character of his children. So long as the Orthodox are willing to give up all the ideas of Calvinism, they ought to be indulged in their partiality for the names and phrases to which they have been so long accustomed. A soulless word, the ghost of a buried idea, that lingers a little before itself goes down to the grave, ought not to breed contention.

The actual agreement of sects in opinion is much greater than is generally supposed. Let one travel across our country from end to end, and converse with intelligent laymen on religion, not as a theologian or a controversialist, but as a man, at the same time avoiding the technical phrases of theology, and he will find in all parts of the country and by men of all Christian denominations, that the same general views are entertained as to the fundamental principles of Christianity. The paternal providence of God and his righteous moral government, the doctrine of a future state and of a righteous retribution, the necessity of repentance, and a good life, as a preparation for the forgiveness of sins, and the happiness of heaven, — these doctrines he will find universally received, and regarded, in almost all cases, as the only ones by which it is essential to govern heart and life. These are the doctrines which have hold on the hearts of men, sway their moral judgments, warn and persuade them in life, and bring hope or fear in dying moments. Address these men as a sectarist and ask to what church they belong, and then, indeed, each one will bring forward his sectarian doctrines, and perhaps earnestly defend them because you assault them; — but nothing is plainer, in most cases, than that these doctrines go not down into the deep places of the soul, — that they are scarcely more than verbally received, and serve only to bind them to a sect for party action. The power of Christianity resides not in them, but in those doctrines which all sects receive in common. In strict accordance with this, the leading revivalists declare, that the controverted doctrines of the day must not be dwelt upon in revivals, because they deaden the excitement and drive away the Spirit of God.

Examine the literature of our times to learn what doctrines of Christianity have given form and color to modern mind, and made a Christian different from a heathen literature, and still it will be found that they are the doctrines to which we have referred above. These doctrines shine through modern thought and feeling. But, except in works written with a theological purpose, and by theologians, what traces can you find of the controverted doctrines of sects in the poetry or romance, the eloquence or the philosophy of our age? And what does the absence of one class of doctrines and the influential presence of the other class denote? It shows that there is a wide and real harmony among those of all sects as to the fundamental principles of religion. The doctrines in which men agree, are those which mingle in with and influence the mental activity of the age, and they do this because they are *felt* to be true and essential. The doctrines of sectarian theology, because they have not this influence, whatever they may be *said* to be, are plainly felt to be not essential.

We do not mean to say that there is entire agreement among Christians in opinion; — far from it; — but we mean to say, that there are doctrines universally received, and that these doctrines, and not others, are felt by men of all sects to be fundamental. The contentions of sects are about points which the great mass of men do not regard as important, — points which are made conspicuous in theology, not from any intrinsic importance, but from happening to be the ones forced up aloft in the pressure of controversy. The disagreement of sects seems only the surface of Christendom; the harmony and union are wide and deep below. So mountain summits on the earth's surface seem to be divided by impassable gulfs, and we forget, that beneath, their roots meet and mingle to the centre.

2. Other sects have their origin in attempts to produce moral reform.

An individual looks on the Christian body with which he is associated as too lax in its notions of duty. Others sympathize with him. They unite together in the work of reform. A new name is fastened upon them. They are gradually separated from those with whom they were formerly connected. They stand apart. A new sect is formed. Such was the commencement of Puritanism. Such was the beginning of Methodism. Wesley taught no new doctrines. He never disconnected himself from the English Church. He belonged to it till the day of his death. His purpose was not to break off a fragment from the Church, but to promote greater holiness in the Church. Neither he nor his followers were ever charged with any heresy in doctrine sufficient to warrant their expulsion from the bosom of the Established Church. The necessity of greater holiness,—on this principle, and not on any peculiar speculative opinions, has the great fabric of Methodism been built up. Such sects may gradually frame, each for itself, a peculiar creed, and lose the spirit which gave them birth, and their members finally be held together by dead sectarian forms and dogmas,—but who does not sympathize with the principle in which they originated? Who does not hope that as long as the world stands, new sects, having for their object moral reform, will arise, to quicken, with their fresh zeal, the torpid blood of Christendom? So long as the spirit that gave birth to such sects remains, and informs them and controls their efforts, who is there in whom the sense of duty is alive, who must not feel for them in his heart the warm beatings of Christian fellowship?

3. But there is a very important fact connected with this subject, which throws still clearer light on the origin and relations of sects. It is this;—that however various speculative opinions may be, the judgment as to what constitutes the Christian character, is in all sects substantially the same. Fenelon would have been received as a Christian in *character* by every church in Christendom. Exceptions would have been taken to his doctrinal opinions alone. Goodness is everywhere the same. Go into any church, Presbyterian, Methodist, or Unitarian, into any class, rich or poor, ignorant or wise, and, setting opinions aside, he, who is regarded as a truly Christian man in one body, will be so regarded, if known, in all. We every day see that all Christians, whatever be their names, are alike,—governed alike by the sentiment of duty, and their souls quick with the same religious affections.

This likeness of character, when speculative opinions are as opposite as the points of the compass, introduces us to the very important truth, that the religious principle is entirely distinct from the intellect. The growth of one does not involve the growth of the other. Indeed, nothing is more common than to see men of cultivated minds in whom the religious principle is dwarfed and dead, and very ignorant men in whom this same principle has the healthiest and noblest developement. The intellects of men do not have to be in the same state in order that the substance of their characters shall be the same. But notwithstanding this, the intellect is the medium through which truth and all external influences approach and act on the religious principle. As the eye is a sense through which external objects act on the intellect, so the intellect itself is, if we may so speak, an inner sense, through which truth acts on the religious principle, to unfold and strengthen it.

But if the medium through which truth acts on the mind varies, then must the *forms*, which the same truth assumes, vary, in order that the same result may follow. For example; one man is ignorant, unimaginative, unreflecting. If you would act on his religious feelings, you must address them through the *senses*. Truth must be put into forms that the senses can appreciate. In another man, the imagination is vigorous, while the reasoning faculty is inactive. Such a one's religious nature must be approached through the *imagination*. These two classes, — the sensual and those in whom the imagination is predominant, make up the great mass of mankind, and therefore it was that our Saviour so constantly presented divine truth in images intelligible to the senses and imagination. There is yet another class, the "emotive" part of whose nature must be addressed through the *reasoning faculty*. A metaphysical argument to prove the duty of benevolence stirs the depths of their souls, while they sleep under the parable of the good Samaritan. Here are three distinct classes of men; and the same truth, in order to produce the same effects in their characters, must be presented under forms as different as are their mental characteristics. And here we come to the third and chief cause of sects, which is, *differences of constitution and education*. Were religious opinions everywhere the same and the consciences of all men equally vigorous, still there would be different sects corresponding to these mental peculiarities. The imaginative will form one sect; the metaphysical, another. One man is by nature a Methodist; — truth must come to him in physical forms, and the senses be stormed before the soul is subdued. Another is by nature a Calvinist; — the jargon of the schools furnishes the *Open Sesame*, which unlocks the entrance-way to his heart; and the stern severity, which the Confession of Faith ascribes to the government of God, finds an echo in his feelings. Another is relying and affectionate. A doubt in religion tortures him. He wants some certain rule of faith. He needs some visible authority on which to lean. If in addition to this he is imaginative, and endued with senses quick to perceive the beautiful in sounds and forms, he is by constitution predisposed to be a Catholic. A large proportion of those who have excelled in the fine arts would, on this principle, we should expect, be found to have been in the bosom of the Catholic or Episcopal Church.

It is often remarked that a man, whatever his previous opinions may have been, always connects himself with that sect by whose ministry he has been "converted." The reason is obvious. In that sect, truth was first presented to him in a *form* that could find access to his religious nature. The same truths that have at last converted him, might have been sounded into his ears a thousand times before; but, because they came to him in forms unsuited to his mental constitution and habits, they were lifeless. To him they were not truths, but dead words. But he finally falls in with Christians whose mental characteristics are like his own, and what he hears from them stirs and moves his soul, as it had moved theirs. He belongs to the sect to which they belong, by nature.

If these remarks be true, in order that there may be *union among Christians in character, there must be different sects;* — that is, in order that the religious principle may be equally developed, divine truth must be presented to different men, in forms as various as are their mental constitutions and habits. We ought, therefore, not to wish that all sects should think the same thoughts, and have the same forms and the same tongue. Such unity as this could be brought about only by extinguishing all thought and all interest in religion. Where there is but one church, there is soon no religion. Where the Church of Rome has been most successful in shutting out heresy, she has been also most successful in dwarfing and blighting the religious nature of man. We ought not to mourn that there are so many different sects, but rather to give God thanks, that, through their instrumentality, all men are able to receive divine truths in forms fitted to penetrate through their intellects into their hearts.

And how should this diversity of sects, arising from constitutional and educational differences, affect the harmony of Christians? In no way, except to promote it. The true bond of union between Christians is likeness and sympathy of character, — the possession of like affections, and the being governed by like principles of action. The unity should be, not in the intellectual speculations, in the creed, but in the spirit. Such union a diversity of sects, by giving power and a wider field of action to Christian influences, should produce.

We have mentioned the principal causes to which sects owe their birth and support. At any rate, few would acknowledge that the sects to which they themselves belong had a different origin, or are supported on different grounds. And what is there in these causes to divide Christians and to embitter their divisions with base and bad passions? Nothing; — and much on the other hand to attract them towards each other. The love of truth, the desire of moral reform, the spectacle of others profiting in a way suited to themselves, form a religion of whose blessings we have drunk; — surely these are all principles of union and friendly fellowship. The strifes and contentions of Christians do not arise from the existence of sects, but from unholy passions never subdued to Christianity. The sectarist, — the jealous, contentious sectarist, — because he loves not his brother whom he hath seen, may know that he is not born again. The bonds will be drawn more closely between sects as they are between individuals, in the same degree, as they become more truly Christian.

We have dwelt the longer on this subject, because, in our view, sects are not the artificial and unnatural shapings of some arrogant and dominion-seeking theologian, but are founded on great principles of human nature of which they are types and representatives. All sects have in them an informing soul of truth. But it is only a part, not all, of truth. The reason that there are many sects is, that the imperfect mind of man can only take in fragments of truth. Each sect has its fragment,— all together possess its divine body. Christian sects are beginning to recognise their brother sects as the representatives of great truths and of principles of human nature, and to respect each other accordingly. This is one step towards Christian union.

But there is another power at work, — till lately unknown,— which is doing more than all things else, to discover and strengthen the bonds of Christian union; — it is the principle of Benevolent Association. This, and not the love of money, or education, is the true spirit of the age; — that which distinguishes our times from all preceding times. It is working wonders in levelling the hills, and filling up the valleys, and making the paths straight, which separate sects. The interest felt in contested doctrines is disappearing in the stronger desire to do good. It is not long since, that sects were at deadly strife, which are now uniting in societies to diffuse temperance, good morals, and the blessings and light of Christianity, through our own and over all other lands. The principle of benevolence is daily gaining dominion over sectarian jealousy; and Christian sects, instead of being so many hostile kingdoms, each arrayed against the other, are becoming the peaceful and harmonious provinces of one kingdom, whose head is Christ. A union is in progress, — silently, almost unobserved, going on while men have slept, yet rapidly, — the only true and desirable union between Christians, — a union, not of heads, but of hearts, — not of intellects, but consciences, — a union of *moral sympathies and ends,* and not of intellectual speculations. This union is a holy one, — the herald of a true millennium. May God hasten its consummation!

While writing these remarks, we observe in the bookstores another work by the author of the one at the head of this article, on a Future Life. We have no room left to speak of it, except to say that whatever its merits may be, we are glad to see it. Our gratification arises particularly from the fact that its author is a *layman.* We hold it to be an augury of good to theological science when there are many lay theological writers.

We confess that we look to laymen for new and valuable views in theology quite as much as to the clerical profession. The former, provided they have any thing like the same amount of learning, occupy a position far the most favorable for original thought. A clergyman, while yet young, with a mind unformed, with an education scarcely begun, becomes a student of divinity. He goes to some sectarian theological school, — puts his mind under the daily supervision of able teachers, — his habits of thought and of reading are directed by them, — he is educated into their system of theology, and educated to be hostile to all other systems; and while his mind is in its forming state, it grows up, — as into a mould, — into the creed which has dominion over the institution where he is.* When he goes forth from this institution, it is as a champion of its creed, and, what is equally bad, he associates only with its champions and adherents, and thus sees the opinions of others only from a hostile point of view. And soon, by his friendships, by his worldly interests and prospects, and by a thousand social ties, he is fettered still more closely to a creed adopted almost without reflection in immature youth. On every side he is surrounded and threatened by penalties for thinking. What wonder is it, that he should go on through life, repeating, parrot-like, the systems of divinity by which his youthful mind was educated! But the intelligent layman who makes theology a study, (and many such there are,) stands in great measure aside from these influences, so unpropitious to truth. His theological reading is likely to be the work of maturer years, when he can test the theories of books by the experience of life. He has no masters to direct his studies, and is the more likely on that account to go out of the beaten circle of ancient systems. He reads, not so much that he may believe what others think, as to think what he himself may believe. He studies not as a school-boy, but as a man. His worldly interests and his social ties do not, to any thing like the same extent as with clergymen, identify him with a creed or a sect. He stands in a freer air and sunshine, and the road to truth is choked by fewer impediments.

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* In speaking thus of theological schools, we would not for a moment be thought to under-estimate their importance. Properly conducted, they are the strong safeguards against fanaticism, and the only places in which the means are collected for training up an enlightened and useful ministry for our churches. But in our country, how few of those, so called, are truly schools of theology; how many, the schools of sectarianism! Because an institution is invaluable when rightly used, it by no means follows that it is so when abused. The perversion of the best becomes the worst.

We are not, perhaps, authorized to look for great reforms in theology to laymen, but to look to them rather as aids in breaking down those walls of system which imprison professional theologians, and prevent them from using their learning as an instrument for the discovery of truth. The clergyman and the layman may greatly aid each other by their writings. They stand at widely different points of view, and each may help to correct the errors of the other. The clergyman may have more learning; but the layman will often have a more correct judgment of the practical applications of that learning. They see truth from different summit levels; and the layman will naturally have new views of its bearings and relations. They see men and society under different aspects, and the layman will see many things illustrative of the value of truth, and suggestive of the best mode of applying it, which will never occur to a professional man. How vast an amount of new thought and illustration has been thrown into theological literature in England by lay writers,—by Locke and Newton, by Milton, Wilberforce, and Hannah Moore! These names, and such as these, belong to the history of every step in the progress of both speculative and practical theology in England. May many lay writers like these, and like the author of the Natural History of Enthusiasm, arise among us, studious of the Scriptures, and able and willing to give the results of their studies to the world! It will be of equal advantage to Christian truth and Christian duty. E. P.

Art. III. — *The Way to do Good: or the Christian Character mature. The Sequel to "The Young Christian" and "The Corner-Stone."* By Jacob Abbott. Boston, 1836. 12mo. pp. 248.

Another crowded volume from a most prolific pen. We have read it carefully, without weariness, but not without satisfaction. It contains more of the author's peculiar excellences, and fewer of his faults, than either of its predecessors; unless we except the fault of dilation, or rather dilution, for which he is so remarkable, and in which we think he has here surpassed himself. There are readers of a particular class and age, perhaps more numerous than is commonly thought, to whom such extreme amplification is not objectionable, and may be useful. We have never been quite sure for what class or age, if for any specially, Mr. Abbott writes these books, there being in them an unusual mixture of strong meat for men, and milk for babes. But even if he has chiefly in view, as he intimates in his preface to this book, "the common classes of society," we are persuaded they would be better satisfied in the end, because they would find themselves aided and more profited, by that condensed style, which admits of greater definiteness and clearness of plan, and will commonly be found to leave upon all grades of mind more distinct impressions. Then there is the fact, that these books would be more likely to be bought, and far more likely to be thoroughly read, if reduced to a smaller compass, — considerations not unimportant to the most disinterested and elevated motive.

We are speaking of this book in connexion with the others, to which, as the title tells us, it is designed to be a sequel. "'The Young Christian,'" says the preface, "was intended to introduce the reader to the first steps of the Christian life; 'The Corner-Stone,' to explain some of the simple elements of revealed religion; and now this work is intended to close the series, by giving the reader some general directions in respect to the great work which God has given him here to do." Such being the connexion of these works, and the series being now closed, our having noticed the first would be a reason for noticing this, though not a reason that would constrain us, if we had no other or better. We think the book worthy of notice and recommendation; and if our recommendation can help its circulation and its object, we give it cordially. Its object is one of the best. Not merely the motive of the writer, which may often be good where every thing else is bad, but the obvious design throughout, the prevailing tendency, the means and the end, are in our view all good. There is a commendable willingness to recommend those means only, in doing good, which are most obviously and unquestionably adapted to the end. This, which at first view may seem slender praise, is yet praise which must be withheld from at least half the books that are written at the present day, and the measures of every kind used to produce an effect. Their authors and advocates seem not content to use the most obvious and probable means of accomplishing their object, those means which commend themselves to all good men, those arguments that are most reasonable, those doctrines that are least disputed, and those methods that will raise least question or resistance. The very opposite to all this is the course chosen by many religious writers, leaders, and supposed reformers. They start with the assumption, that old modes of thought and action are to be discarded as ineffectual, if not false; that that which is common to all is too common to be worth much; that to do good or be good in a merely practical and practicable way is small virtue, and that any cause, doctrine, or measure, which will unite *all* in its favor, is more than suspicious. Something peculiar to themselves, something that will be sure to offend carnal reason and raise the opposition of the natural man, something that will exclude others from a share both in the agency and the result, this is to be sought after, and this alone shall satisfy.

Of this poor presumption and all but intolerable folly Mr. Abbott has none. He is willing to do good in any good way, and he does not insist that there is but one good way, or, if there is, that he is more likely to have found it than the rest of the world. He does not attempt to exclude all who cannot go with him from the privilege of doing good, or pretend that he has any right, more than they, either to refuse or accept another's contribution to the common fund of good influences. He acknowledges whatever is right, wherever it dwells, and welcomes whatever is good, though its name or form seem not the best. He prays that all Christians of all denominations may exhibit more of the spirit of conciliation and concession, and insist less than they do, on their peculiar modes and different forms. His views of this subject are free and generous. They constitute one of the chief excellences of his writings, and we are not without hopes that they will have influence upon the class of Christians to whom he belongs. We may have occasion to show these views more fully, when we speak of that part of his book which comprises them. Not that we think of noticing every part of the book. But we are anxious to give some idea of its plan, having thus spoken of its general temper.

The plan of this work is defective. It wants unity and simplicity. It comprises too great a variety of subjects, with too little connexion or natural order. The title indeed tempts to this, and is itself too comprehensive and vague. There are few features of society, or movements of the world, principles of religion, or modes of action, that might not be included in a consideration of "the Way to do Good." Mr. Abbott seems aware of this, and acknowledges both the difficulty and the imperfection. But we do not see any necessity of creating to himself such a difficulty. Nor do we think his arrangement of the topics he has taken, the best. We have first a chapter on works and faith, then motives, next ourselves, the poor, personal piety, public morals, the church and Christian union, the sick, children, instruction, conclusion. The slightest glance at these several chapters will satisfy any one of the immensity and confusion of the work. It resembles the face of an ancient sermon of the hydra genus, of which the maker seems to fear nothing so much as that he may omit some head or member which of right belongs to the body evangelic. It is true, a book of this kind is not to be subjected to the same rules as a sermon. But our doubt is, whether it is wise to make books of this kind; whether it would not be better, in the multitude of books now sent out, and from the nature of the mind, that each volume should have its own distinct subject, and exhaust it if possible, without attempting any thing more. This seems to be urgently called for in regard particularly to some of the topics embraced in this volume; as the treatment of the poor, the sick, and children. In the present state of our community, nothing is more needed than distinct and complete treatises on these subjects, that the duties, difficulties, dangers, and claims of each may be fully considered. Notwithstanding the prevalent and perhaps correct opinion that common minds do not feel the need of such exactness and completeness, it may still be true that they would feel the advantage. This, however, is matter of judgment, and does not affect the true merits of the book before us. If books on this plan are wise and useful, we hope the work of preparing them will always fall into as good hands as those of Mr. Abbott.

His leading principle, as a guide to the way to do good, if we may state it in few words, is the principle of *personal piety*. Several chapters are devoted to the explanation of piety, and the means of cultivating it, first in the individual himself who is to do good, and then in those whom he is to benefit. In these chapters there are many just discriminations in relation to motives and objects. And on no subject is discrimination more needed, perhaps on none more rare. The motives from which we attempt to do good will always affect the way in which we attempt it, and both may affect materially, not only the amount of good usually done, but also the character, both of the agent and the recipient. And character, as Mr. Abbott aims continually to show, is by far the most important object to be kept in view. If the character is injured either in the giver or receiver, no good is done, but the opposite, whatever the appearance or outward result. How little this has been considered in most great systems and costly efforts of benevolence, every one knows. That it is now coming to be considered soberly and made essential, is one of the most encouraging aspects in that most perplexed and difficult of all works, common charity. If the principles laid down, the distinctions made, the errors and evils exposed, and the advice given in this book, shall be attentively read and heeded, by however limited a number, and however humble a class of benefactors, Mr. Abbott will certainly have found one way to do good.

In saying this, we have particularly in mind the chapters on motives, the poor, and the sick. They are not perfect treatises. They are not so thorough nor so able as others that may be found. They aim only to give simple, practical counsel to common laborers. And the counsel is very superior to that by which common laborers, in the different fields of Christian exertion, appear to be guided. We may say it is such as seems to be strangely disregarded and violated often, by those who are active in the larger denominations of the religious community. We have not been accustomed, either in the theory or practice of certain classes, to find such sensible and wholesome caution as we find here, against the influence of feeling, instead of principle. The error and mischief of acting from impulse, or what is called tenderness, and supposed to be Christian emotion and benevolence, have not always nor often been so candidly exposed and forcibly illustrated. So in regard to the sick, the right way of approaching and dealing with them, in regard to religion, has seldom been better set forth. It is not easy to calculate the evil that has been done in this respect, and done by those who thought they were doing most good. We know few greater trials of one's patience and charity, than those to which we are sometimes subjected by the unauthorized interference, the boldness, the impertinent curiosity, the selfish or sectarian zeal, and, worst of all, the unfeeling roughness, we had almost said, extreme cruelty, with which the sick and the dying are often persecuted, by religious friends, religious strangers, and those who bear the name of religious comforters and pastors. The ignorance that is betrayed of the human mind, the false and delusive views that are given of the power and purpose and promises of religion, the advantage that is taken of weakness and even unconsciousness, and the use afterward made of what has been thus extorted, are, we believe, among the chief causes of reproach to religion, and injury to the best hopes of humanity. We heartily welcome all such sentiments as are found in the following extracts, which are specimens of Mr. Abbott's judicious treatment of the whole subject.

"Do not try to ascertain the effect of your instructions to the sick. Do what you can, but leave the result to be unfolded at a future day. The reasons for this direction are two. First, you cannot ascertain if you try, and secondly, you will generally do injury by the attempt.

"First, you cannot ascertain if you try. The indications of piety, and also of impenitence, upon a sick bed, are both exceedingly delusive. So much depends upon character, temperament, constitution, habits of expression, &c., that the most dissimilar appearances may be exhibited in cases where the spiritual state is substantially the same. In one case, the heart is really changed; but the subject of the change dares not believe it, and still less dares he express any hope of it; and his darkness and despondency would be mistaken, almost universally, for continued impenitence and insubmission. Another, deceived by the illusions which we have already explained, finds a false peace, which, the more baseless it is, the more confidently he expresses it; and Christians very rarely question the sincerity of professions, unless they are compelled to do it by gross inconsistency of conduct.

"These difficulties exist, it is true, in other cases besides those of sickness, and they should teach us to be less eager to ascertain the immediate results of our efforts, than we usually are; and less credulous in trusting to them. But they apply with ten-fold force to sickness, whether it be in the sufferings of acute disease, or in the slow lingerings of decline. The world is shut out, and the ordinary test, — the only safe one, — the fruit, is here excluded.

"Then, secondly, we do *injury* by endeavouring to ascertain. We harass and fatigue the patient by pressing him to give *us* an answer to the claims which we present to him. If we lay truth and duty before him, and, as it were, leave it there, his health will suffer far less than if we follow it with a sort of inquisition into its effects. To bear an examination is very hard work, when the subject is strong and well, — it is exhausting and irritating to the last degree, in sickness, especially when the patient would hardly know how to express his feelings, even if they were distinctly developed and mature, and he is, in fact, only beginning to experience new states of mind which he scarcely understands himself, and certainly cannot describe.

"It is far better, both for ourselves and for the soul which we wish to save, that we should not make much effort to remove the veil which hangs over his future condition. We shall go on with our work in a more humble manner and in a better spirit, if we feel that the duty only is ours, and the result of it God's; and the sinner, who has postponed repentance till summoned to his sick chamber, will be most sure of being safe at last, if he does not think himself safe too soon. Some degree of uncertainty in respect to the genuineness of a change which has been produced under such circumstances, will be the best for him, whether he is to live or die." — pp. 252, 253.

"We err often in such cases, by endeavouring to draw from the dying Christian, the assurances of his unwavering hope, or his last testimony to the reality of religion. We do this partly to procure subjects of pleasant recollection to friends, and partly to furnish new and corroborating evidence to the truth of Christianity. But it is wrong to make any such efforts. We may safely listen to and receive whatever the patient may spontaneously say; in fact, some of the most striking and powerful evidences of the power of religion have been furnished from the testimony which has been recorded from the lips of the dying. But if it is extorted, or even drawn out in the most delicate manner, it is of little worth." — p. 256.

The following paragraph refers to a subject on which one would think it unnecessary to give any directions. We are compelled, however, to believe, and not only to believe, but to know, that these directions are needed, and are sometimes most shamefully disregarded by friends and ministers.

"We close this series of directions with one which might very properly have been placed at the commencement of it. In all our intercourse with the sick, we must acknowledge and submit to the authority of the physician and friends, in respect to the extent to which we may go in regard to a spiritual influence upon them. We ought not to violate, by stealth or otherwise, the wishes of those on whom Providence has placed the responsibility, and to whom he has given the control. I will not say that there may not be some rare exceptions, but certainly no one can doubt that where parental authority, in a case fairly within parental jurisdiction, or the orders of a physician who has the responsibility of life and death resting upon him, rise up like a wall in our way, there Providence does not intend that we shall go. Whatever good we might fancy we could do by violating these sacred powers, we have no right to violate them. In fact, we should do no good to violate them, for we should create a suspicion and jealousy which would close many more doors than we should thus unjustifiably open. It is well for the spiritual friend of the patient to have an understanding with the physician, and obtain some knowledge of the nature of the disease, especially in respect to its influence on the mind; and then to endeavour to fall in with the plan of cure pursued, at least to do nothing to interfere with or thwart it. We are bound to do this, even in a religious point of view; for the hope of salvation, in the case of a sick sinner, lies generally more in a hope of recovery, than in any reasonable expectation of benefit from spiritual instructions given upon a dying bed." — pp. 257, 258.

It is not to be inferred from the previous remarks, that the book we are noticing is designed to be a guide or text-book in the work of charity. It was not the author's purpose, nor is it his view of the way to do good. Visiting the sick, feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, dispensing alms of any kind, he treats as some of the ways, but not emphatically *the* way. The promotion of personal piety is, as we have said, his leading principle, that which he considers the great work and way. And this, first, in regard to the individual himself who aims to do good. His best preparation for the work, his most powerful instrument in any and all circumstances, will be a principle of deep, calm, enlightened, fervent piety. He who has this, can never fail to do some good, however limited his other qualifications, or few his opportunities. He who wants it, though with other qualifications of the highest order, and the richest opportunities, will be sure to do nothing or to do harm. The first duty, therefore, is to cherish our own piety, and cause it to become a principle of life and all action, if we would do permanent good in any province. The next duty is to cultivate the same principle of piety in those whom we are to benefit. This is essential. It is to be thought of and labored for, not as the end but as the beginning of true benevolence; the best preparation for other good, the best preventive of all evil. A common idea is, and most charitable effort goes upon this idea, that when physical suffering is removed, the piety of the sufferer may then be promoted. Mr. Abbott's idea would seem to be, that piety is first to be promoted, in order that physical suffering may be not only removed but prevented. He admits that temporary relief must first be given, before any thing can be done, that actual present suffering *must* be relieved at all events, whatever the circumstances and however great the guilt of the sufferer. But he contends that moral and physical evil are so intertwined, that the latter hardly admits of a separate remedy, and that the removal of the former should be regarded as not only the greater good, but the truer alleviation. Hunger, disease, and misery cannot be warded off, so long as there is sin. Remove the sin, and the evils which it causes or aggravates are removed with it. "Regeneration cuts up the root of wretchedness, and every bitter fruit will soon disappear. The ragged, hungry, diseased, and miserable vagabond will soon be found clothed and in his right mind." This is the principle and the rule. There are exceptions; but they do not subvert the principle, and they will diminish in number and power, in proportion as the rule is remembered and faithfully followed.

There is nothing new in these views; but they are of the first importance, and are here well presented. We are but beginning to understand, to what a sad degree the time, the wisdom, the prayers, and riches of the world, in its essays of benevolence and institutions of charity, have been wasted upon the effect, instead of being directed to the cause, of evil. The symptoms only have been relieved, and relieved in such a way as to feed the disease. Moral evil is the great destroyer. What other evil will compare with it? how many evils would exist without its presence? Is there one benefit, of any name or kind, that can be conferred upon man, which would not be facilitated or enhanced, by the implanting of religious principle, the promotion of personal piety? How great the mistake, that they only can do good who have *money!* This has been considered as preëminently the means of usefulness, and that which it could directly purchase, relief from bodily suffering and outward want, as the end. Christianity is teaching the world, that *piety* embraces both the means and the end, and that its great instrument is sympathy, — sympathy with Jesus, the omnipotent physician, sympathy with man, the sinner and the sufferer. May the time come, when all ministers of good shall feel, with the writer before us, that "the great work of benevolence in this world is the work of coöperating with God in attempting to REDEEM THE HUMAN RACE FROM ITS SINS."

We may speak of Mr. Abbott's book as proposing two principal ways of doing good; the one, by means of charity, which we have now explained, — the other, by means of Christianity as a system, the church, acting upon the community and mankind. Not that there is such a division in the book itself, for, as we have intimated, there is a want of division and clear arrangement. Be that as it may, all that we have to say of the work will be brought under this division.

The chapters on public morals, and the church and Christian union, are not the least important. If we mistake not, they will draw the most attention, and find some objectors among the author's religious friends. We have already seen doubts expressed in one Orthodox journal, in regard to the soundness of these views. We cannot expect, though it seems not much to expect of Christians at this age of their religion, that any one will find a general response, who advocates entire Christian union, and pronounces differences of forms not essential nor insuperable. This is the stand which Mr. Abbott takes, with manly and Christian independence. He regards "denominational jealousies" as a fruitful source of evil, and without reason or excuse in themselves. He pronounces "censoriousness and party spirit, the bane and the destruction of the Christian cause." He acknowledges that much of the action and conflict of the church militant, is for victory over opponents, more than over sinners; that one denomination often "shows itself far more afraid of the progress of the opposing one, than of the progress of sin." He affirms that forms and modes of organization hold a very subordinate place in the Scriptures and in the scale of means by which the church is to be sustained and religion extended. Not that forms are unimportant, but that differences of form are not essential. And yet they are the chief cause of contention and discord. Even among those denominations which most nearly approach each other, separated by nothing but modes of organization and forms of worship, coöperating in many good works, passing under the common name of Orthodox, there are yet insuperable barriers raised by an inordinate attachment to forms, rousing some of the worst feelings, and leading to the virtual condemnation and excommunication of each other. From the manner in which Mr. Abbott speaks of this, we infer that there is even more of jealousy and alienation among the different portions of the true church, than we had supposed. We say the true church, for we are not presumptuous enough to imagine, that even Mr. Abbott, much as we respect him, has any idea of including or considering Unitarians, when he calls upon the various sects to overlook minor differences, and come together in the spirit of mutual confidence and coöperation. If he does intend to include us, we owe him our thanks for an unwonted civility. We presume, however, that our first impression is correct, and that we can claim no other share in the state of things here described, than that of humble observers.

> "The present state of things is certainly melancholy in the extreme. Each of the several great denominations, considering its own peculiarities essential to the character of a true church, the members of one are suspicious and jealous of the other. They must necessarily be so, for they must regard all others as schismatics. They may, indeed, allow that many of the members of other communities, as individuals, are good men, but as organized into ecclesiastical bodies, they must deem them irregular and schismatical. Thus the members of each denomination excommunicate the others, and must do so as long as they maintain that their own peculiarities, though not necessary to personal salvation, are essential to the character of a true church. There is, accordingly, between these denominations, at the central points, in great cities, suspicion, jealousy, mistrust, manœuvring and counter manœuvring. And the evil influence spreads out to the remotest extremities, among the remote and thinly-peopled districts of the country." — p. 220.

Nor does our author think very highly of the efforts usually made to obtain relief from these evils; either the contentions by argument, which, as they proceed upon the assumption, by each party, that its own modes are exclusively valid, end in nothing but more obstinate adherence to these modes, — or the attempts at partial conciliation, by proposing a union in plans and measures, "the parties each still thinking, that its own church is the only true one." There is good sense in what is here said of the "fit of love and coöperation," which sometimes comes over the different denominations. We ourselves have something to learn on this point. Many attempts have been made recently, to bring about such a union of sects, whose common action on great subjects we might be allowed to share. We know the motives in those of any name who propose plans and yield points for conciliation. We believe it is the crying sin of the churches, that there is so little of this spirit, and that all the fruits of the little there is, are poisoned by some breath of discord. We believe all the other causes of infidelity combined, the influences that embolden and aggravate it, are not greater than this one, — the rent, wrangling, criminating, disgraceful state of the churches, and sects, which bear the name of the Prince of Peace. We look for little progress in the power and glory of Christianity, whatever professions may be made, or appearances presented, or soundness boasted, or growth anticipated, while this cankering disease lurks at the heart, and manifests itself, without shame and even with pride, in every member. Far rather would we bear the sin of the worst heresy, if it were with a free conscience, and a humble love of the brethren, than meet the face of Jesus with this inconsistency upon the soul's front, and endure his calm but withering look for disregarding his repeated exhortations to "become perfect in one"; to love one another, as the mark of being truly his disciples, and the only way to make the world believe and know that God sent him. It surpasses our understanding, that ministers and churches *dare* to disregard such precepts, and assume the responsibility of denying the right and restraining the power of others, to work together with them and with all for truth. Still, to recur to our first view, so long as this is their feeling, we desire to work by ourselves. It is a severe demand upon one's self-respect, though that we could meet if it were all, to ask a privilege which no man has a right to withhold, nor in fact the power to give, as it is given of God in our natures, and made by the Son of God a duty. But this is not all. It is a waste of breath, it is a loss of time, and strength, and love, it is to invite abuse and cause further sin, to solicit favors which "a perverted conscience" will not allow to be given. Where there is such a sense of infallibility, or such ignorance of Christianity, that any number of human beings can suppose themselves alone called, or alone able, to carry on the work of the gospel, it is better that others should remain by themselves, and do their own duty independently. Nothing can be gained by bringing together those whose consciences live in opposite hemispheres, while their hands and feet attempt to move in union. The difficulty is with the conscience, or rather with what men imagine to be conscience; and until that difficulty is removed, the conscience enlightened, and the soul enlarged, coöperation will be but a name. "It is inevitable," as Mr. Abbott says, "that each party will be watchful and jealous. If they mean to take a high-minded and honorable course, they will be anxious and watchful, lest they should themselves do something to offend their allies; and if, on the other hand, they are narrow-minded and envious, they will be on the watch, lest the others should do something unjust towards them. The very nature of the case shows, what all experience confirms, that such alliances between the denominations, while each one considers itself the only true church, will always be of the nature, not of a peace among friends, but a temporary and jealous truce between foes."

Mr. Abbott's way to do good, in relation to this state of the church, is that of learning the real place which forms and modes occupy in the view of reason and revelation, making them subordinate to the power of faith and the spirit of benevolence, and while we leave each of the several sections of the Christian family in quiet possession of its own ground, and use of its own means, endeavouring "to diminish, and ultimately to destroy, the walls of jealousy and dislike which separate them." His own view of forms may be seen in the following propositions which he lays down as fundamental. They are far in advance of some that we have seen, and not entirely unlike some for which we have ourselves suffered reproach. We commend them to the ruling powers of those churches, which glory in Apostolical authority and infallible standards.

"1. Forms of ecclesiastical organization, while they were under the special direction of God, in ancient days, were not fixed and permanent, but were *changed continually*, according to the exigencies of the times. These changes continued down to the close of the scripture history.

"2. The forms that were in use at the close of the scripture history, were only usages *incidentally introduced*, from time to time, and not adopted as a system deliberately arranged and established, once for all.

"3. The *description* of these usages is very indistinct and incomplete.

"4. The Apostles were not strict and uniform in their observance of them.

"5. Their present authority rests on *the mere practice of good men*,' in early times, which is nowhere in the Scriptures made binding.

"6. The most complete system which can be drawn from these records of early practice, is *not at all sufficient for the present wants of the church.*

"7. The union of Christians, under any one consolidated ecclesiastical government, must be highly dangerous if not fatal to the cause of true piety.

"8. God sanctions, by the influence of his Holy Spirit, the existence and operations of all those denominations of Christians, whatever may be their forms, whose faith and practice correspond with his word."

On each of these propositions, the author enlarges, sometimes with effect, sometimes profusely and unprofitably. The principle, however, and the spirit are good throughout. We cannot follow him, nor do we think it right to take room for quotations, though there are many passages worthy of notice. One, in illustration of the fifth position, involves truths and distinctions which are so seldom avowed by certain Christians, if held, that we ask a place for them, so far as they are here expressed.

"The disposition thus to exalt the measures and administration adopted by the Apostles, into precedents as binding upon our forms of organization, as their writings are upon our belief and moral conduct, — though it is thus utterly baseless and defenceless in theory, steals insensibly over our minds, and exerts a powerful influence. In fact, we could not attach infallibility to Apostolic practice as an avowed theory. Such a doctrine could not be maintained for an hour; but it insensibly creeps into our minds, and we find ourselves tacitly admitting, and silently acting upon that, which, as a distinctly stated proposition, we should immediately reject. I repeat it, that Apostolic example is of immense value and importance to us, — but it is not authoritative precedent, so that we are to reduce it to system, and force it upon every company of Christians on the globe, upon pain of excommunication. And yet this is the true secret of the divisions and jealousies which prevail in the Christian world. The incidental, scattered, and imperfect allusions which the Apostles made, to the measures they thought called for in their days, in which there is no evidence whatever that they were infallibly guided, and which they probably never thought would be looked back upon as infallible precedents, — these allusions we search out and bring together, we build up a great deal of meaning upon expressions very brief and few, and we mingle with the natural import of the record, the recollections and associations with which our own peculiar religious history has stored our minds, — and the complicated system which we thus form, we insist is essential to Christianity." — pp. 211, 212.

It is one of the recommendations of this book, that it exposes the fallacy of many of those puerile modes of thinking and speaking, which, with not a few Christians among us, have passed into axioms, and are habitually given out as truth and orthodoxy. Some instances of this have been partially shown in the extracts we have made. We will notice one other more directly. There is a silly saying which has reached our ears in various forms, amounting to this, — that a merely moral man is in greater danger, if not a greater sinner, than a grossly immoral man. Mr. Abbott admits that it is a common opinion, and rebukes it. He acknowledges the disposition of many to regard with more dislike, and condemn more violently, those who differ least from them, than those who differ most, and shows the inconsistency of such a disposition. "Instead of looking with a jealous and malignant eye, upon those who differ least from us, we should be glad to have them as near as they are." Their holding half the truth is not to be treated as a sin. Their condition is not worse, but far better than that of those who reject all truth. "Persons embracing a corrupted or defective form of Christianity, are more accessible, conscience is more easily awakened, conviction of sin and penitence are more readily felt than under the deadening influence of paganism. Many of my readers may have been accustomed to think differently." That is a singular system, and those are singular teachers, both in a mental and moral view, who lead any to think differently. It would seem to be clear enough for most children's comprehension, that he who has travelled half the distance that separates him from home, is nearer that home, and can more easily reach it, than the man who has not begun the journey and has no disposition, perhaps no ability, to begin. We are pleased to see also, in another place, as a part of the same discrimination and candor in Mr. Abbott, that he considers "sympathy" the only avenue by which the unbeliever is to be reached; and that he admits, what we have heard more than one public teacher deny, that a deist may be honest. As in other cases, we do not quote this as a great admission, in itself, but only in comparison. It is unusual and encouraging, — though Christianity has been some time prevalent, and we live in an enlightened age and a favored country, — it is encouraging to find any one willing to advise those who would convert men from error and unbelief, to approach them with such feelings as the following words express; — "I do not think it surprising that such a man should be a Deist. Considering his education, his associates, and the position he occupies, I can see easily how the subject of revealed religion should present itself in such a way to his mind, as to lead him to disbelieve it." If unbelievers were always regarded and approached in such a spirit, so far at least as their peculiar case admitted, if it were even allowed that there may be peculiarities in the case of different unbelievers, degrees of virtue and vice, a *possible* exemption from all that God would condemn, there would be ground for a thankful and a most cheering hope. How much have Christians yet to learn, as to their duty toward those whom they regard as not Christians, — be they near or distant, half or wholly infidel. How much have they to learn, and how much to do! May God open the heart, and hasten the work!

We have spoken of Mr. Abbott's book throughout with approbation. We are not disposed to retract or even qualify this opinion, on account of a few faults and errors. A few there are, decided faults and errors, and we had marked some of them as calling for notice. But they are so few, and so evidently the defects of a system more than of an individual mind, that we leave them with this passing allusion. They do not injure the work materially, and would not prevent our putting it into any library or any hands. The space that would be taken by a more particular notice of them, we prefer to occupy, if we may, by a few remarks of our own on the great subject of the book itself, — the Way to do Good. And that we may be both definite and brief, we confine ourselves to one view of that subject; namely, *want of faith in moral influences*, as the most serious obstacle, now prevalent among us, in the way of doing good; an obstacle and evil, as chargeable upon us, as Liberal Christians, as upon any portion of the community, and with glaring inconsistency.

By moral influences, we understand the power of mind upon mind, the influence of thought freely pursued and freely expressed, the influence of knowledge, reflection, inquiry, discussion, the influence of right principle acting itself out, the influence of TRUTH. Take any of the great evils or good enterprises of the world, and see what a lamentable want of faith in these influences everywhere prevails. Take war, intemperance, slavery, infidelity. The number is small, comparatively, of those who hold wrong views of these evils, and are prevented from acting upon them only by wrong views. At least the number is large of those who hold right views, who have sufficient knowledge, who do not need to be convinced of the horrors or expenses of war and intemperance, the wrong of slavery or the danger of infidelity,— but who see no way, in which they can do any thing to relieve these enormous evils. They seem to regard them as, in some sense, a part of the course of nature, if not the order of Providence, which it were wrong to suppose we can change. Thus they settle down into that short-sighted and fatal feeling, that these are among the "necessary evils," which God may arrest, and will in his own time, but over which man has no power.

This sentiment is particularly important, because it prevails among the better portions of society, among decided Christians. It pervades all classes, and bears upon all relations and interests. It affects legislators, statesmen, rulers, reformers, ministers, and churches. It hinders inquiry. It restrains expression. It forbids discussion. It prevents knowledge, action, and even reflection. For that which men do not speak of freely, nor ever act upon, they seldom think of, or think to no purpose, ask for no information, hearken to no argument, feel no obligation. In this way many who would feel and act are discouraged, those who have no desire to feel or act, are excused, and the few who are so weak as to feel unduly, or so bold as to express their feeling in decided action, are ridiculed, if not condemned and opposed. Sad, that this spirit should prevail among Christians, on any subject. Particularly sad, that it should stand in the path of causes eminently Christian, and reforms confessedly practicable. Sad beyond expression, that its malign influence should extend to every subject, and impede all good works.

It is one of the dark signs of the times, — this want of faith in the power of correcting and removing evils. There are, every one sees, remarkable and noble exceptions. There are true manifestations of the opposite spirit. Exertions are made, plans are devised, energies directed, objects proposed and accomplished, which seem to contradict, and, so far as they go, do contradict the fact which we have asserted to be common. We mean not to say, that there is less faith than formerly, in moral truth and Christian influences. We speak not of comparative periods, but of duties and defects in comparison with opportunities, in view of our age, our religion, our professions, and the nature of the evils in question. We speak of faith in *moral* influences, compared with faith in physical, mechanical, or any other. The first bears no proportion to the last, and seems often to fail entirely where it should exist peculiarly. Instead of it, we find a spirit of morbid inaction or dependence, often a sort of skepticism and infidelity, which were not to be expected. We see it in the smile of contempt with which the practical man, as he is called, looks upon the schemes of the theoretical man; as if theory must not precede practice; as if study, opinion, conviction, faith, were not stimulants to action, and the moving powers of the world. We see it in the indifference with which many good men look upon enormous evils, as too distant to be reached, too extended to be compassed, or too old to be eradicated; when they know they must be eradicated, or Christianity fails of its avowed purpose, and refutes its own predictions and promises. We see it in the common assertion, that we are not accountable for evils that are entailed upon us, even if we do nothing to remove them, and that it is extreme folly to trouble ourselves about the sins and sufferings of other nations or distant places; while our religion allows us to regard no people so distant as not to be our very neighbours in their claims upon our regard, and throws upon us a portion of the burden of all sins, however caused, if we do nothing, when we could do something, to bring those who commit them to repentance and reformation. We see it, perhaps, most of all, in the loud demand, at the present day, for speedy results, visible effects, definable and tangible good, to crown every exertion; all in the face of the admitted truth, that it is the distinction of our nature to grasp the distant, and act upon the future, while it is the very purpose of our religion to aid this capacity, to inspire faith in the ultimate good effect of every high principle and right action, however invisible the operation now, or remote the blessings.

We are not disposed to make extravagant demands on men's faith or service. We have no sanguine expectations in regard to the special moral enterprises of our day. We attach no supreme importance to the formation of societies or the benefit of associations. But we do attach importance to the duty of forming and expressing opinions, and diffusing right views. It does not trouble us, that there is some skepticism and opposition to benevolent effort. It is well that there are always those who are determined to bring every scheme, for however good a purpose, to the rigid test of cold investigation, and to follow it with narrow scrutiny. It may be well that this scrutiny should be even suspicious, and that all enterprises should encounter distrust, obloquy, and opposition. This would seem to have been designed, and we can easily see that good may come of it. If there were no suspicion or opposition, errors would more often be unseen, and impositions go undetected. With less caution, there would of course be greater danger of mistake and extravagance. But this can never furnish the slightest excuse for him, whose caution becomes inaction and indifference, whose skepticism creates the darkness and difficulty of which it complains, and whose selfish or obstinate opposition prevents the good and aggravates the evil. It is a great truth, little heeded, that, though it must needs be that offences come, there is a woe for that man by whom the offence cometh.

No, we would not be exorbitant in any demand, nor extravagant in any expectation. There is too much of both these follies in the community. Let us not add to them. But let us not forget or betray the trust committed to us in our nature and by our condition. Let us take our stand on the principle, that in morals there is no such thing as an incurable disorder; since for every disorder there must be a remedy somewhere, under the providence of a perfect Being, and it is the duty of every man to seek and apply that remedy, as soon and as faithfully as possible, though the disorder be ever so old or remote, and the time ever so distant when he can hope it will be fully removed. Let us stand upon another related principle; that for the removal of moral evils, we must use moral means; and that moral means are not imposing in their form, nor instant nor always visible in their effects. Still there is nothing, — and this, while we own, we are to remember and act upon, —there is nothing, whose power or effects will compare with those of moral means. They constitute the vital principle, the mighty, often moderate, often secret, but ever mighty and resistless energy of Christianity. No man has a right to say, that moral means and influences will not avail, in any case. For they are of God, — and the power and kingdom and glory of God are given them. The world has bowed to them, though it has so often forgotten and defied them. They use the resources of the world, they command all its instruments, its forms of good and evil, its strength and weakness, its faith and its scorn. The world is already full of the proof and power of these influences; not in the vision of prophecy alone, or the fancy of faith, but in the reality of history. Trace the world's history, note the changes that have passed over its face, in the condition of its inhabitants, their physical, intellectual, social, moral character. Changes, how many, how marked! And where is the power that has wrought these changes and secured their blessings? Where is the agent, that has rolled the world on, from its infancy and barbarity, to its present state of civilization, religion, manifold wealth and power? Where, but in moral influence? What but the power of truth, faith, knowledge, private principle, enterprise, and action, beginning always with individuals, then wielded by masses and moulding nations? Are these changes to cease? Is this power to die? Not while God reigns, and man has faith in God, and uses the powers he has given, and seeks the influences he has promised, and moves on, unwearied and unwavering, in THE WAY TO DO GOOD.

E. B. H.

Art. IV. — 1. *My Prisons, Memoirs of Silvio Pellico of Saluzzo.* Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1836. 12mo. pp. 367.

2. *Additions to "My Prisons, Memoirs of Silvio Pellico," with a Biographical Notice of Pellico.* By Piero Maroncelli, of Forli. Translated from the Italian, under the Superintendence of the Author. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 12mo. pp. 276.

Some years ago, we met with an ingenious article by Miss Taylor, entitled, "How it strikes a Stranger!" Should her "stranger," in this populous world of ours, observe how much of the time allotted to man is spent in that most passive of employments, reading, how many hundreds of human beings are apparently yielding their souls, day after day, to the sway of other men's minds, — seeking professions which make books the instruments with which they work, or stealing hours from bustling and mechanical tasks, that they may pore over the pages rushing in millions from the ever-teeming press, — would not this sagacious stranger naturally inquire, "*What* do they read?" Would he not seek to learn the character of the works most popular among these insatiable consumers of literary food? Would he not fairly draw some inferences respecting their minds and dispositions after ascertaining the quality of the literature most acceptable to their tastes? We think he would. We think too he would judge kindly of human nature on observing the wide-spread popularity of the work before us. It does not enthral the readers with the spell of genius; its pages do not glow with poetry or eloquence; they offer no reflections fresh with originality, for the profound thinker to seize upon with delight; they disclose no secrets in the philosophy of nature; they charm not the lover of romance by variety of incident and intricacy of plot; they cater not to a depraved appetite for scandal. Yet they have riveted all classes of readers, from the philosopher, who reads to find materials for his meditations, down to the veriest sofa-lounger, who reads only to avoid the trouble of thinking.

What is then the secret of their enchantment? — Let him who thinks ill of his fellow-creatures, observe what these volumes depict. Is it not oppressed virtue? They appeal to some of the best feelings of our nature; to our sympathy with distress, to our sympathy with goodness. They sketch scenes of cruel suffering, both mental and physical; but they sketch too the consolations afforded by sincere piety. They paint the depth of human woe; but they paint that solace in actual operation of which man *cannot* be deprived, and we feel that they paint from life. There is the impress of truth on every page, and it gives an intensity of interest which the most highly-wrought fiction must for ever want. We cannot throw down the book when sympathy becomes too painful, shake off the magician's spell, and exclaim, "After all, these things have never been!" We know that the most fearful details are bare, unadorned facts; and we behold what it was that supported the mind under calamities the most crushing in their nature: calamities beyond all that the most unfortunate of us will probably be called to endure in our probation. That which the moralist in his closet, the preacher in his pulpit, the pious mother at her fire-side, are all laboring to instil into the heart of man,—religion, as an active, strengthening principle, is here visibly, gloriously operating under our eyes. It is not in the character of Silvio Pellico alone that we watch its developement; though he speaks of his religious exercises, his spiritual trials, his backslidings, his penitences, and his prayers, with a freedom and communicativeness somewhat repugnant to Christians of more delicate reserve on such topics, yet he is not the only tenant of the dungeon whom we see looking upward to catch the unearthly light of the gospel as it streams into his cell. In an auto-biography, no matter with how much simplicity and modesty it may be written, the hero of the tale must always be one whose impartiality the suspicious may impeach; but among the characters grouped around the principal figure, among the forms that come and go with more or less distinctness, will be some that leave a strong impression on the memory. The side-lights will fall on some striking attitude of a minor personage, and we shall not easily forget it. Who can help paying homage to the long-tried resignation of an Oribono, dying in a foreign prison, by the slow murder of scant food, unwholesome atmosphere, and want of exercise,—yet looking through his prison-bars on the foreign grave where his bones were to be laid, with a calmness which nothing but Christianity could inspire? Who can study the beautiful character of a Maroncelli, under bodily torments, needlessly increased by neglect, seeking only to alleviate the distress of his beloved friend, and not perceive that the example of his divine Master had sunk into the heart of this affectionate being?

Even Pellico, though his devotional exercises are unfolded to us in the first volume, with a frankness somewhat startling, accustoms us ere long to the novelty, and we feel that this is not done in the spirit of religious display. We have read religious journals, — so called, — printed and published for the world to study and admire, professing to reveal the inmost sins, sorrows, and compunctions of the soul, its most sacred communion with itself, and, — worse yet, — with the Deity, — where on every page glared such vanity, spiritual pride, and arrant self-deception, — we will not say hypocrisy, — that we turned from the record sick at heart. Such are not the disclosures of the open-hearted, enthusiastic, guileless Pellico. We see that he tells all because concealment was not in his nature, or what is better, to set forth and illustrate the truths of which he speaks in his brief and manly preface. We give the preface entire, for there is nothing better written in the whole book.

> "Have I written these Memoirs to gratify my vanity by speaking of myself? I hope not. And as far as one may judge in his own case, it appears to me that I have had better motives, — that of contributing to the comfort of the unhappy, by making known the evils I have borne, and the consolations I have found attainable under the greatest misfortunes; — that of bearing witness, that in the midst of my long sufferings, I have not found human nature so degraded, so unworthy of indulgence, so deficient in excellent characters, as it is commonly represented; that of inviting hearts to love much, to hate no human being, to feel irreconcilable hatred only towards mean deceit, pusillanimity, perfidy, and all moral degradation; that of repeating a truth well known but often forgotten; that both religion and philosophy require an energetic will and calm judgment; and that without the union of these qualities, there can be neither justice, nor dignity, nor strength of principle."

The passage, "bearing witness, that, in the midst of my long sufferings I have not found human nature so degraded, so unworthy of indulgence, so deficient in excellent characters as it is commonly represented," — reminds us of another fact we would recommend to the attention of him who loves to depreciate human nature. Bandied from jailor to jailor, brought into close contact with the myrmidons of a despotic government, with turnkeys and sentries and the whole race of under-strappers to authority, the very beings most prone to abuse the power which they find little chance to exercise but in tormenting, what testimony does the prisoner bear as to the dispositions manifested towards him? Alike among his countrymen under the sunny sky of Italy, and in the bleak land of strangers, he finds kindness, pity, sympathy everywhere. The accents of compassion fall even from the lips of the rough Illyrian peasant, as the desolate band of state prisoners passes him on its way to a ten years' purgatory in Spielberg. "*Arme Herren!*" ("poor gentlemen!") he exclaims, and the carriage-wheels roll on; but that single expression of human sympathy has sunk into the hearts of the wretches cut off from life's tenderest ties. "State prisoners!" The very word is thought to speak of highly-advanced civilization! There is no Spielberg among the unpolished inhabitants of the South Sea Islands; the crisped sons of Africa are too far behind the enlightened empire of Austria to dream of the uses that may be made of Piombi and Pozzi!

The lesson taught on every page of these volumes is one of which a free people do most need to be reminded. To boast of liberty is one thing, to enjoy it with a proper sense and estimate of liberty, is another. To detest tyranny is one thing, to watch against its insidious approaches is another. It may come gliding over the sea, "*spumante salo*," like the serpents that involved Laocoon in their deadly folds; it may steal from behind the incense-clouded altar; it may wear a tiara, and as it lifts the keys of St. Peter, more significant of sway than the proudest sceptre, millions may wake from their dream of security to learn that a new world has sunk into bondage, when the throne of Rodolph of Hapsburg is tenantless, and the chains of the Inquisition have ceased to clank on the soil of Europe. It is well, therefore, that vivid pictures of despotism, as it exists at the present day in other countries, should be set before us from time to time, to be contemplated in strong contrast with the widely different state of things among ourselves. Despotism is a fearful word, in all ears; but we venture to say few readers will lay down these volumes without a more vivid conception of its terrible results than before.

There is another commonplace truth so beautifully exemplified in the narrative of Pellico, that we cannot pass it over. To cultivate the intellect and the affections is allowed to be a very sure mode of cultivating happiness in all ordinary modes of existence. Ten years in "*carcere duro*," offer rather an extraordinary mode of existence, it is true; unless perchance to him who is so happy as to be born under the "paternal" Austrian government; (see Captain Hall's "Skimmings";) but even under circumstances the most wretched that can be imagined, how was the lot of Silvio Pellico and his companions modified by their intellectual acquirements and the lovingness of their dispositions? It is true the very tastes they had acquired *at first* aggravated their woe. The scholar without books! without pen and ink! The fond son and brother forbidden to hold the slightest intercourse with the beings who best loved him! the mind pining for its accustomed intellectual food! the heart thirsting for social intercourse with kindred hearts! and this too when the frail body was indeed a clog on the soul with its own unsatisfied wants, its pains, its shattered nerves, its wasted flesh, its aching bones! How did the experiment terminate? Behold the inexhaustible resources with which God has endowed that mysterious thing, the spirit that is in man! Behold, ye who find so many apologies for indolent neglect of study! ye who are misanthropes because ye can find no one worthy of your love! Read the account these imprisoned scholars give of their hours allotted to study in the forlorn dungeons of Spielberg; read of their intense mental exercises; peruse the sweet melancholy verses composed by Maroncelli at an hour which to most men would seem strangely chosen to invoke the Muses,—while waiting for the amputation of a limb whose disease had been induced by imprisonment. Did not these men find resources in literature when its fountains had been barbarously shut from them? The fertilizing stream had flowed over their minds, and the soil yet bore and blossomed in the season of drought.

Then for the affections; that very susceptibility of enjoyment from social intercourse, that ardor in his attachments which seemed to render Silvio Pellico the man of all others least calculated to endure separation from his fellow creatures, what did they do for him when the hour of trial came? They taught him to derive happiness from such intercourse as he could hold through his grated window with a deaf and dumb boy. It had pleased *God* to place barriers between one of these sufferers and the rest of creation; the poor child could hear no one, he could speak to no one. *Man* had striven to shut out the other from all social intercourse. Yet these two beings held communion together; they loved each other, and their solitary destinies were cheered. A man of colder and sterner temperament would have swept away the ants that came trooping to his window, and crushed the spider that had "hung its tapestry" upon his walls; Pellico fed them, and they were an amusement, an occupation, a source of pleasure to one who had been placed there that he might forget what pleasure was. That very passion for benevolent action which led him, with a credulous simplicity worthy of the Primrose family, into such marvellous charity towards the reprobate Julian, claims something more respectful than a smile from us, if we remember that his excellent feelings would probably have sought their objects with more discrimination, if not cramped and confined within prison walls. Was it not noble, instead of being swallowed up in the selfish consideration of his own helplessness and misery, thus to wage war against infidelity and vice with the spirit of an exulting crusader going forth armed at all points?

The triumphs of friendship, charity, and all good, amiable, and pious feelings are recorded throughout these books in the best possible way, simply by stating facts. In the same way is most terrible, damning witness borne against tyranny; as at the day of judgment, when the voice of human oratory will be hushed, when there shall be no eloquence of accusation or defence, when our deeds alone shall appear for and against us at the unearthly tribunal. With few comments, with no vituperative declamation, under the very inspection of a censorship, a bare narrative is here published of transactions that thrill us with virtuous indignation against oppression and cruelty. What reflections are excited by these few words! After the release of the prisoners, they were in the magnificent avenues of Schönbrunn, still in charge of officers, when "the emperor passed, and the commissary made us retire, that the sight of our emaciated countenances might not sadden him!" What then if the potentate could but once have awakened from his luxurious midnight sleep, and beheld the whole ghastly throng of state prisoners drawn from their dungeons and congregated about his couch, with their heavy irons, their famine-stricken faces, their diseases, their gaunt despair, their raving madness, their dying agonies!

We are glad that Americans may read a translation of this popular work from an American pen. There is an ease and spirit in it which show both familiarity with the Italian, and fine command of our own tongue; the last being an acquirement which equally deserves the name of an accomplishment. There are no awkward idioms left in the midst of a flowing period, as if the translator did not know what to do with them; yet the whole tone of thought and feeling is so foreign, so characteristic of the ardent Italian, that we feel assured the very spirit of the author is there.

The second volume is interesting as connected with the first; though with all our partiality for the amiable and much enduring Signor Maroncelli, we cannot but observe incorrect taste and a rambling turn of mind in his prose style. His philosophy, as set forth in his long treatise on "Cor-mentalism," is of a school to which we do not belong. We have found in this essay many fine words, many positions laid down of imposing sound, many passages that brought to mind the famous piece of Aristophanes, entitled "The Clouds." Lest some modern Socrates should liken us to the satirist of old, who laughed because he could not comprehend, we forbear further comment on matters high above us. We only wish that the accomplished translator, whose own writings evince so much clearness of intellect, *could* have translated her author's meaning into intelligible common sense as ably as she has turned his Italian into English. We could not construe the 163d page, nor the following passage, for all the honorary degrees of all the colleges in Christendom.

> "God is substance, for he is the only self-existent being. Creation is a form of this substance. God is goodness, truth, poetry. Creation is beauty, is art; is the mirror that reflects the goodness, truth, and poetry, which are the divine essence. Substance and form are not separate, but constitute a unity: form is a condition of space and time; substance is absolute."

Something, perhaps, may be said for the teachers of the "New Science." They have exalted notions of the Deity, of human nature, of the love and charity which should be the distinguishing characteristics of the Christian character. So far as their doctrines are at all intelligible and practical, they apparently tend to good, and produce good effects on the individuals embracing them. But we may say as much of Swedenborgianism, of Quakerism. However the fact may be explained, these two denominations are remarkable for the number of excellent characters they produce in proportion to their numerical strength. Yet our sober understandings will not suffer us to become Swedenborgians or Quakers. We cannot but think that fresh discoveries of important truth would appear to the mind of man in revelations so vivid and distinct that all men, of equal intellectual capacity at least, might profit by them. We believe that clear conceptions can always be expressed in perspicuous language; and that if these modern philosophers had really grasped new and just ideas, a thing to be expected as the world grows older, they could state them as intelligibly and convincingly as their predecessors in the great business of making the world wiser. But the language of the "learned Gravina" breathes the very spirit of these latter days, when he speaks as follows of a poet whose obscurity most evidently springs from the frequency of his historical and local allusions. "I discern in Dante a great mystery. I have not the key to it; but I see afar off the day when it will be possessed, and his work will be regarded from a far higher point of view." We should hardly imagine that the difficulty of understanding Dante would *decrease* as we leave his epoch farther and farther behind us in the gloom of antiquity. But these words "great mystery" have a fascination for many, springing from a principle so deeply implanted in human nature that it were vain to contend against any mode in which it may temporarily manifest itself. All things change and pass away in this fluctuating world, even fashions of philosophy: the love of the marvellous and vague will assume some new phasis after a while, and the time will come when men will be satisfied with the degree of mystery in which God has left his own bright nature and dealings involved, without wrapping them in the mists that arise from their own busy fancies.

We cannot but wish too that Signor Maroncelli had announced his system with the prepossessing grace of modesty. The passage we quote must justify this wish.

> "The work which I composed embraced all the fine arts. It was, properly speaking, a new general theory of poetry, not adapted to a transition state, as that of Hermes Visconti of necessity was, but at once stable and progressive; stable in such a way that it will be more and more confirmed in proportion to the progress of the moral, political, and religious condition of man in the present age, and beyond it, even to the greatest advancement which the future may attain."

But the second volume of the work before us communicates many interesting facts; and in the details which Signor Maroncelli gives us, over which no exciding knife was held by the censor, we behold the petty tyranny of which these unhappy gentlemen were the victims, in all its glorious absurdity. Cruel, yet ridiculous, were many of the barbarities to which they were subjected; and the humblest individual who reads of them may despise in his heart the "good Franz," under whose sway such things were permitted, by whose very autograph some of them were sanctioned. Truly the sons of Austria may not blame the children of Israel for having worshipped a golden calf.

There are times when the contemplation of the state of things under such a despotism kindles a hope of better days. It seems as if the trodden worm must turn; as if a tremendous power of reaction must at length be roused, as if the cry of the oppressed must make itself heard at the footstool of Almighty Justice. Without metaphor, we feel as if human beings could not and would not endure for ever a bondage so galling. But alas! we look more narrowly, and we behold a tyranny so complete in all its parts, so perfect, so systematized, that hope dies within us. If slavery cannot breathe in England, freedom cannot breathe in Austria. In the national character, in the very constitution of the Austrian, there seems to be an adaptation for slavery; he is a beast of burden, a very donkey in his nature, stupid, obstinate indeed, but helpless against the panniers and the cudgel. An ignorant people cannot appreciate freedom; and how can knowledge get at an Austrian? The principle of subjection in his very soul makes him a well-disciplined sentinel, an admirable police officer, a most faithful *secondino;* nothing will tempt him to swerve from his obedience, and from his childhood his enjoined task is to stand guard with the musket on his shoulder, against the entrance of the scholar, the philosopher, the philanthropist, within those dark domains. Austria is a slave: Italy is the bondwoman of a Helot.

But Italy yet remembers that there is such a thing as liberty. Austria has worn her chains till she frets in them no more, and habit has lightened their weight; while Italy yet struggles, and they chafe to the quick. If there is hope for suffering Europe, it is here. While there are still signs of life, while there is consciousness, resistance, effort to be free, there is hope. In Austria liberty is locked down in cold, silent, motionless death; in Italy she is filleted and bound for sacrifice, but the victim that eyes the free woods and plains in utter desperation, may yet burst the thongs, spurn the priests, and bound from the very horns of the altar. The most vague notions of liberty if they excite interest, aspirations, and struggles, may result in the study of its nature, in a more distinct conception of its peculiar advantages, in more judicious and successful exertions to obtain it. And how curious, how beautiful, how edifying is it to watch "th' eternal art educing good from ill!" to contemplate the vast yet delicate machinery of human events slowly evolving the fairest of blessings from the darkest of calamities, by processes we can neither anticipate, control, nor comprehend! In these times of affliction, we see many of the worthiest sons of Italy wandering away in exile, learning to exchange their own sweet language, that flows like melted Latin, for the harsh tongues partly of barbarous origin, and pining with homesickness under the foggy skies of Britain, or among the still remoter strangers of another hemisphere. It is not likely that all these unhappy men are to lay their bones in a foreign grave. Some will perhaps return at length to their beloved Italy; and what will they carry back? What boon have they as the reward of their expatriation? All seeming evil is for some good purpose; why are these patriots scattered among the nations of the earth? It remains to be seen whether they are not sent as it were from home to school; whether they will not profit by having lived under liberal governments; by having had opportunities of studying the constitutions of free nations in actual operation; by having come close to that which requires close inspection to be understood. Many a beautiful theory, many a fair political fabric, conjured up in their youthful imaginations, may have faded; but it remains to be seen if, when their passions have cooled, their judgments have been ripened, and their experience enriched by observation, they will not carry home a treasure of more enlightened views, more rational projects, a better knowledge of the objects to be aimed at, and the dangers to be avoided in seeking to enfranchise their countrymen. We shall see if they are not fitting themselves to become the wise legislators of a free people.

From the interesting pages of which we now take leave, we have drawn at least two happy omens for the oppressed land of song. Best of all symptoms is it to find men in the very bosom of the Catholic church professing themselves Christians in language so rational as that of Pellico in the third chapter of his Memoirs; and next best is it, to read of designs so fraught with enlightened public spirit as those mentioned in Maroncelli's Appendix, from the 214th to the 218th page, originating with some of the most influential men of Lombardy. These designs may have failed; they may have been crushed; they may fail and be crushed again and again; but it does not seem to us that the vital principle of liberty is likely to be annihilated among the countrymen of Porro, Confalonieri, Visconti, and Silvio Pellico; and we repeat, as we close these volumes, there is yet hope for suffering Italy.

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Art. V.—1. *A Sermon preached at the Ordination of Charles F. Barnard, and Frederick T. Gray, as Ministers at Large in Boston*, by Joseph Tuckerman; with *The Charge*, by William E. Channing. Boston. 1834.

2. *A Discourse delivered before the Benevolent Fraternity of Churches in Boston, on their First Anniversary, April* 9, 1835. By William E. Channing. Boston. 1835.

3. *The Necessity for a Christian Ministry in special Adaptation to the Poor; Two Sermons preached in Renshaw-Street Chapel, Liverpool. With a Prospectus and Plan of the Objects of the proposed Ministry.* By John H. Thom. Liverpool. 1836.

4. *A Sermon preached in the Second Unitarian Church in Mercer Street, on the Moral Importance of Cities, and the Moral Means for their Reformation, particularly in a Ministry for the Poor in Cities.* By the Rev. Orville Dewey. New York. 1836.

Our purpose is not to review these publications, but to make some remarks on their subject; a subject, one of the best proofs of whose importance is found in the existence of writings relating to it, so marked with dignity and power. We would give as true a portrait as we can of the actual ministry at large in this city. We hope not to draw the perfect image, but plainly to sketch the main features; a few coarse lines sometimes present the face with juster shape and expression, than the most polished engraving. Our points are the foundation of this ministry, its true purpose and idea, its form, its action, its danger, its hope.

First, its foundation. This, in the large sense, we believe to be in the everlasting truth and law of God. We believe it the divine will that the vast chain of being should nowhere be rent, — that link everywhere should join to link, — and that, in the attractive circulations of love, the countless orders of the universe should glide smoothly on in eternal progression. The chronicle of many a world that shines on high would doubtless give better illustrations of this principle than can be furnished by our poor earth.

Again, and more specially, this ministry to the poor has its foundation in Christ. Ancient wisdom, or ancient religion, gave no proper basis for it. It is cheering indeed, that, in ages of darkness, the "caves of philosophy were made to sparkle" to the sons of wealth and genius. Socrates and Plato were brilliant stars, and attracted from the few a gaze of admiration. But the whole world wanted a sun, and cried for life as well as light. With the Saviour, it was not "great souls" alone that were destined for immortality, but all souls, — or rather all souls to him were great. His faith and hope were in universal humanity. And who needs now be told that his whole life was but one expression of this faith and hope? "The poor have the gospel preached unto them." It was indeed a satisfying proof of his divine sonship, and comes in after the enumeration of those works, "which no man could do unless God were with him," like the fitting close of some sublime anthem.

Lastly, the ministry at large is based in the character of our civilization, and the necessities of present society. Not yet are we, according to the Saviour's prayer, "all one." Much of heathendom lies in the very midst of Christianity, not circulating freely so as to be likely to receive virtue from whatever leaven is in the whole lump, but existing a solid mass by itself, and visited but seldom and uncertainly by a single beam of light. What stronger reason could exist for the establishment and vigorous support of such an institution as the ministry at large? We are aware no moral position is so impregnable as to be safely shielded from the assaults of doubters and disbelievers. We know some persons have a set style of speaking on this subject. Society, they say, is a divine institution, controlled by divine Providence. The high and low, the happy and miserable, forms of degradation as well as shapes of glory, we shall always have among us. Do not waste your sensibilities or your efforts on what is unchangeable.

But, with such a moral chaos in our midst, can anybody believe there is no divine spirit to breathe over it with an awakening power, and bring forth from it a new creation into the light of day? From what part of the world's history comes the belief that Providence is inclined to cripple human power, and crush the human will? Or what is really the true character of such faith as that described? Is it Antinomianism, or Fatalism, or Pantheism, or Atheism? How shall we best name that spirit of cold infidelity, which holds back from all new effort, throws dampness and death on every fresh form of life, curses noble designs with failure, because it does not *believe* they will succeed, and is never satisfied when good has been done, till it put its curious fingers into the print of the nails, and thrust its hand into the side. We confess, doubt is sometimes truer and more honorable than belief. The advocates of new measures are sometimes the most cruel of all the intolerant, and we need some steady bulwarks against their passionate zeal. Great service do they render society, who frown away selfishness and impertinence from its seats of power. But the doubters we speak of, are of a different order. There are those, whose skepticism, in such cases, is but another name for their unwillingness to be disturbed in their quiet luxuries, whose care for public good is swallowed up in their fear lest the public good should not harmonize with their exclusive pleasure, and some railroad happen to pass directly through their private garden! We think, however, this kind of infidelity is disappearing, and the earnest belief spreading, that a foundation is laid for such institutions as the ministry at large in the character of our civilization, and the wants of present society. It might seem proper, in this connection, to give a statistical account of the origin and progress of the actual institution in Boston. But the attempt would be more curious than useful. The germs of moral as well as physical growth, though they wrap worlds in their compass, are hard to be detected in their atom forms. In mentioning the name of Dr. Joseph Tuckerman, we give all the information needed on this point.

These remarks bring us naturally to speak of the purpose and idea of the ministry at large. Its purpose is to cleanse and freshen the stagnant places in society, and lift men, made in God's image, from the depths of pollution, that, unbound from perishing things, they may join the company of the immortals. Its idea is to convey the blessings of Christianity to those who are actually, by whatever means, without the pale of Christianity; not to preach to, or visit, those who have found, or are able to find, provision for their spiritual wants in any other way. It is missionary in its purpose as truly, as if it were established in one of the savage islands of the Pacific. If it trench on ground before occupied, or appropriate the fruits of other men's labors, it is not only unjust to institutions already existing, but mars the purity of its own idea, and of course makes its own operation weak and inconsistent.

Again, the idea of this ministry is to act on that large and well-defined class in the community, of which we speak, with the instrument of Christian truth. It is not to give alms, or medicines. It is not to circulate books of science, or increase mere knowledge. The hurt is too deep for such cures. The great disease that afflicts poverty is, indeed, a moral one. Yet we think this fact has sometimes been too strongly expressed, as in some late publications we have seen. We speak not from vague feeling or from the testimony of others, but testify what we do know, when we say there are instances among the poor of even a sublime purity and power of soul. There are those, the history of whose souls would be more precious than the biography of Cæsar or Napoleon. Still these are exceptions. The general conclusion certainly falls the other way. Indeed, if this were not so, we should be hardly able to explain the existence of wide-spread want. God is rich enough to feed and clothe and shelter all his children. He sends suffering only when it is a needful Mentor. The ministry to the poor would, then, strangely err, if it should cherish a morbid sensibility to bodily distresses, and raise a continual sad lament about these things in the ear of the community. Its great endeavour should be to understand and carry out the moral purposes of poverty,— to read with a spiritual interpretation, to the poor man, the volume God puts into his hands in the actual condition of his life. Thus only can it do real good, thus only effectually relieve the sorrows it beholds, or communicate an abiding joy. Could it equalize the wealth of the city among its whole population, or plant an eleemosynary institution in every street to-morrow, the purpose would not be answered; could it diffuse through the whole mass the wisest philosophy of the schools, it would still find itself at fault. But when the spiritual faculties of the poor are developed, and they come to understand the spiritual meaning of their condition, and their glorious hopes, it is really wonderful to observe what a happiness is theirs. The moral conditions of our well-being observed, it is wonderful to mark how common, how cheap, how universally diffused are all the other elements of happiness. A good heart, under whatever external covering, and however scant be the board, is clad in richest drapery, and feasts on the luxuries of the world. Let the soul be attuned to the harmonies of the universe, and those harmonies will reach it in a hovel. The Æolian harp sounds as well in the cottage window as in the palace balcony. Aristides was poor, but preëminently happy, because he was *the Just.* And we know an aged helpless woman, whom charity upholds every moment in its arms, who is far happier than some that roll in wealth. Let there be real culture of spirit, and it matters little what be a man's condition. The remainder of life may be woven, as it were, in the style of drab. Our constitution does not admit beyond a certain measure of outward joy. If all the fountains in creation were opened to a man's lips, he could not exceed this measure. In any usual combination of outward circumstances, this measure can be reached.

We pass naturally from the idea of the ministry at large to its embodiment or form. If, in so short a time, it has taken any very decided form, the fact is proof of its intrinsic vigor. A few years since the whole ministry was included in kind visiting from house to house. Afterwards an audience was collected in the northern part of the city in an "upper room," who listened to the preached word with a wondering delight almost like that with which the first converts heard the voices of the Apostles. Next, by the aid of liberal citizens, a chapel was built in Friend Street, which has lately, with many tears and struggling emotions, been exchanged for a large and beautiful edifice of brick, erected in Pitts Street. An audience was likewise assembled in an apartment in the southern part of the city. Afterwards an edifice was built in Warren Street, and has been occupied for some time. Thus two Christian temples, consecrated to the free spiritual education of the poor, stand on Boston ground, noble monuments of the generous and religious spirit of the Boston community. In each of these chapels a church of Christ has been constituted. And the holy ordinances of our faith, baptism and the Lord's supper, are administered to a band of his pure and faithful disciples. These rites are found to act with special efficacy on the poor, in making spiritual things real to their minds and in their lives. With each chapel is connected a large Sunday school, which holds two sessions every Sabbath.

In the Chapel in Warren Street, the preaching also is adapted specially to children, except in the Sunday evening service in the winter months, when a congregation of adults is assembled. It has been also the habit in the Friend-Street Chapel to preach to children one half the day. But the custom pursued, and intended for the permanent custom in Pitts-Street Chapel, is to adapt both the services in summer, and the three services in winter, to *families*, — and the interior construction of seats is suited to this design.

Another point that may come under the form of this ministry respects the particular individuals engaged in it. The faithfulness of him who first labored is beyond question. And it seems almost superfluous to speak of the disinterested and unwearied zeal of those who, with the rites of ordination, have been since set apart to the work, and of those, in other denominations, who have engaged in it at intervals. Already has the blessing of many ready to perish come upon them, and doubtless the prayers of grateful piety have brought down rich rewards from heaven to their hearts.

It is natural here to consider the outward relation of this ministry to the regular ministry. Both, devoted to the same end, ought to live, not only in harmony, but active sympathy. Especially ought the regular ministry to advise, cheer, sustain, what is, in one sense, the creature of its own formation. We have reason to believe it will do this freely and gladly, and that the union of which we speak will be constantly becoming more hearty and efficient.

The ministry viewed as thus constituted by its idea and form, we speak next of its action. It might seem that, in a city so thick-strewn with church-spires as Boston, there could hardly be any considerable field untouched by the hand of spiritual culture. But, as we have already implied, there is such a field of no narrow boundaries. Nor is the fact a reproach to the established clergy. How can a few men, unblest with any enchanter's wand, be expected to regenerate such a crowded swaying population! But, if they cannot, certainly other provision ought to be made for those souls which, if unprovided for, will perish of hunger in a place, which seems to be the very granary of spiritual food. Would we were able, for the persuading of the doubtful and the arousing of the indolent, to make the forms of certain real existences among us pass and repass, as in a magician's mirror. Swiftly and thick the giant shapes would come. Vice and beggary, intemperance and debauchery, sickness, with trembling step and ghastly visage, moaning old age and wailing infancy, proud, joyless unbelief, the weeping face of sorrow, and then the statue-form of tearless despair, now a tumultuous group of blasphemers, a raging crowd of quarrellers, and following, perhaps, another company, in which husband and wife, parent and child, are seen locked, not in the embrace of love, but of mortal hatred, — thus would the forms proceed, a vast army, in "one ever-lengthening line," till the eye of the spectator would sicken, and the lid drop in faintness. Such is the sphere of action of the ministry at large, which could indeed only by some means of enchantment be pictured to those, who walk over only the city's beautiful grounds, and through the palace courts of society.

Engaging in the work thus before it, the ministry at large does not simply touch at random upon a loose, shifting multitude of units. Little could be effected by chance-contact with such souls. Each chapel has its own congregation, each minister his peculiar parish, and pastoral charge. He visits, exhorts, celebrates the marriage rite, performs the funeral service among his own people. He is their friend, object of respect, source of counsel, refuge from trouble. His teachings and character become a centre of attraction, round which steadily revolve pure and faithful souls, making a little firmament of moral glory.

But while the action of the ministry at large is, first, in a regular sphere, it is also a *various* action. The charge, in its hands differs exceedingly from the parish that has had existence and individual character for a century, and has come down from father to son, guarded continually by faithful watchmen on its walls, saved from the incursion of foes, and edified by many a spiritual builder in every inward grandeur and grace. Many of those who compose the parish of a minister at large, are strangers in Zion, have lived for the most part without her walls, and have approached only fiercely to *rage* around her battlements. Some, brought up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, have long since, by worldly misfortune, been sunk beneath the level, on which our churches are erected, or by deceitful vice allured from the holy hill into the valleys of sensual pleasure, whose draughts have poisoned the soul almost to its death. Many of them can be cured and reclaimed. Some are only innocent, unhappy wanderers. They are touched and overcome by the kindness that leads them once more to the house of God. And how ample a recompense their tears of joy for all expenditure of money, all preparation of means, all weary labor and watching for souls!

But there is another class widely different. They seem to have been "given over to work all uncleanness with greediness." Could their history be written, giving a true picture of their inward as well as outward lives, it would present one of the darkest and most fearfully interesting pages in the world. Even our courts, and jails, and executions, do not give the most terrible lines that would be printed in that page. Tired of home, we visit foreign lands for excitement. But that idle man, whose face and form seem the very personification of *ennui*, is at this moment walking by a door, within which transpires a real experience that would thrill the soul more than the soul of many a man is thrilled, who crosses the sea. How true, that each man dwells in the world of his own creation! And, should a man look with discerning eye into the little sphere of our own city, how would he exclaim, What a multitude of worlds in one!

But what shall be done with the characters of whom we speak? They are the materials of mobs, the elements of every social convulsion. Shall they be left still more to degrade and imbrute themselves? Shall vapors collect, and flames kindle, and volcanoes form, beneath the green, smiling surface of society, and we keep on feasting ourselves in careless delight? The whole machinery of government, alas! proves itself unable to regenerate these spirits, however it may for a moment intimidate them, repress their violence, or even bring about, with a few, outward reform. There is hope only in the labors and prayers of such an institution as the ministry at large. It cannot, of course, in a moment, remedy the whole evil. But it can and does reach and affect many. Some of the worst are entirely restored in heart as well as life,—and multitudes are softened and saved from excesses of crime. If Christian kindness and moral power fail, to what mightier agent shall we resort?

With the minister at large cases are continually occurring of gross vice, or open crime, or deep profligacy, which are seldom numbered among the calls of common parish labor. If they exist in respectable society, there are greater means of concealment. Then there are vices of the *mind* ever occurring, as well as of the life. There is the disease of vulgar infidelity to treat in its various forms. Again, in particular circumstances, families are to be separated, boys and girls to be sent into the country, or provided with board in town, or placed as servants in families, and all this mainly with a view to the accomplishment of a spiritual work. In many cases a proper school is to be sought out. The ministry does very much also in furnishing the various charitable institutions in the vicinity with suitable subjects. We refer to such as the Farm School, the House of Reformation, the Female Orphan Asylum, the Children's Friend's Asylum.

We have been speaking of the *variety* of action called for in the ministry at large. Were there room in these pages for particular statements, we might give catalogues of cases without end in illustration of our general positions. A bare sketch of one will suffice. We know an aged woman, who, when young and gay, had range among the sixteen rooms of a splendid mansion. A short time since we visited her on a cold day, and, with her clothes on, she was lying in bed to keep herself warm! Thus vast are life's changes. This is an unusual case. But a vast process of change is continually going on, some rising to competence or wealth; others sinking to poverty or distress. It may be imagined what cases occur for delicate treatment; yet how favorable they are for enduring impressions. The ministry at large thus becomes, as it were, itself a house of refuge for the unfortunate, — for those afflicted, not with bodily distempers, but with pains of mind and troubles of soul.

These remarks bring us to the last trait we shall mention of the action of this ministry. It is an action often required in cases of emergency. In some instances, there is no doubt, actual insanity and suicide are prevented. An illustration is in our mind of an individual in imminent peril, whom timely aid rescued from the gulf. Sometimes a stranger in the city, having heard of the ministry at large, appeals to it from the midst of her shame and misery. Again, — and the details could be given, if needful, — a young man is absolutely kept away from the prison-house, and made to become an ornament and light in society. And from many a poor hut, where honesty works hard for coarse food, a single visit may scare away the raven forms of discontent and despair, just ready to settle on the roof. A place of worship is sometimes provided for the "stranger within the gates." A Scotchman lately arrived in the city with a small sum of money, of which he was soon defrauded. Being a man of strong religious principle and habit, he could not bear the thought of losing, in his poverty, the privilege of public worship. He applies to the ministry at large, and a seat is given him "without money and without price."

The action of the ministry at large in the ways described has been especially energetic in the operations of the chapel at the south end of the city. Any man, unacquainted with these operations, would be astonished at the number and importance of the cases, in which great influence has been exerted, and great good done. The superintendent of that chapel is entitled to special praise for his unwearied zeal and entire self-devotion in a place where these qualities were in pressing demand.

We regret the necessity we have been under of describing the action of the ministry at large so much by mere generalities of statement. We will only remark, in closing this head, that the good this ministry accomplishes, is the farthest possible from being a general, uncertain thing, fading into air when we attempt to analyze it, but is, with emphasis, something real and substantial.

The action of the ministry at large suggests the idea of its danger. Its danger, of course, is, that it will violate in practice the purity of its own idea. Still, indeed, is the ministry, as an active institution, somewhat chaotic. When its motions shall have been all arranged in harmony with the perfect truth of its principle, it will at the same time help all other institutions, and show forth its own distinct glory.

We have already given the two main elements of the idea of this ministry. They relate to the object and to the instrument of its influence. It is to act on the poor, and with the instrument of Christian truth.

First, its direct action is to be on the poor. Any drawing away of individuals from their regular places of worship would be a mistake and a wrong. While unjust to others, it would be injurious to the ministry itself, destroying its unity and consistency. Those of course who choose, in the exercise of their own liberty, to leave one congregation for another, either permanently or occasionally, cannot be restrained by any papal tyranny, or any rigorous lines of ecclesiastical method.

But, though direct action be avoided, there is an indirect action upon the rich, against which there can be no tolerant objection made. This point might very properly have been treated under the previous branch of the subject, in connexion with the influence on the poor. But it has been expressly considered elsewhere, and it has an interesting aspect in the present connexion.

Many among the rich are engaged with the ministry at large, as teachers and visiters among the poor. They make, in fact, a part of the ministry itself. That is a strange disposition which would censure their benevolent, their blessed activity. And, through their activity and their increasing number, the ministry will bring about one of its most extensive and precious results. We mean a friendly intercourse, in a religious spirit, and for religious ends, between the different classes of society. It is to be feared such intercourse exists very feebly in any one class, and that those who meet at the same communion-table, are often spiritually strangers to each other. A nobler spectacle cannot be presented or conceived of, than this free mingling of the wealthy with the poor, not to lavish money, or better the quality of food and dress, but to cheer despondence, inspire content, and give the humblest laborer a self-respect and dignity in the hope of immortal glory.

Wealth, as well as poverty, has, in the counsels of Providence, a moral purpose, a holy mission. And the wealthy man, whose air is not lofty because of his wealth, who shows plainly that he prizes chiefly other distinctions in himself and others, who will not honor anybody offering no better credentials than his purse, but gives many tokens of his respect and love for great souls, even in their rags and wretchedness, — this man is fulfilling his mission from God!

And when thousands among us shall come up to this idea of the rich good man, what a change will be wrought in our social condition! Every thing like caste or pride will be destroyed, artificial modes and fashions will give way to sincerity and reality. Instead of beings nurtured in the school of hypocrisy, will be seen the children of nature. Curses will die unuttered, vengeance will not thirst. All distinctions will be forgotten save those which are spiritual and eternal. Human society will be a true type of the family in heaven. The Saviour's prayer for his disciples will be fulfilled to all men, "That they may be one even as we are one." *

We have spoken of the danger of the ministry in regard to the object of its influence, and made such qualifying remarks as justice seems to us to demand. But we wish to speak particularly of the danger in regard to the instrument of influence. The danger is of forsaking Christian truth, and relying on secondary and comparatively inefficient means. Much of what we shall say has an application, we believe, far beyond the ministry of which particularly we speak.

First, there is danger the ministry at large will lose the vitality of Christian truth by falling into a mechanical habit. As we have seen, it has a real and great work to perform. Surely it cannot accomplish it, unless it have power and life in itself. If it be kept upright by external pressure, like a dead man in a crowd, if it repose idly upon the establishments furnished it for its operations, if it merely transmit, as a channel, the general influences that circulate around, or if it fall into a matter-of-course style of preaching and visiting, whatever be the number or length of its sermons or visits, it is mechanical, and consequently inefficient. It may, unwittingly, even injure the poor instead of doing them good. For, as we have already remarked, there is a fund of spirituality in their very condition. Suffering, and grief even, are God's angels leading men to virtue. And then, again, a mechanical action will not satisfy the mental demands of the poor. It is often said that in the straits of poverty, there can be no opportunity for the acquisition of knowledge or the education of the soul. But Providence is kinder than man believes. These very straits are an education. It is true, much learning from books cannot be gained,—but often, amid strugglings with a hard fortune, an intellectual process goes on beneath the surface, none the less powerful because silent and without visible token. The very necessities

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* We have spoken of the social and spiritual influence of the wealthy on the poor as the most important that can be exerted. We would not be understood to say outward help is not often of essential service. It may often promote the greatest, even spiritual, ends. It is particularly desirable some plan should be devised to relieve the deserving poor of enormous rents. A good block of buildings might be made a mighty moral engine.

of the poor excite the will to constant effort, and give a kind of mental exercise, seldom relieved. Thus we are sometimes surprised with instances among the uneducated of fresh and well-compacted thought, and, at other times, of a strictly philosophic use of language. Many wonder at the cheerful faces of the poor. The truth is, their wants, and the mental study accompanied with labor they occasion, leave them no time to brood over their sorrows. Their minds cannot vaguely muse till they become morbid. Their thoughts cannot be relaxed, and their hands folded till *ennui* steals over their nerves. By the very troubles we lament, God keeps his children mentally alive and healthy.

We see, then, the elements which a minister at large must mould. Can he do his work by becoming mechanical, by being absorbed in outward things, — in facts and plans, and meetings, and movements ? No. This ministry must kindle a fire in its own heart. It must be very thoughtful as well as very active, and thoughtful that its activity may be of any worth. It must not move under the action of blind forces, and go whither it knows not, but must descend to and analyze, and comprehend, and act out great principles. We would by no means advise a habit of crude theorizing. To go from the mechanical to spiritualism, and mere words, is avoiding Scylla to strike on Charybdis. But we would urge to constant thought on the materials brought together by actual observation. Reality and life lie between dead facts on the one side and barren generalities on the other.

The ministry at large has its attention so continually called to the actual, to the situation of particular families, to an acquaintance with individual wants and sorrows, that we suppose there is very little need of advising it to avoid fine fancies, and wordy theories, and metaphysic jargon. There is perhaps more propriety in exhorting it to drink at the founts of true philosophy, and investigate those principles of religious science which have a vital connexion even with *its* labors. Thus, having the life that is eternal, it will obtain for it continual expression and illustration in the circumstances in which it is placed, and find its deepest convictions adding power to every sermon and pastoral visit. Everywhere the symbols of the infinite, the all-beautiful, and perfect, will crowd in for its use. The dull clouds of mere speculation that overshadow so many minds, will, by its energetic operations, be condensed into distinct and well-formed drops of rain, and yield all their good by descending in fertilizing showers upon the soil fitly prepared and sown with precious seed.

Another way in which there is danger the ministry at large may injure its idea, and neglect the instrument of Christian truth, is by dwelling too much in the regions of natural theology. We fear there is a too frequent, too exclusive attention to the marks of God's attributes simply as they appear in the world around us. There is *temptation* to this, — these marks are so plain, and appear in forms so interesting, especially to the minds of children. But this course, habitually pursued, can bring out but a portion of the religious nature, inasmuch as but a portion of the divine attributes is very obviously revealed by these marks. The intelligence and goodness of Deity are made most manifest by them. His moral attributes and purposes do not so distinctly appear, except to a very discerning eye. And consequently, the facts implied by these attributes in relation to the human soul, namely our probationary state and accountableness, are not presented. And surely no facts are of more solemn import. We do not mean to disparage the theology of nature. It is the sure friend and supporter of revealed religion. And would that the sectarian divine were more frequently reclaimed from his flights, his exaggerations of the meaning of single scripture clauses, by the great truths written largely on the frame of the world. Yet are we *Christian* believers, and, if we dwell exclusively or chiefly on the evidences of God in the outward creation, we make the "*grace* of God of none effect." But shall this theology of nature be entirely cast away ? By no means. We retain it most effectually when we make our preaching most thoroughly Christian. The creation shines with new splendor to eyes that Christ has anointed and washed. We talk of the religion of nature. Who finds the most religion in nature ? Is it not he who has drunk most deeply of the sublime spirit of Jesus ? Let the glories of the universe, then, be used as illustrations of Christian truth. There is no fear they will crush it by their weight. So vast are the themes of our faith, these glories will seem but their fitting symbols. Suns and stars are an immense, but true mirror for the grandeur and loveliness of Christianity. Let, then, natural history and philosophy, botany, and zoology, be, we would not say forsaken, but sprinkled with holy water, and, as it were, baptized into the Christian church.

Once more. — There is danger that the ministry at large will injure its idea and forsake the ground of Christian truth, by neglecting to avail itself of the full power of the family relation. From the foundation of the world God has made the family his school, in which has been developed what is best and strongest in individual character. Every family is a moral sphere by itself, and yet ever ready to blend with, or form part of another. And in what does the brotherhood of human nature appear so conspicuously as in the fact that a man leaves kindred and friends to select an individual, till lately a stranger, for whom he cherishes an especial love and honor, for whose good he is willing to live, and labor, and die? And not only does the natural language of the human heart, and the records in all ages of human history, indicate this moral importance of the family. The New Testament stamps the seal of revelation on this language and these records. It presents God's highest goodness and glory as residing in his paternal divinity. We are "joint heirs with Christ." Heaven is a family, and a perfect family would be heaven upon earth. And therefore our prevailing ecclesiastical habit of addressing families, instead of a promiscuous mass of individuals, and of frequently appealing to the social principle, instead of for ever referring all things to the general idea of humanity, has, we conceive, a sure foundation. And we entirely sympathize with the strict vindication and maintenance which this custom of our churches, whenever and however assaulted, has been wont to receive. The principle, which has survived a thousand wars and changes and revolutions, should not be lightly in any way surrendered.

But it is well known a custom has risen among us of preaching to congregations of children. It is the custom, to some extent, of the ministry at large. And it must be allowed, the peculiar situation of this ministry seems to furnish a reason for it. The family is often presented to it, not at all according to the heavenly archetype, but in a state of great imperfection and abuse. Where we see a child suffering and sinning because of its parents, taking in poison, as it were, from its mother's breast, all the good instincts and principles of our souls plead for its rescue. And there are cases, where the members of the same family must be separated from each other. But it is astonishing what a vigor is frequently found in the family affections. The intemperance of years is sometimes unable to burn out the substance, or greatly affect the strength of a father's love for his child. The common remark is true, that the bad man does not wish his children to follow in his steps. When the whole house trembles with toil and woe, we are often astonished at the unwillingness of parents to confide their children into strange hands. And it is indeed true, however benevolent our asylums and associations, no one can be expected to feel for a child like its mother.

Still we admit, some families are in such a moral state they must be broken up. The house is divided against itself and must fall. But this can never be the social condition of the poor so extensively as to make it necessary to establish an utter division between parents and children in the assembly of God's house.

Is it said, the parents are corrupt, and the children alone can be saved? But, "they that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." Is it said, the children will not receive as much attention as they ought unless the sermons are adapted specially to them? We reply, that two Sunday-school sessions on the Sabbath furnish opportunity for as much religious instruction in one day as a sober mind would be likely to judge profitable. And, again, it may be doubted whether children do not, in one sense, receive too great attention, — whether so much and so marked attention really does them good. Oftentimes we believe children have been made irreverent and vain by what has been supposed spiritual instruction.

And when the children return to their parents, on whom no Sabbath-day has shone, the examples set must act with the power of levers to overthrow what has been built up. Facts do indeed compel us to admit that, in many cases, even in circumstances so unfavorable, great influence is exerted on the children's minds. But, how much greater would it be were the parents simultaneously moved! We would not decide on this matter dogmatically. It may be necessary in some cases to preach to children Sunday after Sunday. But, if so, we must think the necessity only temporary. Doubtless children may be with advantage specially addressed from the pulpit at considerable intervals of time, as in some of our churches. This will doubtless be the custom in the Chapel in Pitts Street.

We are now brought to the last particular, in which we think there is danger the ministry at large (as well as other institutions) will injure its idea by neglecting the instrument of Christian truth. The danger we speak of relates mostly to the influence exerted on children. We fear, the tendency of the methods of appeal to them in general use, is to a disproportionate education of their religious natures. There is nothing more remarkable in Christianity than the *variety* of address to the mind which it employs, while it preserves the complete simplicity of its purpose. It does full justice to the whole soul. It excites hope and fear, love and awe, the desire of glory, and the dread of shame. Now it exhibits the greatest tenderness of affection, and again, with a terrible severity, probes the conscience. At one time, it commiserates him who has yielded to sore temptation; at another, thunders out woe upon woe against the wilful transgressor. With the sweetness of celestial invitation, it calls God's faithful children to their reward, and, anon, consigns reprobate souls to the utter darkness and prolonged horrors of the future retribution. Now what we fear is, that there is a prevailing habit (and not in this ministry simply, but throughout our religious institutions) of appealing chiefly to the understanding and affections of children, to the neglect of the deeper principles of reverence and conscience. There is, of course, temptation to attend most to the work which can be effected with least pains. The instinctive feelings of a child blossom out as easily and naturally as any flowers in the field. And common care is sufficient to waken the intellect, placed as it is " 'mid all this mighty sum of things for ever speaking." But it is no such simple work to secure that new birth, in which the *spirit* comes forth, in which vital bonds are woven between the human being and God, in which the full idea of rectitude is formed, in which affections are developed infinitely nobler than the instinctive, and a principle of faith nourished, which is superior to the world and all it contains. "That was not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and *afterwards* that which is spiritual." Much has lately been said of a new philosophy in respect especially to the natures of children. No doubt, in the child's bosom are the germs of mighty power. In the infant's heart lies the energy that, for good or ill, may soon shake the whole world. Nor can we question but we ought to become as little children in simplicity and innocence. But, that the child has more positive moral power than the man, or that the great object of the man's life and education is that he may become again a child, we do not believe. We cannot become converts to such philosophy, or to such religion. What! is the movement of

Providence backward? Do we grow up from infancy in vain, and worse than in vain? Is all this discipline of joy and sorrow, are these assaults of temptation, these strugglings of the spirit with the flesh, worthless, and worse than worthless? Shall we charge God with folly and ill success in his plans for the education of his children? It is plain, our work is to bring out in the child all its latent powers, especially the spiritual. Those best acquainted practically with this work, will best appreciate its difficulty.

As we have already said, the two principles that seem to us to have been most neglected, are those of reverence and conscience. Dr. Spurzheim was in the habit of remarking the danger in our country, especially on this first point. Doubtless the peril is increased by the character of our institutions, the youth of the nation itself; the absence of established ranks, ancient associations, a hereditary throne. The principle of reverence needs some ladder, resting on the earth, to aid its ascent into the skies. Let us, in the absence of one kind of means, make more efficient use of others. Let us present the Deity, not only in his tenderness and kindness, but also in the marks, everywhere visible in revelation and nature, of his power and greatness, and glory, and make constant use also of the histories and portraits of great and good men, dead and living. We fear also, that sufficient attention is not paid to the developement of the conscience. A great deal is said about the necessity of interesting the children, and making religion pleasant to them. But how shall we do this? By presenting only the agreeable traits of truth, and neglecting its more solemn features? *Let* us interest them, but *rightly*. Let us take care that, in endeavouring to interest them in religion, we do not, with unconscious dexterity, substitute something else in the place of the religion, and lecture all the while upon that. If we could make the Ohio roll, or Niagara foam, at our Chapel door, or hang the walls with the paintings of the best masters, or deck the pulpit with the richest flowers of the tropics, though we might thus *interest* the children, we ought to decline using our power. And, after all, would not the history of all education prove, that the surest way of interesting child or man is by direct and vigorous appeals to the living conscience itself? Yes. — The giant in iniquity cannot be more deeply interested, as well as humbled, than by suddenly touching that tender place of sin within him, which he imagined no human skill could reach. He who has this power of reaching the conscience, may, like the ancient mariner, stop whom he will, and make him "listen like a three years' child!"

One remark, by way of qualification, in closing this branch of the subject. We have insisted strongly, that the ministry at large should exert its main influence by using the instrument of Christian truth. And, in its capacity of a ministry of Christ, this it should be careful to do. But we would by no means shut out the individuals composing it from other means of influence, or from appearing in other capacities. We do not desire to censure, but warmly to approve, other operations than those adopted simply to exert a Christian influence. There is, for instance, a sewing school kept in each chapel, which meets every week, and in which ladies, glad to employ their leisure in good works, give free and constant aid. In the chapel in Warren Street there are also two other schools, one for young men, the second for young women, in which, during the week, instruction is given in reading, writing, and arithmetic. There are, sometimes, also lectures given to mechanics and other young men, or meetings for conversation and debate. All these means are good. As a philanthropic institution in the general sense, let the ministry at large use them. But let it not, for any thing else, neglect its own mission. Let not the commerce of other things swallow up the "one thing needful." Let not inferior designs and labors, however well attended to, be indiscriminately mingled together with the great design and labor; but let that take precedence, by a long, long interval, of all other occupation. Thus, alone, preserving the purity of its idea, will the ministry at large be able to finish its work.

A few words let us say under our last head, the hope of the ministry at large. This rests greatly of course with the established churches, whose child this ministry is. We doubt not, they will foster it as they have done, pardoning its faults, saving it from the dangers of its youth, and training it up to a manly strength and wisdom. Its hope rests also, in a measure, in the spirit of the community, which has, thus far, been so sympathetic and generous. Still let us remember, that, however aided from without, it cannot long stand without retaining its own vitality and energy. But in speaking of the hope of the ministry at large, our chief purpose was to allude to some indications of its probable spread greatly beyond its present limits. In England the same work is advancing with a vigorous growth.

In our commercial metropolis, New York, the idea is rooted beyond all danger of decay. And what nobler spectacle can there be, than that of the educated and refined so loving their race, that they are willing to plunge into the moral corruption of that city, and raise men from the living sepulchre of foul lusts and flaming passions! We trust the time is not far distant when such ministries will exist in other places nearer that in which the work was begun. And a clergyman lately among us from the West, expressed his belief that such an institution would meet with perfect success, and work with great power in that section of the country. That so much has been done is proof of a commencing regeneration, which, if it go on to the end, the need will no longer exist of what is called a reform in society. Let men be truly *born again*, and reformation will take care of itself.

One word more. A certain body of Christians has always been reproached with the epithets, negative, barren, infidel. No reply is needed to such theological censure but the existence of the ministry at large. C. A. B.

ART. VI. — 1. *Biblia Sacra Vulgatæ Editionis. Juxta Exemplar ex Typographiâ Apostolicâ Vaticanâ, Romæ* 1592. *Correctis corrigendis ex Indicibus correctariis Romæ, &c.* Edidit LEANDER VAN ESS, S. T. D. Tubingæ, 1824.

2. *The New Testament, first published by the English College at Rheims in* 1582, *with Annotations, &c.* Corrected and revised and approved of by the Most Rev. Dr. TROY, R. C. Archbishop of Dublin. Dublin and London, 1816.

3. *The New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, translated out of the Latin Vulgate, diligently compared with the original Greek, and first published by the English College of Rheims, Anno* 1582: *with the original Preface, Arguments and Tables, marginal Notes and Annotations. To which are now added an Introductory Essay, and a complete topical and textual Index.* New York, Leavitt; Boston, Crocker & Brewster. 1834.

THE history and character of the Vulgate are subjects of interest to us, as, by the authority of the Church of Rome, it is made the only authentic record of truth to the large majority of Christians. It owes its existence to a policy the exact opposite to that which now excludes the people from the possession of the records of our faith. The name Vulgate, as it denotes something common to all, is now certainly a misnomer. The Roman Church professes to have inherited the sacred volume in its purest form, and by unbroken descent, from a version of general and high authority. This is a claim, which in order to its support must allow of an appeal to facts and to history. Of course it depends upon the assumption or the proof of the position, that there was a Latin translation of the Scriptures in the earliest ages of Christianity, to which high credit was allowed. This, then, is the great question, Was there such a translation? Criticism offers some good arguments to dispute its existence. Our information on this point is as satisfactory as the nature of the case could be supposed to admit.

When the collection of writings contained in our Bible was made from those deemed canonical, the Old Testament Scriptures existed in the Hebrew original, and in a Greek translation; and if the writings of the New Testament were not all originally composed in Greek, they undoubtedly were known in that language at that period. The Greek was then very prevalent both as a spoken and written language, particularly in the city of Rome;* but the Latin was gradually recovering its place and crowding out the Greek both here and in the provinces. Consequently, Latin versions of the Scriptures became necessary. From the quotations of Tertullian it would appear that one or more translations of different books existed before the close of the second century. After this period they became very numerous in Africa, Italy, and Gaul. We do not know who were the authors of these early Latin versions. Michaelis,† on the ground that Oriental proper names were sometimes written in the Latin Testament according to the Syriac, rather than the Greek orthography, supposed that they might have been written by some native Jews in Syria in the first century. This conclusion, however, would not follow even upon the admission of the truth of his premises. These indeed are not conformable with the truth; and, if such had been the origin of the earliest Latin translation, we should find the language of what now remains of it, much more impure than it really is. Eichhorn supposes, with better reasons, that the first Latin version was made in Africa.*

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* Suetonius, Vit. Claud. c. iv. Juvenal. Sat. vi.

† Introduction, Vol. ii. Sect. xxv.

Whether one or more original translations were made from the Hebrew and the Greek of the Old and New Testaments, we know that copies from them soon became very numerous and very faulty. Previous to the fifth century St. Augustine bears witness to this fact. He says,† "It would be easy to enumerate the interpreters from the Hebrew into the Greek, but not so to number the Latin interpreters. For, as soon as any one in the early times obtained possession of a Greek copy, and seemed to himself to have a trifling acquaintance with both languages, he presumed to become an interpreter." Probably some complete copies of the Scriptures in his time, were made up of parts taken from several different translations of them. From the books supposed to be still preserved in the Vulgate in the language of the ancient copies, we should conclude that they were very faulty. Bowyer‡ and Hug‖ give several of their variations. The question now comes before us, which has long been in dispute between Romanists and other Christians, whether there was one among these many translations to which peculiar credit was attached. A passage in the writings of St. Augustine, as we now read his text, seems thus to designate one.

Among the versions which he has just referred to in the passage we have quoted, he says, "the *Italic* may be preferred, for it is more clear and exact in the rendering of the words." The original is, "*In ipsis autem interpretationibus, Itala cæteris præferatur; nam est verborum tenacior cum perspicuitate sententiæ.*" The dispute rests upon the word *Itala*, rendered *Italic*. It was the commonly received opinion, both among Romanists and Protestants, that there was in early times a well-known version which went by this name, and had received the sanction of the bishops of the Western church. Dr. Bentley first questioned the genuineness of the reading in the text of St. Augustine. He suggested the substitution of the word *illa* in the place of *Itala*, and a consequent change of *quæ* for *nam*. According to his emendation, Augustine would then say, "Among the various translations, that should be preferred, which is distinguished for its exactness and perspicuity." Bentley having stated his opinion in a conversation with Mr. David Casley, the latter defended it.* Lardner,† Ernesti,‡ Marsh,§ and other critics, agree in the conjecture. Lardner‖ afterwards gives the following account of another and better emendation. "Since the publication of that volume [Dr. Lardner's vol. iv.], I have had the honor to receive from the Bishop of Oxford another conjecture. For *Itala*, his Lordship would read *usitata*; 'so Augustine himself elsewhere calls the old Latin version, and also Vulgate, as does Jerome. The first syllable *us*, might easily be swallowed up by the end of the word immediately preceding, which is *interpretationibus*; and the remaining difference is only that between a *t* and an *l*; and thus there is no need of changing *nam* into *quæ*; which, having no manuscript to favor it, may be reckoned a somewhat bold alteration.' If this conjecture be approved of, some observations of mine [his former opinion] are superseded, as I am very willing they should be, for the sake of better."

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* Einleitung in das Alt. Test. § 321.

† De Doct. Christ. Lib. ii. cap. ii.

‡ Conjectures, &c. Preface, p. ix.

‖ Einleitung, § 113.

The reasonableness of this new conjecture will appear in a better light to our readers by the sight of the original words printed, as they were written in ancient manuscripts, in uncial characters, and without any break between them, thus, — "INTERPRETATIONIBUSUSITATA." The conjecture does certainly appear reasonable; and if we must adopt either of those which we have mentioned, this latter is preferable. In opposition to these emendations, Sabatier,¶ the editor of the fragments of the old versions, and Mosheim,** and especially Jahn†† and Hug,‡‡ as Catholics, contend earnestly for the common text of St. Augustine. The question, however, seems to be little more than what Father Simon might call "a contention for the right of property to the shadow of an ass." For, on the whole, it appears improbable either that Augustine mentions, or that there was, such a version as the Italic. He himself never mentions it elsewhere, nor does Jerome, who wrote largely upon the Latin version. Besides, *Italica* would have been the proper word in prose, instead of the poetic *Itala.* It may be, that Augustine referred to the same version as that which Jerome * speaks of as *Vulgata* and *Communis*, and which Gregory † calls *Vetus;* one which, from local circumstances, from having been frequently copied, from being used in a particular church, or from sharing the favors of a distinguished bishop, or some like accident, may have been the most sought after by the scribes.

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* Catalogue of the MSS. of the King's Library, Pref. pp. xix. xx.

† Works, Vol. iv. p. 525.

‡ Instit. Interpret. Part iii. cap. iv. § 13.

§ Notes to Michaelis, Vol. ii.

‖ Works, Vol. v. p. 229.

¶ In his Proleg. Biblior. Veter. Ital.

** De Rebus Christ. ante Constant. M. p. 224, &c.

†† Introduction to the O. T. § 60.

‡‡ Einleitung, § 115.

It is however admitted by all parties, that the Scriptures, as they existed in the Latin language at this period, were very inaccurate. This was their condition when Jerome, presbyter of Antioch, was induced by Damasus, bishop of Rome, about A. D. 382, to undertake their emendation. In his preface to the Book of Joshua, Jerome says there were among the Latins as many different copies, or texts, as there were manuscripts: "*tot exemplaria, quot codices.*" He was to alter the common Vulgate edition, to a closer conformity with the Greek of the Old and New Testaments, without re-translation. He complained frequently that the old versions were very much confused by the work of various hands. Marginal notes, expositions, and oral traditions, had been incorporated into the text. There were then several Greek copies having a Latin version by their side.

Jerome, not being commissioned to amend by comparing his text with the original Hebrew, revised his Old Testament by consulting the most accurate copy of the Alexandrine Greek version; namely, that in Origen's Hexapla, which he found on his journey to Palestine, in the library at Cæsarea. But in the New Testament he everywhere compared with the original Greek. Only the Psalms and the Book of Job have descended to us in Jerome's first revision of the Old Testament. Indeed the whole of it was never published. His MSS. were fraudulently secreted or destroyed by some one to whom he had intrusted them. Thus disappointed, he undertook a new translation of the Old Testament, using now the Hebrew, and completed it about A. D. 405.

This last work was considered by his cotemporaries as a dangerous innovation. The old fable of the seventy-two inspired Greek interpreters was then in vogue, and the Jews were so suspected and hated, that the Alexandrine Greek translation was much preferred to the Hebrew original. Even Augustine, the friend and admirer of Jerome, inveighed bitterly against his work. About the end of the sixth century, that is, nearly two hundred years after its completion, Gregory the Great sanctioned it. It then took the place of the old version except in the Psalms, which, being set to the music of the Church, could not well be altered.

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* Jerome, Comment. in Jerem. xiv. & xlix.

† Gregor. 1 Ep. ad Leandr.

Still Jerome's revision did not differ in its fate from all new projects. The people were very backward in receiving it. Even the Romish Church still permitted the old one. The learned Roman, Cassiodorus, ordered the two versions to be always written together in parallel columns, that the one might be amended by the other. This circumstance again tended to confusion and error.

In the eighth century, Charlemagne ordered his secretary, Alcuin, to make another revision by the comparison of various MSS. Hug mentions * having seen and transcribed an entire MS. of Alcuin's emendation, belonging to Mr. Von Speyer, of Basle. The most celebrated copy now known is that preserved in the library of the Monastery of St. Emeram at Ratisbon, written in the year 870, by order and at the expense of Charles the Bald, in golden letters, bound in gold, and set with pearls and precious stones. It contains only the four Gospels; the text is very confused, and very different from the present Vulgate.†

The edition of Alcuin was by royal command introduced into France, and became generally the current text. Lanfranc, archbishop of Canterbury, in the eleventh century, amended the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, several *Correctoria* of the Vulgate were made with much pains and are of great value. A *Correctorium* was made by the University of Paris, and adopted by the primate of France. This is described at large by Simon.‡

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* Einleitung, § 123.

† A description of this MS. is given in a treatise published in 1786. "Dissertatio in Aureum et Pervetustum SS. Evange. Cod. MS. Monaster. S. Emerami. Ratisb." By Coloman Sauftl, Librarian.

‡ Hist. Crit. des Vers., cap. 9; and Nouv. Observ. sur la Texte, &c. P. ii. cap. 1.

Still it was impossible, with all this care, either to suppress old errors, or to avoid the introduction of new ones into the text. The dangers incidental to MSS. had their full influence upon all the copies made in the middle ages.

We should therefore expect to find similar imperfections in the early printed copies of the Vulgate; such indeed was the case. Robert Stephens was the first who attempted to remedy its defects by publishing Latin New Testaments in 1543 and 1545. John Hentensius improved upon his, and published another in 1547. The divines of Louvain, by an order from the Council of Trent, revised the whole Bible, and published an edition in 1573. All these editions were disapproved by the Romanists, and Pope Sixtus V. forbade the publication of various readings with the text of the Vulgate. He ordered the revision of other MSS. and by his command an edition was made public in 1590. This was declared by him to be of perpetual authority. But his successors thought otherwise. Gregory XIV. began another, which was completed by Clement VIII. in 1592, was authorized by the fourth session of the Council of Trent, and is to this day the only acknowledged version of the Papal Church.

As might have been expected, the existence of two versions, each having the seal of perpetual authority affixed to it by the Church and by her infallible heads, became a subject of merriment among the Protestants, and caused no small scandal to the Romanists. A book was published by a distinguished scholar at Oxford, called "The Papal War, or the Discordant Concord of Sixtus V. and Clement VIII., concerning the Edition of Jerome."* This book contains a very spirited "Epistle dedicatory" to John, Archbishop of Canterbury, the Preface of Sixtus V. and the Bull of Clement VIII., prefixed to their editions, and a large collection of the variations of the text in both.†

Still the discordant decrees of the doctors had gone forth; and the only possible course was to reconcile them with each other, and thus to save the infallibility of the Church. The edition of Sixtus, indeed, did not deserve a longer credit than it enjoyed. " Many passages," says Hug, " were found covered over with small bits of paper, on which the corrections were printed; others were erased, or merely altered with the pen." The Holy Church seemed, both to its enemies and to its friends, to be in an inextricable dilemma. It could neither condemn nor justify its own work. In this predicament, Bellarmine, who wrote the preface to Clement's edition, and obtained canonization for his ingenuity, is said to have discovered a middle course, and to have proposed that all the blame should be laid upon the printer. This was accordingly done, and Sixtus and his successors remained infallible.

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* "Bellum Papale, sive Concordia Discors Sixti Quinti et Clementis Octavi, circa Hieronymianam Editionem, &c. Auctore, Thoma James, Oxon. Lond. 1678."

† See also, "Histoire de la Bible de Sixte Quint, par Prosper Marchand," in Schelhorn's "Amœnitates Litterariæ." Tom. iv. p. 433.

As we have already said, the edition of Clement is the model of the now authorized Vulgate. The best copy of it now in use is that of Dr. Van Ess, of which the title is given at the head of our article, and which professes to be corrected from several *Correctoria* in the Vatican. The character of this version is such as might be expected from its various perils by sea and land, and its sojourn among false brethren. Its authors are innumerable, its construction and style are very various, and in many important particulars it is not entitled to the place which it now holds in the present advanced state of biblical criticism. The one great defect which characterizes it is, that it is constructed upon the early Latin versions, and with a most unjustifiable neglect of the original languages. We have already mentioned the prejudice which was entertained in the early ages against the Hebrew, and the same descended, in an aggravated form, to the middle ages. When Melancthon introduced the study of Greek, he was cried out upon as the inventor of a new language which was full of damnable heresies. Blackwall, in his " Sacred Classics Defended and Illustrated," (Vol. ii. p. 145), speaking of " that strange and unnatural fancy maintained by some ill-natured bigots and unlearned theologues of the Roman Church, that the Latin was far superior to the Hebrew and Greek versions," says, " Above all, one Nic. Ramus expresses himself with consummate impudence and blasphemous scurrility, when he compares the Vulgate in the Alcala edition, placed between the Hebrew and the Septuagint, to our blessed Saviour, crucified between two thieves, meaning the Septuagint by the penitent thief, and, such was the good man's modesty and understanding, the Hebrew text by the impenitent thief."

The Council of Trent declared in its decree, "that the Vulgate edition, which had been approved by the long use of so many ages in the Church, should be considered authentic in all public readings, disputations, preachings, and expositions, and that no one might presume to reject it upon any pretext." Consequently the Church is obliged to treat this version with great respect. Yet, though the words of the decree are seemingly very plain, there is a great difference in the interpretations put upon them. The more bigoted members of that Church maintain, that the Vulgate is absolutely perfect. Others, who are more liberal, assert that "authentic" means only "legal," and that the credit of the Vulgate is restricted to the purposes specified, namely, to preaching and exposition.

It is maintained in the Romish Church, and acknowledged in the preface of the Vulgate, that it is "an erroneous opinion that the Holy Scriptures should always be in our mother tongue, or that they ought or were ordained by God to be read indifferently of all." Perhaps this is true to a certain extent; but it is very far from justifying the denial of their perusal alike to all. Such, however, was their doctrine, the ignorant were forbidden to read them lest they should be led into error, and the most accomplished in all learning were kept back by the same restraint, lest pride and self-sufficiency should be fostered by them. What faithful disciple of the Church would dare even to repeat a Scripture phrase, unless he knew something of the liberty of his own mind, when he found the door to the Christian records guarded by such language as this, which is to be found in the original in the decree of the Council of Trent, in its fourth session, April 8th, 1540? "The Church being desirous to repress that temerity by which the words and sentences of sacred Scripture are turned and twisted to profane purposes, to scurrilous, fabulous, and vain things, to flattery, detractions, impious superstitions, and diabolical incantations, divinations, lots, even libels, she commands and orders, to take away such irreverence and contempt, that no one, in future, shall dare in any manner to use the words of the sacred Scripture for these or similar purposes; that all such profane violations of the word of God shall be repressed by such punishments as the law has specified, or the bishops shall devise." Truly we cannot help being reminded of the old proverb, that those who live in glass houses should not throw stones.

In the Eastern churches the Scriptures were confined to the use of the priests as early as the seventh century, and the example was at once followed by Rome. Latimer wrote a long and earnest letter to Henry VIII., praying for the Scriptures in English. The people would no longer be denied their possession. Even the disciples of Rome sought for them, and it was evident to the Church that they must be allowed them in some shape. The tenet of their restriction, which was so long and zealously maintained, did more than any other cause to impede the progress of the Reformation, and to embarrass the controversies of the Protestants. The parties have never had a common ground on which to stand. The Romanists objected to English versions, and denied their own.

At the accession of Elizabeth, the Romish priests, burning with all the rancor of Bonner's spirit, lashed into fury by the loss of the blood for which they thirsted, and the danger which threatened their own, fled to the Netherlands, and soon assembled at Douay, in the north of France. Here they founded a college in 1568, with the encouragement of Philip II. of Spain. After ten years a similar institution was founded for them at Rheims by the Guises. Here they published, in the year 1582, an English translation of the Vulgate New Testament, with annotations founded upon the traditions of the Church. These annotations are certainly sufficiently abominable to justify all that has been said of them. They sought to revive again, in all their bitterest and most alarming terror, the transalpine doctrines. This publication excited a great deal of contention and fierce dispute in England and on the continent. The most alarming principles were contained in the notes, justifying sedition, rebellion, and public or private murder, maintaining the right of the holy pontiff to dethrone rulers and to absolve their subjects from allegiance, and anathematizing the Protestants with all the curses of the three worlds. Let it be remembered too, that these notes rested upon the authority of traditional usages and opinions, taken or garbled and misrepresented by pretended inferences from the fathers. And this was an authority which was considered even superior to Scripture itself; for it was made up from primitive decisions upon disputed passages contained there.

Bold and severe as well as learned attacks were made upon the text and annotations of this Testament by several learned men, particularly by George Wither,* and by Dr. William

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* A view of the Marginal Notes of the Popish Testament, &c. London, 1588.

Fulke.* Thomas Cartwright was employed upon the same work; but, being prohibited by Archbishop Whitgift on the ground that he was a Puritan, Dr. Fulke was appointed in his place. The confutation of Cartwright, however, was published in the year after that of Dr. Fulke.

The character of these works will appear in an extract from Wither's "Epistle Dedicatorie." He first takes notice of the prohibition of the Scriptures, and shows it to be contrary to their own declarations, and to the words of Jerome and Chrysostom. "Their translation," he says, "how much soever they brag of paines, care, and conscience, to deale sincerely, is fraudulently framed to make poore men thinke the Scriptures to be more obscure and dark, a great deale, than they are, and so to fray them (as much as in them lieth) from taking paines to read them. I note this onely, not because it is not full of other corruptions and partialities, but because, leaving them to the censurer thereof, I take that which every blind man may see, that they have studied them for nothing lesse than perspicuitie and plainnes. For they have both hunted for words of purpose which the people do not understand, and also left their sentences unperfect, halt, maimed, and without sense, and all to strike simple persons in a maze."

The following specimens of the Rhemish translation and annotations, with the answers of Wither, will show the spirit of the controversy.

"Matt. vi. 11. Give us to-day our superstantiall bread.

(Note.) In St. Luke, the Latine is daily bread, the Greek being indifferent to both.

(Answer.) You do in this according to your common custom; that which is most obscure, fartherest from the people's understanding, and may best serve you to dally withall, that you make choice of.

Matt. vi. 31. Be not carefull, therefore, saying what shall we eate, or what shall we drinke, or wherewith shall we be covered? For all these things the heathen doe seeke after.

(Note.) They seek temporall things onely, and that not of the true God, but of their idols, or by their owne industrie.

(Answer.) To contend with you about the heathen, it were but a follie. But for seeking either by your owne industrie, or by them which are no gods, you and they may be coupled together. For you be right cousin-germaines, and therein ye give them not place an inch.

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* Fulke's Rhemish Testament. London, 1617 and 1633.

Matt. ix. 15. But the days will come when the bridegroom shall be taken away from them, and then they shall fast.

(Note.) Christ signifies that the church shall use fasting days after his ascension.

(Answer.) Christ does not prescribe any certaine daye or dayes every weeke to fast in howsoever occasions doe fall out, neither doth he appoint men, when they fast, to abstain from one kind of meat and to fill their bellie with another.

Matt. x. 28. And feare yee not them that kill the bodie, and are not able to kill the soul.

(Note.) A goodly comfort for Christians and Catholikes and all good men in the persecutions of Turke, of heretikes, of all wicked men.

(Answer.) Which comfort did animate and encourage all those whom you have burnt and killed for religion."

Some of Wither's answers are truly amusing; we have no room for further extracts, and must therefore refer the reader to them, if he wishes to see some fine specimens of the *argumentum ad hominem.* The Rhemish Testament is the only English version which is allowed by the Church of Rome to its members. It is with the greatest difficulty that Protestants can prove upon them their own work. In the year 1816, an edition of the Rhemish Testament, with notes in fact urging the murder of Protestants, and boldly supporting the superstitions of Papacy, was issued at Dublin and London, under the direction of all the Roman hierarchy in Ireland, and approved by more than three hundred priests. Its title is the second at the head of this article. It occasioned great excitement in Britain when its character became known. The "British Critic" (New Series, Vol. viii. p. 296, ix. p. 113,) contains some able remarks upon its history and character. Dr. Troy, however, whose professed recommendation it bore, disavowed, and expressly rejected the edition in a letter in the "Dublin Correspondent," (October 27th, 1817.) But the publisher of it, feeling himself aggrieved by the Doctor's disclaimer, answered his letter, and, in our opinion, fairly proved the work upon him, inasmuch as he showed that Dr. Troy had recommended the same publication as it was about going to the press under the management of a former publisher, through whose bankruptcy it fell into the hands of his successor. However this may be, some of the other Irish prelates did disclaim it. For, when summoned before the British Parliament, they asserted with the solemnity of an oath, that the edition was one of no authority. Whether it had authority then or not, we cannot say. It certainly was but a re-print of the Rhemish Testament, authorized by the heads of the College, and the English Papists resident there. With every disposition to be charitable towards our brethren of the Roman Church, we must say that the conduct of its rulers in this matter appears at least very disingenuous. If they would deny the possession of the Scriptures as a common privilege, let them maintain the doctrine. We would not draw back from allowing, that they might produce a show of reasoning in its support. But, if they pretend to allow to all the privilege of reading the records of truth, let them authorize a version, so that we may know what they believe and how they believe. There was a meaning, which has some force even now, in the charge of honest Wither, in his "Epistle Dedicatorie." We cannot otherwise account for some of the obscure meanings given to very common and intelligible words. Thus in the Rhemish Testament, in Phil. 6. we have *agnition* instead of acknowledgment; *archsynagague*, Mark v. 22; *azymes* for unleavened bread, Matt. xxiv. 17; *Dominical day*, for Lord's day, Rev. i. 10; *exinanited* for humbled, Philip. ii. 7; *fiduce* for faith, and *holocaust* for sacrifice, &c.

The third title at the head of our remarks is that of an exact republication of the Rhemish Testament, with the addition of an Introduction and an Index. It is an offering in the service of religious controversy; one of those manifold kinds of publications of every variety of moral and literary character, which the Catholic controversy in our country has produced. It comes from the printing and publishing offices of Protestants, prefaced with their views, and recommended by the teachers whom they respect. As such we see not but that it affords a legitimate armory both for offence and defence. We have no disposition to enter upon that controversy, and have referred to this publication, only as it was connected with the history of the Latin Vulgate.

It is a matter of interest to decide how far the received Greek text of the New Testament, from which our authorized version was made, has been affected by the Vulgate. To give a fair statement of all that has a bearing upon the subject, would require a long and a critical treatise. We can but hint at the arguments and facts which go to establish the point, that our received Greek text has been influenced by the Vulgate. Our remarks naturally fall under two heads, the influence of the

Latin upon the Greek text, previous to the discovery of the art of printing, and subsequent to it.

The question respecting the early alteration of Greek by Latin MSS. has been a subject of much controversy and of much difference of opinion among scholars in Germany. Wetstein and the elder Michaelis advanced the charge with great zeal and ability. It was first repelled by Semler, and subsequently by Griesbach, Woide, and the younger Michaelis. We have no Greek MSS. extant of earlier origin than the sixth century, and it is no difficult matter to trace the influence of the Latin even upon the most valuable of these. Wetstein says that the Greek text of the Codex Alexandrinus was altered to conform it to the one called the Old Italic. The Codices Barberini, Boernerianus, and Bezæ, all of great value, bear evident traces of corruption from this source. Erasmus says, that in a council held at Florence in 1439, for the purpose of uniting the Greek and the Latin churches, a resolution was formed that the Greeks should alter their MSS. by the Latin.*

Now, if the critic could not lay his finger upon a single passage thus perverted, yet there is such a probability of it, arising from the circumstances of the case, as amounts not only to certainty, but to necessity. We have mentioned the undue reverence, which, in early as well as in later centuries, was attached to the Latin, in preference to the Greek text. As many early Greek MSS. were notoriously imperfect, their defects would most naturally be supplied by their owners from the revered Vulgate. But whatever may be the decision in relation to this first part of our question, when we come to the printed copies of the New Testament, we have indisputable facts to show that the Greek text was influenced by the Vulgate. The first printed edition of the New Testament in Greek was completed in 1514. It formed a part of the Polyglot, published by Cardinal Ximenes at Complutum in Spain, which was printed in the last-mentioned year, though Pope Leo X. did not give it his apostolical sanction until 1520, and it was not publicly distributed until 1522. Previous to this date Erasmus had published three editions of his New Testament.

Wetstein brought and sustained the charge of corruption in the Greek text of the Complutum Polyglot. Goeze† wrote a treatise to repel it, principally with the intent to support the genuineness of the text in 1 John v. 7. In the preface to the Complutum Old Testament occurs this remarkable illustration. "We have placed the Latin translation of Jerome between the Hebrew and the Greek, as if between the Synagogue and the Eastern Church; like the two robbers upon either side, and Jesus, i. e. the Roman or Latin Church in the midst." Goeze endeavours to apply the denomination of robbers to the Jewish synagogue and the Greek Church, rather than to the Hebrew and Greek texts. Bishop Marsh, who examined the Complutum edition with care, gives it as his opinion on the charge brought against its editors, "that *in general* it is not true. For, though in some *single* passages they follow the Vulgate in opposition to all the Greek MSS., there are more than two hundred passages in the Catholic Epistles in which the Complutum Greek and Vulgate texts differ."* Charity, therefore, will make us very willing to free its editors from the charge of wilfully corrupting their work, while we maintain that their cherished opinions at times interfered with their duty.

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* Erasmus, 5th edit. of the New Test. Capita Argumentorum, &c.

† Goeze, Defence of the Complut. Bible.

Thirteen editions were printed from the Greek text of the Complutum edition, at Antwerp, Geneva, and Mayntz.† Erasmus had published editions of the New Testament in Greek in 1516, -19, -22 -27, and -35. There can be no question but that he altered the Greek text from the Vulgate. Instances are specified ‡ in which he even gave his own translation from the Latin, both when his Greek MSS. were defective, and when they were not. About twenty editions were printed in various places from the text of Erasmus. In the last two which he himself published, he made several alterations from the Complutum.

The next Greek editor was Robert Stephens. His first edition, which was little more than a compilation from the Complutum and the fifth edition of Erasmus, was published at Paris in 1546. There were eight or more issues of this compilation previous to 1554. Theodore Beza, the next Greek editor, depended chiefly upon the labors of his predecessors. He amended Stephens's text in about fifty places. An issue from his text, slightly amended, was published by Elzevir at Leyden in 1624, and this is the received text of the Greek Testament now in common use.

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* Notes to Michaelis, Vol. ii. p. 852.

† Le Long, Bibl. Sacra.

‡ Wetstein's Prolegomena.

Thus we find that the Complutensian and Erasmian editions are the basis of our Greek text. It is a singular fact that, until the time of Wetstein's copy in 1752, no edition of the Greek New Testament had been made entirely from Greek MSS. The Complutum, as we have already said, gave undue authority to the Vulgate, and Erasmus, although he was aware of the injustice, was compelled by the prejudices of his time to do likewise.*

It could not therefore be otherwise than that our received Greek text should have been influenced by the Vulgate. Numerous instances of this might be specified. We will refer to three, each of a different character, to one of which have been united very important consequences.

In Luke ii. 22, the proper rendering of the Greek *τοῦ καϑαϱισμου αὐτῶν,* according to all the MSS. is, "when the days of *their* purification were fulfilled." This includes the infant Jesus, as well as his mother Mary. But this reading, seeming to imply the want of perfect purity in the Saviour's nature, was changed in the Vulgate by the substitution of *αὐτῆς*, so as to refer the rite to Mary alone. This alteration was made in the Greek from the Latin, and being perpetuated in our received text, we find it in our English Bibles.

In John xviii. 15, by conforming the Greek to the Vulgate, a very expressive sentence has lost much of its significance, so that we have, "And Peter followed Jesus, and so did *another* disciple," instead of, "and so did the other disciple," a phrase by which John commonly designates himself.

Another alteration of the Greek by the Vulgate has introduced into our text the famous passage, 1 John v. 7, "of the three heavenly witnesses." There is not a shadow of evidence for the genuineness of this verse. It is not found in any Greek manuscript, save in a copy which was written from the printed text of the Complutensian Polyglot. It never was quoted during six centuries in the Christian Church, to support the doctrine of the trinity, though the verses before and after it were frequently used for that purpose. It first appeared in Greek in the Complutensian Polyglot, on the authority of Thomas Aquinas. It probably came into the Latin text from a gloss in the margin upon the following verse.

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* See Bishop Bull's Sermons, Vol. i. Serm. vi. Wetstein's Proleg. p. 126. Michaelis, Introduc. Lectures, Sect. xxxi. and Simon's "Histoire Critique."

There is still another point in the different bearings of our subject which calls for our attention, namely, the use which has been made of the Vulgate in the formation of other received versions. The French, Italian, Spanish, and German Bibles which were published before the sixteenth century were wholly taken from the Latin.* Luther, while he translated from the Greek, made great use of the Vulgate, though Coleridge has represented him "with sullen and angry hope reaching for his sworn enemy only when the original is absolutely unintelligible." In England, Tyndale, Coverdale, and Rogers, and James's translators were also evidently influenced more or less by the Vulgate, either directly, or through Wiclif and Luther.

If any critical value is to be attached to the Vulgate, it is because it may contain some readings from the oldest Latin versions, from which, by careful criticism, may be deduced the readings of the most ancient Greek MSS. There are certainly many erroneous renderings in the Vulgate itself, and in the Rhemish Testament, which tend to strengthen the perversions of the Church of Rome. For instance, John and Jesus are made to preach, not, "repent ye," but, "do penance." Matt. iii. 23, iv. 17. We might cite numerous instances of a similar character.

Besides these there are many variations from the Greek original, such as the following.

Matt. xxviii. 1. "And in the evening of the Sabbath which dawneth on the first of the Sabbath." A very wretched translation.

Mark vii. 13. "Going out of the coasts of Tyre, he came by Sidon, to the sea of Galilee." This is founded upon an absurd various reading.

Luke xi. 53. "The Pharisees began to stop his mouth about many things." But by the true rendering, in our version, they did exactly the contrary.

As it regards the common use of Christians, the Vulgate must be pronounced corrupt in many important passages. The opinion so often advanced, that it is better to circulate an erroneous copy of the Scriptures than none at all, does not recommend itself to us without some qualification. If there were no other objection to such a course, it is enough to say that it tends to perpetuate a great evil, and is in fact the principal bar to its removal. G. E. E.

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* Simon, Hist. Crit. des Vers., cap. 28, 40, 41.

ART. VII. — *Nature*. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1836. 12mo. pp. 95.

WE find beautiful writing and sound philosophy in this little work; but the effect is injured by occasional vagueness of expression, and by a vein of mysticism, that pervades the writer's whole course of thought. The highest praise that can be accorded to it, is, that it is a *suggestive* book, for no one can read it without tasking his faculties to the utmost, and relapsing into fits of severe meditation. But the effort of perusal is often painful, the thoughts excited are frequently bewildering, and the results to which they lead us, uncertain and obscure. The reader feels as in a disturbed dream, in which shows of surpassing beauty are around him, and he is conversant with disembodied spirits, yet all the time he is harassed by an uneasy sort of consciousness, that the whole combination of phenomena is fantastic and unreal.

In point of taste in composition, some defects proceed from over anxiety to avoid common errors. The writer aims at simplicity and directness, as the ancient philosopher aimed at humility, and showed his pride through the tatters of his cloak. He is in love with the Old Saxon idiom, yet there is a spice of affectation in his mode of using it. He is sometimes coarse and blunt, that he may avoid the imputation of sickly refinement, and writes bathos with malice prepense, because he abhors forced dignity and unnatural elevation.

These are grave charges, but we make them advisedly, for the author knows better than to offend so openly against good taste, and, in many passages of great force and beauty of expression, has shown that he can do better. The following sentences, taken almost at random, will show the nature of the defects alluded to.

> "Now many are thought not only unexplained but inexplicable, as language, sleep, dreams, beasts, sex." — p. 7.
>
> "Standing on the bare ground, my head bathed by the blithe air, — and uplifted into infinite space, — all egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball." — p. 13.
>
> "Whilst we use this grand cipher to expedite the affairs of our pot and kettle, we feel that we have not put it to its use, neither are able."
>
> "Therefore is Space, and therefore Time, that men may know

that things are not huddled and lumped, but sundered and individual." — p. 48.

"I expand and live in the warm day, like corn and melons." — p. 73.

The purpose of the book, so far as it may be said to have a purpose, is, to invite us to the observation of nature, and to point out manifestations of spirit in material existences and external events. The uses to which the outward world is subservient are divided into four classes,—Commodity, Beauty, Language, and Discipline. These ends the writer considers as the final cause of every thing that exists, except the soul. To the consideration of each he allots a chapter, and displays, often with eloquence and a copious fund of illustration, the importance of the end, and the aptitude of the means provided for its attainment. In the latter part of the work, he seems disposed to neutralize the effect of the former, by adopting the Berkeleyan system, and denying the outward and real existence of that Nature, which he had just declared to be so subservient to man's spiritual wants. Of the chapters on "Spirit" and "Prospects," with which the work concludes, we prefer not to attempt giving an account, until we can understand their meaning.

From this sketch of the author's plan, it would seem, that he had hardly aimed at originality. What novelty there is in the work, arises not from the choice or distribution of the subject, but from the manner of treatment. The author is not satisfied with that cautious philosophy which traces the indirect influences of outward phenomena and physical laws on the individual mind, and contemplates the benevolence of the Deity in particular instances of the adaptation and subserviency of matter to spirit. He contemplates the Universe from a higher point of view. Where others see only an analogy, he discerns a final cause. The fall of waters, the germination of seeds, the alternate growth and decay of organized forms, were not originally designed to answer the wants of our physical constitution, but to acquaint us with the laws of mind, and to serve our intellectual and moral advancement. The powers of Nature have been forced into the service of man. The pressure of the atmosphere, the expansive force of steam, the gravity of falling bodies, are our ministers, and do our bidding in levelling the earth, in changing a wilderness into a habitable city, and in fashioning raw materials into products available for the gratification of sense and the protection of body. Yet these ends are only of secondary importance to the great purpose for which these forces were created and made subject to human power. Spiritual laws are typified in these natural facts, and are made evident in the whole material constitution of things. Man must study matter, that he may become acquainted with his own soul.

> "All the facts in natural history, taken by themselves, have no value, but are barren like a single sex. But marry it to human history, and it is full of life. Whole Floras, all Linnæus' and Buffon's volumes, are but dry catalogues of facts; but the most trivial of these facts, the habit of a plant, the organs, or work, or noise of an insect, applied to the illustration of a fact in intellectual philosophy, or in any way associated to human nature, affects us in the most lively and agreeable manner. The seed of a plant, — to what affecting analogies in the nature of man, is that little fruit made use of, in all discourse, up to the voice of Paul, who calls the human corpse a seed, — 'It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body.' The motion of the earth round its axis, and round the sun, makes the day, and the year. These are certain amounts of brute light and heat. But is there no intent of an analogy between man's life and the seasons? And do the seasons gain no grandeur or pathos from that analogy? The instincts of the ant are very unimportant considered as the ant's; but the moment a ray of relation is seen to extend from it to man, and the little drudge is seen to be a monitor, a little body with a mighty heart, then all its habits, even that said to be recently observed, that it never sleeps, become sublime." — pp. 35, 36.

Thus far, whatever we may think of the truth and soberness of the writer's views, he is at least intelligible. But his imagination now takes a higher flight, and the bewildered reader strives in vain through the cloud-capt phraseology to catch a glimpse of more awful truths. Who will be the Œdipus to solve the following enigmas?

> "This relation between the mind and matter is not fancied by some poet, but stands in the will of God, and so is free to be known by all men. It appears to men, or it does not appear. When in fortunate hours we ponder this miracle, the wise man doubts, if, at all other times, he is not blind and deaf;
>
> 'Can these things be,
> And overcome us like a summer's cloud,
> Without our special wonder?'
>
> for the universe becomes transparent, and the light of higher laws than its own shines through it. It is the standing problem which has exercised the wonder and the study of every fine genius since

the world began; from the era of the Egyptians and the Brahmins, to that of Pythagoras, of Plato, of Bacon, of Leibnitz, of Swedenborg. There sits the Sphinx at the road-side, and from age to age, as each prophet comes by, he tries his fortune at reading her riddle. There seems to be a necessity in spirit to manifest itself in material forms; *and day and night, river and storm, beast and bird, acid and alkali, preëxist in necessary Ideas in the mind of God, and are what they are by virtue of preceding affections, in the world of spirit. A Fact is the end or last issue of spirit. The visible creation is the terminus or the circumference of the invisible world.* 'Material objects,' said a French philosopher, 'are necessarily kinds of *scoriæ* of the substantial thoughts of the Creator, which must always preserve an exact relation to their first origin; in other words, visible nature must have a spiritual and moral side.'" —pp. 43, 44.

In the chapter on "Discipline," the lessons of Nature are enforced with great energy and directness. Man is not so constitutionally active, but that he must receive repeated monitions to labor, or the powers of body and mind will rust and decay. Wants and cravings are imposed upon him, some of which his very physical constitution imperatively requires to be satisfied, and immediate stinging pain is the punishment of neglect. Once gratified, they recur, and provision must again be made. To the knowledge of higher wants he arrives by more extended observation and by every advance in knowledge. Thus, the thirst for truth is insatiable, and increases from gratification. Nature entices us to toil, by offering to gratify the lust for power, and subjecting herself to our dominion. She assumes the harness, and allows us to guide the reins, that she may carry us onward. An exact correspondence exists between the constitution of the soul and of the universe. The love of beauty, of dominion, of comfort, find their appropriate food in the various relations of things, that first called these passions into being, or at least first made us conscious of their existence. Variegated colors, brilliant appearances, curious forms, call us away from the chamber and the couch, that we may walk abroad and admire. The desire of fame and the social instinct are adapted to each other. Either principle alone would be inefficient and useless. United, they are continually pressing us to action. Industry is the great lesson of life, and the universe is the teacher.

But man is not only an active, but a moral being. The constitution of society, the relations which connect him with his fellows, are his instructers in virtue. A hermitage is no school of morals, and were man a hermit from his birth, the terms *right* and *wrong* with him would have but an imperfect and narrow application. The moral teachings of *nature*, understanding by the term all that is distinct from spirit, are auxiliary, but insufficient. Mind must act upon mind. Man must stand in need of his fellow, before he can learn to love him. The mother, indeed, may love her child, before the infant is able to pay the first instalment of its debt to her, "risu cognoscere matrem." But the feeling is instinctive, and as such, is not a subject of moral approbation, any more than when it exists in the brute. With this limitation, we accept the following remarks from the book before us.

"It has already been illustrated, in treating of the significance of material things, that every natural process is but a version of a moral sentence. The moral law lies at the centre of nature, and radiates to the circumference. It is the pith and marrow of every substance, every relation, and every process. All things with which we deal, preach to us. What is a farm but a mute gospel? The chaff and the wheat, weeds and plants, blight, rain, insects, sun,— it is a sacred emblem from the first furrow of spring to the last stack which the snow of winter overtakes in the fields. But the sailor, the shepherd, the miner, the merchant, in their several resorts, have each an experience precisely parallel and leading to the same conclusions. Because all organizations are radically alike. Nor can it be doubted that this moral sentiment which thus scents the air, and grows in the grain, and impregnates the waters of the world, is caught by man, and sinks into his soul. The moral influence of nature upon every individual is that amount of truth which it illustrates to him. Who can estimate this? Who can guess how much firmness the sea-beaten rock has taught the fisherman? how much tranquillity has been reflected to man from the azure sky, over whose unspotted deeps the winds for evermore drive flocks of stormy clouds, and leave no wrinkle or stain? how much industry and providence and affection we have caught from the pantomime of brutes? What a searching preacher of self-command is the varying phenomenon of health!"—pp. 53, 54.

Having thus considered the uses of the material world, its adaptation to man's physical wants, to his love of beauty, and his moral sense, the author turns and aims a back blow at the universe, which he has been leading us to admire and love. The heavens are rolled together like a scroll, the solid earth cracks beneath our feet,

"Wide wilderness and mountain, rock and sea,
Peopled with busy transitory groups,"

are shadows, and exist only in mind. Matter is nothing, spirit is all. Man is alone in the vast inane with his God.

We have no quarrel with Idealism. Philosophers may form what dreams they choose, provided their speculations affect favorably their own faith and practice, and can never, from their very nature, command the belief, or bewilder the understanding of the mass of mankind. But we do protest against the implied assertion of the idealist, that the vulgar entertain opinions less philosophically just than his own. In the pride of opinion, he has overrated his own success, which at the utmost amounts only to this, that he has shown the inconclusiveness of the arguments commonly adduced to prove the outward and independent existence of matter. But he has brought no positive arguments to disprove the existence of any thing exterior to mind. He has not shown, that the common opinion involves any repugnancy or inconsistency in itself. The bridge on which we relied for support may be broken down, but we are not whelmed in the waters beneath. The belief still exists, and its universality is a fact for which the idealist cannot account. This fact puts the burden of proof upon him, and it is a load which he cannot support. The infant forms this belief before it quits its mother's arms. It has existed in every age, as a postulate for the exercise of many affections and emotions, that form a part of the primitive constitution of mind. Nay, the philosopher himself, "when he mingles with the crowd, must be content to comply with common opinions, to speak as custom dictates, and to forget, as well as he can, the doubts and the doctrines which reason perhaps permits, which speculation loves, and which solitude encourages."

On reviewing what we have already said of this singular work, the criticism appears to be couched in contradictory terms; we can only allege in excuse the fact, that the book is a contradiction in itself. A fair notice of it would be in the vein of honest Touchstone's commentary on a shepherd's life. "Truly, shepherd, in respect of itself, it is a good life; but in respect that it is a shepherd's life, it is naught. In respect that it is solitary, I like it very well; but in respect that it is private, it is a very vile life. As it is a spare life, look you, it fits my humor well; but as there is no more plenty in it, it goes much against my stomach. Hast any philosophy in thee, shepherd?"

But enough of the work itself; it belongs to a class, and may be considered as the latest representative of that class.

Within a short period, a new school of philosophy has appeared, the adherents of which have dignified it with the title of Transcendentalism. In its essential features, it is a revival of the Old Platonic school. It rejects the aid of observation, and will not trust to experiment. The Baconian mode of discovery is regarded as obsolete; induction is a slow and tedious process, and the results are uncertain and imperfect. General truths are to be attained without the previous examination of particulars, and by the aid of a higher power than the understanding. "The hand-lamp of logic" is to be broken, for the truths which are *felt* are more satisfactory and certain than those which are *proved*. The sphere of intuition is enlarged, and made to comprehend not only mathematical axioms, but the most abstruse and elevated propositions respecting the being and destiny of man. Pure intelligence usurps the place of humble research. Hidden meanings, glimpses of spiritual and everlasting truth are found, where former observers sought only for natural facts. The observation of sensible phenomena can lead only to the discovery of insulated, partial, and relative laws; but the consideration of the same phenomena, in a typical point of view, may lead us to infinite and absolute truth, — to a knowledge of the reality of things.

As the object and method of philosophizing are thus altered, it is obvious that language also must be modified, and made to subserve other purposes than those for which it was originally designed. Transcendental philosophy took its rise in Germany, and the language of that country, from the unbounded power which it affords of composition and derivation from native roots, is well adapted to express results that are at once novel and vague. Hence the mysticism and over refinement, which characterize the German school of philosophy, art, and criticism. Our own tongue is more limited and inflexible. It must be enriched by copious importations from the German and Greek, before it can answer the ends of the modern school. And this has been done to such an extent, that could one of the worthies of old English literature rise from his grave, he would hardly be able to recognise his native tongue.

Among other innovations in speech made by writers of the Transcendental school, we may instance the formation of a large class of abstract nouns from adjectives,—a peculiarity as consonant with the genius of the German language, as it is foreign to the nature of our own. Thus we now speak of the *Infinite*, the ***Beautiful***, the ***Unconscious***, the ***Just***, and the ***True***. A new class of verbs also has been formed from the same or similar roots, such as ***individualize***, ***materialize***, ***externize***, &c. For instances of new and awkward compounds, take the following; ***instreaming***, ***adolescent***, ***symbolism***, ***unconditioned***, ***theosophists***, ***internecive***.

We deprecate the introduction of a new class of philosophical terms, as it encourages tyros to prate foolishly and flippantly about matters, which they can neither master nor comprehend. Once let a peculiar diction gain footing in philosophy, as it has already done in poetry, and we shall have as great a cloud of pretenders and sciolists in the former, as already exercise our patience in the latter. Nonsense cannot be concealed in plain and sober prose. It stands conspicuous in its jejuneness and sterility. But by ringing the changes on the poetical vocabulary, a ***mirage*** of meaning is produced, and the mass of readers are cheated into the belief that the author says something. So is there reason to fear that a great portion of modern metaphysics and what is termed *æsthetic* criticism, is made up of "words, words," and very awkward and affected words too. Translate a passage of such writing into English, and it will be found to transcend both reason and common sense.

We speak generally. To many writers of the New School we confess our obligation for new and valuable hints, expressed in energetic though affected language. But their influence is most pernicious. Writers, who cannot fathom their depth of thought, will imitate their darkness of language; and instead of comparing truths and testing propositions, readers must busy themselves in hunting after meaning, and investigating the significancy of terms.

It would avail but little, perhaps, with some Transcendentalists to assert, that the deepest minds have ever been the clearest, and to quote the example of Locke and Bacon, as of men who could treat the most abstruse subjects in the most familiar and intelligible terms. If in their modesty they did not rank themselves above such names as these, they would probably allege the different nature of their tasks, and attribute the difficulty of communication to daring originality in the choice of ends and means. But it is evident that novelty both of plan and execution, though it may retard progress, ought not to vitiate results. We do not complain of the New School for doing little, but for doing nothing in a satisfactory manner; for boasting of progress, when they cannot show clear evidence of having advanced a step. We cannot believe, that there is a large class of truths, which in their very nature are incomprehensible to the greater part of mankind. Of course, we speak not of the multitude, whose incapacity results from ignorance and the want of experience in thinking. But the Transcendentalists more than insinuate, that the majority of educated and reflecting men are possessed of minds so unlike their own, that they doubt their power of constructing a bridge which may serve for the transmission of ideas to persons so little fitted to receive them. What a frivolous excuse for being unintelligible is this! There is an essential unity in Truth, in the means of research, and in the vehicle of communication. There is but one philosophy, though there are many theories; and but one mode of expressing thought, (namely, by symbols,) though there are many languages. Philosophy is the love of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things and their relations. To perceive them at all is to perceive them clearly, and the perception cannot fail of being conveyed to others, except through a very school-boy's ignorance of the force of terms.

The alleged analogy between the new philosophy and the higher branches of mathematics, as respects the preparatory labor required for the study of either, rests upon forgetfulness of the essential difference between moral and demonstrative reasoning. One cannot read the "Mecanique Celeste" without a knowledge of geometry and the calculus. But the difficulty relates to the mode of proof, and results from the technical nature of the reasoning process. The several propositions, which are proved by La Place, admit of being enunciated in terms intelligible to the lowest capacity. A child may understand them, though he knows nothing of the means by which they have been attained and shown to be true. But in moral reasoning, where there are few technicalities, and the conclusion is but a step from the premises, the obstructions to our progress arise from the mutability and ambiguity of terms. Obscurity of language is not a defect merely in the mode of communication, but betrays a want of the power of reasoning. Words are not only the exponents, they are the substratum and essence of abstract thought. Mathematical propositions are like the rounds of a ladder placed against the side of a building; we must pass over each in succession, before attaining the summit. But in treating of moral subjects, the several steps are like the rounds of the same ladder placed flat upon the earth; we can tread on any one, provided the foot-hold be sure, without touching the others.

We are ashamed to labor this point. The analogy alluded to is so forced, that it can have deceived no one. If the partisans of the New School still insist upon it, let them manufacture a treatise on the rudiments of Transcendentalism, that tyros may begin with the alphabet of the science, and toil slowly but surely up its cloud-capt heights. In this connexion a few homely remarks from the writings of a philosopher, who enjoyed some repute in his day, may not appear inappropriate. "Nevertheless, this artificial ignorance and learned gibberish prevailed mightily in these last ages, by the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing the men of business and ignorant with hard words, or employing the ingenious in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth. Besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and absurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obscure and undefined words; which make these retreats more like the dens of robbers, or the holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fair warriors; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the strength that is in them, but the briers and thorns, and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man, there is no other defence left for absurdity but obscurity." *

But we are not left to infer vagueness and incompleteness of thought from obscurity of language. The writers of whom we speak, openly avow their preference of such indistinct modes of reflection, and justify loose and rambling speculations, mystical forms of expression, and the utterance of truths that are but half perceived, on the same principle, it would seem, that influences the gambler, who expects by a number of random casts to obtain at last the desired combination. In this respect, the philosophy of the New School is well summed up by the writer before us in the following assertions; "that a guess is often more fruitful than an indisputable affirmation, and that a dream may let us deeper into the secret of nature than a hundred concerted

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* Locke on the Understanding, Book iii. chap. 10, sect. 9.

experiments." "Poetry comes nearer to vital truth than history." Why not follow the principle of the gambler entirely, by shaking a number of words in a hat, and then throwing them upon a table, in the hope that, after a number of trials, they may so arrange themselves as to express some novel and important truth?

> "Insanam vatem adspicies, quæ, rupe sub imâ,
> Fata canit, foliisque notas et nomina mandat."

If it be urged, that vagueness is not inconsistent with reality and truth, we reply, that this assertion does not meet the point, nor resolve the difficulty. In the imperfect conceptions of man, mystery may envelope truth, but it does not constitute that truth, any more than the veil of the temple is in itself the "Holy of Holies." Still less is there any *necessary* connexion between dimness and reality; for truth, considered as the object of Divine contemplation, is light itself, and glimpses of the spiritual world are blinding to man, only because they dazzle with excessive brightness. We live in the twilight of knowledge, and though ignorant of the points of the compass, it argues nothing but blind perverseness, to turn to the darkest part of the horizon for the expected rising of the sun.

We have a graver complaint to make of the spirit in which the disciples of the modern school have conducted their inquiries and answered their opponents. "It might seem incredible," says Mackintosh, "if it were not established by the experience of all ages, that those who differ most from the opinions of their fellow men, are most confident of the truth of their own." Dogmatism and the spirit of innovation go hand in hand. And the reason is obvious, for there is no common ground on which the opponents can stand, and cultivate mutual good will in the partial unity of their interests and pursuits. Both the means and the ends, which other philosophers have proposed to themselves, are rejected by the new sect of hierophants. They are among men, but not of men. From the heights of mystical speculation, they look down with a ludicrous self-complacency and pity on the mass of mankind, on the ignorant and the educated, the learners and the teachers, and should any question the grounds on which such feelings rest, they are forthwith branded with the most opprobrious epithets, which the English or the Transcendental language can supply. It is not going too far to say, that to the bitterness and scorn, with which Coleridge and some of his English adherents have replied to modest doubts and fair arguments, no parallel can be found, save in the scholastic controversies of the Middle Ages.

But the world has grown too old and too proud to be sent to school again by any sect. It boasts of having accomplished something by the labor of ages, of having settled some principles and ascertained some facts; and though it will thankfully accept any addition to its treasury, it will not regard as useless all its former stores, and begin the career of discovery anew. The Transcendentalists have been unwise, therefore, in adopting an offensive tone in the outset, and promulgating new views of things in an overbearing and dictatorial manner. Dogmatists may be sincere, but they are not often successful. Their manner creates a disgust, which no acknowledged ardor in the pursuit of truth, no disinterestedness of purpose, no acuteness of inquiry can ever remove. A sneer is unanswerable, but it is no argument, and repels rather than persuades the modest inquirer. To cavil at the understandings of those who complain of obscurity, is a poor mode of rebutting the charge, since the ignorant, the foolish, and the vain may on every occasion use the same plea with equal effect. The weapon is too common, and has been too much abused, to be any longer effective. The affectation of distinguishing between *esoteric* and *exoteric* doctrines became obsolete centuries ago, and it is preposterous to attempt to revive it at the present day.

We cannot better illustrate our meaning, than by quoting a passage written in a spirit directly opposite to that alluded to. It is taken from the writings of a man, whose name will never cease to be respected, till the maxim shall come to be generally received, that strong common sense is incompatible with philosophical genius. "To Mr. Coleridge, who doubts his own power of building a bridge by which his ideas may pass into a mind so differently trained as mine, I venture to suggest, with that sense of his genius which no circumstance has hindered me from seizing every fit occasion to manifest, that more of my early years were employed in contemplations of an abstract nature, than those of a majority of his readers; that there are not, even now, many of them less likely to be repelled from doctrines by singularity or uncouthness; more willing to allow that every system has caught an advantageous glimpse of some side or corner of the truth; more desirous of exhibiting this dispersion of the fragments of wisdom by attempts to translate the doctrines of one school into the language of another; who, when he cannot discover a reason for an opinion, considers it as important to discover the causes of its adoption by the philosopher; believing, in the most unfavorable cases, that one of the most arduous and useful researches of mental philosophy is to explore the subtile illusions, which enable great minds to satisfy themselves by mere words, before they deceive others by payment in the same counterfeit coin. These habits, together with the natural influence of my age and avocations, lead me to suspect that in speculative philosophy I am nearer to indifference than an exclusive spirit. I hope, that it can neither be thought presumptuous nor offensive in me to doubt, whether the circumstance of its being found difficult to convey a metaphysical doctrine to a person, who, at one part of his life made such studies his chief pursuit, may not imply either error in the opinion, or defect in the mode of communication."*

The distinguishing trait of the Transcendental philosophy, is the appeal which it makes from the authority of reason and argument to that of passion and feeling. We are aware, that the miserable sophistries of skepticism can in no way be so effectually exposed, as by a reference to the original, simple, and unadulterated impressions of mind. In one sense, the heart is wiser than the head; the child is the teacher of the man. A process of reasoning, which leads to a false result, is a mere logical puzzle, and so far from establishing that result, it only demonstrates the weakness of the reasoning faculty, that cannot discover the mistake, which, through the medium of a higher power, we know must exist. The foundations of moral and religious truth are like the axioms on which the mathematician grounds his argument; if, either directly or by necessary inference, conclusions are found to be at variance with these first principles, they are at once rejected as being demonstrably absurd.

But some bounds must be set to the application of views like these. Postulates must not be confounded with axioms. He who mingles controverted propositions with essential truths, in a vain attempt to obtain the evidence of consciousness for each, corrupts, so far as in him lies, the fountain head of argument, and introduces confusion into the very elements of knowledge. The distinction, so much insisted on by the New School, between the Reason and the Understanding, if it mean any thing, must be coincident with that which exists between the mind's active and creating power on the one side, and its passive and recipient faculty on the other. If not so,—if the two faculties agree in being each perceptive of truth,—we ask, what difference in kind can there be between two classes of truths, that separate powers are necessary for their reception? In *kind*, we say; for that a variety in degree should require the exercise of different faculties, is as absurd to suppose, as that a man must have one eye to see a mountain, and another for a molehill. We know that we shall be asked, whether moral truth is recognised by the same exertion of mind that admits the demonstrations of the geometer; and we reply, that the question is not a pertinent one. Our assertion is, that the argument for the existence of a God, or the immateriality of the soul, is tested by the same power of mind that discovered and proved any proposition in Euclid. The motive for supposing the existence of a mental faculty distinct from the Understanding, and which is denominated *par excellence* the Reason, seems to have been, to obtain evidence in favor of intuitive truths, equal or superior to that which is afforded to another class of propositions by demonstration. It is a needless supposition; for demonstration itself proceeds by intuition, the several steps being linked together by the immediate and necessary perception of their agreement with each other.

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* Mackintosh, Progress of Eth. Phil., p. 302. Amer. Ed.

The aim of the Transcendentalists is high. They profess to look not only beyond facts, but without the aid of facts, to principles. What is this but Plato's doctrine of innate, eternal, and immutable ideas, on the consideration of which all science is founded? Truly, the human mind advances but too often in a circle. The New School has abandoned Bacon, only to go back and wander in the groves of the Academy, and to bewilder themselves with the dreams which first arose in the fervid imagination of the Greeks. Without questioning the desirableness of this end, of considering general truths without any previous examination of particulars, we may well doubt the power of modern philosophers to attain it. Again, they are busy in the inquiry (to adopt their own phraseology,) after the Real and the Absolute, as distinguished from the Apparent. Not to repeat the same doubt as to their success, we may at least request them to beware lest they strip Truth of its relation to Humanity, and thus deprive it of its usefulness. Granted that we are imprisoned in matter, why beat against the bars in a fruitless attempt to escape, when a little labor might convert the prison to a palace, or at least render the confinement more endurable. The frame of mind which longs after the forbidden fruit of knowledge in subjects placed beyond the reach of the human faculties, as it is surely indicative of a noble temperament, may also, under peculiar circumstances, conduce to the happiness of the individual. But if too much indulged, there is danger lest it waste its energies in mystic and unprofitable dreams, and despondency result from frequent failures, till at last, disappointment darkens into despair.

In offering these suggestions, we trust not to have appeared as arguing against a generous confidence in the power of the human intellect, and in the progress and efficacy of truth. There is a wide field still open for the exertion of mind, though we cease to agitate questions which have baffled the acuteness, ingenuity, and skill of the philosophers of all time. But arrogance and self-sufficiency are no less absurd in philosophy, than criminal in morals; and we cannot but think, that these qualities are displayed by men who censure indiscriminately the objects which the wise and good have endeavoured to attain, and the means which they have employed in the pursuit. A fair and catholic spirit will ever incline to eclecticism in its inquiries and systems; while it is the mark of a narrow mind to consider novelty as a mark of truth, or to look upon the difficulties of a question as evincing the importance of its solution. To regard Franklin as a greater name than that of Plato, might be unjust, were not the comparison itself fanciful and improper; but we may safely assert, that there are few, very few, who would not do better to look at the American rather than the Grecian sage, as their model of the philosophical character.

F. B.

Art. VIII. — *Theological Aphorisms.*

The following article, which we have translated for the Examiner, is a selection from two articles, entitled "Theological Aphorisms," in a late volume of the "Theologische Studien und Kritiken," one of the most valuable journals now published in Germany, devoted to theological literature and science. It is from the pen of Professor Ullman, of the University of Halle, a writer still young, but enjoying an enviable reputation for his soundness of mind and thorough and profound attainments. We present it to our readers as a specimen of the mode of thought which distinguishes a large and increasing school of modern German theologians. Its sobriety of discussion, its freedom from traditional prejudices, its calm and unpretending good sense, and its spirit of fervent piety, will recommend it, we think, to those who are interested in the improvement of theology, whether at home or abroad. It will be read with satisfaction, also, as a proof that the progress of inquiry in Germany has led only to a more hearty faith in the Christian revelation, while it has relieved it of many difficulties that have hitherto retarded its universal prevalence. The direction which is indicated in these "Aphorisms" of Professor Ullman, it will be perceived, is equally removed from the lifeless Supernaturalism of a past age, and from the shallow Rationalism with which later theologians have endeavoured to supplant it. It is essentially the same movement with that which was commenced by Herder, continued by Schleiermacher and De Wette, and which is now sustained by a powerful host of the most active intellects among the scholars of Germany, and which will terminate, we cannot doubt, in the production of a higher life, of more consummate beauty, and of more divine energy, in religion, theology, and society.

THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE TO A THEOLOGIAN.

It has indeed been said by eminent teachers of the church in every age, in the greatest variety of forms,—but it needs always to be repeated, because notwithstanding its simpleness, it is always forgotten,—that the science of divine things essentially depends on the disposition; that the true theologian comes only from the motherly bosom of a sound and genuine piety. We must indeed know what is divine, in order to love it; but it is quite as certain also, that we must love it, in order truly to know it. One is the condition of the other. They both go hand in hand. He who is incapable of enthusiasm for the Pure and the Lofty, whose heart cannot be filled with the Greatest, great as it may be,—he may, perhaps, possess the most excellent gifts for other departments of life and science, but, it is clear, that he was not born for a theologian. The theologian, unless he remains in the outworks of his science, has to do with the most sublime objects; and how can a degraded soul, dead to impressions from the Elevated and the Eternal, be happy in the contemplation of divine things? In like manner, we need to be reminded, and, at the present day, every thing points us to the fact, that the establishment of a correct relation between science and life is a paramount want of the times. Theology is studied far too much from books, and far too little from life. Books, certainly, are not to be held in light esteem; and we are not speaking to those who are too fond of their ease to use them; but we must needs look through books into life, and into the depths of our own soul. Our science essentially consists in going to the bottom of the great religious manifestations of past ages as well as the present, and of the facts of our own consciousness, with a free, open, and penetrating spirit; it is a thoughtful observation of the developement of religious life, a science of experience. Men may quarrel with the word *experience* as they will; it has a good foundation in theology, and will always retain its pleasant tone. The ablest theologians of all ages, — our Luther, with his *oratio, tentatio, meditatio*, especially included, — have never lost sight of the need of an inward, vital experience of religious and moral truths. He who has never felt the influence of religion on the heart, how is it possible that he should know or say any thing correctly with regard to it? All the truths pertaining to piety and to life may be laid down in the Bible, and in a thousand other books; they may be exhibited in the most impressive facts; but they will exist in vain for us, unless they have been transformed into living convictions and inward realities. Only what is present in the spiritual life, can become a complete conception, a full and living idea, a true inward possession; all the rest is dead abstraction, external notices, and foreign good. It is true, indeed, that enormous mischief may be occasioned by that which we call experience; and many strange and wild notions have been brought forward under this name; but what wise man will refrain from the true use of any thing, on account of its possible abuse? Have not men made a wrong use even of Reason, and of the appeal to its decisions? But if experience be united with a sound, legitimate, and thorough-going reflection, if it be not embraced merely in isolated and personal relations, but is always combined with the universal developement of the religious life in history, with the experience of the

Christian world as a whole; then, surely, it ought not to be rejected; then, it is not merely great and excellent in itself, but the only true and living ground on which all genuine theology rests. History and life from without, but, at the same time, the depths of our own heart and spirit from within, — and the former only when they are reflected with brightness and purity in the latter, — are the exhaustless and enduring fountains of the theologian; and, "Ere thou goest further," may we call to every one, with the poet, "go back into thyself."

CRITICISM.

Criticism is an element which no science can dispense with, and certainly not theology; but two things, however, are requisite for criticism to assume its appropriate place in this department. It must be exercised in the right sense, and it must not be merely negative in its character. The same freedom, acuteness, and impartiality which are demanded in the critical treatment of other writings, should be applied to the historical investigation of the sacred records, and to the judgment of their contents; but the critic should never forget this one fact, which is indeed involved in the very nature of the case, that they are holy writings with which he is here employed. He who is not and cannot be possessed with the feeling that he here enters into a sanctuary, into the halls of a solemn temple, is as little fitted to be a judge of such subjects, as that man is to pronounce an opinion in matters of architecture, who can enter one of the sublime cathedrals of a past age, with no impression on his soul of the Extraordinary, the Vast, the Holy. The understanding, at such a moment, can retain its most transparent clearness, can assert all its valid rights; and it ought to do so. Was Göthe's understanding injured, because he was transported with the Minster of Strassburg? Or Herder's, because he was excited and enraptured by the Great and Beautiful in every form? But he who confines himself merely to the operations of the understanding, and has no sense for any thing higher, in the investigation and judgment of such memorials, will always lose something essential, of which the ground and kernel are the most elevated thoughts and truths. Connected with this, is the demand that criticism, in every department of theology, should not be merely negative, but, in accordance with its nature, should also tend to recognise, to build up, and to sustain. To discover a chasm, a defect, a spot, is not difficult; a minute, analytic, fault-finding criticism can be carried on with small understanding and very superficial knowledge; we find such critics in every walk of life, who, in the most beautiful exhibitions, the most profound and expressive works of art, seize upon the imperfection of some petty detail, and thus deprive themselves of the enjoyment of the whole; the same judges are to be met with also in the theological sciences, in exegesis, in ecclesiastical history, in the judgment of systems and modes of thought. They pursue a task as pitiable as it is unsatisfactory. The true business of the critic is to pass a judgment, no less profound than comprehensive, upon the subject of his examination; to proceed in this with an art, that has become practical skill, and, as it were, converted into flesh and blood; above all, he is called upon to understand a living, spiritual work, in its whole significance, with respect to its essence and form, and to bring it forth from its central point, to clear and perfect intuition by himself and others; and in order to comprehend any subject in all its compass and depth, there is needed a mind of a kindred nature and one capable of self-abandonment; he may then attempt to pass his own independent judgment, to estimate the object of inquiry from his own point of view; he may place his own reflection in the true relation, for comparison, with that which he is to judge; and this becomes still more difficult, because it is necessary, relatively at least, to pass beyond the object which is given. But in all respects, it is evident, that a genuine criticism, — a criticism not merely censorious, skeptical, and inclined to minute analysis, but that which is truly observant, creative, and reconciling, is one of the most important tasks in which a theologian can engage.

THE IDEA OF REVELATION.

THE idea of revelation is most intimately connected with the essence of religion. Religion wishes to be not merely an hypothesis concerning God, but a certainty of God; but this it can be only when it is also a certainty from God, when we do not merely form thoughts and opinions for ourselves concerning God, but God gives himself to be known by us. We can only know that Spirit, which comes forth from itself, which communicates, reveals itself; and it lies also in the essence of Spirit, as of a living being, actually to manifest, to impart itself, so that it can be known. But Spirit can be revealed in works, words, and acts, — for we distinguish acts as the immediate, highest, and most complete expression of personality, from works, regarded more as subsisting by themselves and separate from personality. Creation, in the first place, is an expression of the Divine Spirit, the sublime production of Omnipotence; but nature, though endowed with life, is yet a mute revelation, a silent imitation of the Divine, a copy of divine thoughts, but in which they are at the same time veiled. Nature does not speak of God; she awakens only a presentiment of him, she points him out only to the heart which already bears a consciousness of the Divine within itself. As we are not satisfied when the human soul is revealed to us merely through the eye, the countenance, and the form, as we always desire that a man should speak to us, in order that we may truly see him; so it does not satisfy us that God should only cast a glance upon us from the stars of heaven, from the flowers of the earth, and from all the magnificence of creation; we still long for something more, —we wish to hear his word, so that the significance of nature may dawn upon us. The word is a more animated and intelligible, a more sublime expression of spirit, than the mute work; and if God would permit himself not only to be sought but found, he must needs manifest himself through the word. Hence the immeasurable importance of the word for the religious life, which is acknowledged by almost every religion. The word is the expression of the divine as well as of the human spirit; and it is only when our secret presentiment of God is met by the word, that it is elevated to the rank of distinct knowledge. The word of God is uttered in every human spirit; but it must also be brought to understanding, to full consciousness; and even when this is done, the consciousness of the Divine is again clouded by sin and the manifold darkness and deception, which are combined with it. The revelation of God in the soul is always circumstanced like the soul itself; it passes through an impure, variable element, and hence is itself disturbed, fluctuating, and imperfect. On this account it is needed that men should rise up, who, filled with a higher and purer spirit, first discover the true word for the idea of God that slumbers in the heart, and speak forth that which lies unconsciously in the depths of the spirit; but who then also, when a moral depravation has taken place, renovate the religious life, and so utter the word of God, that it becomes a true and firmer standard of the knowledge of God than the comparatively impure consciousness of sinful man. Such speakers, aroused by the Deity, were the holy men of the ancient covenant, above all the prophets. But the word of God, which even they spake, was yet imperfect; it came to them from without, in moments of higher inspiration, in images and visions, from special divine teaching, and for the purpose of individual divine missions.

It was not so with Christ. The word of God came not to him from without, for specific purposes, in individual teachings, and by peculiar impulses. He was himself the word of God. In him it dwelt, as the living fulness of the divine power and wisdom, by which all things have their existence, and from him, it went forth, without his being in an extraordinary condition, as the natural, necessary expression of his essential character. But the manifestation of Christ became the perfect revelation of the Divine only by the fact that action was added to the word. The word ever belongs, for the most part, to one side of the spiritual life, namely, to knowledge and perception; it principally comprehends doctrine in itself; but religion is not merely knowledge, it is essentially life, it belongs to the whole sphere of the spirit. If, then, the religious condition of humanity was to be thoroughly improved and renovated, if the Divine was to be exhibited before man, for his personal appropriation, this could not be effected by doctrine alone, it must, at the same time, be accomplished by that which is a still more perfect expression of the Spirit, by Divine Action, or by a series of Divine acts, in the whole manifestation of a life. This is the essential element in the revelation of God through Christ. It is the original exhibition of a divine life, through the creative power of which, a new life, consecrated to God, is produced in humanity. The works of Christ are an expression of divine truth and love, they bear the seal of divine perfection. His whole life is one great, connected divine act, crowned by his death, as the completion of divine love. If a God, who is love and truth, would perfectly reveal himself, he must needs reveal himself, not only in the boundless grandeur and beauty of the universe, but in the sublimity and loveliness of a perfectly moral and holy existence, not only in a true and profound doctrine, but in a life, in which world-redeeming love was always identical with world-redeeming truth, in which doctrine was everywhere action, and every action a divine doctrine. Thus is the whole manifestation of Christ, and above all his death an act of God, by which God calls us to himself, with greater power than by a word, and draws us with more tenderness than by the fairest work of creation. In Christ we look upon God with unveiled face, as God looks upon us with the full glance of grace and love.

THE PROGRESS OF TRUTH.

TRUTH in and for itself, as it exists in the divine mind, is eternal; but for the human race it is progressive, always developing itself in a purer and higher form. Even in revelation, it is not presented in the fixed and unchangeable form of a precise theoretical system; but as a spirit which is to be realized in humanity, a principle to be gradually unfolded. The eternal, the immutable substance of all knowledge of truth, is established by the Deity himself; but its realization within the limits of time is intrusted to the activity of the human mind. In this respect, every age has its peculiar call, a specific commission, and hence certain distinct rights. It can never be the problem of one generation, merely to re-produce in itself the ideas and convictions of another, any more than we can require of one individual, that he should be another rather than himself; and even if the old is brought again upon the stage, it must always appear in a new form, and inspired with fresh life, or it can have no actual significance. In fact, every individual person, but much more a whole race, notwithstanding all historical connexions, has the need of being developed from within, of moving according to his own spiritual laws and wants, and of thus attaining strength and satisfaction in his spiritual being. This demand, which is made also on the present theological generation, would fail of being met, the generation would show itself unworthy of its place in the developement of the whole, if it absolutely persisted in any theological tradition, any hereditary scientific or ecclesiastical result; hence also, if it desired to perpetuate the existing form of Supernaturalism or Rationalism, though perhaps with certain modifications and improvements in individual details. They, who with honest convictions cannot pass beyond these forms, must of course abide in them; but the whole grand developement of the age and of society cannot remain banished within their limits. Theology and the church in general must escape from these distractions, and create for themselves a new and more appropriate form. We cannot again go back to the old in its ancient shape; a dress, which the spirit has once laid aside, it assumes no more; it is inexhaustible in the creation of new forms; but it accomplishes this, as human spirit, only from materials that are already given, in historical continuity,—not bringing forth an absolutely new production, but building on a certain established ground-work. Our problem then can be only to appropriate to ourselves from the old that which has been tested and found genuine, and with these materials to carry up a fresh structure in a more beautiful and imposing style. No individual, certainly, will complete this. The building will not arise by a single blow. But it is not a work which we are first called upon to begin; it has already been commenced. Every theological science exhibits proofs of this regeneration; from year to year, new productions are brought out, alive with a deeper Christian spirit, but without prejudice to earnestness and strength of inquiry; and as soon as sincere love and a holy enthusiasm become more prevalent, these living stones will be joined together, with still more glorious beauty and harmony, for a magnificent temple of Christian science.

USES OF CONTROVERSY.

THERE are often moments in which theologians of the present day may feel a yearning after that ancient Past, (though, in other respects, less attractive) when unity and firmness prevailed in the church, under a traditionary and rigidly exclusive system; and although subordinate points of difference excited contention and doubt, yet those which involved the very existence of Christianity, the whole compass of the religious life, were not made a question. But such yearning, were we disposed to yield to it, would be effeminate and idle; division, when it has once entered into the spiritual life, can be avoided by no one; we must either be overwhelmed by it, or pass through it to higher peace. Even controversy has something elevating and delightful, and is indispensable in the developement of the whole; only it is not properly engaged in for its own sake, it serves for the education and strengthening of the spirit, and should lead to a determinate end, to true union. War is only for the sake of peace. Every spiritual contest of humanity has also always laid down a result, whether the points at issue have been confirmed in decided opposition, or a third product, higher than either, has been the fruit of the struggle. The former has usually been the case in ecclesiastical, the latter, in theological combats. There, separation has taken place, and the parties have filed off from each other as distinct confessions; here the parties contend together in one and the same community, until a new party is elaborated by their conflict. We are now in the midst of such a war of mind; we evidently live in an age of crisis and transition, though perhaps approaching to its close. The results are not yet brought to light, but they cannot fail, they are even now beginning, to make their appearance. Only one of two things is before us. We must proceed either to what is better or worse. Either a time of scientific, moral, and religious laxity and corruption must follow; or our age is in preparation for a new birth of religion, theology, and the church; it stands nearly in the same relation to the future, as the fifteenth century did to the Reformation. The first is not probable, in an age, in which, amidst much degeneracy that we do not conceal from ourselves, a new religious spirit, especially among the German people, is evidently poured forth, in which a greater moral earnestness has been restored, and a fresh and vigorous life been developed in every department of science. All this must be suddenly broken up, before we can actually suffer the ruin which is predicted to us by many. On the contrary, the lamentations of those who think that humanity or science is on the decline, because their system is thrown into the shade, must appear ludicrous to the unprejudiced observer. Reason and science are not bound up in the conceptions of the eighteenth century; and if there are men at the present time who do not possess much mind and vigor of thought, and hence would fain repress a powerful intellectual developement, we need not be surprised; it has never been otherwise; but they can avail nothing against the extraordinary movement and activity of mind, which are found in almost every department of society and knowledge, on a larger and more comprehensive scale than has hardly ever been the case before. This, taken in connexion with the awakened religious interest already alluded to, clearly indicates a progress to what is better; and faith also rejoices in this more cheerful view of the future, and cannot renounce the conviction, that the course of history is ordered by God, who will bear on his truth through every conflict to victory. At the right time, then, the right men will not be wanting, who will renew the covenant between faith and science, in a still more successful manner, than is possible in this period of transition; who, with an energy like that of the old Reformers, will establish a new creation in the church, and introduce as a universal result, that which is only striven after, by our yet distracted age, — the victory of pure, Apostolic Christianity, but placed on a firmer basis, and born to a higher life, in the spirit of deep and genuine science. Then, if there be need of a prominent individual instrument, another Luther will arise, who, nourished in the motherly bosom of a sincere piety, and fed with the very marrow of science, will reconcile faith with speculation, theology with the church, and install them in their true position, in society and life.

CONFLICT OF OPINIONS.

THE clergyman, as indeed every one, who would act upon the heart, must possess a firm stand-point; he must have a decided character and aim at a decided object; he must speak to others with a consciousness, it is true, of human weakness and imperfection, but, at the same time, with the secure repose of inward certainty. This demand, at the present moment, will be so modified, that a man should either avoid involving himself in the divisions and struggles of the age, or else must have labored his way through them to inward unity and to higher peace. If he has not shared in the conflict of opinions, he has then preserved the full simplicity of Christian faith, and by means of this unclouded and child-like piety, he is capable of producing a great effect, especially on hearts equally pure and simple with his own; but there can be only few, particularly in our relations in Germany, who through the whole course of a university education, are able to preserve themselves in this condition of religious and theological innocence; nay, amiable as we may deem this child-like sense in laymen and women, we ought not even to wish it in a theologian, who is to grow up in the assaults, and commotions, and storms of our present spiritual life. Of him, we should rather demand the contrary, that he should have pressed through the divisions of the age, that he have survived the critical period of inward experience, that he have raised doubts and also solved them, that he have rescued for himself, from the war of systems and opinions, a treasure of holy and indestructible truth, which may form the very spring of his life, the priceless diamond of Christianity, purified and strengthened in the fire of severe and earnest inquiry. But ill does it stand with him, if he is yet engaged in conflict himself, if the rent of the world's history goes also through his soul; he is there an *ἀνὴρ δίψυχος*, torn asunder in the interior of his being; and since he finds himself still in uncertainty, he has not the fixed stand-point, which alone enables one to act decidedly on others, and to gather them around a common and living centre.

THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTINCT EXPRESSION.

Whoever is in the habit of reading theological writings, particularly those designed for the public at large, will not be able to suppress a great many wishes, with regard to language and style. First of all, he would make the most natural demand, that every one should have some definite meaning in what he writes. But what if we could take all men who write, at their word? I venture to say, that among twenty, who use the word "mystical," there are not five, who have a clear and philosophical conception of its meaning, and one which will bear the test of history. How much party clamor on all sides would be removed at once, if every writer would make use only of those expressions, which are founded on a fixed, precise, and distinct idea! As soon as we circulate in theology too much small coin, and pieces that are worn smooth, we must take up with phrases that are current, but past service, indefinite, without character or value. But when all shall endeavour in earnest, to give only a faithful copy in words, of the essential nature of the subject in hand, or at least, of the true and complete import of what they think and feel, we may then expect greater freshness, reality, and life, in theological language and ideas. The subjective truth would lead us to a greater degree of objective truth. Another canker on our theology is the ambiguity and incompleteness of expression, of which many avail themselves, in order to say one thing to the simple, and suggest another to be inferred by the wise, in order privily to insinuate the new under the garb of the old, and in suspicious cases to get clear of difficulty. This was never done by the open-hearted Reformers; this was scorned by the straightforward Luther. Least of all does such a masquerade dress become their admirers; poorly does it sit upon us Germans, whose plain and honest language, by its very nature, rebels against such abuse. Finally, we should always speak on the loftiest subjects, in the most dignified and graceful style. We do not ask for pomp or affectation; simplicity will always remain the chief sign and ornament of truth,—above all, of religious truth ; but this need not prevent us from summoning every thing, in order to represent the Christian spirit in the greatest purity and beauty of expression, and thus with twofold energy, before men. The True produces a double effect, as the Beautiful; nay, in our dainty times, it can hardly act at all, but in union with beauty. The most perfect and imperishable production is brought forth, when the truth and profoundness of the Christian spirit are combined with the masterly strength and dignity of a classical style.

THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS.

Let every one do what he can; let him seek with humbleness of mind, and with a pure love of truth; and if he has found its living image, let him guard it, with fidelity and gratitude, within his heart. Let every one also defend what he recognises as the inmost need of his life and the salvation of humanity, with decision and firmness, even to his last breath. But let no one suppose that he is essential to the victory of truth, let no one boast of his own person. No individual is of so much consequence, that the truth can be brought to recognition by none but himself; Divine providence always finds its instruments, whether these individuals or others. Men have died, on whom thousands looked, as the champions of truth and right; a chasm seemed made in humanity, and the spirit itself to go down to the grave; the waves of time broke over them, but truth was not buried in the stream, her spirit continued to hover over the waters. Least of all, does truth need force; she is not in alliance with the sword. She cannot be obtained for this. The mightiest powers of earth are shattered; thrones sink and states fall; but truth falls not and dies not; she has a guardian sovereign, whose sceptre is never broken. Amid the ruins of all earthly things, she pursues unseen her silent path, but known and felt by the souls which thirst for her. As such truth, which has stood fast and still stands fast, in all changes of persons, of systems, and of kingdoms, Christianity has maintained its ground in the history of the world. The undying spirit of the gospel has broken through centuries, and has always raised up its own defenders. The Apostles, the great teachers of the church, the Reformers, have passed into the grave; but their spirit is revived in a thousand others, and transmitted, in its vital power, from generation to generation. Doubts threaten to undermine Christianity; human wisdom would suppress it; narrow-minded dogmatism slay it; a service of ceremony degrade it to a religion of sense. Not only much has threatened it, much also has injured it; but we ought not to be anxious on that account. Christian truth yet hovers, in unapproachable loftiness and purity, over the endeavours of men. God is with it, and the human soul needs it. When we should the least believe it, it revives and grows young again, like the eagle; while the old forms die out, new creations of the spirit appear, and the Ancient and Everlasting is again presented in the freshness and beauty of renovated youth.

G. R.

NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

The Poor Rich Man, and the Rich Poor Man. By the Author of "Hope Leslie," "The Linwoods," &c. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1836. pp. 186. — We cannot allow this little book to pass without emphatically calling to it the attention of our readers. It is one of those rare productions of wisdom and genius which none can read without delight, and which are adapted to leave deep impressions of duty. If we dared to allude to so trite a saying as that which sets ballad-making above law-making, we would say that the writer of works like this, and its twin-sister, "Home," has the character and fortunes of this nation more at her disposal than any of the ambitious politicians in the land. We look far more to the operation of strong principle and persuasive truth, wrought quietly into the heart, and formed silently into habit, for the safety and progress of society, than to any action of government, or other external institution. Let our families be well ordered, let love and rectitude rule in social intercourse and common affairs, and all will be well. Let domestic economy be perfect, and political economy will take care of itself. The world has no more efficient friends than they who devote the powers of a sagacious and cultivated mind to teaching the people, and leading them to the ways of industry, order, and piety. Precisely of this class is the author of the little work before us. She has a clear perception of what the people need, a keen feeling of the errors which prevail in our social order, a perfect understanding of the remedies which are demanded, a hearty longing for the best pattern, and an exquisite tact in setting forth, in a graphic, attractive, and convincing form, the truths which she wishes to convey. There is a charm about her lessons which makes it pleasant to listen to her, and a persuasion in her voice which converts her listeners into disciples.

The motto on the title-page describes the subject which forms the *moral* of the book; "There is that maketh rich, yet hath nothing: there is that maketh himself poor, yet hath great riches." Upon this pregnant text there probably was never a finer sermon preached than in this narrative. Never was more convincingly set before us the great truth of the utter worthlessness of mere wealth, and the despicable meanness of a man who lives only to be rich; — seldom so beautifully described the honor and satisfaction which attend the state of contented and industrious poverty. The thoughtful of all ages have known this, the moralists of all sects have taught it, the preachers of Christianity have set it forth in the strong language of the inspired volume, and in their earnest reasonings about happiness and virtue. Yet the world has still gone on in error, men have lived for wealth as the supreme good, and now, in the very light of this improved century, when knowledge is more widely spread, and religion more truly and generally honored than in any previous age, and the true sources of happiness more universally understood; in this age and this country, there seems to be almost a new and yet more insane developement of the thirst for acquisition, and a most inordinate value set upon that external advantage which mere money can give. It is impossible to look upon society, and see how extensively the grossest errors prevail on this subject, how arts, letters, and even religion are sacrificed to the love of gain, and not be impressed with a profound sadness at the prospect of the world. It requires a strong faith in the final triumph of principle, and a recollection of all that is admirable in the action of the times and promising in our own institutions, to restore the mind to its cheerfulness. The prodigious efforts which are now made by the benevolent and wise in behalf of mankind, are retarded by nothing so much as this prevailing worldliness, and can have their full effect only when it is removed. In vain do we make progress in civilization and refinement, in political wisdom and social enjoyment, while we allow the luxury and pomp which wealth introduces, to rear unreasonable barriers, and make hateful distinctions, and decoy a large portion of society away from those higher pursuits which are the true dignity and only certain strength of man.

While all reflecting persons are looking on this state of things with apprehensive forebodings, our author's spirit is stirred within her, and she speaks; — not in the formal harangue of the pulpit, not in the stately treatise, drawing conclusions from remote premises and cunningly threading a maze of philosophical deduction, but she speaks to the people themselves, in their own language, appealing to their own good sense, to their own observation and experience. She paints the truth in characters that live and move, draws scenes which they acknowledge to be natural and real, and makes them to decide by their own conviction, that the wealth which is to satisfy, consists not in riches, but in character, and may be found abundantly where the world gives least.

When the divine Teacher was asked, Who is my neighbour? he set before the inquirer a picture of a wounded traveller, relieved by a stranger and enemy, while a Levite and a priest of his own nation passed him by in neglect. No dissertation on brotherly love could have wrought conviction so effectually as this group of four characters, connected in so striking a narrative. And so, *parva componere magnis*, no treatise on wealth and poverty could so powerfully set forth the true doctrine on these most important topics, as is done in this long parable in which is answered the question, Who is the rich man?

We cannot recite the story here; it is given in the briefest space in the book itself, which contains materials which might easily be extended to two large volumes, and yet are so skilfully managed that nothing seems to be wanting to the vividness and completeness of the picture. We wish we had room for a specimen or two of the manner in which single scenes are made to do the work of long discussions; as in the ninth chapter, where the author gives us a peep into the rich poor man's house. But the work is, or ought to be, in everybody's hands. We hope it will be followed by the history of Mr. Beckwith, the *rich* rich man, into whose house and heart we are slightly introduced in the sixteenth chapter, and whose whole system of life we desire to have depicted for the emulation of our prosperous citizens. If not this, we shall look earnestly for other works of this class from the same hand, and shall expect that those who have the means, and understand their value, will see to it that they are extensively circulated.

A Historical View of the Council of Nice, with a Translation of Documents. By the Rev. ISAAC BOYLE, A. M. Boston. 1836. 8vo. pp. 62. — This sketch of the History of the Council of Nice was prepared as a sort of appendix to the second edition of Cruse's Translation of Eusebius recently issued; but for the convenience of those who might desire it in a separate form, some additional copies have been struck off, and are offered for sale. It has the merit of conciseness and impartiality, and is written in a style of easy narration, without affectation or pedantry. It is not encumbered with tedious details, yet is sufficiently minute, we suppose, to satisfy the general reader. At the end, Mr. Boyle subjoins an argument for the truth of the doctrine of the trinity, derived from the fact, that the council asserts, as he expresses it, "our Saviour's true and proper divinity." Were we to attempt to argue the point with Mr. Boyle, which we have no intention of doing at present, we should object, that the council does not assert our Saviour's divinity in the sense in which modern Trinitarians understand the term; that it does not, for example, assert the *numerical* identity of the Son with the Father, but only a sort of generic sameness, *homogeneousness*, we believe, is Professor Stuart's word, the Son being divine because begotten of divine, as man is human, because begotten of human. This appears from the express testimony of both Eusebius, and Athanasius (with Trinitarians, a less suspicious authority), and from the face of the Nicene creed itself, and is a point, we believe, now generally conceded by the learned in these matters. With regard to the Spirit, it is still worse.

The Historical View is accompanied by several brief documents relating to the origin of the Arian controversy, and the proceedings of the council, — as a Letter of Alexander of Alexandria, whose rashness provoked the dispute; — the Letter of Constantine to Alexander and Arius, in which he treats the whole controversy as a frivolous and silly affair, (for which the Orthodox have never forgiven him,) and urges the combatants to lay aside their weapons and be friends, notwithstanding some differences of opinion, which, he says, are unavoidable, "since all men have not the same understanding of every thing, the same turn of mind, and mode of thinking." But the Imperial convert knew little of the pertinacity of theologians, and his advice was thrown away. The Letter of Constantine is followed by one of Arius, the great champion of mental freedom in an age of growing bigotry and exclusiveness. This is addressed to his friend Eusebius of Nicomedia, from whom the Arians took the name of Eusebians. Then follows a letter of the latter, to Pamphilus of Tyre; and next, Eusebius Pamphilus's Apologetic Letter to his people from Nice; then two Letters of the Emperor, written after the council had broken up, and which show that, however his understanding may have been enlightened, he had lost something of his good temper and charity by contact with his theologians, for they breathe, the former of them especially, a fierce and denunciatory spirit we do not discover in his epistle to Alexander and Arius, written before the council. These are among the principal original documents from which we derive our knowledge of that tyrannical council, which aimed a deadly blow at religious freedom, and prepared the way for all the miseries entailed on the world, by the creed-making and creed-imposing spirit. We are glad, however, to have them in a dress which renders them accessible to the English reader.

Mr. Boyle's version is easy and classical, and is among the very best specimens of translation of old theological writings which have fallen under our eye. We cannot say as much for Mr.

Cruse's translation, which, though in the main accurate, as far as the sense is concerned, is bald, hard, and dry.*

Discourses on the Philosophy of Religion, addressed to Doubters who wish to believe. By GEORGE RIPLEY. Boston: James Munroe & Company. 1836. 8vo. pp. 80. — Whoever is deterred from looking into these discourses, under an impression that they must be dry, abstract, and metaphysical, because "on the philosophy of religion," will be misled by the title-page. They contain a remarkably plain and practical exposition of the spiritual nature and life of man, considered in connexion with the Christian revelation; the whole being adapted, as well by the clearness of the method as by the simplicity of the language, to purposes of popular instruction. The author's main object is to bring into stronger light, than preachers usually do, the coincidence of Christianity with the higher nature of man, and to find in this fact an argument for the truth of Christianity more likely to avail with a portion, at least, of that class of "doubters who wish to believe," than the common historical argument. The discourses, five in number, were written and preached, we are told, nearly two years ago, in the usual course of professional labor. The reason of their publication at this moment is thus stated in the Preface:

"I have been thought by some esteemed friends to have exhibited views in a recent number of one of our theological journals,† that are liable to many serious objections. I fear also that I may have unconsciously given pain to some devout and timid minds, who think that discussions of this nature serve only to unsettle the foundations of Christian faith. I have the most heartfelt sympathy with such minds. I would sooner never speak again, than do aught which tends to cloud the blessed light of a serene and confiding piety. It was my purpose, in the discussion alluded to, to suggest a mode of considering the evidences of Christianity which should free it from certain difficulties under which it has been thought to labor. No one who has read my article understandingly can suppose that I intended to cast any doubt on the reality of the Christian miracles,— or that I doubted them myself. I do not. Their certainty being once established, by what I deem the only valid proof, they are no less holy and precious to me than to others.

"The fears which are entertained by many, who are not theologians by profession, with regard to the effect of free discussion, often arises from the want of an intelligent and vigorous faith. They dread lest the progress of inquiry should bring to light some hidden defect in the grounds of our religion. They are, in fact, doubters, though they know it not. They wish to believe. They cannot bear to hear a word said which implies that any cherished view is wrong. But this arises from a lurking suspicion that there is something unsound in the fabric of their faith. To such minds these discourses are addressed. I would frankly point out to them the principles on which my own faith is built; and I cannot but hope that theirs will gain strength by the exposition. The interests of speculative science and of practical piety appear to me so intimately blended, that it would cause me deep sorrow to think that I had laid a rude hand on either. What I have recently published explains the negative side of my faith. I here give the positive; and one should read both the statements in connexion, in order to perceive the complete whole in which I venture to think my views exist in my own mind."

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* For some notice of Mr. Cruse's version, see Ch. Exam. Vol. XIII., N. S., p. 313.

"† Christian Examiner for Nov. 1836. Review of Martineau's Lectures."

The reader can hardly fail of being both pleased and instructed by the perusal of these discourses; but he must not expect, in compositions of this nature, to meet with many single passages which will strike him as particularly original or felicitous. The whole, however, may be confidently referred to as one of the happiest among the many indications we have had of late, of a disposition to introduce a higher tone of spirituality into the preaching of Unitarians.

A Good Life, extracted from "The True Plan of a Living Temple, or Man considered in his proper Relation to the ordinary Occupations and Pursuits of Life. By the Author of 'The Morning and Evening Sacrifice,'" &c. With an Introductory Essay by JOHN BRAZER. Boston: Joseph Dowe. 1836. 16mo. pp. liii. and 216.— This is a useful and seasonable publication. It is almost a literal reprint of the Fourth Part of "The True Plan of a Living Temple"; making, however, a complete whole by itself. After the full, able, and discriminating review of the entire work given by the editor of the reprint before us in this Journal, (Numbers for May and July of the present year,) it would be superfluous and presumptuous to speak of the author's general merits. The particular object of that portion of the work, with which the public are here favored, is to lead men to set a juster estimate on the duties of common life, especially on those which pertain to the particular station, no matter how exalted or how humble, in which the individual finds himself placed in the present condition of things. For this purpose, after an appropriate and valuable Introduction by the editor, we have first, a Description of a Well-Spent Day, then the Social Relations, then General Aspects of Life, and lastly, Estimates of Life considered in itself, and as the Dawning of an Eternal Day. The author is understood to be of Orthodox connexions; nevertheless there is nothing for which his writings are more remarkable than the liberal, philosophical, and truly Christian spirit by which they are pervaded. Even his great faults in style, diffuseness and repetition, do not so much mar that part of his treatise here given, which contains the practical application of his principles, and in which of course discrimination, minuteness, and particularity can hardly be carried to excess. It makes a neat volume, so far as outward appearance goes; and can be recommended, in other respects, without reserve as a sort of manual Whole Duty of Man, to be put into the hands of persons of all descriptions.

New Publications.—We are under great obligations to Mr. Greenwood for the first American Edition of Maundrell's *Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem, at Easter, A. D.* 1697. *To which is added an Account of the Author's Journey to the Banks of the Euphrates at Beer, and to the Country of Mesopotamia.* (Boston: S. G. Simpkins. 1836. 16mo. pp. 271.) It is a reprint, in a neat and cheap form, of the fourth edition, published at Perth, Scotland, in the year 1800, the errors of that copy being corrected by careful reference to one of the first edition printed at Oxford, 1703. The Rev. Walter Colton, a chaplain in the U. S. Navy, has sent out a lively and agreeable volume of Travels, under the title of a "*Visit to Constantinople and Athens.*" (New York: Leavitt, Lord, & Co. 1836. 12mo. pp. 348.) Mr. John Frost, a distinguished teacher in Philadelphia, has published a *History of the United States, for the Use of Schools and Academies.* With Thirty Engravings; (Boston: Charles J. Hendee. 1836. 12mo. pp. 461.) which seems to be every thing, both as regards literary and mechanical execution, that is required in such a manual. A work of singular merits has just appeared under the auspices of the American Stationers' Company, *The Young Lady's Friend.* By a Lady. Boston: 1836. 12mo. pp. 432. We hope to notice it more particularly in our next Number.

Two theological works have just been issued from the press, of a character to cause some sensation, of which we shall take occasion to speak hereafter. *Remarks on the Four Gospels.* By W. H. Furness. Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, & Blanchard. 1836. 12mo. pp. 340. *New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Church.* By O. A. Brownson. Boston: James Munroe & Company. 1836. 12mo. pp. 116.

Among the works announced as on the eve of publication we notice the *Memoirs of the late Rev. Bernard Whitman.*

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